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ABSTRACT 
Animistic Fictions: German Modernism, Film, and the Animation of Things 
Brook Henkel 
 
This dissertation investigates representations of animated objects in German modernist 
literature and film between roughly 1900 and 1930. Rainer Maria Rilke’s 1902 remark 
that “all community has withdrawn from things and humans” corresponds to a more 
general reflection in German literary modernism on a new estrangement and distance 
between human subjects and the external object-world. Responding to this perceived 
crisis, modernist texts by Rilke, Franz Kafka, and others present an animated life of 
things as a highly ambivalent fiction, posing both a distorted and potentially recuperative 
relationship between humans and things. Alongside textual representations of animated 
things in Kafka’s stories and Rilke’s poetry and prose, the new medium of cinema also 
presented a visual life of things in early stop-motion animation films around 1910 as well 
as in the experimental films of the 1920s avant-garde. In contrast to nineteenth-century 
theories on the subjective, psychological origins of animistic experience, literature and 
film after 1900 approached the animation of things as a matter of external, artificial 
production. Focusing on the literary works of Rilke and Kafka, and the writings and films 
of German avant-garde artist Hans Richter, this dissertation argues for an understanding 
of modernist representations of animated things as “animistic fictions,” aimed at 
producing the effects of animistic experience, while also foregrounding and self-
reflecting upon their artificial status. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A story about German modernism inevitably begins with a crisis. The story told here is 
no exception and takes as its starting point the well-known ruptures proclaimed by 
German and Austrian modernist literature around the turn of the century. In numerous 
texts after 1900, the more familiar crises of language, narration, and visual perception 
coincide with an even more basic rift in the very relationship between humans and things. 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s pivotal 1902 text “Ein Brief,” for example, introduces a 
literary subject, who experiences not only a failure of conceptual language to grasp 
external realities, but also a related estrangement and fragmentation in his perception of 
individual things.1 Around 1900, Robert Musil would begin a journal with the declaration 
of a frozen “isolation” from his “organic” surroundings; and a similar state of detachment 
would characterize the protagonist of his 1906 novel, Die Verwirrungen des Zöglings 
Törleß, a young military-school student, who perceives external objects as if “through a 
veil” or as though a “fine net were dancing before his eyes.”2 Perhaps the most emphatic 
claims that the external world of things had somehow receded from the vicinity of 
humans can be found in the writings of Rainer Maria Rilke. In a short 1902 piece on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1 See Hugo von Hofmannsthal, “Ein Brief,” first published in the Berlin daily Der Tag (October 
18–19, 1902) and collected in Hofmannsthal, Erzählungen, Erfundene Gespräche und Briefe, 
Reisen, Gesammelte Werke in zehn Einzelbänden, vol. 7, ed. Bernd Schoeller (Frankfurt am 
Main: Fischer, 1979), pp. 461–72, here p. 466: “Mein Geist zwang mich, alle Dinge [...] in einer 
unheimlichen Nähe zu sehen [...]. Es gelang mir nicht mehr, sie mit dem vereinfachenden Blick 
der Gewohnheit zu erfassen. Es zerfiel mir alles in Teile, die Teile wieder in Teile, und nichts 
mehr ließ sich mit einem Begriff umspannen. Die einzelnen Worte schwammen um mich; sie 
gerannen zu Augen, die mich anstarrten und in die ich wieder hineinstarren muß.” 
 
2 See Robert Musil, Tagebücher, ed. Adolf Frisé (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1983), p. 1: 
“Es ist um mich eine organische Isolation, ich ruhe wie unter einer 100 m tiefen Decke von Eis.” 
Quoted above as well, see Musil, Die Verwirrungen des Zöglings Törleß [1906] (Hamburg: 
Rowohlt, 1959), pp. 9 and 22, respectively. 
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landscape painting, to offer just one example, Rilke describes that, in the art and culture 
of the time, “all community has withdrawn from things and humans.”3 
 While many of the central protagonists in the development of German and 
Austrian modernist literature would articulate a radical rupture in relations between 
humans and things, the very same authors would also seek to represent a strangely 
autonomous and animated life of external objects. The crisis of language and visual 
perception in Hofmannsthal’s “Ein Brief” is expressed in explicit contrast to an 
alternative mode of experiencing the world, with intimations of an overflowing “life” or 
silent “language” of things just beyond one’s ability to comprehend.4 In a related manner, 
Musil’s Törleß struggles to account for his sense of the “silent voices” and “questioning 
eyes” of inanimate objects, and describes, toward the end of the novel, what he terms a 
“secret, unnoticed life of things” (geheimes, unbeachtetes Leben der Dinge).5 Beyond the 
mere speculations of literary figures, one finds in the poetry and prose of Rilke as well as 
the experimental narratives of Franz Kafka even more interesting occurrences, presented 
directly to the reader, of inanimate objects coming alive with their own autonomous 
movements and affecting a profound influence over their human counterparts––the reader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
3 Rainer Maria Rilke, “Von der Landschaft” [1902], in Werke: Kommentierte Ausgabe in vier 
Bänden, vol. 4: Schriften, ed. Horst Nalewski (Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig: Insel, 1996), pp. 
208–13, here pp. 212–13: “eine Zukunft [hat] begonnen mitten in unserer Zeit: [...] Daß [der 
Mensch] unter die Dinge gestellt ist wie ein Ding, unendlich allein und daß alle Gemeinschaft aus 
Dingen und Menschen sich zurückgezogen hat.” 
    
4 In recounting his near-ecstatic experiences, Hofmannsthal’s Lord Chandos describes everyday 
objects as if they were filled with a “flood of higher life” (Flut höheren Lebens) or possessed of 
their own silent language: “eine Sprache, in welcher die stummen Dinge zu mir sprechen.” 
Quoted here, “Ein Brief,” pp. 467 and 472, respectively. 
 
5 See Musil, Die Verwirrungen des Zöglings Törleß, pp. 126, 129, and 195, respectively. 
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included. Here, the so-called “thing-poems” (Dinggedichte) in Rilke’s two-volume Neue 
Gedichte from 1907/08 and the strange Odradek figure from Kafka’s 1919 story, “Die 
Sorge des Hausvaters,” are only the most famous examples. In all of these cases, the “life 
of things” represented in modernist texts bears little resemblance to the marvelous, 
animated objects of the fairy tale or even the magical artifacts and uncanny automata of 
Romanticism. To speak of an animation of things in German modernism is to speak of 
animation with a difference. It is a “life of things” that appears utterly estranged and 
detached from the desires, control, and signification of humans.6 
To be sure, this estrangement of relations between humans and the external world 
of things has long been understood as part of a broad shift in German literary production 
after 1900, involving the rejection of nineteenth-century realism, a decentering of the 
bourgeois subject, and a move toward the literary representation of alternative, mental 
states that would become characteristic of the Ausdruckskunst of German expressionism.7 
Beyond reflections internal to the development of modernist literature, this rift between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For a recent sketch of the dynamics of estrangement in German modernist representations of 
“living things,” see Dorothee Kimmich, Lebendige Dinge in der Moderne (Konstanz: Konstanz 
UP, 2011). A similar estrangement of things might be said to exist in Romanticism, as well; 
although, as recent scholarship has emphasized, the life of things in aesthetic works of the late 
18th and early 19th centuries is better situated in relation to cultures of memory and material 
mementos, as well as the rapid proliferation of exotic objects and manufactured commodities in 
the crowded domestic interiors of the previous century. Here, it was far more the matter of an 
excess signification of objects rather than their radical distance from humans. See, for example, 
the introduction and essays collected in Christiane Holm and Günter Oesterle (eds.), Schläft ein 
Lied in allen Dingen? Romantische Dingpoetik (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2011). 
 
7 For earlier scholarship on the emphatic severing of relations between humans and things in 
German modernist literature, including discussions of not only authors mentioned above, but also 
Carl Einstein, Gottfried Benn, Georg Heym, and other expressionists, see Walter Jens, “Der 
Mensch und die Dinge: Die Revolution der deutschen Prosa” [1957], in Statt einer Literatur-
geschichte, expanded 7th ed. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978), pp. 113–37; and Christoph Eykman, 
“Das Ich, die Dinge und die Wirklichkeit im deutschen Expressionismus,” in Denk- und 
Stilformen des Expressionismus (Munich: Francke, 1974), pp. 108–24.  
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humans and things can also be understood according to a larger, cultural-historical 
context with its origins in the middle of the previous century. As various scholars have 
broadly reconstructed, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a 
transformation and differentiation in the status and perception of things as a result of 
modern industrial production and commodification, new scientific knowledge, and the 
dislocating experiences of the modern city.8 In modernity, succinctly put, the unique 
material qualities of things as well as their immediate, personal connections to humans 
were seen to dissipate into the intangible realms of quantitative abstraction, circulation 
and exchange, and scientific atomization, whereby things appeared stripped of any 
concrete, phenomenological existence. In the early decades of the twentieth century, this 
rupture and bifurcation in the experience of things would become codified, critiqued, and 
accounted for in various ways in the philosophical writings of Henri Bergson, Edmund 
Husserl, and Martin Heidegger, in the sociological work of Georg Simmel, and in the 
essays of Georg Lukács, Siegfried Kracauer, and Walter Benjamin, among others.  
 Whatever the historical, social, or epistemological explanations, a crisis in the 
status and perception of things was inherent to the self-understanding of German 
modernist literature after 1900 and played a significant role in its pursuit of new 
fragmentary forms and an abstraction of representational content. Consider, for example, 
the experimental prose constructions of Carl Einstein’s Bebuquin (1907–12) or Gottfried 
Benn’s Rönne novellas (1914–16), both of which combine formal fragmentation with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
8 See, for example, Christoph Asendorf, Batterien der Lebenskraft: Zur Geschichte der Dinge und 
ihrer Wahrnehmung im 19. Jahrhundert (Giessen: Anabas-Verlag, 1984). For a related account of 
late nineteenth-century American literature and culture, as well as international modernism, see 
Bill Brown, A Sense of Things: The Object Matter of American Literature (Chicago and London: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 2003). 
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self-reflections on the unreality and inaccessibility of external objects.9 Or consider the 
case of Rilke’s 1910 novel, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, in which a 
traumatizing estrangement and malicious animacy of things contribute to the 
discontinuous form of the modernist city novel.10 When, in 1936, Walter Benjamin 
described the demise of coherent storytelling due to the experiential ruptures of the early 
twentieth century, his contrast with a past age of artisanal handicraft––in which 
handmade objects were immersed in the life of their makers and still bore their bodily 
traces––provided a fitting image for all that had been lost or left behind in the form and 
content of modernist literature.11 By the time of Benjamin’s analysis, the predominance 
of fragmentation in literary modernism could be securely linked to a foundational break 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
9 See, for example, Carl Einstein’s representation of the creative impotence of his protagonist 
before external objects in Bebuquin [1912] (Berlin-Wilmersdorf: Verlag der Wochenschrift Die 
Aktion, 1917), pp. 24–26; and see Gottfried Benn, “Die Reise” [1915], in Prosa und 
Autobiographie in der Fassung der Erstdrucke, ed. Bruno Hillebrand (Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer, 1984), pp. 33–40, here, p. 37: “Scheu sah [Rönne] sich um; höhnisch standen Haus und 
Baum; unterwürfig eilte er vorbei. Haus, sagte er zum nächsten Gebäude [...]; Baum, zu allen 
Linden seines Wegs. Nur um Vermittlung handele es sich, in Unberührtheit blieben die 
Einzeldinge.” 
 
10 For a reading that convincingly links the formal fragmentation and problematization of 
narration in Rilke’s novel to Malte’s traumatic, urban experiences, see Andreas Huyssen, 
“Modernist Miniatures: Literary Snapshots of Urban Spaces,” PMLA 122.1 (Jan. 2007): pp. 27–
42, here pp. 27–29. For his more extensive reading of the “dissolution of boundaries [...] between 
the body and things, the animate and the inanimate” in the novel’s interrelated depictions of 
Malte’s childhood traumas and adult, urban experiences, see Huyssen, “Paris/Childhood: The 
Fragmented Body in Rilke’s Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge,” in Twilight Memories: 
Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), pp.105–26, 
quoted here, p. 110. 
 
11 Walter Benjamin, “Der Erzähler: Betrachtungen zum Werk Nikolai Lesskows” [1936], in 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2.2, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), pp. 438–65, here, p. 447: “Die Erzählung, wie sie im Kreis des 
Handwerks [...] lange gedeiht, ist selbst eine gleichsam handwerkliche Form der Mitteilung. [...] 
Sie senkt die Sache in das Leben des Berichtenden ein, um sie wieder aus ihm hervorzuholen. So 
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with a past age, which was characterized by a more intimate and close association among 
humans and things.  
And yet the cultural production of the early twentieth century did not only 
represent and reflect upon an estranged relationship with things. Artists and writers of the 
time also conceived of a new interdependence and closeness between humans and things 
as a response and challenge to a supposed disintegration of relations. Taking the elaborate 
ornamentation of turn-of-the-century Jugendstil as his primary aesthetic model, art 
historian Christoph Asendorf provides numerous examples from the literary and visual 
arts of the unifying flows of energy and decorative forms that interwove human figures 
with an animated world of things. Turning to a brief discussion of literary modernism, he 
identifies a related “animistic” tendency in German modernist poetry and prose after 
1900 and cites Rilke in particular as forwarding a literary project aimed at, “die 
Restitution einer vermeintlich magisch-animistischen Verbundenheit mit den Dingen.” In 
the same section of the book, titled “Lives of Things” (Leben der Dinge), Asendorf points 
to a parallel development in the reception of early silent cinema, providing the following 
summary: “Die Verlebendigung, das In-Fluß-bringen der starren Dinge, die der 
Jugendstil mit Hilfe des organischen Ornaments suggerierte, ist [im Film] durch die 
Abfolge der Bilder zur maschinell bewältigten Selbstverständlichkeit geworden.”12 
Drawing a parallel with the symbolic intertwining of humans and things in the 
ornamental forms of Jugendstil, Asendorf thus identifies in the literary and moving-
image culture of the early twentieth century the responsive aim of a “restitution” of more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Quoted above, see Asendorf, Batterien der Lebenskraft, pp. 136 and 139. 
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vital relations, analogous to the “animistic” blurring of boundaries between the animate 
and inanimate, subject and object, mental images and the external world.13 
 In contrast to this account, the present study argues that the “life of things” in 
German modernism and film cannot be so easily identified with turn-of-the-century 
vitalism or Western ideas about the supposed “animism” of pre-modern societies. 
Internalizing a presumed crisis in the fundamental relationship between humans and 
things, modernist representations after 1900, I argue, pursue the animation of things not 
as a restitution of some prior, subjective merging with the external world, but rather as a 
deliberate, artificial procedure. While Asendorf acknowledges the respective 
“artificiality” and “apparatus-character” of modernist literary and cinematic animations 
of things, he fails to follow up on this important insight and instead reinforces the 
vitalistic fantasies of fin de siècle culture.14 Dispensing with the idea of some restored, 
happy union between humans and things, this dissertation argues that modernist writers 
like Rilke and Kafka, as well as key figures of 1920s avant-garde cinema like Hans 
Richter, approach the representation of animated objects as self-consciously constructed 
fictions, which foreground their artificial status.  
While I agree that modernist works can be read in terms of a reaction or response 
to a perceived crisis in the state and perception of things, this should not be assessed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
13 Here, see also the sections titled “Animismus,” “Lebendiger Gedanke,” and “Der Brief des 
Lord Chandos,” in ibid., pp. 137–38, 142–44, and 147–50, respectively. 
 
14 Asendorf describes Rilke’s poetry, for example, as “ein hochartifizieller Versuch einer neuen 
Verbindung mit den Dingen nach der allgemeinen Alienation.” And on cinema, he remarks, “Es 
ist aber nicht der Apparatcharakter des Lebens der Dinge im Film, sondern, jenseits der Technik, 
dieses selbst, das die frühen Betrachter interessiert. Die Dämonisierung der Maschinenwelt im 
mittleren 19. Jahrhundert wiederholt sich angesichts des neuen optischen Mediums in Theorien, 
die dessen Magie betonen.” Quoted here, ibid., pp. 144 and 140, respectively. 
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merely in terms of representational content or the symbolic meaning of form. Instead of 
focusing on the supposed meaning of animated objects as part of the representational 
content of the work, this dissertation investigates the intended effects of such aesthetic 
representations in both literature and film. Pursuing a close formal analysis of new, 
representational strategies and techniques affecting the fictional animation of things, the 
present study argues that the animated objects of German modernism serve a highly 
ambivalent function, entailing both a distortion and estranged distance in relation to 
humans as well as a reconfiguration of animistic experience––from one of internal, 
subjective animation to a matter of external, artificial production. Representations of 
animated objects thus function not as emblems of either distortion or recuperation, but 
rather as complex figures that mediate between effects of estrangement and an open-
ended reconfiguration of relations. In analyzing this historical configuration of things, 
humans, and media in aesthetic representations of the early twentieth century, the 
following chapters explore a particular constellation of relations that has become a central 
problematic in recent cultural, media, and social theory. 
 The two main literary cases to be examined at length in the dissertation are the 
emphatic representations of things in the poetry, prose, and aesthetic writings of Rainer 
Maria Rilke as well as the complex roles of animated objects in the stories of Franz 
Kafka. Rilke’s extensive and rightly famous focus on “things” (Dinge) throughout his 
literary career demonstrates, in itself, an important transition that the present study 
attempts to identify in modernist literary production. Between Rilke’s earlier poetry of 
the Stunden-Buch (written 1899–1903, published 1905) and Buch der Bilder (1902, 
expanded edition 1906) and the somewhat later “thing-poems” of the Neue Gedichte 
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(1907) and Der Neuen Gedichte anderer Teil (1908), there appears a crucial shift from 
turn-of-the-century conceptions of monistic and empathetic mergings between subject 
and object to a hard modernist conception of things as utterly estranged and foreign to 
humans. Echoing the dismissive readings of Rilke by Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno, 
Asendorf is certainly justified in identifying the poet’s earlier work from around 1900 
with a decorative interweaving of humans and things comparable to the ornamentation of 
Jugendstil.15 With the Neue Gedichte, however, Rilke makes a decisive shift from the 
mere illustration of relations between humans and things to the poetic staging of complex 
encounters with specific objects, performatively enacting for the reader an estranging and 
transformative power of things.  
Focusing on a number of overlooked poems from the Neue Gedichte as well as 
Rilke’s aesthetic writings, letters, and prose before 1910, Chapter 1 of the dissertation 
identifies this important, modernist transition in the poet’s literary representations of 
things. Rilke’s important insight that modernity had somehow introduced a dangerous 
rupture in the very basic association between humans and things was suggested to him, 
around 1902, by the joint experiences of the traumatic urban environment of Paris, on the 
one hand, and the visual art of Auguste Rodin and the Worpswede school of German 
landscape painting, on the other. In relation to the former, Rilke’s Malte would later 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
15 For Asendorf’s reading of Rilke’s poems, culled almost exclusively from the 1902 edition of 
Buch der Bilder, see ibid., pp. 134–37. For Benjamin’s dismissive identification of this earlier 
poetry with the “emblems of Jugendstil”, see his unpublished text, “Rainer Maria Rilke und Franz 
Blei” [1927], in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4.1, ed. Tillman Rexroth (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1972), pp. 453–54. And for Adorno’s better-known dismissal of Rilke’s “Dingkult,” 
see his “Rede über Lyrik und Gesellschaft” [1957], in Noten zur Literatur (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2003), pp. 49–68, here, p. 52. 
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describe the “corrupted” (verdorben) existence of everyday objects, which appear to have 
taken on their own hostile, animated lives within the tumultuous surroundings of the 
modern city.16 In the lives and artistic practices of Rodin and other visual artists, by 
contrast, Rilke imagined a certain, atavistic connection or mimetic closeness between 
humans and things, surviving tenuously amidst the ruptures of modernity. As a response, 
after about 1903, Rilke began pursuing poetry as a means of artificially controlling one’s 
encounter with the world of objects in a manner that attempted to stabilize its more 
dangerous aspects and to artificially mediate a more positive “kinship” (Verwandtschaft) 
with things, which he found exemplified in the life and work of Rodin. 
 A similar ambivalence in the status of fictionally animated things can be found in 
the experimental prose of Franz Kafka. In addition to the famous Odradek figure from 
“Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” stories like “Blumfeld, ein älterer Junggeselle” and “Der 
Kübelreiter” introduce strangely animated things that take on complex narrative 
functions. In these stories, which will be the focus of Chapter 3, the animation of objects 
functions not only as a reflection on distorted relations between humans and things, but 
also as a narrative device for mediating the very same relations. Kafka’s animated things 
function both as living extensions of particular human characters as well as autonomous 
go-betweens, which draw his isolated protagonists into complex, social negotiations with 
other human figures in the story. Although, as in Rilke, the estrangement between 
humans and things is taken as a given, the fictional animation of things plays a complex 
and open-ended role in the facilitation and reconfiguration of relations among humans 
and things. And like Rilke’s “thing-poems,” the animation of things like Odradek is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Rainer Maria Rilke, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge [1910], in Werke, vol. 
3: Prosa und Dramen, ed. August Stahl (Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig: Insel, 1996), p. 582. 
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confined to the diegetic space of the text but also suggests itself to the reader as an 
alternative strategy for experiencing the world of external objects. In both cases, the “life 
of things” in German modernism exists not as some vitalistic recuperation of relations, 
but rather as part and parcel of a new fragmentation and estrangement of experience. 
Despite their autonomous life and power, textual objects like Rilke’s “Archaïscher Torso 
Apollos” and Kafka’s Odradek, for example, are inherently fragmentary, on the level of 
both the work’s representational content as well as its indeterminate, formal construction. 
 Just as important to the present argument are contemporaneous developments in 
early cinematic production and theory. A focus on the fictional animation of things 
indeed suggests surprising and largely unexplored, historical interrelations between the 
different aesthetic media of literature and film. For one, the articulation of a silent “life” 
or “language” of things in modernist literature after 1900 anticipates the later theoretical 
fashioning of cinematic structure and effects in 1920s film theory. As Tobias Wilke has 
recently argued, the “language [of] silent things” postulated in Hofmannsthal’s “Ein 
Brief” must be distinguished from past conceptions of external objects as legible signs (as 
in the metaphoric “book of nature”) and suggests instead a different kind of immediacy in 
the experience of things proper to the new age of modern optical technologies. 
Contemporaneous with the emergence of silent cinema, that is, the experiences of a “life” 
or “language” of things described in Hofmannsthal’s 1902 text can be read, Wilke argues, 
as predicting the theorized effects of the new medium found in works of interwar film 
theory such as the important 1924 study Der sichtbare Mensch by Béla Balázs.17 Here, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
17 See Tobias Wilke, Medien der Unmittelbarkeit: Dingkonzepte und Wahrnehmungstechniken, 
1918–1939 (Munich: Fink, 2010), pp. 27–43. Here, Wilke associates Chandos’s description of a 
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Balázs describes the emphatic transformation of things in silent cinema: “In der 
gemeinsamen Stummheit werden [die Dinge] mit dem Menschen fast homogen und 
gewinnen dadurch an Lebendigkeit und Bedeutung. Weil sie nicht weniger sprechen als 
die Menschen, darum sagen sie gerade so viel.”18 Musil’s Törleß anticipates the 
theorization of such cinematic effects in an even more direct manner, making explicit 
reference to film in order to describe the structure of the protagonist’s visual intimations 
of a “secret, unnoticed life of things.”19 One might even speculate, here, whether Balázs 
directly borrowed from Musil’s 1906 novel when expressing, in nearly identical terms, 
“the secret––because unnoticed––life of all things,” revealed in the cinematic close-up.20 
While the near-visionary experiences of Törleß and Chandos are suspended, so to speak, 
in the realm of indefinite possibility, theoretical accounts from the 1920s situate cinema 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Material, das unmittelbarer, flüssiger, glühender ist als Worte” with the new medium of film (pp. 
33–34). As Wilke’s reading points out, the particular potency of Hofmannsthal’s text lies in its 
superimposition of two distinct, historical transitions in conceptions of a “language of things”: the 
transition to an “immediacy” of things with modern optical media (at the time of the text’s 
publishing) with an older 17th century transition away from understanding things as legible signs 
(corresponding to the 1603 date of Chandos’s fictional letter to Sir Francis Bacon). On the 
historical transformation from networks of similarity among words and things to a radical 
separation between the two around 1600, see Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Les Mots et les choses) [1966] (New York: Vintage, 1994), 
pp. 17–45.   
 
18 Béla Balázs, Der sichtbare Mensch oder die Kultur des Films [1924] (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2001), pp. 31–32. 
 
19 See Musil, Die Verwirrungen des Zöglings Törleß, pp. 128–29: “[In Törleß] war beständig eine 
rastlose Unruhe, wie man sie vor einem Kinematographen empfindet, wenn man neben der 
Illusion des Ganzen doch eine vage Wahrnehmung nicht loswerden kann, daß hinter dem Bilde, 
das man empfängt, hunderte von – für sich betrachtet ganz anderen – Bildern vorbeihuschen.” 
  
20 Balázs, Der sichtbare Mensch, p. 49: “Die Lupe des Kinoapparates wird dir [...] das geheime – 
weil unbeachtete – Leben aller Dinge [zeigen].” While Musil’s 1925 review of Der sichtbare 
Mensch, titled “Ansätze zu neuer Ästhetik,” is far better known, Balázs was also closely familiar 
with Musil’s literary writings and even penned a review of the Törleß novel in an article 
published only a year before his first book of film theory. See Balázs, “Grenzen,” Österreichische 
Rundschau (April 19, 1923): pp. 344–49.   	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as an external, visual prosthesis for simulating the kind of “animistic” experiences only 
imagined in literary modernism.21 
Less commented on and more central to the present study are not so much the 
structure and effects of the cinematic medium itself, but rather specific films that make 
deliberate use of new cinematic techniques to visually animate things. Between 1907 and 
1912, there appeared a considerable number of early stop-motion animation films (by an 
international range of filmmakers including James Stuart Blackton, Segundo de Chomón, 
Émile Cohl, and Guido Seeber), which succeeded in visually animating photographed 
objects, making them appear to move about without any human manipulation. As a 
relatively late and sophisticated example of what Tom Gunning has famously called the 
“cinema of attractions,” stop-motion or object-animation films caught the particular 
attention of the literary intelligentsia in the early twentieth century and suggested a new 
realm of aesthetic possibility that was unique to the cinematic medium. Well before the 
emergence of film and media theory as a proper field of study in the 1920s, various 
writers of the literary milieu weighed in on the relative merits or, more often, deficiencies 
of early cinema. Around 1910, in particular, writers like Georg Lukács, Egon Friedell, 
and Vachel Lindsay singled out the visual animation of objects as a unique, cinematic 
capability, which distinguished the medium from the literary and theatrical arts. Whereas 
literature could only linguistically evoke an animation of things (such as found in fairy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
21 Beyond Balázs, one might also cite discussions of a “life” or “personality” of things by avant-
garde filmmakers like Hans Richter and Fernand Léger, or Jean Epstein’s direct remarks about an 
“animistic tendency” (tendance animiste) in film. See Epstein, “On Certain Characteristics of 
Photogénie” [1924], in French Film Theory and Criticism: A History/Anthology, vol. 1: 1907–
1929, ed. Richard Abel (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1988), pp. 314–18, here pp. 316. For the 
French original, see “De quelques conditions de la photogénie,” Cinéa-Ciné-pour-tous 19 
(August 15, 1924): pp. 6–8, here p. 7. 
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tales and Romanticism), cinema was understood to present a life of things as an 
“empirical reality” on the cinema screen, allowing things to become animated actors in 
the cinematic drama.22 Fueled by the literary imagination of intellectuals and writers 
around 1910, this emphasis on the aesthetic potentials of an animated life of things in 
cinema would prove a foundational focus for the more extensive theoretical assessments 
of film to emerge in the 1920s. 
If a literary imagination was involved in shaping an emerging aesthetics of film 
based on a new “life of things,” cinematic animation also played a significant role in 
influencing modernist, literary representations. After 1910, experimental writers like 
Kafka, Alfred Döblin, and F.T. Marinetti all drew explicitly on the representations of 
animated objects in early cinema in their pursuit of new, modernist and avant-garde 
poetics, which could adequately convey the material presence and force of the modern 
world of things. Though frequently overlooked, the representation of animated things 
poses a close and aesthetically productive interrelationship between modernist literature 
and film in the early twentieth century. Chapter 2 of the dissertations draws together such 
representations according to common themes of uncanny experience in urban, domestic 
settings around 1910. Relating literary and cinematic representations of animated things 
to the new, animistic anxieties and nervousness of the modern city, the chapter provides a 
cultural and historical framework for understanding this productive exchange between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
22 See, for example, Georg Lukács, “Gedanken zu einer Aesthetik des ‘Kino’,” Pester Lloyd 90 
(16 Apr. 1911): pp. 45–46; and the revised version, Frankfurter Zeitung (10 Sept. 1913), 
reprinted in Kino-Debatte: Texte zum Verhältnis von Literatur und Film 1909–1929, ed. Anton 
Kaes (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1978), pp. 112–18, quoted here, p. 114. 
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literature and film in the development of modernist conceptions and representations of an 
uncanny and unsettling “life” of things.  
Beginning around 1900, with the emergence of a modernist conception of the 
thing in the writings of Rilke, the dissertation continues through an investigation of 
interrelations between early stop-motion animation films and modernist literary 
representations around 1910, before moving on to a close analysis of the narrative 
function of animated things in the stories of Kafka before 1920. In the final chapter, the 
study will turn to a more exclusive study of cinema by looking at the central importance 
of animated objects in avant-garde films of the 1920s, with a focus on the writings and 
cinematic works of German avant-garde artist and filmmaker Hans Richter. Understood 
in a three-fold sense as movement, life, and physiological rhythm (i.e. breath, lat. anima), 
animation emerges as a central category in the cinematic experiments of Richter and the 
avant-garde, with its own internal frictions that play a crucial role in the self-reflective 
construction of cinematic effects. While cinema can be understood as a technology 
inherently based in animation––as in the early English and German descriptions of film 
as “animated photography” or “living pictures” (lebende Bilder)––this is not sufficient to 
account for the striking emphasis on the animated “life of things” in interwar film theory 
and avant-garde cinema. Necessary as well was the cultural influence of modernism, 
which declared a radical rupture in relations between subjects and objects, and imagined 
instead a new, estranged and autonomous life of things, which could only be facilitated 
by means of external, artificial production. 
 In his social, historical, and theoretical account of cinema, Der Kampf um den 
Film (written largely in exile during the 1930s but not published until 1976), Hans 
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Richter himself suggested as much, linking the “spirit of avant-garde [film]” not only to 
modernist, abstract painting (as is tirelessly reiterated in secondary scholarship), but also 
to the “spirit of modern literature.” Downplaying the influence of Méliès’s early 
illusionary cinema on the interwar avant-garde, Richter asserts a deliberate mobilization 
of “cinematographic technology” (kinematographische Technik) against the “vulgar, 
naturalistic theater of the fictional narrative film,” as analogous to the formal ruptures of 
literary modernism in opposition to nineteenth-century realism.23 Addressing the 
animation of objects in particular, in his 1928 article, “Der Gegenstand in Bewegung,” 
Richter stresses the need to reject “natural movement” in film in favor of the 
denaturalizing constructions of an “artificial” (künstlich) movement of things. Citing the 
cinematic experiments of Fernand Léger’s Ballet mécanique (1924) and Man Ray’s Emak 
Bakia (1926), Richter affirms the avant-garde’s complete liberation of the object from its 
“rational-naturalistic-symbolic meaning.”24 For Richter, the artificially animated thing 
was far more valued for its dynamic and expressive effects, which could be precisely 
controlled and constructed by the filmmaker. As Richter claims in Kampf um den Film, 
the connection between the “spirit of modern literature” and avant-garde films––like 
those of Léger and Man Ray, as well as his own films like the 1928 Vormittagsspuk––
was a similar constructive approach to art-making, which considered elements of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
23 Hans Richter, Der Kampf um den Film: Für einen gesellschaftlich verantwortlichen Film 
[1939], ed. Jürgen Römhild (Munich: Hanser, 1976), p. 43: “Aber der Geist der Avantgarde war 
nicht der von Méliès; es war der Geist moderner Malerei und Literatur. Von dorther kommend, 
versuchten die Avantgardisten, die kinematographische Technik dem vulgären, naturalistischen 
Theater des Spielfilms entgegenzusetzen.” 
 
24 Quoted above, see Hans Richter, “Der Gegenstand in Bewegung” [1928], reprinted in Jeanpaul 
Goergen et al. (ed.), Hans Richter: Film ist Rhythmus [Kinemathek 95] (Berlin: Freunde der 
Deutschen Kinemathek, 2003), pp. 42–43. 
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external world merely as “raw material” (Rohstoff) to be artificially shaped through the 
particular means of an aesthetic medium.25 
 To speak of the artificial animation of things in the works of Rilke, Kafka, and 
Richter as “animistic” requires a brief historical and conceptual clarification. Introduced 
in the foundational work of nineteenth-century cultural anthropology, Primitive Culture 
(1871) by Edward Burnett Tylor, the term “animism” was chosen to designate a “doctrine 
of souls,” which described the supposed belief of “primitive” societies in a nonhuman 
world populated by animating spirits.26 Theorized as the “groundwork” stage in the 
evolutionary development toward modern, religious and scientific views, Tylor’s 
conception of animism was rearticulated, revised, and critiqued in the course of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, playing a central role in the sciences of 
anthropology and psychology. In its most general sense, the term “animism” in the 
nineteenth century indicated a basic failure to distinguish between inner and outer, 
subject and object, mental images and external realities. For Tylor, this was exemplified 
by the various “primitive” beliefs in immaterial souls or animating spirits that could 
freely migrate and inhabit both human bodies and nonhuman things. Clearly, my use of 
the term “animistic” is already one order removed and abstracted from this original, 
anthropological definition of a “doctrine of souls.” 
While Tylor’s Primitive Culture identified the continued existence of animism in 
contemporaneous, non-Western societies, he would also decry as an inauthentic product 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See Richter, Der Kampf um den Film, p. 43–44. 
 
26 For Edward B. Tylor’s definition and detailed ethnographic account of animism, see Primitive 
Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom 
[1871], vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010). 
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of delusion any comparable beliefs and practices among modern Europeans, such as the 
popular spiritualism and séances of the nineteenth century.27 When Karl Marx put 
forward his critique of the commodity form in his 1867 work Das Kapital, he would 
express a similar disdain for modern spiritualism in his infamous comparison between 
commodities and the dancing or turning tables of the nineteenth-century séance.28 While 
Marx borrows the earlier, eighteenth century term “fetishism” to describe the false 
conception of an autonomous life of commodities, his critique lacks a focus on the base 
materiality characteristic of the fetish-object and might be more accurately compared 
with accounts of the life or animation of things in theories of animism that would appear 
shortly after Das Kapital.29 Whatever the terminology, within the context of the 
nineteenth-century social and anthropological theory, the notion that things had an 
autonomous life or animating spirit in modern society was deemed an utter delusion, 
attributable to either the distortions of modern social conditions, as in Marx, or the 
inauthentic “survival” of the so-called primitive beliefs described by Tylor. 
This reading of the animation and life of things as an inherent falsehood in 
modernity has played a considerable role in critical interpretations of German modernist 
representations of things. Giorgio Agamben’s 1977 book Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
27 On Tylor’s observations and dismissive assessment of spiritualism and London séances, see 
Erhard Schüttpelz, “Animism meets Spiritualism: Edward Tylor’s ‘Spirit Attack,’ London 1872,” 
in Animism, vol. 1, ed. Anselm Franke (Berlin and New York: Sternberg Press, 2010), pp. 155–
69. 
 
28 See Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie [1867] (Vienna: Verlag für 
Literatur und Politik, 1932), p. 76. 
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Western Culture, to pick one exemplary case, borrows Kafka’s animated Odradek figure 
as an emblem for the distortion of relations between humans and things due to the 
commodity form. And in his reading of Rilke’s Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids 
Brigge, Agamben interprets a strangely animate tin object in the latter part of the novel as 
the result of “bad human conscience with respect to commodified objects.”30 In a similar 
vein, Adorno understands the emphatic life of things in Rilke’s poetry as but a delusional 
response to the “real power of reification.”31 My own reading of such objects in German 
modernist literature is situated in explicit contrast to such Marxist-informed 
interpretations, as well as to the many psychoanalytic interpretations that would view the 
animation of external objects as a result of psychological mechanisms of projection. 
Rather than viewing the life of things as a result of some social or mental distortion 
(whether represented within the text or attributed to author’s own conditions), this 
dissertation argues that the animation of things in German modernism was pursued as a 
deliberate and self-conscious fiction, which both internalized a sense of crisis in relation 
to things and, at the same time, sought ways of reconfiguring these relations through the 
constructive use of aesthetic media.  
In this sense, the innovative work of Spyros Papapetros on nineteenth-century 
animism and animation provides a far more productive and nuanced point of reference 
and contrast for the present study. In his recent book On the Animation of the Inorganic, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture [1977], trans. Ronald L. 
Martinez (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 47. This reading of Rilke’s Malte 
appears in a larger section of the book titled “In the World of Odradek: The Work of Art 
Confronted with the Commodity.” 
 
31 See Adorno, “Rede über Lyrik und Gesellschaft” [1957], in Noten zur Literatur, p. 52. 
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Papapetros traces the complex interrelationships between anthropological accounts of 
animism such as Tylor’s and notions of animation that emerged in late-nineteenth-
century art history and psychological aesthetics.32 One of the key insights of the study is 
that theories of aesthetic abstraction and empathy (Einfühlung), such as found in the 
writings of Aby Warburg, Wilhelm Worringer, and Alois Riegl, as well as Robert and 
Friedrich Theodor Vischer, constitute a Western analogue to accounts of “primitive” 
animism. Despite attempts to fashion a safe version of animistic and animated experience 
in modern visual aesthetics, Papapetros argues that such late-nineteenth-century 
theoretical accounts were more suggestive in evoking the new “hostile external world” of 
technological artifacts and things in modern society.33 While Papapetros devotes a 
chapter to the malicious animistic effects of architectural structures in German 
expressionist cinema, his predominant focus is on static objects and images, which 
despite their stillness provoke all kinds of animated responses in the viewer. The 
emphasis here is less on the external animation of things but rather on the viewer’s 
internal, subjective experiences, which can quickly oscillate between perceptions of a 
hostile animacy of things and a more positive, “extensional animation,” which suggests 
subtle interconnections between humans and things.34  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See Spyros Papapetros, On the Animation of the Inorganic: Art, Architecture, and the 
Extension of Life (Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2012). 
 
33 Ibid., p. ix: “The invention of empathy theory and the revival of anthropomorphism and the 
physiognomy of objects portray the failed attempt of turn-of-the-century aesthetics to subjectify 
(and therefore neutralize) the radical power of artifacts in both archaic and modern societies.”  
 
34 See ibid., pp. 20–27. 
  
	  
	   21	  
Building on this insightful work, the present study maintains this basic 
ambivalence inherent to animation, while also drawing some important historical and 
aesthetic distinctions not considered in Papapetros’s book. For one, while the notion of an 
empathetic merging of subject and object can be observed to carry on into the early 
twentieth century––perhaps counter-intuitively––in the realm of aesthetic abstraction, the 
culture of literary modernism after 1900 also marks a radical severing of relations 
between human subjects and the world of discrete, material things.35 Nineteenth-century 
accounts of an empathetic “Verschmelzung von Subjekt und Objekt” and “der 
pantheistische Drang zur Vereinigung mit der Welt,” such as found in the psychological 
aesthetics of Robert Vischer, are precisely what is radically problematized and suspended 
in the modernist literary texts of writers like Hofmannshal, Musil, Rilke, Kafka, and 
Benn.36 While modernist writers in Germany and Austria would imagine, in various 
ways, experiences that, while not belonging to animism proper, could be described as 
akin, as animistic, this was always with the implicit knowledge that such experiences 
belonged properly to the past, or to the experiential realms of the child, the primitive, or 
the psychologically unhinged. Instead, within the culture of modernism, such experiences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The hard distinction between abstraction, on the one hand, and empathy with naturalistic 
depictions of humans and things, on the other, was codified in the influential 1907 dissertation of 
Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraktion und Einfühlung: Ein Beitrag zur Stilpsychologie, 3rd ed. 
(Munich: R. Piper, 1911). In recent scholarship, Papapetros is hardly alone in emphasizing the 
empathetic dimensions of modernist abstraction. See, for example, Jutta Müller-Tamm’s 
important study of German expressionism, Abstraktion als Einfühlung: Zur Denkfigur der 
Projektion in Psychophysiologie, Kulturtheorie, Ästhetik und Literatur der frühen Moderne 
(Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 2005). Asendorf’s earlier study, as well, makes related 
observations on the empathetic qualities of Jugendstil ornamentation and the abstract paintings of 
Kandinsky. For his treatment of Worringer, see Batterien der Lebenskraft, pp. 144–46.   
 
36 Quoted here, cf. Robert Vischer, Über das optische Formgefühl: Ein Beitrag zur Ästhetik 
(Leipzig: H. Credner, 1873), p. 28. 
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became a matter of artificial production, either through new strategies and techniques of 
literary representation or to be found in the new, visual animations of film.37  
Alongside literary modernism, the birth of the cinematic medium itself around 
1900 would also come to challenge and reconfigure the nineteenth-century models of 
subjective animation. With the “living pictures” of film, animation was no longer 
considered primarily a matter of subjective, interior experience, but rather a mechanically 
produced illusion that could be experienced collectively by a rapidly growing number of 
people. While the foundational myth of cinema was that early audiences, like “primitive” 
animists, had confused the projected image for reality, the modern viewers were in fact 
far savvier and were less enthralled by the apparent reality of the moving images than by 
the animating technology itself.38 As Hans Richter claims in Kampf um den Film, the 
attraction of early cinema was based in the fact that the movement of humans and things 
had become externalized, objectified, and estranged for the viewer:  
Zum ersten Mal betrachtete der Mensch sein Abbild in Bewegung, – objektiv, 
wie etwas Fremdes. Das war das Ur-Kino! [...] Es war, als entdecke man erst 
jetzt die Bewegung der Dinge, – der Umwelt, – die eigene. Das Stück Leinwand 
am anderen Ende des Saales gab die Ebene ab, auf der man die Dinge, wie von 
einem anderen Planeten aus betrachten konnte und sich selbst wie ein fremdes 
Wesen. Dieses Erlebnis hat uns die moderne Technik vermittelt.39 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Beyond the focus of the present study, one might also think here of Musil’s “other condition” 
(der andere Zustand), theorized in relation to cinema and pursued through complex, literary 
constructions in his unfinished, experimental novel Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften. 
 
38 See Tom Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)Credulous 
Spectator,” in Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing Film, ed. Linda Williams (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers UP, 1995), pp. 114–33. On the myth of early cinema’s “primitive spectator,” see also 
Assenka Oksiloff, Picturing the Primitive: Visual Culture, Ethnography, and Early German 
Cinema (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 117–34.   
 
39 Richter, Kampf um den Film, p. 27. 
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With cinema, in other words, the human’s subjective experience of the animated world 
became dislocated and resituated at an estranging distance, in which animation became a 
matter of external construction rather than lived experience. As Henri Bergson described 
in 1907, one might look at still images forever and “never see them animated [...]. In 
order that pictures may be animated, there must be movement somewhere. The 
movement does indeed exist here [i.e. in film]; it is in the apparatus.”40 
This is not to say that cinematic technologies themselves played an 
overwhelmingly deterministic role in shaping the artificial construction of animation in 
literary modernism. Rather, the constructive animation of things in modernist literature 
and early and avant-garde cinema demonstrates a close, mutual interaction between the 
two aesthetic media as part of the same culture of modernist production. Writing in 1926, 
the film critic Rudolf Kurtz attempted to collect and characterize the literary, visual, and 
cinematic arts of modernism under the broad rubric of expressionist construction: 
Unter einem weiten Gesichtspunkt betrachtet, darf man sagen, daß der 
Expressionist die psychologische Verbindung von Menschen und Dingen 
ablehnt. Er ordnet, statt zu erklären. Das Verhalten von „Gegenständen“ 
bestimmt sich durch seine metaphysische Absicht, statt daß er es sich psycho-
logisch klarmacht. Er konstruiert seine Welt, statt sich verstehend in eine 
vorhandene einzufühlen.41 
 
In general agreement with this broad characterization, this study aims to assess the 
artificial construction and effects of animated things in German modernist literature and 
film. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution [1907], trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt, 
1911), p. 305. 
 
41 Rudolf Kurtz, Expressionismus und Film (Berlin: Verlag der Lichtbildbühne, 1926), p. 22. 
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The topic of a life or animation of things will likely bring to mind a whole range 
of recent theoretical work in other disciplines as varied as anthropology, art history, 
media theory, sociology, and the history of science. Within literary and cultural studies, 
Bill Brown has been perhaps the most vocal and persistent in pursuing a general 
theoretical assessment of the life, agency, complex materiality, and interconnectivities of 
things in the twentieth century and beyond.42 Extrapolating from the work of Martin 
Heidegger, Brown has been largely responsible for popularizing a general distinction 
between “objects” (Objekte or Gegenstände) and “things” (Dinge) in the study of 
modernist and contemporary, cultural production. As W.J.T. Mitchell summarizes it,  
Objects are the way things appear to a subject––that is, with a name, an identity, 
a gestalt or stereotypical template, a description, a use or function, a history, a 
science. Things, on the other hand, are simultaneously nebulous and obdurate, 
sensuously concrete and vague. A thing appears as a stand-in when you have 
forgotten the name of an object. [...] [They] play the role of a raw material, an 
amorphous, shapeless, brute materiality awaiting organization by a system of 
objects. Or they figure the excess, the detritus and waste when an object becomes 
useless, obsolete, extinct, or (conversely) when it takes on the surplus of aesthetic 
or spiritual value.43 
 
Hewing far more closely to Heidegger’s original distinction between object and thing, the 
recent social and anthropological theory of Bruno Latour has sought to loosely combine 
the philosopher’s account of the breakdown and conspicuousness of objects becoming 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See, for example, Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry 28.1 (Autumn 2001): pp. 1–22. 
Brown’s well-known article has since been collected in an anthology of writings, which provides 
a helpful overview of current theoretical treatments of objects and things as well as their 
historical precedents in earlier twentieth-century philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and 
social theory. See here, The Object Reader, ed. Fiona Candlin and Raiford Guins (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2009). For an extended application of his focus on things in international 
modernism and American literature in particular, see Brown, A Sense of Things: The Object 
Matter of American Literature (Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2003). 
 
43 W.J.T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago and 
London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 156. 
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things in Sein und Zeit (1927) with his later, postwar account of “The Thing” (Das Ding) 
as an emphatic “gathering” (Versammlung), through its etymological connection to proto-
parliamentary assemblies.44 Largely downplaying the considerable influence of 
Heidegger for his work, Latour has presented a far-reaching theory of the active life and 
agency of things in the networked “collectives” of the contemporary globalized world, 
revealed most visibly in moments of the material breakdown and failure of functioning 
networks. 
While the recent currency of a distinction between objects and things will be 
helpful at times in clarifying my readings of German modernist works (Kafka’s stories 
most notably), I would also warn against identifying the literary and cinematic 
representations of the early twentieth century with current universalizing theories about 
the life or agency of things. Rilke’s emphatic sense of the “thing” (Ding), for example, 
can only be very loosely compared with Heidegger’s and it bears even slimmer 
resemblance to the recent theoretical accounts of Brown, Latour, and others. Where the 
dissertation speaks most closely to current theory, it is to affirm the basic heuristic value 
of “animistic fictions” for estranging and reconceptualizing our understandings of the 
complex roles and status of material things in relation to humans. Here, I am not so much 
interested in how one might speak of a modern “animism” or “life of things” in any 
meaningful, realist sense, but rather how recent theorists have taken deliberate recourse to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See, for example, Bruno Latour, “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or How to Make Things 
Public,” in Making Things Public, ed. Latour and Michael Weibel (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2005), pp. 14–41. For Heidegger’s famous account of the breakdown of objects, see Sein und Zeit 
[1927] (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), pp. 90–102; and for his emphatic 
postwar account of the thing as a gathering, see Heidegger’s 1950 lecture, “Das Ding,” in 
Vorträge und Aufsätze, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 7 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), 
pp. 165–87.   
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fictional and narrative strategies (even appropriating actual literary representations like 
Kafka’s Odradek) in order to theorize the “lives,” “desires,” “force,” “agency,” “speech,” 
and “biographies” of things.45 If the present dissertation speaks at all to recent theory, it 
will be to highlight the fictionality underlying much of this work and to problematize 
current notions of a happy revitalization of relations between humans and things in the 
animated, technological environments of the contemporary world. 
More directly relevant to the current study is the influence that recent theory has 
had on studies of German literary modernism. Here, the representation of animated 
objects in modernist texts like those of Kafka have been read in terms of the meta-
critique of modernity put forward by Bruno Latour: that is, that the radical separation 
between subject and object imposed by the “modern constitution” has led only to an 
unacknowledged proliferation of nonhuman hybrids, which exist at the boundaries of 
subject and object, nature and culture, and which play their own active role in social 
networks whether the modern subject admits it or not.46 Responding to Latour, German 
literary scholars have read representations of an “Aufstand der Dinge” in modernist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
45 Political theorist Jane Bennett, for example, draws directly on Kafka’s Odradek in theorizing a 
“nonorganic life” and ecological “force” of things. See her recent book, Vibrant Matter: A 
Political Ecology of Things (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2010), here, pp. 6–8. For a range of 
theoretical scholarship that employs explicitly “animistic” methodologies in the study of 
aesthetic, scientific, and everyday consumer objects, see, for example, Mitchell, What Do 
Pictures Want?; Arjun Appadurai (ed.), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural 
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986); Alfred Gell, Art and Agency: An Anthropo-
logical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998); Lorraine Daston (ed.), Things That Talk: Object 
Lessons from Art and Science (New York: Zone, 2004). For a recent art exhibit and collection of 
essays calling for a “reclaiming” of animism in modern art and culture, see Anselm Franke and 
Sabine Folie (eds.), Animismus: Moderne hinter den Spiegeln (Cologne: Walther König, 2011).  
 
46 See Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern [1991], trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard UP, 1993). 
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literature as a related critique of the modern hierarchy of the subject over the object and a 
charge to acknowledge the agency and active power of things.47 Some have even 
suggested that modernist literary writings like those of Kafka demonstrate a theoretical 
“knowledge of things” somehow comparable to the recent theory of writers like Latour.48 
In contrast to such readings, I can do no better than cite Caroline Walker Bynum’s 
astute response to contemporary theories of the life and agency of things. In the context 
of her recent study of the miraculous and effective materiality of Christian devotional 
objects in the late medieval period, Bynum notes that “the search for a universal theory of 
how things act” frequently ignores the very theories of relations between subjects and 
objects that are historically contemporaneous to the things and representations being 
studied; and second, that recent theories treat the life of things too anthropomorphically 
and ignore the inherent estrangement and otherness of things that appears variously coded 
according to different historical understandings.49 Taking a similar stance, my reading of 
the literary and cinematic animation of things in German modernism avoids imposing the 
structures of recent theory and instead pays close attention to the ways that modernists 
themselves conceived of the transformation of relations between humans and things. 
Instead of adopting Latour’s meta-critique of the modern separation between subjects and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See, for example, Hartmut Böhme, Fetischismus und Kultur: Eine andere Theorie der Moderne 
(Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2006), pp. 45–49, and for his reading of Kafka’s Odradek, pp. 
50–54. 
 
48 See Uwe C. Steiner, “Widerstand im Gegenstand: Das literarische Wissen vom Ding am 
Beispiel Franz Kafkas,” in Literatur, Wissenschaft und Wissen seit der Epochenschwelle um 
1800: Theorie – Epistemologie – komparatistische Fallstudien, ed. Thomas Klinkert and Monika 
Neuhofer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 237–52. 
 
49 See Caroline Walker Bynum, Christian Materiality: An Essay on Religion in Late Medieval 
Europe (New York: Zone, 2011), pp. 280–84, quoted here, p. 280.  
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objects, the present study emphasizes modernism’s own accounts and responses to this 
presumed rupture, by focusing on the dynamic interplay between conceptions of 
animation and reification, mimesis and mimicry, life, movement, and the uncanny in 













































A KINSHIP OF THINGS: 





Wodurch sind überhaupt Dinge mit uns 
verwandt? Welches ist ihre Geschichte? 
 
                           –– Rainer Maria Rilke 
 
 
Within German modernist literature, the most complex and enigmatic reflection on things 
can be found in the work of Rainer Maria Rilke. From his earliest texts of the late 
nineteenth century through his major poetry of the early 1920s, Rilke’s writing displays a 
persistent and central preoccupation with man’s relationship to things, formulated both in 
more general terms and with respect to specific material objects. His emphatic notion of 
the “thing” (Ding), the “Herzwort” of his entire oeuvre, as one early critic describes it, 
continues to fascinate readers due to its productive slippage between aesthetic, critical, 
and social functions within the poet’s work, as well as its flexible inclusion of a wide 
variety of objects, including artworks and architecture, plants and animals, commodities, 
craft-objects, and everyday things.50  
While Rilke’s literary representations and considerations of things undergo 
significant transformations across different periods of his writing, they also demonstrate 
important continuities that correspond to the poet’s anthropological grounding of human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
50 Quoted above, see Hermann Kunisch, Rainer Maria Rilke und die Dinge (Cologne: Balduin 
Pick, 1946), p. 9. 
	  
	   30	  
behavior and artistic production, on the one hand, and his critical diagnosis of modernity, 
on the other. Throughout his writings, Rilke contrasts the corrupted state of modern 
relations to objects––which he attributes variously to commodification, urban experience, 
and technological developments––with a more primary relationship, in which the 
intimate familiarities and mutual likenesses between humans and things are temporarily 
uncovered in the realms of aesthetic and childhood experience.51 As I will argue, Rilke’s 
often repeated––but overlooked––notions of a “similarity” (Ähnlichkeit), “kinship” 
(Verwandtschaft), or “mimicry” (Mimikry) between humans and things involve a 
complex set of mimetic registers, which are integral to both the poet’s assessment of 
modern pathologies, as well as his understanding of the production and reception of art 
and poetry. 
A more comprehensive reading of Rilke’s emphatic notion of the “thing” (Ding) 
has presented a particular interpretive challenge, as it takes on radically different guises 
within different contexts. In Rilke’s celebrated writings on Auguste Rodin and Paul 
Cézanne, and in his Neue Gedichte (1907) and Der Neuen Gedichte anderer Teil (1908), 
for example, encounters with objects are attributed a largely edifying effect, whereby the 
perceiving subject gains a degree of calm and resolve through an immediate experience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
51 For Rilke’s pointed remarks on the distorting effects of modern technology and commodity 
exchange on the new status of things as “Schein-Dinge,” or “Lebens-Attrappen,” see his well-
known letter, “An Witold Hulewicz, Sierre, 13. XI. 1925,” in Briefe, vol. 2, ed. Rilke-Archiv in 
Weimar (Wiesbaden: Insel, 1950), p. 483. For related comments on the distorted, unreality of 
things in modernity, see also an earlier 1912 letter in Rilke, Briefe, vol. 1, p. 373: “Die Welt zieht 
sich ein; denn auch ihrerseits die Dinge tun dasselbe, indem sie ihre Existenz immer mehr in die 
Vibration des Geldes verlegen und sich dort eine Art Geistigkeit entwickeln, die schon jetzt ihre 
greifbare Realität übertrifft.” Future references to this two-volume 1950 edition of Rilke’s letters 
will appear parenthetically in the text as (B) followed by volume and page number. 
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and closeness with respect to the aesthetic representation of things.52 In Rilke’s 
contemporaneous work on his 1910 novel, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids 
Brigge, and in letters documenting his first visits to Paris, by contrast, encounters with 
objects result in a traumatic breakdown of boundaries between animate and inanimate, 
self and other, human and thing. Malte’s experience of finding an external object “at 
home inside [him],” for example, is not an edifying moment but rather a cause for sudden 
terror.53 And in a later episode in the second half of the novel, the narrator describes the 
tormenting presence of seemingly animate things (“Dinge von beschränkten und 
regelmäßigen Gebrauchen[, die] sich ausspannen und sich lüstern und neugierig 
aneinander versuchen”), which appear to “ape” (nachäffen) the bad behavior of humans 
(KA III, 583). 
The difficulty in reconciling these different representations of things is reinforced 
by the divergent approaches to reading Rilke’s work. On the one hand, there exists a 
longstanding line of interpretation that reproduces the poet’s own mystifying language of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
52 On the edifying effects of the “art-thing” for the artist and others, see Rilke’s June 24, 1907 
letter to his wife Clara from Paris: “Darin liegt die ungeheure Hilfe des Kunstdings für das Leben 
dessen, der es machen muß – : daß es seine Zusammenfassung ist [...], der immer wieder-
kehrende, für ihn selbst gegebene Beweis seiner Einheit und Wahrhaftigkeit, der doch nur ihm 
selber sich zukehrt und nach außen anonym wirkt, namenlos, als Notwendigkeit nur, als 
Wirklichkeit, als Dasein” (B I, 172). 
 
53 Rainer Maria Rilke, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge [1910], in Werke: 
Kommentierte Ausgabe in vier Bänden, vol. 3: Prosa und Dramen, ed. August Stahl (Frankfurt 
am Main and Leipzig: Insel, 1996), p. 487. The object in question is the exposed interior wall of a 
demolished building. As will be discussed later on in the chapter, Malte’s frightful encounter with 
the dirty and decaying surface of the domestic interior involves a traumatic breakdown between 
inner and outer brought on by a mimetic identification with the protagonist’s own flayed nerves 
and exposed interiority. The passage quoted above reads: “Ich erkenne das alles hier, und darum 
geht es so ohne weiteres in mich ein: es ist zu Hause in mir.” Subsequent references to the same 
four-volume Kommentierte Ausgabe (KA) of Rilke’s works will be cited parenthetically in the 
text according to volume and page number. 
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“things” and his penchant for pre-modern artworks and craft-objects. On the other hand, a 
more productive set of readings has emerged in more recent years, stressing Rilke’s acute 
sensitivity and insight into the ruptures of the modern subject in relation to the traumas of 
the city. Such divergent readings can be brought into productive dialogue, I would argue, 
by instead emphasizing the poet’s understanding of a mimetic or imitative relationship 
between humans and things. While Rilke’s early poetry frequently evokes a monistic 
union or ornamental entwinement between the human subject and the world of objects, 
after about 1902 this relationship to things becomes increasingly estranged and 
destabilized in Rilke’s prose, poetry, aesthetic writings, and letters. Coinciding with his 
first extended residence in Paris, the joint experiences of the tumultuous big city and the 
artistic production of Rodin led Rilke to develop a bifurcated understanding of the human 
relationship to external objects. Based on his observations of Rodin’s sculptural 
production, Rilke comes to privilege the sculptor’s immediate, tactile connection to his 
artwork and other objects of the world. Asserting a close “kinship” (Verwandtschaft) 
between Rodin’s sculpture and a much longer history of handmade objects, Rilke 
identifies a certain atavistic quality to the sculptor’s relationship with things, 
corresponding to the mimetic behavior of both children and early humans. In contrast to 
these more positively coded, onto- and phylogenetic forms of mimesis, Rilke’s personal 
account of life in Paris presents a far more destructive side to mimetic relations linked to 
the fragmentation, dissolution, and voiding of the self. In reconstructing these ambivalent 
mimetic registers in Rilke’s writing, I will also show how his development of a new 
poetry of things or “thing-poems” (Dinggedichte) can be read as an attempt to artificially 
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produce and control a more positive mimetic resemblance between humans and things, 
which appeared to be dying out or distorted in modern life. 
The concept of mimesis being drawn on here corresponds to the revival of 
mimetic theory in the early twentieth century, marked by a departure from the more 
traditional concerns of aesthetic verisimilitude, which began with Plato and Aristotle and 
were carried through in traditions of illusionist imitation and in nineteenth-century norms 
of literary and visual realism. In the early twentieth-century theories of Walter Benjamin, 
Theodor W. Adorno, and Roger Caillois, the mimetic reemerges not as a narrow category 
of aesthetic representation, but rather as a more broadly construed relational practice. 
Here, mimesis comes to include all manner of human behavior involved in producing 
similarities (as in astrology, dance, “primitive” magic, and the play of children), as well 
as a somatic and sensuous closeness to the world, which undermines a strong separation 
between subject and object, human and thing. In Benjamin, Adorno, and Caillois, albeit 
in different ways, the mimetic also takes on a darker connotation, as an unreflected 
compulsion to become and behave similarly to others and one’s surroundings, a 
compulsion that threatens humans with both self-annihilation and mass manipulation. 
This ambivalent status of mimesis makes it a powerful, conceptual tool for understanding 
Rilke’s understanding of relations between humans and things in both their positive and 
pathological forms. 
In scattered writings after 1930, Benjamin, Adorno, and Caillois all sought 
different ways of restoring to the theory of mimesis its ancient association with a 
primary, human tendency towards imitative and mimetic behavior, a move that had 
already become a central feature in sociological and psychological theories of imitation 
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and identification from around 1900 (in the work of Gabriel Tarde and Sigmund Freud, 
most notably).54 What Rilke shares with these early twentieth-century theories is both an 
anthropological grounding of human nature in mimesis, and the recognition of an 
inherent ambivalence or instability in mimetic behavior, particularly in its modern 
manifestations. In relation to Caillois’s work on mimicry, Rilke identifies a similar drive 
to become thing-like and imitate one’s surroundings, a strategy leading to both self-
preservation and increased endangerment. Thus in the 1901 poem, “Der Schauende,” the 
suggestion is given for surviving a violent storm: “ließen wir, ähnlicher den Dingen, / uns 
so vom großen Sturm bezwingen, – / wir würden weit und namenlos” (KA I, 332). 
Alternatively, in a 1903 letter, Rilke describes the suffering and decay of the Parisian 
populace as, “das trostlose, mißfarbene Mimicry der übergroßen Städte,” which, like 
Caillois, he compares to the biological adaptations of animals (and insects in particular).55 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
54 The original connection between artistic representation and human social behavior in theories 
of mimesis can be found in Book X of Plato’s Republic. Around 1900, this social aspect of 
mimesis was revived in Gabriel Tarde, The Laws of Imitation [1890], trans. E. C. Parsons 
(Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1962); and in Freud’s theories of identification and projection 
found in his Totem und Tabu: Einige Übereinstimmungen im Seelenleben der Wilden und der 
Neurotiker [1913] (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1991). For a broader history of the concept of 
mimesis with chapters devoted to both Benjamin and Adorno, see Gunter Gebauer and Christoph 
Wulf, Mimesis: Kultur, Kunst, Gesellschaft (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1992), here, pp. 
374–405.   
 
55 Rainer Maria Rilke and Lou Andreas-Salomé, Briefwechsel, ed. Ernst Pfeiffer (Frankfurt am 
Main: Insel, 1975), p. 67. Hereafter cited as Bw. Caillois’s principle account of mimesis and 
mimicry can be found in his, “Mimétisme et psychasthénie légendaire,” Minotaure 7 (1935): pp. 
5–10. Here, Caillois bases his theory of mimicry on sociobiological parallels between mimetic 
behavior in animals and humans, an assumption strongly criticized by Adorno in his review of 
Roger Caillois, La Mante religieuse, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 7 (1938): pp. 410–11. For 
Rilke however, the similarities between human behavior and the mimetic adaptations of animals 
were obvious. In the same letter, he describes observing Parisians as if they were, “eine neue Art 
Thier, dem die Noth besondere Organe ausgebildet hat, Hunger- und Sterbeorgane. Und sie [...] 
hielten aus unter dem Fuß jedes Tages der sie trat wie zähe Käfer, dauerten, als ob sie noch auf 
etwas warten müßten” (Bw 67). 
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In relation to Adorno’s thinking on mimesis, Rilke similarly privileges a haptic or 
somatic closeness with the world of things, particularly in his Neue Gedichte and writings 
on Rodin; while in Malte, a somatic closeness with things has the potential to slip over 
into a dangerous merging of self and other, similar to accounts of mimesis in Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s Dialektik der Aufklärung.56 If Giorgio Agamben’s reading is to be trusted, 
another passage in Rilke’s Malte might also be compared with Adorno’s sense of a 
thoroughly negative form of mimesis (Mimesis ans Verhärtete und Entfremdete) brought 
on by the alienating powers of reification and the commodity form.57 Quoting Malte’s 
statement on, “wie verwirrend der Umgang mit den Menschen auf die Dinge gewirkt hat” 
(KA III, 582), Agamben reads a strange animated tin object in the novel as related to the 
distorting effects of things turned into commodities.58  
For the time being, the larger point to be made here is simply that Rilke’s 
emphatic notion of the “thing” (Ding) need not be reproached as some romantic 
mystification or as evidence of the poet’s obliviousness to the modern world. By reading 
this emphasis on things in terms of mimetic relations, it can be wrested from a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
56 Malte’s experience of Paris as smelling of fear (KA III, 455), for example, can be productively 
compared with Adorno’s mimetic conception of smell as a voiding of the self through a complete 
identification with the other. See Theodor W. Adorno [and Max Horkheimer], Dialektik der 
Aufklärung: Philosophische Fragmente [1947], Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, ed. Rolf 
Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), pp. 208–9. In a related passage in Malte, the 
narrator describes: “Die Existenz des Entsetzlichen in jedem Bestandteil der Luft. Du atmest es 
ein mit Durchsichtigem; in dir aber schlägt es sich nieder, wird hart, nimmt spitze, geometrische 
Formen an zwischen den Organen” (KA III, 505). 
  
57 Quoted here, Theodor W. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 7, ed. Rolf 
Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 39. 
 
58 See Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture [1977], trans. Ronald 
L. Martinez (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 47. Elsewhere, Agamben refers to 
the same 1912 letter quoted in footnote 52 as evidence of Rilke’s awareness of the ghostly 
dissolution of things due to the money economy (p. 38).   
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obscure position within Rilke’s larger body of writing and be apprehended not only for its 
positive, restorative dimensions, but also as an expression of modern pathologies, both 
social and experiential. Such a reading does more than reconcile the seemingly 
contradictory sides of Rilke’s literary treatment of things. It also helps to place such 
reflections historically, as roughly contemporaneous with developments in early 
twentieth-century theories of mimesis (from strictly aesthetic theories of mimetic 
representation to psychological and anthropological insights into the nature of mimetic 
behavior). While Rilke lacks the theoretical rigor and dialectical sophistication of 
thinkers like Benjamin and Adorno, his representations of mimetic relations between 
humans and things anticipate key aspects of their later theories of mimesis, and do so in 
relation to concrete observations regarding the fate of things in modern society, the 
experiential ruptures of urban modernity, and the production and reception of art. In this 
manner, Rilke’s numerous literary, aesthetic, and personal reflections on things can be 
understood in terms of an open-ended exploration of mimetic relations, as well as a 
poetic struggle to shore up a more positive sense of mimesis and mimicry against the 
depravations of the modern. 
As I will work out later on in the chapter, a comparison with Benjamin’s writings 
on the “mimetic faculty” is particularly instructive for elucidating Rilke’s conception of a 
“kinship” (Verwandtschaft) between humans and things. The theory of mimesis as 
developed in “Lehre vom Ähnlichen” and “Über das mimetische Vermögen” (both 1933) 
is, of course, an outgrowth of Benjamin’s earlier philosophy of language, which is quite 
foreign to Rilke’s own concern with things.59 However, Benjamin’s discussion of 
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“sensuous similarities” (sinnliche Ähnlichkeiten), in their onto- and phylogenetic forms, 
bears a striking resemblance to Rilke’s own conception of relations to things.60 Like 
Benjamin, as I will show, Rilke develops a speculative history of man’s mimetic relations 
with things, which links the imitative play of children with magical correspondences in 
the beliefs of early man. Like Benjamin, Rilke also privileges a haptic closeness with 
things that he locates most strongly in childhood experience.  
Where they differ, however, is in their response to the historical fate of mimesis 
and mimicry. Benjamin describes the disappearance of “sensuous similarity” in its 
phylogenetic form, and an historical transformation of the mimetic faculty into the 
“nonsensuous similarities” of language. While Rilke also acknowledges an historical 
change in the mimetic relations between humans and things, he nevertheless maintains 
the latent possibility of a positive sensuousness of mimetic correspondence in opposition 
to its modern, distorted and pathological forms. For Benjamin, the older phylogenetic 
form of mimesis can only be glimpsed via memories of similar behavior in childhood. 
Rilke insists, however, that it can also be re-actualized through the experience of art, a 
claim he underscores by his frequent comparisons between aesthetic and childhood 
experience. The important question is not whether Rilke errs here in his historical 
understanding, but rather how this understanding shapes his conception of aesthetic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 On the relation between language and things in Benjamin’s early theory of language, see “Über 
Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen” [1916], in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 
2.1, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 
pp. 140–56. See also, Winfried Menninghaus, Walter Benjamins Theorie der Sprachmagie 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980). 
	  
60	  Cf. Benjamin, “Über das mimetische Vermögen” [1933], in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2.1, pp. 
210–13; and, in the same volume, an earlier version of the text, “Lehre vom Ähnlichen” [1933], 
pp. 204–10.	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production and reception more generally, and his own poetic practice in particular. In this 
way, Rilke’s discussion of things in relation to poetry and the visual arts appears as a 
tentative struggle against the kind of historical loss later described in Benjamin’s work on 
the “mimetic faculty.” Ironically, Rilke’s own struggle to account for the mimetic powers 
he finds latent in Rodin’s sculptural works leads him back to spoken and poetic language 
as a means of evoking such mimetic relations––an implicit admission that such relations 
were already impossible and could only be artificially staged and produced through the 
medium of language.  
This approach to understanding Rilke’s conception of the thing departs 
significantly from previous readings, and only forcefully emerges with a broader 
consideration of his writings. In both popular reception and professional Rilke 
scholarship, the poet’s emphatic notion of the “Ding” has been most closely associated 
with the poetry of his middle period, and with his Neue Gedichte (1907) and Der Neuen 
Gedichte anderer Teil (1908), in particular. While the popular designation of these poems 
as “thing-poems” (Dinggedichte) has been frequently called into question, critics 
continue to emphasize their status as “Dinglyrik,” or thing-centered poetry, involving, if 
not the ekphrasis or objective description of things, then the poetic rendering of their 
experiential encounter by the human subject.61 Here, the focus has been not so much on 
the things themselves, but rather on how Rilke’s poetry represents and reflects upon 
aesthetic experience and visual perception through dynamic inversions of subject and 
object, inner and outer perspectives, and epiphanic transformations in the perception of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
61 For an overview of relevant scholarship, see notes in the Kommentierte Ausgabe, vol. 1, pp. 
904–17; and Wolfgang G. Müller’s commentary in the Rilke-Handbuch: Leben–Werk–Wirkung, 
ed. Manfred Engel (Weimar: Metzler, 2004), pp. 296–99.    
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things.62 In analyzing the visual and perceptual dimensions of Rilke’s Dinglyrik, critics 
have frequently emphasized the strong connection between his Neue Gedichte and 
contemporaneous engagement with the visual arts of Rodin and Cézanne between 1902 
and 1907, and also speculated, more tentatively, on overlaps with developments in the 
emerging field of phenomenology.63 Quite often, Rilke’s repeated references to things 
have been subsumed under discussions of his contemporaneous project of “learning to 
see” (sehen lernen) as expressed in his letters on Rodin and Cézanne, and, most 
famously, in his 1910 Malte novel. While these lines of interpretation have been 
productive for understanding certain aspects of the Neue Gedichte, they have also 
prevented a better understanding of Rilke’s more idiosyncratic notion of the Ding, which 
supposes a more primordial relationship between humans and nonhumans, in which the 
boundaries between subject and object, persons and things, are not so clearly defined.  
Already in 1900, in the programmatic poem, “Fortschritt,” later published in the 
first part of Das Buch der Bilder (1902), Rilke himself suggests a differentiation between 
concerns over visual immediacy, on the one hand, and a kinship with things, on the other: 
“Immer verwandter werden mir die Dinge / und alle Bilder immer angeschauter” (KA I, 
284). By looking at both earlier and later writings, as well as the Malte novel from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
62 Still the most thorough study in this regard is Judith Ryan, Umschlag und Verwandlung: 
Poetische Struktur und Dichtungstheorie in R. M. Rilkes Lyrik der mittleren Periode (1907–1914) 
(Munich: Winkler, 1972).  
 
63 The close relationship between Rilke’s Neue Gedichte and the visual arts is a commonplace in 
critical scholarship. Some insightful work has also followed up on Käte Hamburger’s 
phenomenological reading of the Neue Gedichte. See her, “Die phänomenologische Struktur der 
Dichtung Rilkes,” in Rilke in neuer Sicht, ed. Käte Hamburger (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 
1971), pp. 83–158; and more recently, Wolfgang G. Müller, “Rilke, Husserl und die Dinglyrik 
der Moderne,” in Rilke und die Weltliteratur, ed. Manfred Engel and Dieter Lamping (Düsseldorf 
and Zürich: Artemis & Winkler, 1999), pp. 214–35. 
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Paris period, Rilke’s conception of the Ding can be decoupled from more familiar 
associations with visual experience, and be resituated, instead, as a central component in 
his anthropological conception of mimetic relations between humans and art-objects, and 
humans and things more generally, where visual perception is only but one of its aspects. 
Following that, a return to Rilke’s more concentrated reflections on things in the Neue 
Gedichte, and in his letters and aesthetic writings of the Paris period, will allow for a 
stronger rereading of these texts in terms of the staging and performing of mimetic thing-
relations.64 
Rilke’s writings on Auguste Rodin between 1902 and 1907 occupy a central 
position in this discussion, as it is here that the poet develops his understanding of art as a 
making of things. Through a careful study of Rodin and his work in Paris, Rilke fashions 
an image of an ideal artistic practice, which merges art and life in a daily craft-like 
production of “art-things” (Kunst-Dinge), and which entails an artisanal absorption in 
work that grants the artist a kind of obstinate, thingly resistance to incursions of the urban 
surroundings. As will become clear later on in the chapter, Rilke’s traumatic experiences 
during his early stays in Paris motivate this fashioning of Rodin as a maker of things. 
Through close readings of his personal letters and published writing on Rodin, I will 
show further how Rilke’s language implies an ideal mimetic resemblance between the 
sculptor and his work, whereby the artist takes on a more thing-like character in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
64 For insightful readings that focus on different aspects of visual immediacy in the textual 
production of Rilke’s Paris period, see Stefanie Harris, “Exposures: Rilke, Photography, and the 
City,” New German Critique 99 (Fall 2006): pp. 121–49; and Tobias Wilke, “Überschriebene 
Präsenzen: Rilke vor/nach Cézanne,” in Lehrer ohne Lehre: Zur Rezeption Paul Cézannes in 
Künsten, Wissenschaft und Kultur (1906–2006), ed. Torsten Hoffmann (Freiburg im Breisgau: 
Rombach, 2008), pp. 151–67. 
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resemblance to the sculptural work. When focusing on the aesthetic experience of 
Rodin’s works, particularly in his 1905/06 lecture on the sculptor, Rilke likewise 
imagines a mimetic relationship between the viewer and artwork, comparing an 
interaction with Rodin’s sculpture to the mimetic and animistic play of children and to 
the experience of manmade things in the earliest periods of human existence. By evoking 
relations to objects in childhood experience as well as the early history of humans (just as 
Benjamin does), Rilke situates a reception of Rodin’s sculpture, not in terms of an 
imitative representation of nature, truth, or beauty, as in prior theories of aesthetic 
mimesis, but rather in terms of the mimetic relations it facilitates among humans and 
things (KA IV, 455–57).  
Integral to his lecture on Rodin is Rilke’s attempt to restore to the present a lost 
awareness of the thingness of art, which he claims was a primal experience in the very 
earliest instances of artistic production. According to Rilke, the very first manmade 
objects, whether “Werkzeuge” or “Götterbilder,” were produced with an acute awareness 
of their alternate temporality and otherness as things: the artwork being first experienced 
as, “ein Nicht-Mitsterbendes […], ein Dauerndes, ein Nächsthöheres: Ein Ding” (KA IV, 
456). And yet despite the work’s temporal otherness, its undying persistence among the 
world of things, it still bore human traces and a resemblance to its maker. For Rilke, the 
early work of art was not primarily a beautiful thing, but rather: “Ein ähnliches. Ein Ding, 
darin man das wiedererkannte was man liebte und das was man fürchtete und das 
Unbegreifliche in alledem” (KA IV, 456). A recognition of oneself in the artwork 
persisted, despite its mute and self-contained thingness, its indifference to the mortal life 
of humans. For Rilke, a similarly strange kinship with things could be recalled in 
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childhood play, where one’s “childhood things” (Kinder-Dinge) could at once be 
intimately identified with, and yet later––marking an ultimate difference with the mortal 
human––slip indifferently away as worthless, forgotten, and unchanging things (KA IV, 
455–56).  
The child’s immediate, haptic experience of objects also provides a model for 
Rilke’s understanding of sculpture as things. As he explains in the Rodin lecture and 
elsewhere, sculpture is ideally experienced for its simple thingness, as a system of tactile 
surfaces and concrete, material weight. Regardless of the figure or theme of the work, “je 
länger man hinsieht, desto mehr vereinfacht sich auch dieser Inhalt, und man sieht: 
Dinge” (KA IV, 460). Rilke attributes to Rodin in particular the ability both to experience 
external objects as simple surfaces and to give this kind of apprehension of things a 
lasting, material form in his work. The experience of the artwork awakens––for the 
viewer as well––a related haptic and sensuous immediacy with respect to the surface of 
all things. Finally, the thingness of art implies for Rilke an overall, positive mimetic 
relationality, which ties the work not only to its maker and environment of its making, 
but also to a whole network of “art-things,” forming what Rilke calls in a 1903 letter, 
“eine weite stille Verwandtschaft von Dingen” (Bw 102). This “kinship of things,” as 
Rilke imagines it, links Rodin and his work through family-like relations to a whole 
“Dynastie großer Dinge” and a “Geschichte unendlicher Geschlechter von Dingen,” 
forming a vast kinship of relations among artworks of the present and distant past (Bw 
102, 111). 
In all of these dimensions of Rilke’s Kunst-Ding, the thingness of the work lies 
both in its broad mimetic relationality to both humans and other objects, as well as its 
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fundamental distinction from the mortal existence of humans. As an undying thing, the 
artwork gives a lasting, material form to these connections of mimetic closeness and 
resemblance (preserved from earlier onto- and phylogenetic stages of human 
development), and enables such mimetic relations to be re-actualized through aesthetic 
experience in the present. In light of a perceived corruption of things in his own time, 
Rilke attributes to art the ability to enact this sort of positive kinship with things, and to 
stabilize an otherwise threatening intrusion of a hostile nonhuman realm. The successful 
artwork, for Rilke, can thus be understood as a generative nexus for producing positive, 
mimetic resemblances among humans and things, and for provoking in the recipient of 
the work a broader recognition of sensuous similarity. In his 1905/06 Rodin lecture, Rilke 
attempts to stage for his audience this type of idealized encounter with artworks, by 
evoking their childhood relations with things and appealing to the experience of 
manmade objects in early human history.  
This recognition of mimetic relations as central to Rilke’s understanding of things 
also provides a new basis for productively rereading his famous “thing-poems.” In many 
of his poetic works from the two-volume Neue Gedichte, Rilke develops complex, poetic 
strategies for performing for the reader the kind of idealized, mimetic kinship he 
imagines between humans and things. Acutely aware of a dark, destructive side to thing-
relations during his early stays in Paris, Rilke looks to his poetry as a means of artificially 
producing and rehabilitating a more positive, mimetic closeness between humans and 
things. Much of Rilke’s thing-centered poetry, in other words, can be read as staging an 
artificially controlled encounter with things, as an implicit alternative to the distorted, 
mimetic relations and destructive merging of self and other, prevailing in modern life. 
	  
	   44	  
I will turn to a close reading of selected poems from the Neue Gedichte at the end 
of the chapter. For now, Rilke’s “Die Rosenschale” can serve as a particularly lucid 
example of this poetic strategy. As the poem opens, it presents to the reader two disparate 
objects: first, the writhing tangle of two viciously fighting boys; second, the calming and 
edifying presence of a full bowl of roses. Implicit in this poetic juxtaposition is a notion 
of a contrasting, mimetic correspondence between perceiver and perceived––that a thing 
filled with anger and fear produces a similar state in the viewer, and that other objects 
produce different likenesses: 
Zornige sahst du flackern, sahst zwei Knaben  
zu einem Etwas sich zusammenballen,  
das Haß war und sich auf der Erde wälzte  
wie ein von Bienen überfallnes Tier. 
  
Nun aber weißt du, wie sich das vergißt: 
denn vor dir steht die volle Rosenschale, 
die unvergeßlich ist und angefüllt 
mit jenem Äußersten von Sein und Neigen, 
Hinhalten, Niemals-Gebenkönnen, Dastehn, 
das unser sein mag: Äußerstes auch uns. (KA I, 508–9) 
 
In addressing the reader directly with “you” (du), Rilke’s poem attempts to stage a 
particular experience of these contrasting things, and, at the same time, to perform for its 
reader a related becoming akin with them. The poem purposefully replaces the fearful 
“something” (Etwas) of the fighting boys with another object in order to demonstrate its 
transformative effect. What readers are first led to experience in the bowl of roses itself, 
that is, a filled presence of being and offering, can be similarly manifested through 
mimetic correspondence in the inner state of perceiving humans (Äußerstes auch uns).  
As the poem proceeds, it provokes the reader’s mimetic capabilities even further, 
encouraging one to not only become like the bowl of roses, but to perceive in it a whole 
network of sensuous similarities and interconnections. “Ist irgend etwas uns bekannt wie 
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dies?” the poem asks of the roses, and suggests to the reader a series of likenesses: the 
white rose, “wie eine Venus aufrecht in der Muschel”; the cambric rose, “ist sie kein 
Kleid”; and another, like “opalnes Porzellan, zerbrechlich, eine flache Chinatasse” (KA I, 
509–10). Rilke’s comparisons distinguish themselves from usual poetic metaphors in that 
they are presented as open-ended suggestions, as encouragement for the reader to 
recognize further similarities in their own perception of things.65 As the poem concludes, 
it imparts to the reader a transformative awareness, not only of resemblances among 
humans and things, but also of the interconnections (with wind, rain, sky, and earth) that 
are contained and enclosed in all natural things.66 The poem thus performs for the reader 
a full scope of positive, mimetic relations, and does so in explicit opposition to a 
destructive identification with the initial fear-causing thing. 
While Rilke’s poetry explores this mimetic kinship with things in mainly aesthetic 
and perceptual terms, the reception history of the Neue Gedichte––particularly in the 
1920s––underscores the relevance of these literary works in relation to broader, socio-
critical reflections on the “state of things” in modernity. Around the time of Rilke’s death 
in 1926, there arose a renewed interest in the Neue Gedichte, which were frequently read 
as a poetic attempt at preserving things against the destruction of modern technologies, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
65 The poem is punctuated by further questions and suggestions, offering readers a sense of tactile 
closeness and correspondence with things, while encouraging them to explore their own mimetic 
capabilities: “Und dann wie dies: daß ein Gefühl entsteht, / weil Blütenblätter Blütenblätter 
rühren? / [...] Und die Bewegung in den Rosen, sieh: / [...] Was können sie nicht sein” (KA I, 
509–10). 
 
66 “Und sind nicht alle so, nur sich enthaltend, / wenn Sich-enthalten heißt: die Welt da draußen / 
und Wind und Regen und Geduld des Frühlings / und Schuld und Unruh und vermummtes 
Schicksal / und Dunkelheit der abendlichen Erde / bis auf der Wolken Wandel, Flucht und 
Anflug, / bis auf den vagen Einfluß ferner Sterne / in eine Hand voll Innres verwandeln” (KA I, 
510). 
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and restoring an intimate closeness with things, which had become estranged in modern 
life. Before turning to his poetry and writings before 1910, I will show how Rilke’s 
reputation as a poet of things and a writer of “thing-poems” (Dinggedichte) emerges 
historically out of the politically and socially convulsive Weimar period amidst broader 
reflections on the corrupted relationship between humans and things in modernity. By 
first framing my analysis with respect to Rilke’s historical reception in the 1920s, I hope 
not only to bring out more forcefully the implied, social and recuperative dimensions of 
Rilke’s performative Dinglyrik (alongside its more familiar, aesthetic concerns), but also 
to establish the poet’s writing as part of a prehistory to the extensive, theoretical concerns 
with things that arise in the Weimar period: including Martin Heidegger’s discussion of 
things and equipment in Sein und Zeit (1927), Georg Lukács’s long essay on reification, 
Das Phänomen der Verdinglichung (1923), Walter Benjamin’s writings on commodities 
and mimetic thing-relations, and the new status of things in cinema and the interwar 
avant-garde. If Bill Brown is correct in identifying a pervasive “discourse of things” in 
the 1920s, then Rilke must certainly be included as an important early instance of what 
Brown calls, “modernism’s resistance to modernity […] its effort to deny the distinction 
between subjects and objects, people and things.”67 
 
The Poet of Things 
As Robert Musil was quick to remark, the death of Rainer Maria Rilke on December 29, 
1926 was met with a noticeably muted response from the German daily press.68 In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
67 See Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry 28.1 (Autumn 2001): pp. 1–22, here p. 12. 
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early months of 1927, however, numerous literary critics and writers, Musil included, 
followed up with their own commemorative speeches and publications, which, in the 
majority of instances, argued for Rilke’s inclusion among the pantheon of great German 
lyrical poets, and claimed further, on behalf of a still devoted and admiring readership, an 
intimate familiarity with the man and his work.69 At the same time, what the widespread 
commemoration of the poet’s life and work also underscored was the apparent disconnect 
between Rilke’s aspirations as a modern lyrical poet and the particular historical realities 
of mass culture and sociopolitical life in 1920s Germany. In contrasting ways, both 
conservative literary critics and the more progressive modernist writers of the time sought 
to portray Rilke as a writer apart: a poet who maintained popularity among an educated 
readership, but whose major poetic works were marked by an uneasy remove from the 
pressing social, political, and cultural concerns of the Weimar period. In Musil’s 
commemorative address, he honored Rilke as, “der größte Lyriker [...], den die 
Deutschen seit dem Mittelalter besessen haben,” yet he was careful to qualify this 
honor.70 For Musil and others, the poet’s literary contributions remained largely 
peripheral to their immediate historical context, and were perhaps best understood as but 
the belated end to a particularly German demand for “dichterische Größe.” While Rilke 
could be said to have achieved a kind of “perfection” (Vollkommenheit) with respect to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Robert Musil, “Rede zur Rilke-Feier in Berlin am 16. Januar 1927,” in Prosa und Stücke, 
Kleine Prosa, Aphorismen, Autobiographisches, Essays und Reden, Kritik, Gesammelte Werke, 
vol. 2 (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2000), p. 1229. 
 
69 See, for example, articles and speeches collected in the commemorative Rilke edition of the 
literary journal, Orplid: Literarische Monatsschrift in Sonderheften 3.1/2, ed. Martin Rockenbach 
(April–May 1927). 
 
70 Musil, “Rede zur Rilke-Feier,” p. 1229. 
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the history of German lyric poetry, this achievement appeared untimely and at odds with 
the more politically and socially-oriented literary concerns of the 1920s.71 
In an attempt to place Rilke’s poetic contributions in closer dialogue with the 
aesthetic and social demands of the time, Musil and other commentators, such as Walter 
Benjamin and the Swiss writer Robert Faesi, turned their attention away from the poet’s 
accomplished later works, the Duineser Elegien (1923) and Die Sonette an Orpheus 
(1923), and instead focused on the earlier collections, especially the Neue Gedichte 
(1907) and Der Neuen Gedichte anderer Teil (1908), as evidence of Rilke’s particular 
sensitivity to the world of natural and artisanal objects and his concerns over the 
relationship between humans and things. What has since become commonplace in 
popular and critical understandings of Rilke’s two volumes of Neue Gedichte––that is, 
their status as “thing-poems” (Dinggedichte), characterized by an in-depth attention to the 
material forms and effects of artworks, architecture, animals, flowers, and everyday 
things––itself emerged as a new point of interest in the poet’s reception of the 1920s. 
While current scholarship predictably stresses the relationship between Rilke’s Dinglyrik 
and his contemporaneous study of the visual arts,72 critics of the Weimar period 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
71 Ibid., pp. 1230–31. The circumstances surrounding Musil’s speech only further demonstrate the 
particular ambivalence that the poet’s remembrance provoked at the time. Speaking as a member 
of a loose but prominent association of leftist writers, the “Gruppe 1925,” Musil represented a 
decidedly more generous and sympathetic view of the poet when compared with his other 
politically and socially minded peers. The speech itself was the outcome of heated debate on 
whether to honor the deceased poet at all. In Alfred Döblin’s later account, Brecht was the most 
fiercely opposed. Other prominent members of the literary group included Ernst Bloch, Max 
Brod, Hermann Kasack, Erwin Piscator, and Joseph Roth. See documentation in Klaus Petersen, 
Die „Gruppe 1925“: Geschichte und Soziologie einer Schriftstellervereinigung (Heidelberg: Carl 
Winter Universitätsverlag, 1981), here, p. 79. 
 
72 The comparison between the Neue Gedichte and Rilke’s contemporaneous writings on Rodin 
and Cézanne occurs far too frequently to survey here. For more recent examples, see Bernard 
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frequently attributed to the Neue Gedichte a number of important social and critical 
functions in addition to their visual, aesthetic effects. Following a previous decade of 
criticism that read Rilke’s work largely in religious and metaphysical terms,73 the 
reception of the 1920s assessed his poetry of things not only in terms of their sensory 
immediacy with respect to unique material objects, but also as a productive literary 
strategy for restoring and preserving the interrelationships and familiarity among humans 
and things, which appeared otherwise threatened in an era of urbanization, 
mechanization, and mass society. 
This renewed interest during the Weimar years––in Rilke’s near-devotional 
attention to the things of nature, art, and everyday life in the Neue Gedichte––can be 
explained, at least in part, with respect to the period’s dominant critical discourses on 
reification, commodities, and modern technologies. Situated with respect to the political 
and economic instability of the interwar years, rapid developments in industrialization, 
urbanization, and commercialization, and a general environment of cold, calculating 
rationality in social relations, there emerged at the time a number of important, 
theoretical discussions that sought to analyze modern social pathologies in terms of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Dieterle, “Plastisches Schreiben bei Rainer Maria Rilke,” and Brigid Doherty, “Introjektion, 
Übertragung, und literarische Medienreflexionen in Rainer Maria Rilke’s Briefe über Cézanne,” 
in Literarische Medienreflexionen: Künste und Medien im Fokus moderner und postmoderner 
Literatur, ed. Sandra Poppe and Sasche Seiler (Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 2008), pp. 27–39 and 40–
64, respectively.    
 
73 In monographs, reviews, and scholarly articles before 1920, the predominant focus was on 
religious, mystical, and pantheistic readings of Rilke’s literary works, encouraged by earlier 
monastic and religious themes of his popular Stunden-Buch (written 1899-1903, published 1905). 
See, for example, Heinrich Scholz, “Rainer Maria Rilke: Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnis und 
Würdigung des dichterischen Pantheismus der Gegenwart,” in Festschrift für Alois Riehl (Halle: 
Max Niemeyer, 1914), pp. 3–42. Scholz praises what he calls “das Evangelium der Dinge” in 
Rilke’s Stunden-Buch, and derides his Neue Gedichte as mere evidence of the poet’s eventual 
decline into “religiöse Erschöpfung” (pp. 10 and 42). For listings of other early criticism, cf. 
Walter Ritzer, Rainer Maria Rilke: Bibliographie (Vienna: O. Kerry, 1951), pp. 208–318.  
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corrupted relationship among humans and things. These included, most notably, Georg 
Lukács’s chapter on reification in Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein (1923), and Martin 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (1927), which attempted a philosophical restoration of man’s 
primordial relations with “things” (Dinge) and “equipment” (Zeug), in opposition to 
scientific objectivity and the subject/object distinction.74 As Rilke’s letters indicate, he 
situated his own literary dedication to pre-industrial, handmade objects in explicit 
opposition to the “Schein-Dinge” of modern, capitalistic society (B II, 483).75 While 
Adorno would later dismiss Rilke’s “Dingkult” as merely an instance of “die reale 
Gewalt der Verdinglichung,”76 for writers and critics of the Weimar period, his Neue 
Gedichte provided a welcome occasion for re-imagining a far less alienated relationship 
with the world of things.   
As Tobias Wilke has recently pointed out, for Walter Benjamin in particular, a 
critical diagnosis of the historical “state of things” in 1920s Europe could be analyzed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
74 See Georg Lukács, “Das Phänomen der Verdinglichung” [1923], in Geschichte und 
Klassenbewußtsein (Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1968), pp. 257–86; and Martin 
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit [1927] (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006), especially, pp. 63–76. 
It is instructive that Axel Honneth’s recent revival of reification theory attempts to put Lukács 
and Heidegger in productive dialogue in order to uncover the possibility of a more primary, non-
reified life praxis characterized by “care” (Sorge) in everyday interactions among humans and 
things. Despite criticisms of his argument, Honneth’s blending of Lukács’s and Heidegger’s work 
of the 1920s attests to this historical period’s strong investment in working out more fundamental 
forms of human-thing relations not dominated by scientific objectivity, instrumentality, or the 
exchange of commodities and money. See Axel Honneth, Verdinglichung (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2005). 
 
75 Heidegger cites the same 1925 letter at length in his 1946 lecture, “Wozu Dichter?,” in 
Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), p. 291. 
 
76 See Theodor W. Adorno, “Rede über Lyrik und Gesellschaft” [1957], in Noten zur Literatur 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), pp. 49–68, here p. 52. 
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both in a figurative and literal sense.77 Under the heading “Gedanken zu einer Analysis 
des Zustands von Mitteleuropa,” Benjamin composed the following short text in 1923: 
I. Der Zustand der Dinge 
Gänzliches Schwinden der Wärme aus ihnen. Die Gegenstände des täglichen 
Gebrauchs stoßen den Menschen sacht aber beharrlich von sich ab. In summa hat 
er tagtäglich in der Überwindung der geheimen Widerstände – und nicht etwa nur 
der offenen – die sie ihm entgegensetzen, eine ungeheure Arbeit zu leisten. Ihre 
Kälte muß er mit der eigenen Wärme ausgleichen, um nicht an ihnen zu erstarren 
und ihre Stacheln mit unendlicher Geschicklichkeit anfassen um nicht an ihnen 
zu verbluten.78 
 
In this passage, which would later be reworked and expanded in his 1928 montage-text, 
Einbahnstraße, Benjamin finds expression for his more large-scale analysis of modern, 
social pathologies in the degenerate state of everyday objects themselves. As he 
elaborates in the longer passage from Einbahnstraße, this “Entartung der Dinge” is 
replicated as well in the corresponding “roughness” (Roheit) of humans, leading to a 
general social environment of cool and prickly repulsion.79 
While Benjamin was largely indifferent to Rilke’s poetic works, attributing their 
effects to the dated, turn-of-the-century ornamentation of Jugendstil, he did come to the 
defense of particular poems of the Neue Gedichte. After reading Franz Blei’s harshly 
critical assessment of the recently deceased poet in the January 7, 1927 edition of Die 
Literarische Welt, Benjamin put down some of his own reflections on the “tactile beauty” 
of poems like “L’Ange du Méridien” and “Archaïscher Torso Apollos” from the Neue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
77 See Tobias Wilke, Medien der Unmittelbarkeit: Dingkonzepte und Wahrnehmungstechniken, 
1918–1939 (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2010), pp. 13–14.  
 
78 Walter Benjamin, Einbahnstraße [1928], Werke und Nachlaß: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 
8, ed. Detlev Schöttker (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2009), p. 134. 
 
79 Ibid., p. 26. On the discourse of “coldness” in the arts and sociology of the Weimar period, see 
Helmut Lethen, Verhaltenslehren der Kälte: Lebensversuche zwischen den Kriegen (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1994).     
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Gedichte. He describes these and other such poems as, “Lieder von der vollendeten 
taktilen Schönheit von Früchten; Strophen, die sich als Lied im Sinn der Griechen von 
Hand zu Hand wie eine Schale, eine Scherbe geben lassen,” and makes further appeal to 
“die Hände einer Generation” that were brought together by the collective handling of 
these poetic things.80 While Benjamin shows no remorse that, as he claims, lyrical poetry 
had long ago come to an end in Europe, he nevertheless revisits Rilke’s Neue Gedichte 
with an attention not only to their suggestions of thingly contours and haptic textures, but 
also to their social character in mediating the sensibilities and interpersonal relations of a 
generation of readers. Benjamin’s appeal to human warmth and tactile contact with things 
in the above 1923 fragment, “Der Zustand der Dinge,” makes clear why, upon Rilke’s 
death, he would reserve praise for the writer’s earlier poetry of things––as a potentially 
restorative counter-measure to the coldness and repulsion among people and things that 
appeared to arise in the interwar years. 
From a conservative perspective, the Swiss writer Robert Faesi likewise appealed 
to a generation of readers with an intimate connection to the things of Rilke’s poetry, but 
provided a different and far more pessimistic image of the historical “state of things.” In 
his commemorative address for the poet, delivered in Zürich and Stuttgart in early 1927, 
Faesi remarked: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
80 Walter Benjamin, “Rainer Maria Rilke und Franz Blei” [1927], in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 
4.1, ed. Tillman Rexroth (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), pp. 453–54, here p. 454. In his 
brief discussion of the poet, Benjamin also ridicules the “verwesende Innerlichkeit” of Rilke’s 
earlier poetry, which he associates “mit den Emblemen des Jugendstils.” A complete reprint of 
Franz Blei’s 1927 article on Rilke can be found in Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4.2, pp. 
1025–27. Blei’s review offers a highly critical assessment of Rilke’s detachment from present 
historical realities, which was commonly noted at the time: “Die Problematik Rilkes war ganz 
Interieur immer geblieben, er schaute mit seinen großen blassen Augen in die Landschaft aus dem 
einzigen Fenster eines Zimmers, in dem es ganz leise nach Kranksein roch und aus dem er sich in 
ein bukolisches Idyll sehnte” (p. 1025).     
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aus [Rilkes Werk] steigt der wehe Duft der verfallenden Dinge [...]. Und Zerfall 
in den Büchern der Bilder und der Dinge, die der Lyriker vor uns aufschlägt: das 
Verwittern alter Kathedralen und Schlösser, das Überwuchern vergessener 
Sarkophage, das Welken der Astern in den Beeten vereinsamter Parke, das 
Nachdunkeln und Verbleichen der Ahnenbilder, das Gilben der Handschriften, 
das Erblinden schöner Augen [...]. Das längst vergangene, das noch immer 
vergehende – seinem Untergang gibt der Dichter Dauer im Wort. All das ist 
Kunst des Endes, all das ist Kennzeichen einer ganzen Generation.81 
 
In Faesi’s account, Rilke thus becomes the chronicler and poetic preservationist for a 
whole catalog of neglected and disintegrating objects that have already been left behind 
by the early twentieth century. In contrast to Benjamin, the function of Rilke’s poetry lies 
here not in a vision of restored immediacy between human and things, but rather in the 
resigned preservation, in the poetic word, of a whole world of disappearing objects.82 
It should come as no surprise that the now well-known literary term of the “thing-
poem” (Dinggedicht) had its origins in the 1920s as well. In an article published the same 
year as Rilke’s death, the German literary scholar Kurt Oppert developed a general 
classification for the type of descriptive, thing-centered poetry he found first in the late 
work of Eduard Mörike, in certain poems of Conrad Ferdinand Meyer, and finally, in its 
fully realized form, in the Neue Gedichte of Rainer Maria Rilke. In contrast to the 
subjective, emotional content of lyrical poetry following Goethe, Oppert posited a, 
“Gegentypus [...], der auf unpersönliche episch-objektive Beschreibung eines Seienden 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
81 Faesi’s Gedenkrede can be found printed in Orplid 3 (April–May 1927): pp. 13–23, here pp. 
15–16. While Faesi’s list indeed evokes many of the same objects represented in Rilke’s Neue 
Gedichte, the general tone of decadence and disintegration in the passage is perhaps more easily 
aligned with the late nineteenth-century poetry of Stefan George. Cf. George, “Nach der Lese,” in 
Das Jahr der Seele [1897], Sämtliche Werke in 18 Bänden, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982), 
pp. 11–22. 
 
82 For a more recent reiteration of this nostalgic assessment of things in modernity, see Christoph 
Jamme, “The Loss of Things: Cézanne, Rilke, Heidegger,” in Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art, 
and Technology, ed. Karsten Harries and Christoph Jamme (New York and London: Holmes & 
Meier, 1994), pp. 139–53. 
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angelegt ist.”83 The “Dinggedicht,” as he termed it, avoided the usual lyrical effect of 
dissolving represented objects into a personal expression of subjective experience. 
Instead, such poems sought to develop an objective and distanced description of the 
things themselves, and to preserve a sense of the objects’ obdurate materiality: a 
“sachlicher Dauer” and “epische Starre der Dinge.”84 While the thingly and objective 
qualities of Oppert’s Dinggedicht cannot be clearly related to the emergent Weimar 
aesthetics of Neue Sachlichkeit, both of these developments might be understood in 
relation to a similar historical impulse: a movement against the preceding, subjective and 
emotional excesses of German Expressionism and for a more detached and descriptive 
assessment of material realities. 
In current Rilke scholarship, Oppert’s Dinggedicht concept is often appropriated, 
however his exact definition of the term is disregarded, since it fails to identify the 
dynamic interplay of subjective and objective dimensions in Rilke’s Neue Gedichte.85 
Such criticism is certainly justified, yet it overlooks the exact historical positioning of 
Oppert’s argument. While his article on the Dinggedicht may suffer as scholarship for its 
normative privileging of objective description in poetry––from which Rilke’s actual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
83 See Kurt Oppert, “Das Dinggedicht: Eine Kunstform bei Mörike, Meyer und Rilke,” Deutsche 
Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 4 (1926): pp. 747–83, quoted 
here, pp. 747–48. 
 
84 Ibid., p. 748. 
 
85 See, for example, Lawrence Ryan, “Neue Gedichte––New Poems,” in A Companion to the 
Works of Rainer Maria Rilke, ed. Erika A Metzger and Michael M. Metzger (Rochester, NY: 
Camden House, 2001), pp. 128–53; and his “Rilke’s Dinggedichte: The ‘Thing’ As ‘Poem in 
Itself’,” in Rilke-Rezeptionen/Rilke Reconsidered, ed. Sigrid Bauschinger and Susan L. Cocalis 
(Tübingen and Basel: A. Francke, 1995), pp. 27–35. For a more systematic attempt at reading the 
interrelations between subjective and objective representations in the Neue Gedichte, see Judith 
Ryan, Umschlag und Verwandlung. 
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poems depart significantly––it also reveals much about the priorities in the poet’s critical 
reception at the time. In particular, Oppert makes a strong cultural-historical connection 
between the development of a supposedly objective description of things in Rilke’s Neue 
Gedichte and an apparent need for, “Protest und Gegenzug wider die dingzerstörende 
Technik und Zivilisation der Umwelt.”86 Oppert attributes the same historical 
understanding to Rilke himself, arguing that the ninth of his Duineser Elegien, written 
mainly in 1922, amounts to the poet’s retrospective insight into his earlier Neue Gedichte: 
the realization that his poems indeed sought to preserve those things that were 
increasingly threatened by modern technologies and civilization, and to give them lasting 
presence in the poetic word. Oppert quotes Rilke’s Ninth Elegy approvingly (“Mehr als je 
/ fallen die Dinge dahin, die erlebbaren, denn, / was sie verdrängend ersetzt, ist ein Tun 
ohne Bild”)––interpreting “Tun ohne Bild” as “die bloße leere Betriebsamkeit” of 
modern life––and describes the program of the Duineser Elegien (of preserving and 
transforming inwardly, “diese von Hingang lebenden Dinge”) as simply a later 
articulation of what was already occurring in the Neue Gedichte (KA II, 228–29).87 And 
yet, such 1920s readings of the Neue Gedichte cannot be simply projections of Rilke’s 
Duineser Elegien program back onto an earlier period of literary production. Even before 
the Duineser Elegien were published in 1923, critics of the interwar period began 
reassessing the Neue Gedichte in terms of a preservation of natural and traditional objects 
against the destructive consequences of modernization. In a 1919 monograph on Rilke 
(cited in Oppert), Robert Faesi describes the Neue Gedichte as an encyclopedic storage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
86 Oppert, “Das Dinggedicht,” p. 781. 
 
87 Ibid., p. 781. 
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for all types of things, dead and living, natural and manmade, plant and animal, “wie in 
einem ungeheueren Arsenal.”88 The military connotation would have been even more 
resonant just after the end of World War I, suggesting an “arsenal” of more traditional 
objects in opposition to military technologies of mass destruction. 
The interpretation of Rilke’s poetry as a preservation or salvation of things, which 
emerged for the first time during the Weimar period, corresponds closely with the 
prevalent Kulturpessimismus of the time. As part of a fundamentally conservative critique 
of modernity, Rilke’s poetological positions in the Duineser Elegien and Die Sonette an 
Orpheus might be understood to represent but a highly individualistic form of opposition 
to the alienating forces of modern Zivilisation, through a literary project of preserving 
aspects of a disappearing, traditional Kultur within a poetic realm of “Innerlichkeit.”89 As 
Rilke expresses it in the seventh of his Duineser Elegien, the responsibility of mankind is 
to preserve and transform inwardly (“es innen verwandeln”) the remnants of a threatened 
past––“ein dauerndes Haus,” or “ein einst gebetenes Ding,” such as a temple, pillar, or 
statue––as part of poetic opposition to the growth of modern cities and abstract, 
technological constructions (KA II, 221–22). Even a generous reading would have to 
admit that Rilke’s poetic program of internalizing the threatened, external realities of a 
pre-modern world was, at best, a highly personal and quietistic stance, one which tended 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
88 See Robert Faesi, Rainer Maria Rilke (Zürich: Amalthea-Verlag, 1919), here p. 24. 
 
89 On the conservative and regressive aspects of Rilke’s Dingbegriff in the 1920s, see, for 
example, Egon Schwarz, Das verschluckte Schluchzen: Poesie und Politik bei Rainer Maria Rilke 
(Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1972), pp. 90–105; and Peter Demetz, “Weltinnenraum und 
Technologie,” Sprache im technischen Zeitalter 17/18 (Jan.–June 1966): pp. 4–11. For more 
recent attempts at making such conceptions productive for analyzing Rilke’s understandings of 
sensory experience and aesthetic abstraction, see essays collected in Poetik der Krise: Rilkes 
Rettung der Dinge in den “Weltinnenraum”, ed. Hans Richard Brittnacher, et al. (Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann, 2000).  
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toward a regressive retreat from political and social realities. At worst, as Egon Schwarz 
has retrospectively shown, it merged easily with the anti-modern and nationalistic 
rhetoric of European fascism, whose Italian variety Rilke came to praise in private 
correspondences between 1921 and 1926.90  
While the poetological position of the Duineser Elegien can be easily critiqued in 
this manner, the 1920s notion of a preservation of things is far more ambiguous in 
relation to the Neue Gedichte. As Benjamin’s and Faesi’s 1927 remarks suggest, Rilke’s 
Neue Gedichte are significant not only for their poetic representations of material objects, 
but also for how they take on a particular, performative dimension, by staging for the 
individual reader an immediate experience of things, and by facilitating further a kind of 
collective readership that assembles in opposition to the damaging influences of 
capitalism and industrial technology. For Faesi, problematically, this takes the form of an 
elitist, anti-modernist, and quasi-religious community of sensitive readers, who join Rilke 
in devoting themselves to the disappearing objects of nature and culture.91 For Benjamin, 
however, this finds expression in the tactile handling and interpersonal exchange of 
Rilke’s poetry of things, bringing together a generation of readers conditioned by the 
subtle, sensory effects of the poems. In this sense, the 1920s reading of the Neue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
90 See Schwarz, Das verschluckte Schluchzen. 
 
91 Faesi, Orplid 3 (April–May 1927): p. 19: “Und den Dingen gibt er [Rilke] sich hin: den Dingen 
der Landschaft und der kostbaren Gebilden der Kultur.” Faesi continues on to imagine a cult-like 
community of readers in opposition to the culture of machines and capitalism: “Weit unter dem 
Dröhnen der Maschinen und dem Geschrei des Marktes verlaufen wie in Katakomben die 
geheimen, aber ungestörten Gänge zwischen diesem Dichter und der Gemeinde seiner 
Wahlverwandten. Hier auf dem Grunde seiner Einsamkeit und um ihren Preis allein erwächst eine 
zarte, fast religiöse Vereinigung des Empfindens und beginnt das Wort dieses Einzelnen, 
Abgesonderten, Geltung – für die Masse nicht – aber für viele Beste und Empfänglichste zu 
gewinnen” (p. 23). 
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Gedichte as a preservation of things need not be subsumed under the esoteric notions of 
the Duineser Elegien, as a poetic transformation of external objects into an invisible 
realm of interiority.92 In assessing Rilke’s readership at the time of his death, Benjamin 
and Faesi stress rather a social function of the Neue Gedichte: a collective entangling of 
human readers with an array of natural, aesthetic, and everyday things. 
In what follows, I will argue that this social dimension was itself constitutive for 
Rilke’s treatment of the “thing” (Ding) from the very beginning, and that it plays a major 
role in his anthropological grounding of art in terms of mimetic relations. Rilke’s 
understanding of the thing can be observed to develop out of a complex set of issues, 
historically situated around 1900: the radical Sprachskepsis of the time, the experience of 
urban modernity, and developments in the modernist arts. It is not sufficient merely to 
investigate the supposed influence of these encounters on Rilke’s literary writings. Far 
better is to observe how this emphatic notion of the Ding takes shape at the intersection 
of his poetological thinking, his reflections on the visual arts, and his anthropological 
understanding of historical relationships between humans and things. Framing the 
analysis with respect to Rilke’s 1920s reception helps to emphasize the convergence of 
aesthetic, critical, and social dimensions in the poet’s conception of the Ding as it 
emerges in relation to earlier historical crises in the understandings of language, sensory 
experience, and visual representation around 1900. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
92 The most direct statement regarding Rilke’s poetological project of transforming external, 
visible things into a state of invisible interiority can be found in the November 13, 1925 letter to 
Witold von Hulewicz (B II, 478–85). Also, cf. the ninth of the Duineser Elegien: “Und diese, von 
Hingang / lebenden Dinge verstehn, daß du sie rühmst; vergänglich, / traun sie ein Rettendes uns, 
den Vergänglichsten, zu. / Wollen, wir sollen sie ganz im unsichtbarn Herzen / verwandeln / in – 
o unendlich – in uns!” (KA II, 229). 
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A Kinship of Things  
As with other critical receptions of Rilke in the 1920s, Robert Musil’s commemorative 
address bases a defense of the poet’s work largely on the intimacy and familiarity it 
facilitates among humans and things. Musil elaborates, in particular, on Rilke’s 
sophisticated use of metaphor (Gleichnis) to achieve a dynamic interweaving of humans 
and things, amounting to not only an aesthetic effect, but also a transformative vision of 
the human with respect to its myriad interrelations with the nonhuman world. As he 
explains it toward the end of the speech, Rilke’s most important poetic achievement 
might be best understood as a novel inversion of the longstanding, poetic tradition of 
personification and anthropomorphism: 
Bei Rilke werden nicht die Steine oder Bäume zu Menschen – wie sie es immer 
and überall getan haben, wo Gedichte gemacht wurden –, sondern auch die 
Menschen werden zu Dingen oder namenlosen Wesen und gewinnen damit erst 
ihre letzte, von einem ebenso namenlosen Hauch bewegte Menschlichkeit.93 
 
In Musil’s account, Rilke’s poetic representations of humans and things amount to a 
strangely reciprocal animation. Not only are things animated in the likeness of humans, 
but humans too are animated with a new “breath” (Hauch) of life in their likeness to 
things. In contrast to more traditional Western notions of the artist as creator, who 
breathes life into inanimate things, Musil evokes a world of animistic magic, whereby 
humans are transformed through their mimetic resemblance and contact with things. 
That humans and nonhumans can become each other’s likenesses in Rilke’s 
poetry corresponds, for Musil, to a particular “feeling about life” (Lebensgefühl) in which 
persons and things are seen not as distinct and opposing categories but rather in terms of 
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their fluid interactions and interrelations.94 As Musil suggests, this sense of a metaphoric 
likeness between humans and things in Rilke is not merely the product of poetic 
technique; it also forms the anthropological basis of the poet’s understanding of art and 
life. In a long 1900 poem, “Fragmente aus verlorenen Tagen,” republished in the 1902 
edition of Buch der Bilder, Rilke provides a striking account of the power of mimetic 
resemblances. Comparing momentary, daily experiences to various thingly entities––over 
a long list of similes (“Wie Vögel, [...] wie Gassen, [...] wie Trunkene [...] wie volle 
Rosen [...]”)––Rilke concludes the poem:  
Und mancher Tage Stunden waren so. 
Als formte wer mein Abbild irgendwo, 
um es mit Nadeln langsam zu mißhandeln. 
Ich spürte jede Spitze seiner Spiele, 
und war, als ob ein Regen auf mich fiele, 
in welchem alle Dinge sich verwandeln. (KA I, 321–22) 
 
Relating poetic metaphor to the magical technique of injuring or destroying the image of 
an enemy, Rilke’s poem attributes a mimetic power to objects comparable to late 
nineteenth-century anthropological accounts of “imitative magic.”95 In Rilke’s poetry up 
to around 1900, he would still attempt to evoke and illustrate this type of magical 
interrelationship with things in the first-version voice. After about 1902, however, he 
recognized the necessity of artificially staging and performing such mimetic relations, by 
addressing the reader directly in second person (as in the poem “Die Rosenschale,” 
discussed above). The motivations and representational strategies informing this shift will 
be investigated in detail in what follows. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
94 Ibid., p. 1238–39. 
 
95 For the classic account of “imitative” or “homeopathic” magic, beginning with a discussion of 
this very technique, see James George Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion 
[1890ff.], abridged 1922 ed. (London: Penguin, 1996), pp. 15–45. 
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The close connection between anthropology and aesthetics is evident throughout 
Rilke’s letters and essays, and takes shape most strongly through his reflections on 
things. In his early writings, Rilke discusses art and the artist not in opposition to life, but 
as a privileged “Lebensform” that entails a particular attitude and quasi-animistic 
relationship to the world of things. As he explains it in “Moderne Lyrik,” a lecture from 
1898: 
Kunst erscheint mir als das Bestreben eines Einzelnen, über das Enge und 
Dunkle hin, eine Verständigung zu finden mit allen Dingen, mit den kleinsten, 
wie mit den größten, und in solchen beständigen Zwiegesprächen näher zu 
kommen zu den letzten leisen Quellen alles Lebens. [...] So sehen Sie also, daß 
Künstler nichtnur [sic] kein Ausgeschalteter des Lebens ist, sondern, daß 
vielmehr die Kunst sich darstellt als eine bewegtere – ich möchte sagen 
unbescheidenere Lebensform, indem der Schaffende auch an die schweigsamsten 
Dinge mit seinen flehenden Fragen herantritt und, mit keiner Antwort zufrieden, 
immer weiter muß. (KA IV, 65) 
 
In Rilke’s description, the artist’s closeness to the world of things bears a strong 
resemblance to the behavior of children, who might likewise attempt dialog with 
inanimate objects. As Rilke explains further in “Über Kunst” (1898), art as a “way of 
being” (Art zu sein) or “perceiving” (Lebensanschauung) also involves a release from 
personal intent and control, and a denial of the value and ownership of objects, which 
bespeaks the childlike as well:   
[D]iese Art zu sein hat etwas Naives und Unwillkürliches und ähnelt jener Zeit 
des Unbewussten an, deren bestes Merkmal ein freudiges Vertrauen ist: der 
Kindheit. [...] Kein Ding ist wichtiger als ein anderes in den Händen des Kindes. 
Es spielt mit einer goldenen Brosche oder mit einer weißen Wiesenblume. Es 
wird in der Ermüdung beide gleich achtlos fallen lassen und vergessen, wie beide 
ihm gleich glänzend schienen in dem Lichte seiner Freude. Es hat nicht die Angst 
des Verlustes. Die Welt ist ihm noch die schöne Schale, darin nichts verloren 
geht” (KA IV, 116). 
 
A similar mode of disinterested, precategorical perception reappears in Rilke’s writings 
on Rodin and Cézanne between 1902 and 1907, and can be productively compared to the 
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poet’s project of “learning to see” (sehen lernen) as articulated in the Malte novel and 
contemporaneous letters. What these earlier texts underscore, however, is that this 
manner of apprehending things is not merely a matter of aesthetic training. It also 
involves a particular anthropological conception of the artist, whose aesthetic production 
and perception comes close to the child’s relationship to things.96 
More so than Cézanne, Rodin is the artist that for Rilke best represents the 
integration of art and life under the Lebensform of the artist. As I will argue in the next 
section of the chapter, Rilke’s Paris writings on Rodin go about fashioning the sculptor as 
the paragon of the modern artist, who remains centered on artistic production and 
impervious to the distractions and violent intrusions of modern urban life. For Rilke, 
Rodin’s way of being, as a craftsman or “Handwerker,” involves a mimetic closeness to 
the world of things that permits him a centeredness and resistance to the overwhelming 
sights, sounds, speeds, and sicknesses of the city. Rodin’s reserve of humanity (as Musil 
would later suggest for Rilke as well) lies in his closeness to things, his ability to perceive 
humans as things, and to become even thing-like himself. As Rilke describes it in a 1903 
letter to Lou Andreas-Salomé, “ganz offen ist [Rodin] wenn er bei Dingen ist, oder wo 
Thiere und Menschen ihn still und wie Dinge berühren. […] Da es ihm gegeben ward, 
Dinge zu sehen in allem, erwarb er die Möglichkeit: Dinge zu bauen; denn dieses ist 
seine große Kunst” (Bw 92–93). Rodin’s disinterested yet intimate apprehension of 
things, which Rilke elsewhere relates to the child, thus enables him to produce things of 
his own that instantiate a similar encounter for the viewer of the work. With this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
96 A related statement can be found in Rilke’s 1903 monograph on the Worpswede landscape 
painters: “Sie wollen das Beste erreichen und sie sind Kinder geworden. Sie sehen alles in einem 
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production of sculptural things, as Rilke argues in yet another 1903 letter to Andreas-
Salomé, Rodin also succeeds in generating a solid material reality that exists in 
opposition to the restlessness of modern life:  
er [hat] Dinge gemacht und hat sie um sich gestellt, Dinge und Dinge; so wuchs 
um ihn eine Wirklichkeit, eine weite stille Verwandtschaft von Dingen, die ihn 
mit anderen und älteren Dingen verband, bis er selbst aus einer Dynastie großer 
Dinge zu stammen schien: seine Ruhe und seine Geduld kommt von daher, sein 
angstloses, dauerndes Alter, seine Überlegenheit über die Menschen, die viel zu 
beweglich sind, zu schwankend, zu sehr spielend mit den Gleichgewichten, in 
denen er, fast unbewußt, ruht. (Bw 102–3) 
 
Rilke’s important articulation here, of a “kinship of things” (eine Verwandtschaft 
von Dingen), allows him to link Rodin and his work to a diverse array of aesthetic objects 
of both present and past. Through the metaphor of familial relations, Rilke brings 
together synchronic and diachronic temporalities in the interrelations of things: the artist 
produces a “kinship of things” through his body of work in the present; in addition, he 
and his work also bear a familial resemblance to a whole “dynasty” of much earlier 
works. The source of this kinship, as I will show, lies in the anthropological connection 
that Rilke makes between phylo- and ontogenetic stages of human development. The 
modern artist’s ability to see “things” (Dinge) in humans and nonhumans alike, along 
with the artist’s own kinship with the world of things (both of which Rilke relates to the 
child) exhibit a further connection to the relations to objects found in the earliest periods 
of human history. In preserving the child’s relationship with things as a particular 
Lebensform, the modern artist thus also approximates a more primordial interrelation 
between humans and nonhumans, and gives these relations a lasting, material form in the 
production of art-objects. In this manner, Rilke’s anthropological grounding of the artist 
and artistic production enables him to bridge vast historical distances and to attempt a 
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resuscitation of a mimetic kinship between humans and things through aesthetic 
production in his present day. 
In his 1905/06 lecture on Rodin, Rilke rearticulates this anthropological 
conception of art, but shifts attention from production to the reception of art-works. In 
what amounts to a complete reorientation in the approach to Rodin’s art, Rilke conveys to 
his audience an encounter with the sculptor’s works as akin to a return to the child’s 
animistic interactions with inanimate objects. Withholding Rodin’s name for the entire 
introduction of his talk, Rilke avoids the usual questions of aesthetics and beauty, and 
evokes instead the child’s relationship and attachment to things: 
Wenn es Ihnen möglich ist, kehren Sie mit einem Teile Ihres entwöhnten und 
erwachsenen Gefühls zu irgend einem Ihrer Kinder-Dinge zurück, mit dem Sie 
viel umgingen. Gedenken Sie, ob es irgend etwas gab, was Ihnen näher, 
vertrauter und nötiger war, als so ein Ding. Ob nicht alles – außer ihm – imstande 
war, Ihnen weh oder unrecht zu tun, Sie mit einem Schmerz zu erschrecken oder 
mit einer Ungewißheit zu verwirren? Wenn Güte unter Ihren ersten Erfahrungen 
war und Zutraun und Nichtalleinsein – verdanken Sie es nicht ihm? War es nicht 
ein Ding, mit dem Sie zuerst Ihr kleines Herz geteilt haben wie ein Stück Brot, 
das reichen mußte für zwei? [...] Dieser kleine vergessene Gegenstand, der alles 
zu bedeuten bereit war, machte Sie mit Tausendem vertraut, indem er tausend 
Rollen spielte, Tier war und Baum und König und Kind, – und als er zurücktrat, 
war das alles da. Dieses Etwas, so wertlos es war, hat Ihre Beziehungen zur Welt 
vorbereitet [...]. (KA IV, 455) 
 
By appealing to his audience’s memories of childhood, Rilke attempts to uncover from an 
earlier ontogenetic stage of development a common, animistic relationship with things––
comprised of both an early, psychological identification with a particular object and the 
child’s capacity for mimetic play. Rilke acknowledges these childhood relations to things 
as part of a primary, developmental stage that is eventually surpassed. To the audience of 
his Rodin lecture, however, he also asserts that a similar relationship might be recaptured 
in their own experience of art-objects. The childlike relationship with things that Rilke 
associates with the Lebensform of the artist can be had by others as well, he suggests: in 
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this case, through the viewer’s experience of Rodin’s sculptural works.97 
As Rilke describes it near the beginning of the lecture, this childlike relationship 
with things also bears a deeper connection to a more primordial state of human existence: 
Mir ist zu Mute wie einem, der Sie an Ihre Kindheit erinnern soll. Nein, nicht nur 
an Ihre: an alles, was je Kindheit war. Denn es gilt, Erinnerungen in Ihnen 
aufzuwecken, die nicht die Ihren sind, die älter sind als Sie; Beziehungen sind 
wiederherzustellen und Zusammenhänge zu erneuern, die weit vor Ihnen liegen. 
(KA IV, 454) 
 
For Rilke, the child’s identification and mimetic play with things corresponds with the 
early history of human relations to things in a phylogenetic sense. In response to his main 
questions in the lecture––“Wodurch sind überhaupt Dinge mit uns verwandt? Welches ist 
ihre Geschichte?” (KA IV, 456)––Rilke offers an anthropological fiction to account for a 
primordial kinship between humans and things: 
Sehr frühe schon hat man Dinge geformt, mühsam, nach dem Vorbild der 
vorgefundenen natürlichen Dinge; man hat Werkzeuge gemacht und Gefäße, und 
es muß eine seltsame Erfahrung gewesen sein, Selbstgemachtes so anerkannt zu 
sehen, so gleichberechtigt, so wirklich neben dem, was war. Da entstand etwas, 
blindlings, in wilder Arbeit und trug an sich die Spuren eines bedrohten offenen 
Lebens, war noch warm davon, – aber kaum war es fertig und fortgestellt, so 
ging es schon ein unter die Dinge, nahm ihre Gelassenheit an, ihre stille Würde 
und sah nur noch wie entrückt mit wehmütigem Einverstehen aus seinem Dauern 
herüber. Dieses Erlebnis war so merkwürdig und so stark, daß man begreift, 
wenn es auf einmal Dinge gab, die nur um seinetwillen gemacht waren. Denn 
vielleicht waren die frühesten Götterbilder Anwendungen dieser Erfahrung, 
Versuche, aus Menschlichem und Tierischem, das man sah, ein Nicht-
Mitsterbendes zu formen, ein Dauerndes, ein Nächsthöheres: ein Ding. (KA IV, 
456) 
 
The mimetic kinship with things that Rilke claims for the child and the artist is thus given 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
97 For more on the complex rhetorical and didactic strategies of Rilke’s lectures, see Torsten 
Hoffmann, “Rilke als Redner: Publikumskommunikation und Kunstvermittlung in den Vorträgen 
‘Moderne Lyrik’ (1898) and ‘Vom Werke Auguste Rodins’ (1905/1907),” Zeitschrift für 
Germanistik 20.3 (2010): pp. 543–62. As Hoffmann correctly notes: “Das Hauptanliegen seines 
Vortrags besteht weniger in der Information über Rodin als vielmehr in der Vermittlung einer 
ästhetisch-anthropologischen Grundhaltung, die Rodin beispielhaft verkörpert und die Rilke zur 
Orientierung und Nachahmung empfiehlt” (p. 544). 
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a speculative origin in the early production of man-made objects. In Rilke’s account, the 
human’s mimetic capacity for producing imitative representations of nature is quickly set 
aside, and replaced by a more intense fascination with the mimetic correspondences 
between human and thing. The uncanny experience––that man-made things can bear the 
warmth and traces of their human makers, and, at the same time, mark an absolute 
distance and indifference to their mortal lives––becomes, for Rilke, the originary impulse 
behind the production of tools, idols, and artworks. By first appealing to the child’s 
interactions with objects, Rilke attempts to situate for his audience a reception of Rodin’s 
sculpture not in terms of aesthetic mimesis, that is, as imitative representations of 
external nature, but rather in terms of their relational kinship with humans and other 
objects. By grounding this mimetic relationship in the above anthropological fiction, 
Rilke adds a temporal, historical dimension to this “kinship of things,” providing a 
phylogenetic account of its emergence, and positioning the man-made thing as the 
immortal bearer of mimetic correspondences (ein ähnliches Ding). Thus for Rilke, 
Rodin’s ability to produce art-objects, in tune with a childlike experience of things, links 
him and his work to a more primordial kinship among humans and things, which 
originates in the earliest human, artistic production.   
In writings related to his work on the “mimetic faculty,” Walter Benjamin would 
likewise employ the metaphor of kinship in his historical descriptions of mimetic 
correspondences among humans and things. As with Rilke, Benjamin’s account suggests 
that these similarities are not merely the subjective fantasies of individuals, but rather can 
also have a wider, objective meaning for a given culture. As Blair Ogden has recently 
worked out, Benjamin’s appeal to family resemblances in writings preliminary to “Über 
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das mimetische Vermögen” helps to articulate two central aspects of his theory of 
mimesis: (1) that mimetic similarities can straddle the boundary between nature and 
culture; and (2) that these similarities occur in time in both a diachronic and synchronic 
fashion.98 Benjamin writes: 
Der Ansatz sieht so aus: Man geht von der »Ähnlichkeit« aus. Man sucht sich 
klar zu machen, daß was wir von Ähnlichkeiten wahrnehmen können, etwa in 
den Gesichtern untereinander, in Architekturen und Pflanzenformen, in gewissen 
Wolkenformen und Hautausschlägen, nur winzige Teilansichten aus einem 
Kosmos der Ähnlichkeit sind. Man geht weiter und sucht sich klar zu machen, 
daß diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht nur durch zufällige Vergleiche unsererseits in die 
Dinge hineintragen werden, sondern daß sie alle – wie die Ähnlichkeit zwischen 
Eltern und Kindern – Auswirkungen einer eigens in ihnen wirkenden, einer 
mimetischen Kraft sind. Und ferner: daß die Gegenstände nicht nur, die Objekte, 
dieser mimetischen Kraft ohne Zahl sind, sondern daß dies gleicherweise von den 
Subjekten, von den mimetischen Zentren gilt, deren jedes Wesen eine Mehrzahl 
besitzen könnte. Zu alledem hat man zu bedenken, daß weder die mimetischen 
Zentren noch die mimetischen Gegenstände, ihre Objekte, im Zeitlauf 
unveränderlich die gleichen geblieben sein könnten, daß im Lauf der 
Jahrhunderte wie die mimetische Kraft so auch die mimetische 
Anschauungsweise aus gewissen Feldern, vielleicht um sich in andere zu 
ergießen, geschwunden sein könnte.99 
 
As with family resemblances, which depend on both genetic inheritance and socially 
learned behavior, Benjamin assesses a whole “Kosmos der Ähnlichkeit” that arises not 
only out of the biological reproduction of similarities (as in people’s faces and plant 
forms), but also through modes of mimetic perception that are culturally learned and 
which draw non-arbitrary connections among a whole array of natural and cultural 
objects (including buildings, cloud formations, and skin diseases, along with plants and 
humans). And as with family resemblances, these mimetic similarities can manifest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
98 See Blair Ogden, “Benjamin, Wittgenstein, and Philosophical Anthropology: A Reevaluation 
of the Mimetic Faculty,” Grey Room 39 (Spring 2010): pp. 57–73, here, pp. 61–62. 
 
99 Walter Benjamin, “Zur Astrologie” [1932], in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 6, ed. Rolf 
Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), pp. 192–93 
(my emphasis). Benjamin likely took down this fragment in 1932, as preliminary to his 1933 
texts, “Lehre vom Ähnlichen,” and “Über das mimetische Vermögen.”  
	  
	   68	  
themselves both synchronically, at a given historical moment, and diachronically, as 
subject to change over longer historical periods. 
Benjamin’s later texts, “Lehre vom Ähnlichen,” and “Über das mimetische 
Vermögen,” make clear the impossibility of a significant remainder in the present of any 
“Kosmos der Ähnlichkeit” from earlier world-views. In modernity, as Benjamin explains, 
there can be found only the most minimal residues of the magical correspondences rooted 
in earlier sensuous similarities among humans and things. Building on his earlier 
philosophy of language, Benjamin acknowledges that our powers of mimetic recognition 
and behavior have been purged of their earlier magical form and relocated into the system 
of writing and language, as “das vollkommenste Archiv der unsinnlichen Ähnlichkeit.”100 
While Rilke and Benjamin share similar understandings of mimesis as a primary human 
tendency (still evident in ontogenetic development), they differ significantly on the 
possibilities of sensuous, mimetic correspondences within modernity. Benjamin’s 
“mimetic faculty” quickly slips over into a theory of non-sensuous similarity in language. 
Rilke, by contrast, imagines the possibility of mimetic correspondences rooted in 
sensuous similarity. With the onset of modernity, however, Rilke imagines an historical 
transformation in the mimetic relations between humans and things, in which a 
pathological form of mimesis develops as the underside of a more positive kinship with 
things. The production and reception of art-objects, as Rilke maintains, offers one 
possibility for resuscitating a mimetic closeness with things, which resists the damaging 
consequences of modernity. At the same time, however, Rilke’s deliberate strategies of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
100 See Walter Benjamin, “Über das mimetische Vermögen” [1933], in Gesammelte Schriften, 
vol. 2.1, pp. 210–13, here p. 213. 
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rhetorically staging animistic encounters with art-objects in the Rodin lectures and 
performing the mimetic power of things in the Neue Gedichte suggest his implicit 
knowledge that such relations were already lost in modern life and instead had to be 
artificially produced through poetic means. 
While the interplay of aesthetics and anthropology is a constant in Rilke’s 
consideration of things, this more historical notion of a “kinship of things” emerges only 
gradually in his writing. In early works before 1900, Rilke’s notion of a kinship between 
humans and things remained couched in religious, monistic terms. In “Das Buch vom 
mönchischen Leben”(1899) from Das Stunden-Buch, Rilke’s speaker intends to find 
oneness with God by joining the order of things, by becoming like their “brother” 
(Bruder): “Ich bin auf der Welt zu gering und doch nicht klein genug, / um vor dir zu sein 
wie ein Ding, / dunkel und klug,” and later proclaims to God, “Ich finde dich in allen 
diesen Dingen, / denen ich gut und wie ein Bruder bin” (KA I, 162–63, 168). Elsewhere 
in Das Stunden-Buch, as well as in other contemporaneous poems, Rilke resorts to 
romantic tropes of musical resonance and song in order to imagine an ideal mergence and 
communication with things.101 In a famous poem from the early collection Mir zur Feier 
(1899), Rilke situates the ideal language of a “singing of things” in relation to the 
prominent Sprachskepsis of the time:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
101 See, for example, “Das Buch von der Pilgerschaft” (1901): “es ist ein großes Wunder in der 
Welt: / ich fühle: alles Leben wird gelebt. / Wer lebt es denn? Sind das die Dinge, die / wie eine 
ungespielte Melodie / im Abend wie in einer Harfe stehn?” (KA I, 211); and “Am Rande der 
Nacht” (1900) in Das Buch der Bilder: “Meine Stube und diese Weite, / wach über nachtendem 
Land, – / ist Eines. Ich bin eine Saite, / über rauschende breite / Resonanzen gespannt. / Die 
Dinge sind Geigenleiber, / von murrendem Dunkel voll; / […] / Ich soll / silbern erzittern: dann 
wird / Alles unter mir leben, / und was in den Dingen irrt, / wird nach dem Lichte streben” (KA I, 
283); see as well the description of a “gemeinsame Melodie” between human and thing in the 
1898 text, “Notizen zur Melodie der Dinge” (KA IV, 106). 
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Ich fürchte mich so vor der Menschen Wort. 
Sie sprechen alles so deutlich aus: 
Und dieses heißt Hund und jenes heißt Haus, 
und hier ist Beginn und das Ende ist dort. 
[…] 
Ich will immer warnen und wehren: Bleibt fern. 
Die Dinge singen hör ich so gern. 
Ihr rührt sie an: sie sind starr und stumm. 
Ihr bringt mir alle die Dinge um. (KA I, 106)102 
 
In general, Rilke’s early poetics of things belongs to a monistic or pantheistic 
world-view, in which the lives of man, nature, and things are connected under a single 
unifying principle. The oneness of inner and outer, subject and object, person and thing, 
originates in the anthropomorphic projection of inner emotions out onto the nonhuman 
world. Explaining the role of the artist in his 1898 lecture “Moderne Lyrik,” Rilke writes: 
“Die Geheimnisse der Dinge verschmelzen in seinem Innern mit seinen eigenen tiefsten 
Empfindungen und werden ihm, so als ob es eigene Sehnsüchte wären, laut”(KA IV, 65). 
According to Rilke’s early aesthetics––as articulated in “Moderne Lyrik” and elsewhere–
–the representation of nonhuman things becomes thus the outer appearance or pretense 
(Vorwand) for the expression of an inner emotional state (Geständnis). Things present 
themselves only in order to become one with the artist’s subjective expression:  
Die Kunst ist der dunkle Wunsch aller Dinge. Sie wollen alle Bilder unserer 
Geheimnisse sein. […] Das ist das Rufen, das der Künstler vernimmt: der 
Wunsch der Dinge, seine Sprache zu sein. Er soll sie aus den schweren 
unsinnigen Beziehungen der Konvention in die großen Zusammenhänge seines 
Wesens heben. (KA IV, 91–92) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
102 On the connection between Sprachskepsis around 1900 and an idealized “language of things,” 
cf. Hugo von Hofmannsthal, “Ein Brief” [1902], in Erzählungen, Erfundene Gespräche und 
Briefe, Reisen, Gesammelte Werke in zehn Einzelbänden, vol. 7, ed. Bernd Schoeller (Frankfurt 
am Main: Fischer, 1979), pp. 461–72. While Rilke’s 1899 poem gives a similar voice to a crisis 
of language, the alternative it offers bears far more a regressive resemblance to the Romantic 
language or “singing” of things found in Eichendorff’s “Wünschelrute” (1835), for example. 
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During this early period of Rilke’s writing, the closeness between humans and things 
occurs through the dissolving of the external object into an interior subjectivity. Here, the 
mechanism of animating the thing, i.e. the anthropomorphizing projection of the human 
subject, most resembles the Einfühlungsästhetik of the late nineteenth century.103 
As Torsten Hoffmann has helpfully summarized, Rilke departs from his earlier 
monistic and pantheistic views upon his first serious engagement with the visual arts after 
1900.104 Through his study of the Worpswede landscape painters, Rilke grew to replace 
his earlier, aesthetic notions of a pan-subjective oneness with the world with a view of the 
radical foreignness and sublime indifference of nature in relation to man. During his off 
and on stay at the artist colony near the north German area of Worpswede between 1900 
and 1902, Rilke developed a familiarity with the contemporary work of various, regional 
landscape painters, such as Fritz Overbeck, Otto Modersohn, and Heinrich Vogeler, as 
well as the surrounding environment and peasant milieu that were their subject-matter. In 
his 1903 Worpswede monograph, as well as in an important preliminary sketch from 
1902, “Von der Landschaft,” Rilke builds on these experiences to develop a speculative 
history of landscape painting, which also considers the changing historical relationship 
between humans and things. In “Von der Landschaft,” Rilke describes how the 
representation of landscape changes historically from an indifferent backdrop for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
103 See, for example, Robert Vischer’s account of an empathetic “Verschmelzung von Subjekt 
und Objekt” and “der pantheistische Drang zur Vereinigung mit der Welt” in his Über das 
optische Formgefühl: Ein Beitrag zur Ästhetik (Leipzig: H. Credner, 1873), quoted here, p. 28; 
and the aesthetic theory of empathy in Theodor Lipps, Ästhetik: Psychologie des Schönen und der 
Kunst, 2 vols. (Hamburg and Leipzig: Voss, 1903–1906). 
 
104 See his “Nachwort” to Rainer Maria Rilke, Schriften zur Literatur und Kunst, ed. Torsten 
Hoffmann (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2009), pp. 249–54. 
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human body in the arts of antiquity to the abstract regions of heaven, hell, and earth in 
Medieval painting, and from the emotionally expressive landscapes of the Renaissance to 
modern landscape painting that sees nature, “als ein Fernes und Fremdes, als ein 
Entlegenes und Liebloses, das sich ganz in sich vollzieht” (KA IV, 208–13, here 211). In 
the background landscape of Leonardo’s Mona Lisa, Rilke identifies the historical shift 
from a representational aesthetics that understands landscape to be a pretense (Vorwand) 
for the confession of human emotion (Geständnis), to a representation of nature in 
landscape as, “das Andere, das Teilnahmslose,” as sublimely indifferent to the lives of 
humans (KA IV, 210–12). Through his speculative history of landscape painting, Rilke 
thus at once relegates his previous aesthetics of Vorwand und Geständnis to an earlier 
historical period and claims for the present an increasing alienation between man and 
nature. 
In Rilke’s account, this history of pictorial representation corresponds closely 
with the actual historical relations between humans and things. The disappearance of an 
aesthetics of empathy and subjective projection in contemporary landscape painting 
suggests, for Rilke, an historical recognition of the radical distancing and estrangement 
between man and nature in the present––a mutual drawing apart and reification of human 
and nonhuman alike. He writes in “Von der Landschaft”: 
In diesem Aufwachsen der Landschafts-Kunst zu einem langsamen Landschaft-
Werden der Welt liegt eine weite menschliche Entwicklung. Der Inhalt dieser 
Bilder, der so absichtslos aus Schauen und Arbeit entsprang, spricht uns davon, 
daß eine Zukunft begonnen hat mitten in unserer Zeit: daß der Mensch nichtmehr 
der Gesellige ist, der unter seinesgleichen im Gleichgewicht geht, und auch 
derjenige nichtmehr, um dessentwillen Abend und Morgen wird und Nähe und 
Ferne. Daß er unter die Dinge gestellt ist wie ein Ding, unendlich allein und daß 
alle Gemeinschaft aus Dingen und Menschen sich zurückgezogen hat in die 
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As Rilke explains in the Worpswede monograph, the representation of humans as thing-
like in contemporary landscape painting is not, however, the reflection of an altogether 
negative situation. It marks as well a challenge to an anthropocentric and instrumental 
view of nature, by placing man on the order of things according to a much larger scale of 
historical relations: 
Es scheint immer wieder, daß die Natur nichts davon weiß, daß wir sie bebauen 
und uns eines kleinen Teils ihrer Kräfte ängstlich bedienen. Wir steigern in 
manchen Teilen ihre Fruchtbarkeit und ersticken an anderen Stellen mit dem 
Pflaster unserer Städte wundervolle Frühlinge, die bereit waren, aus den Krumen 
zu steigen. Wir führen die Flüsse zu unseren Fabriken hin, aber sie wissen nicht 
von den Maschinen, die sie treiben. Wir spielen mit dunklen Kräften, die wir mit 
unseren Namen nicht erfassen können, wie Kinder mit dem Feuer spielen, und es 
scheint einen Augenblick, als hätte alle Energie bisher ungebraucht in den 
Dingen gelegen, bis wir kamen, um sie auf unser flüchtiges Leben und seine 
Bedürfnisse anzuwenden. Aber immer und immer wieder in Jahrtausenden 
schütteln die Kräfte ihre Namen ab und erheben sich, wie ein unterdrückter 
Stand, gegen ihre kleinen Herren, ja nicht einmal gegen sie, – sie stehen einfach 
auf, und die Kulturen fallen von den Schultern der Erde, die wieder groß ist und 
weit und allein mit ihren Meeren, Bäumen und Sternen. [...] Der Mensch verlor 
seine Wichtigkeit, er trat zurück vor den großen, einfachen, unerbittlichen 
Dingen, die ihn überragten und überdauerten. Man mußte deshalb nicht darauf 
verzichten, ihn darzustellen, im Gegenteil: durch die gewissenhafte und 
gründliche Beschäftigung mit der Natur hatte man gelernt, ihn besser und 
gerechter zu sehen. Er war kleiner geworden: nichtmehr der Mittelpunkt der 
Welt; er war größer geworden: denn man schaute ihn mit denselben Augen an 
wie die Natur, er galt nicht mehr als ein Baum, aber er galt viel, weil der Baum 
viel galt. (KA IV, 309–13) 
 
That man could no longer see himself to be reflected in what seemed an increasingly 
alien and indifferent nature, or be depicted as such in the visual arts, was thus, for Rilke, 
not only a narrative of historical loss, but also an uncovering of a deeper, ahistorical 
commonality among humans and things as discrete elements of the natural world. 
Through Rilke’s study of the Worpswede painters and his observations of the 
north German peasants of the coastal plains, he developed an understanding of a deeper 
commonality between humans and things in terms of the unconscious mimicry and 
mimetic resemblances that had arisen over long periods of human association with a 
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natural environment. In the case of the north German peasants, they appear shaped by 
their strenuous labors on the coastal plains: 
Alle haben nur ein Gesicht: das harte, gespannte Gesicht der Arbeit, [...] Man 
sieht Arme, die das Heben schwerer Dinge übermäßig verlängert hat und Rücken 
von Frauen und Greisen, die krumm geworden sind wie Bäume, die immer in 
demselben Sturm gestanden haben. [...] Im Frühling, wenn das Torfmachen 
beginnt, erheben sie sich mit dem Hellwerden und bringen den ganzen Tag, von 
Nässe triefend, durch das Mimikry ihrer schwarzen, schlammigen Kleidung dem 
Moore angepaßt, in der Torfgrube zu, aus der sie die bleischwere Moorerde 
emporschaufeln. (KA IV, 321–23) 
 
Rilke repeats a similar claim in an August 12, 1904 letter collected posthumously in the 
popular Briefe an einen jungen Dichter: “Wir sind ins Leben gesetzt, als in das Element, 
dem wir am meisten entsprechen, und wir sind überdies durch jahrtausendelange 
Anpassung diesem Leben so ähnlich geworden, daß wir, wenn wir stille halten, durch ein 
glückliches Mimikry von allem, was uns umgibt, kaum zu unterscheiden sind.”105 
As Rilke indicates slightly earlier in the Worpswede book, this positive mimetic 
resemblance to the natural surroundings is, by contrast, entirely missing for the residents 
of the modern city:  
Ähnlich wie die Sprache nichts mehr mit den Dingen gemein hat, welche sie 
nennt, so haben die Gebärden der meisten Menschen, die in den Städten leben, 
ihre Beziehung zur Erde verloren, sie hängen gleichsam in der Luft, schwanken 
hin und her und finden keinen Ort, wo sie sich niederlassen könnten. (KA IV, 
315) 
 
Combining the rhetoric of the turn-of-the-century Sprachkrise with a nostalgic critique of 
urban life, Rilke recognizes the strong, modern separations between word and thing, man 
and nature. That the hard lives of north German peasants could bring about a positive, 
mimetic resemblance with nature was but a peripheral and atavistic occurrence in the new 
age of the modern metropolis and could only be evoked as a regressive fantasy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
105 Rilke, Briefe an einen jungen Dichter (Leipzig: Insel, 1929), p. 45.  
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Instead, Rilke imagines the inherent mimetic behavior of humans to be 
dangerously rearticulated within the modern city. In contrast to the tough mimetic 
adaptation to nature of the north German peasants, Rilke describes the city-dweller’s self-
destructive struggle to adapt to the modern technological environment, crowds, and 
shocks of the city. Describing the people of Paris in a July 18, 1903 letter, Rilke writes: 
sie waren Vorübergehende unter Vorübergehenden, alleingelassen und ungestört 
in ihrem Schicksal. Man fing sie höchstens als Eindruck auf und betrachtete sie 
mit ruhiger sachlicher Neugier wie eine neue Art Thier, dem die Noth besondere 
Organe ausgebildet hat, Hunger- und Sterbeorgane. Und sie trugen das trostlose, 
mißfarbene Mimicry der übergroßen Städte und hielten aus unter dem Fuß jedes 
Tages der sie trat wie zähe Käfer, dauerten, als ob sie noch auf etwas warten 
müssten, zuckten wie Stücke eines zerhauenen großen Fisches, der schon fault 
aber immer noch lebt. [...] O was ist das für eine Welt. Stücke, Stücke von 
Menschen, Theile von Thieren, Überreste von gewesenen Dingen und alles noch 
bewegt, wie in einem unheimlichen Winde durcheinandertreibend, getragen und 
tragend, fallend und sich überholend im Fall. (Bw 67, my emphasis) 
 
For Rilke, the human tendency toward mimetic behavior and perception is not altogether 
lost under modern social and experiential conditions; rather, it reappears in pathological 
and grotesque forms that mimic the dehumanizing turmoil and fragmentation of the 
modern city. Like Roger Caillois’s later account of mimicry as the “mimetic assimilation 
of animate beings into the inanimate realm,” Rilke’s comparison with animals and insects 
underscores the ambivalence of the drive to imitate one’s surroundings, which can easily 
slip from a strategy of survival to a means of self-destruction.106 
      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
106 Cf. Roger Caillois, “Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia” [1935], in The Edge of 
Surrealism: A Roger Caillois Reader, trans. Claudine Frank and Camille Naish (Durham and 
London: Duke UP, 2003), pp. 91–103, quoted here, p. 102. Throughout the article, Caillois 
discusses insects whose adaptive mimicry appears to make them more susceptible to prey and 
death. Rilke reuses his image of the squashed beetle in a similar manner in his 1910 Malte novel: 
“Wie ein Käfer, auf den man tritt, so quillst du aus dir hinaus, und dein bißchen obere Härte und 
Anpassung ist ohne Sinn” (KA III, 507). 
	  
	   76	  
Rodin and the City 
In response to his fearful fantasies of self-destructive mimesis and mimicry in the modern 
city, Rilke, after 1902, approached his own poetic production and the sculpture of Rodin 
as artificial, aesthetic strategies for instantiating a controlled and more positive kinship 
with things. Through his firsthand study of Rodin’s sculptural practice and artworks 
(which he began in Paris in 1902), Rilke develops the fullest articulation of his 
anthropological conception of the artist as a maker of things and art-making as a 
resuscitation of a positive mimetic kinship between humans and things. Before presenting 
related, close readings of Rilke’s “thing-poems” in the final section of the chapter, the 
present section will trace out the development of Rilke’s creative fashioning of Rodin’s 
life and work in explicit contrast to the urban traumas that the poet experienced during 
his time in Paris. 
At the end of August 1902, Rilke left the small north German town of 
Westerwede, where he shared a home with his wife Clara and their young daughter, and 
relocated for his first extended stay in the city of Paris. Earlier that year, he had secured a 
book deal to produce a study of Auguste Rodin for art historian Richard Muther’s series 
of illustrated monographs, Die Kunst, and therefore required first-hand experience of 
Rodin’s working methods and his large body of sculptural work. During his first months 
in Paris, Rilke enjoyed a friendly acquaintanceship with the older artist, observed his 
daily sculptural practice, studio spaces, and everyday life, and was able to rapidly 
compose the text for his monograph between mid November and mid December of 1902. 
The book publication appeared in March of 1903, with an unchanged second edition in 
1904. An expanded third edition followed in 1907, which included a version of Rilke’s 
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later lecture on Rodin that he wrote in October 1905 and delivered in Prague and various 
German cities between late 1905 and March of 1906. As is well known, Rilke’s 
concentrated study of Rodin during this period not only resulted in a highly original 
reassessment of the sculptor’s work, but also had a profound impact on Rilke’s 
understanding of his own literary production. Most famously, Rilke’s related conceptions 
of the Ding and Kunst-Ding––which gained a new emphasis in relation to Rodin’s 
sculptural practice––would come to inform much of the poetic work in his two-part 
collection of the Neue Gedichte and Der Neuen Gedichte anderer Teil, published in 1907 
and 1908, respectively. Rilke’s well-known, yet obscure intention to produce “written 
things” (geschriebene Dinge) in analogue to the “plastic things” (plastische Dinge) of 
Rodin, continues to motivate many interpretations of these poetic works (Bw 105). 
As is also well known, Rilke’s first stay in Paris was important not just in terms of 
his highly productive encounter with the art and person of Rodin; it also marked the 
beginning of the poet’s traumatized responses to the modern metropolis, triggered by its 
human crowds, illnesses, and crime, as well as the shocks, noises, and excessive stimuli 
of the urban environment itself. Traces of Rilke’s ill ease in the city can be found 
throughout his correspondences from this period. And in his 1910 novel, Die 
Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge––a work that bears strong biographical 
correspondences to Rilke’s repeated stays in Paris, and, which has become a central 
literary account for the experience of urban modernity––the fragmentary narrative opens 
with a date and location corresponding to Rilke’s very first residence in the city: “11. 
September, rue Toullier” (KA III, 455).107 During Rilke’s early stay in Paris, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
	  
	   78	  
traumatic shocks of the city formed the opposite pole of experience to his calming study 
of Rodin and his work. 
That a close relationship exists between Rilke’s early experiences of the city and 
his interpretive fashioning of Rodin and his work has been consistently overlooked, 
however. As I will argue, Rilke’s understanding of Rodin and sculpture more generally––
as developed in his 1903 Rodin monograph, contemporaneous letters, and his later lecture 
on the sculptor––must be considered in terms of a reciprocal relationship with his initial 
traumas of living in Paris. Rilke’s most important experiences during his early stay in 
Paris––of Rodin’s steadfast and solitary work as a sculptor and the city’s tumultuous 
environment––can be understood as the basis for the poet’s conception of art as a making 
of things. In his writings on Rodin, Rilke develops a conception of art-making that is 
divorced from more traditional concerns of beauty and representation, considering it 
instead in terms of a craft-like production of concrete realities or “art-things” (Kunst-
Dinge), which take on their own emphatic and solid existence irrespective of their status 
as visual representation. For Rilke, the dramatic or psychological content of Rodin’s 
sculptures and their manner of presenting the human body are issues of comparatively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Rilke moved into his apartment at 11, rue Toullier on August 28, 1902, and stayed there until 
his wife’s arrival in Paris in early October. Early accounts of Rilke’s fears and distress in the city 
can be found, among other places, in his letters of August 31, October 17, and December 31, 
1902. See Rilke, Briefe aus den Jahren 1902 bis 1906, ed. Ruth Sieber-Rilke and Carl Sieber 
(Leipzig: Insel, 1929), pp. 21–25, 52–54, and 57–58. As Andreas Huyssen has convincingly 
argued, Rilke’s representation of traumatic experiences in his Malte novel (which overlap 
significantly with accounts in his early letters from Paris), cannot be entirely accounted for by the 
shocks of the city alone. Malte’s (and Rilke’s) psychological stress must also be understood as 
partially rooted in childhood traumas and an early inability to develop adequate psychological 
shields against external shocks. See Andreas Huyssen, “Paris/Childhood: The Fragmented Body 
in Rilke’s Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge,” in Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture 
of Amnesia (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 105–26.        
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little importance.108 Struggling amidst the overabundance of fearful shocks and stimuli of 
the urban environment, Rilke instead appeals to the self-sufficiency, permanence, and 
resilient thingness of Rodin’s sculptural works, which appear to transcend the 
ephemerality and distracting commotion of city life.  In Rodin’s sculpture, Rilke locates a 
counter-resistance to the disruptive and destabilizing forces of the city, a thingly force 
that emanates as well from the sculptor himself. Central to this conception of art, as I will 
work out in detail below, is Rilke’s emphasis on a mimetic resemblance between person 
and artwork, whereby the viewer takes on certain anthropomorphic qualities supposedly 
found in the “art-thing” itself––imparted to the work by the life and milieu of its maker. 
In this manner, art-making comes to resemble, for Rilke, an extensive social technology 
for asserting the agency of the artist out among the broader elements of a particular time 
and place.109  
The most important source for observing this development of Rilke’s conceptions 
of art-making and “art-things” can be found in his numerous letters from between 1902 
and 1903, which correspond with his first stay in Paris and his later return to the 
Worpswede area in the summer of 1903. And it is here, as well, that Rilke articulates his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
108 These were the primary concerns of contemporaneous monographs around 1900, which Rilke 
studied but departed from significantly. See Ursula Emde, Rilke und Rodin (Marburg and Lahn: 
Verlag des Kunstgeschichtlichen Seminars, 1949), pp. 96–102. 
 
109 In this sense, Rilke’s imaginative understanding of art resembles contemporaneous, 
anthropological theories of the effects of magical objects and techniques, such as Marcel Mauss 
[and Henri Hubert], A General Theory of Magic [1902], trans. Robert Brain (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2001). In 1913, Freud would note the animistic and magical residues still 
attached to contemporary understandings of art. See Freud, Totem und Tabu: Einige Überein-
stimmungen im Seelenleben der Wilden und der Neurotiker [1913] (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 
1991), p. 141: “In der Kunst allein kommt es noch vor, daß ein von Wünschen verzehrter Mensch 
etwas der Befriedigung Ähnliches macht und daß dieses Spielen – dank der künstlerischen 
Illusion – Affektwirkungen hervorruft, als wäre es etwas Reales.”    
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key notion of a “kinship of things.” Combining direct experiential accounts of life in 
Paris with more conceptual formations related to his thinking on Rodin, Rilke’s letters 
from this period reveal the importance of modern, urban experience for the understanding 
of Rodin’s art that he develops at length in the monograph. In the very same letters that 
document Rilke’s fears and anxieties with respect to his urban environment and its 
inhabitants, Rodin and his work are frequently evoked as a powerful “counterweight” 
(Gegengewicht) or “opposition” (Widerspruch) to the chaotic disturbances of the city.110 
After spending four months in Paris (and joined by his wife since early October 1902), 
Rilke wrote back to the Worpswede-based painter, Otto Modersohn:   
Paris (wir sagen es uns täglich) ist eine schwere, schwere, bange Stadt. Und die 
schönen Dinge, die da sind, machen mit ihrer strahlenden Ewigkeit doch nicht 
ganz gut, was man durch die Grausamkeit und Wirrheit der Gassen und die 
Unnatur der Gärten, Menschen und Dinge leiden muß. Paris hat für mein 
geängstigtes Gefühl etwas Unsäglich-Banges. Es hat sich ganz verloren, es rast 
wie ein bahnverirrter Stern auf irgendeinen schrecklichen Zusammenstoß zu. So 
müssen die Städte gewesen sein, von denen die Bibel erzählt, daß der Zorn 
Gottes hinter ihnen emporstieg, um sie zu überschütten und zu erschüttern. Zu 
alledem ist Rodin ein großer, ruhiger, mächtiger Widerspruch, die Zeit fließt von 
ihm ab, und wie er so arbeitet, alle, alle Tage seines langen Lebens, scheint er 
unantastbar, sakrosankt und beinahe namenlos. Er und sein Werk sind von 
derselben Art und Wesenheit wie die alten Kathedralen, wie die Dinge im 
Louvre.111 
 
The passage lays out two key features of the conception of art that Rilke develops in 
relation to Rodin’s work. First, against the fearful turmoil of the modern city, Rilke 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
110 In addition to the following block quotation, see as well Rilke, Briefe aus den Jahren 1902 bis 
1906, pp. 52–53: “Oh, wie hielt ich mich da [in Paris] mit Händen und Zähnen an den paar 
Dingen, die anders waren. An Rodin vor allem, der ein Greis ist und groß. An den Dingen, die er 
gemacht hat, an den stillen, in sich hineinschreienden Steinen. Ich war im Louvre vor der 
Gioconda. Ich war vor der Nike von Samothrake, die mir zum erstenmal ein Gefühl von 
Griechenland gab, von einer Zeit, wo man Siege so feiern wusste. Das waren Gegengewichte, 
gewiß. Aber die Atmosphäre drückte durch alles durch und drückt heute wie am ersten Tage” 
(emphasis added). 
 
111 Ibid., pp. 57–58 (emphasis added). 
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locates a limited form of resistance in a collection of interrelated, aesthetic objects (die 
schönen Dinge), which silently persist amidst the “confusion” (Wirrheit) and 
“artificiality” (Unnatur) of the urban environment. In this sense, Rodin’s more 
contemporary sculpture poses an atavistic connection to city’s medieval cathedrals and 
the ancient art and artifacts preserved in the Louvre. Second, with respect to Rodin in 
particular, Rilke fashions an image of a tireless, working artist who, in remaining 
impervious to the disturbances of the city, becomes centered and thing-like himself.112 
According to Rilke, Rodin’s own thingly resistance to the city is something he shares 
with his own sculptural works, and is that which links him and his art to the much older 
things of the Parisian cathedrals and artworks in the Louvre. 
The notion of a “Verwandtschaft von Dingen,” as Rilke would articulate it in a 
letter the following year, thus takes on for the poet an edifying and protective function 
with respect to the urban environment. The assertion of a mimetic kinship between artist 
and art-thing provides the basis, in fact, for Rilke’s understanding of Rodin’s artistic 
production as an “opposition” or “counterweight” to urban modernity. In his 1903 
monograph on the sculptor, Rilke likens Rodin’s work to the sculpture of antiquity, 
describing their related states-of-being as within a “circle of solitude” (Kreis der 
Einsamkeit) and as “wholly-absorbed-in-themselves” (Ganz-mit-sich-Beschäftigtsein) 
(KA IV, 418). Given his persistent characterization of Rodin as a person, Rilke’s 
anthropomorphic account of the solitude and self-absorption of Rodin’s sculptures also 
describes a mimetic kinship between the artist-maker and the made art-thing. After first 
fashioning Rodin in the monograph as leading a resolute, centered, and solitary existence, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 In a related September 17, 1902 letter to painter Heinrich Vogeler, Rilke remarks: “Rodin ist 
sehr groß, und sehr seinem Werke ähnlich” (B I, 40). 
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Rilke then proceeds to imagine these human qualities as somehow manifest in his artistic 
products as well. In a converse manner, the characterization of Rodin from the letter 
quoted above––as “unantastbar, sakrosankt und beinahe namenlos”––can in fact be found 
to originate in his earlier work on the monograph, as descriptions not for the sculptor but 
for the sculptural works themselves: “[Das Bildwerk] mußte irgendwie unantastbar, 
sakrosankt, getrennt vom Zufall und von der Zeit, in der es einsam und wunderbar wie 
das Gesicht eines Hellsehers aufstand” (KA IV, 410).113 For Rilke, this reciprocal 
mimetic relationship arises out of an art-making process, whereby the artist and “art-
thing” come to resemble one another: the Kunst-Ding becoming more person-like and the 
artist more and more like a nameless thing. Rilke is consistent in this conception even in 
his direct observations of Rodin at work: “Es ist sehr schön, ihn arbeiten zu sehen. […] er 
und das Ding, sein Ding; man wüßte kaum mehr zu sagen, welches das Werk ist” (KA IV, 
491).114       
According to Rilke, Rodin’s ability to replicate in his sculptural work something 
akin to his own “counterweight” (Gegengewicht) or “opposition” (Widerspruch) to the 
city is grounded in his integration of art and life as craftsperson or handworker. As Rilke 
would express it in his 1905/06 lecture on Rodin, the disassociation of sculpture from the 
usual aesthetic concerns of beauty and representation––through its reappraisal as a 
practice of making things and surfaces––amounts to a reformulation of art as a humble, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
113 Rilke’s description of Rodin’s sculptures as “namenlos” can be found throughout the 
monograph. See, for example, the second paragraph of Rodin (KA IV, 405). 
 
114 This statement appears as an unpublished note from the fall of 1902 (during Rilke’s work on 
the Rodin monograph), and appears in nearly identical form in a September 28, 1902 letter to wife 
Clara. See Briefe aus den Jahren 1902 bis 1906, p. 49.  
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daily activity in resemblance to the workaday world of the preindustrial age: “Aus allen 
den großen anspruchsvollen und launenhaften Worten scheint die Kunst aufeinmal ins 
Geringe und Nüchterne gestellt, ins Alltägliche, ins Handwerk” (KA IV, 458). This 
integration of aesthetic production and an atavistic form of everyday life through daily 
“handwork” hinges, for Rilke, on Rodin’s particular way of apprehending the world of 
things. In his August 8, 1903 letter to Andreas-Salomé, Rilke describes the sculptor’s 
realization of an “equilibrium with respect to the world” (Gleichgewicht der Welt 
gegenüber) through a “way of looking and living” (Art zu schauen und zu leben) that he 
achieves through his sculptural practice (Bw 93). As Rilke explains in the same letter, the 
importance of Rodin’s work lies not in its apparent subject matter or thematic content 
(Stoff), his abstract conceptions and intentions as an artist (Absichten), or the possible 
meanings and interpretations of the work (Deutung). Citing Rodin’s own supposed 
indifference to such concerns, Rilke describes, “das so unendlich unstoffliche und 
einfache Element seiner Kunst,” and the artist’s sculptural production as, “unberührt und 
rein von Absichten und Stoffen” (Bw 93, 95). Instead, Rilke regards Rodin’s artistic 
practice as a “realization” (Verwirklichung) of things, arising out of a focused 
coordination of eyes and hands, in which his “way of looking and living” intertwines 
with his sculptural production of Kunst-Dinge (Bw 94).  
In the same August 8, 1903 letter, Rilke also stresses the strongly haptic quality of 
Rodin’s visual experience of things, which the sculptor seems to grasp, or “surround with 
seeing” (mit Schauen umgeben), as singular, isolated, and self-enclosed surfaces or 
“systems of surfaces” (Systeme von Flächen).115 Likewise, in his short sketch on Rodin 
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from the fall of 1902, Rilke describes: “Der Zusammenhang seines Auges mit dem Ton. 
Man glaubt alle die Wege seines Blicks, die sicheren, schnellen, ein Netz in der Luft 
bilden zu sehen, darin sich das Ding immer mehr verfängt” (KA IV, 491). Rodin’s ability 
to “surround” or “ensnare” the thing with his gaze, to apprehend it as a tactile “system of 
surfaces,” depends, for Rilke, on a mimetic coordination between the sculptor’s hands 
and eyes. Because Rodin was long practiced in the tactile formation of surfaces, he had 
also developed the visual ability to perceive objects purely as “systems of surfaces,” 
entirely detached from aesthetic concerns of thematic content or idealized form, and 
everyday concerns of desire for the object or its value and use. The human body most 
importantly, fragmented or whole, could be perceived and represented as a unified, self-
enclosed surface (apprehended, in Rodin’s word, as le modelé; or, for Rilke, by 
perceiving and representing the human as a Ding).116  
Rilke’s privileging of self-enclosing surfaces in Rodin’s sculptural work must also 
be understood in implicit contrast to the fragmentation and flayed interiority of the body 
depicted in his 1910 Malte novel. The sculptural objects encountered in Rodin’s studio 
suggested to Rilke not only the edifying enclosures of things, but also the fragmentation 
of body parts like hands, legs, torsos, and faces, as well as the exposed hollow interior of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Rilke and Andreas-Salomé, Briefwechsel, p. 93: “Immer ist ihm das, was er schaut und mit 
Schauen umgiebt, das Einzige, die Welt, auf der alles geschieht.” My understanding of haptic 
vision in relation to Rilke draws loosely on the work of Aloïs Riegl. For a similar appropriation, 
see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 1987), pp. 543–51. 
 
116 On Rodin’s use of the term modelé, see Rilke’s September 5, 1902 letter to his wife Clara, in 
Briefe aus den Jahren 1902 bis 1906, pp. 34–35. Rilke’s most emphatic expression for the 
rendering of humans as things, appears in the original 1905 draft to his Rodin lecture: “[Rodin] ist 
der Mann, der, nachdem mans lange nicht mehr gekonnt hat, wieder Dinge macht, – wirkliche, 
auf allen Seiten begrenzte, selbständige Dinge; Dinge aus Männern und Frauen; Dinge über uns 
hinaus” (KA IV, 502). 
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the unfinished sculptural surface.117 Thus, in Malte, one reads the narrator’s horrified 
description of an impoverished Parisian woman:  
Die Frau erschrak und hob sich aus sich ab, zu schnell, zu heftig, so daß das 
Gesicht in den zwei Händen blieb. Ich konnte es darin liegen sehen, seine hohle 
Form. Es kostete mich unbeschreibliche Anstrengung, bei diesen Händen zu 
bleiben und nicht zu schauen, was sich aus ihnen abgerissen hatte. Mir graute, ein 
Gesicht von innen zu sehen, aber ich fürchtete mich doch noch viel mehr vor 
dem bloßen wunden Kopf ohne Gesicht. (KA III, 457–58) 
 
In the novel’s complex interweaving of the narrator’s urban and past childhood traumas, 
the fragmented body reappears in his childhood story of a disembodied hand (KA III, 
518–21) and takes on further mimetic registers in young Malte’s identification with 
fragmented and shattering objects (KA III, 461, 529–30). In a key episode for Malte’s 
adult experiences in Paris, a mimetic identification with an exposed and fragmented, 
architectural object leads to a traumatic breakdown of boundaries between inner and 
outer, animate and inanimate, human and thing: “es war sozusagen nicht die erste Mauer 
der vorhandenen Häuser [...], sondern die letzte der früheren. Man sah ihre Innenseite” 
(KA III, 485). In his description of the material residues of domestic life left clinging to 
the exposed interior surface, Malte develops a nauseating comparison with the inner 
fluids, scraps, and organs of the human body, before concluding with the horrifying 
recognition: “Ich erkenne das alles hier, und darum geht es so ohne weiteres in mich ein: 
es ist zu Hause in mir” (KA III, 487).118  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Rilke’s August 8, 1903 letter to Andreas-Salomé already suggests this ambivalent quality of 
Rodin’s fragmentation of the body into sculptural things: “auch Menschen erfahre ich schon 
manchmal so, Hände leben irgendwo, Munde reden, und ich schaue alles ruhiger und mit 
größerer Gerechtigkeit” (Bw 98). 
 
118 For a far more detailed discussion of the psychological connections between bodily 
fragmentation in Malte’s childhood and adult urban experiences, see Andreas Huyssen, 
“Paris/Childhood: The Fragmented Body in Rilke’s Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge.” 
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Along with bodily fragmentation, Rilke’s novel also describes the spatial 
dissolution or voiding of the self in highly ambivalent, mimetic terms. Anticipating 
Caillois’s account of mimetic “depersonalization through assimilation into space,” 
Rilke’s novel describes death and disease as a deforming, spatial expansion of the 
body.119 The loss of bodily contours also exists in Rilke’s writings in the mimetic 
assimilation to dark spaces. This takes more positive forms in Malte’s childhood merging 
with “familiar, intimate things” (die gewohnten herzlichen Dinge) in his darkened 
bedroom (see the paragraph beginning “O Nacht ohne Gegenstände” (KA III, 507)), as 
well as in the Jugendstil-like interweaving of body and things during the night in Rilke’s 
1900 poem “Gebet” collected in the 1902 version of Buch der Bilder (KA I, 284). But this 
spatial dissolution of the self also has a destructive side. In the Malte novel, the narrator 
describes the frightening effects of the darkened space of a high vaulted room from his 
childhood: “Dieser hohe, [...] gewölbte Raum [...] saugte mit seiner dunkelnden Höhe, 
mit seinen niemals ganz aufgeklärten Ecken alle Bilder aus einem heraus [...]. Man saß da 
wie aufgelöst; [...] wie eine leere Stelle” (KA III, 471).  
In contrast to these unstable and potentially destructive, mimetic relations with 
fragmented objects and unbounded spaces, Rilke projects onto Rodin the fantasy of a 
thingly “integrity” (Zusammenfassung) and “unity” (Einheit) shared by the artist and art-
thing, capable of extending its edifying effects outward to anonymous recipients of the 
work.120 Crucial for these imagined effects is Rilke’s notion that the aesthetic experience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 See Malte’s account of his grandfather’s death as a corporeal expansion (KA III, 459–64), as 
well as the description of his own diseases as a tumorous, expansive growth: “das Große” (KA III, 
497). Cf. Caillois, “Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia,” in The Edge of Surrealism, quoted 
here, p. 100. 
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of self-enclosed art-things (“Rodins Dinge, die Dinge an den gothischen Kathedralen, die 
antikischen Dinge, – alle Dinge, die vollkommene Dinge sind”) was capable of 
transforming the viewer’s perception of other external objects, as well, into an ossified 
and non-threatening accumulation of things: “[Die Kunst-Dinge] wiesen mich auf die 
Vorbilder hin; auf die bewegte lebendige Welt, einfach und ohne Deutung gesehen als 
Anlaß zu Dingen” (Bw 98). 
As Rilke describes it, Rodin’s comparable ability to see things in all objects, 
human and nonhuman, allowed him to give his way of perceiving a lasting, material form: 
Da es ihm gegeben ward, Dinge zu sehen in allem, erwarb er die Möglichkeit: 
Dinge zu bauen; denn dieses ist seine große Kunst. [...] Das Ding ist bestimmt, 
das Kunst-Ding muß noch bestimmter sein; von allem Zufall fortgenommen, 
jeder Unklarheit entrückt, der Zeit enthoben und dem Raum gegeben, ist es 
dauernd geworden, fähig zur Ewigkeit. Das Modell scheint, das Kunst-Ding ist. 
So ist das eine der namenlose Fortschritt über das andere hinaus, die stille und 
steigende Verwirklichung des Wunsches, zu sein, der von allem in der Natur 
ausgeht. (Bw 93–94) 
 
For Rilke, Rodin’s balance or equilibrium with respect to the world was achieved through 
his trained, visual experience of objects. His ability to see “things” (Dinge) in everything 
enabled him to produce a corresponding physical reality that had a definite and lasting 
form: a Kunst-Ding. In this manner, the artist’s “way of looking and living” (Art zu 
schauen und zu leben) could take on a solid, material form, and replicate a similar way of 
experiencing the world––via his distributed sculptural objects located in the shared space 
of the city.   
As Rilke claims in his Rodin monograph, the long history of sculpture reveals an 
art form, “die mehr giebt als Wort und Bild, mehr als Gleichnis und Schein” (KA IV, 
408). The lasting significance of sculpture, for Rilke, rests not in the meaning or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 See, quoted here, Rilke’s June 24, 1907 letter to his wife Clara from Paris (B I, 172). The 
relevant passage is reproduced in footnote 53 above. 
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verisimilitude of the work, but rather in how it entails a “becoming-thing” 
(Dingwerdung) of its maker’s disposition. With respect to Rodin, in particular, Rilke 
considered his sculptural works as a means of giving extended material form to the 
sculptor’s own resolute life as a craftsman, which, for Rilke, enabled him to resist the 
disturbances of modern urban life. As Rilke writes in that same August 8, 1903 letter to 
Andreas-Salomé: 
[Rodin] hat gleich Dinge gemacht, viele Dinge, und aus ihnen erst hat er die neue 
Einheit gebildet oder aufwachsen lassen, und so sind diese Zusammenhänge 
innig und gesetzmäßig geworden, weil nicht Ideen, sondern Dinge sich gebunden 
haben. [...] Und je mehr die Dinge um ihn wuchsen, desto seltener waren die 
Störungen, die ihn erreichten; denn an den Wirklichkeiten, die um ihn standen, 
brachen alle Geräusche ab. Sein Werk selbst hat ihn beschützt; er hat darin 
gewohnt wie in einem Wald, und sein Leben muß schon lange dauern, denn was 
er selbst gepflanzt hat, ist ein Hochwald geworden. (Bw 95–96) 
 
Here, as elsewhere, it is largely irrelevant for Rilke what Rodin’s sculptural works might 
represent, communicate, or signify; they are far more important for what they do: they 
“protect” (beschützen) the artist from the “disturbances” (Störungen) of the city. As Rilke 
also indicates, this protective power of Rodin’s work extends its effects to other humans, 
as well. In an earlier August 1903 letter to Andreas-Salomé, Rilke describes his 
experience in the vicinity of Rodin’s work as occupying a kind of protective shelter (im 
Schutze) from the intense fears that would later grip him in Paris (Bw 85). And in even 
earlier letters sent from Paris, the city’s cathedrals and the sculpture in the Louvre are 
evoked alongside Rodin’s work as sites of refuge, calm, and solitude amidst the tumult of 
the city.121 The source of this influence, as Rilke indicates for Rodin, is a mimetic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
121 See Rilke’s September 16, 1902 letter to his wife Clara: “[Die Kathedralen] sind die 
Einsamkeit und die Stille, die Zuflucht und Ruhe im Wechsel und Wirrwarr dieser Gassen.” See 
also his December 31, 1902 letter to Otto Modersohn: “[Rodin] und sein Werk sind von derselben 
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resemblance between maker and work. That the characteristics of the maker are 
replicated and embodied in the artwork allows Rilke to imagine the artist extending an 
influence and agency via their work out into the realm of external relations. 
Admittedly, Rilke’s discussion of Rodin, and Kunst-Dinge in general, is highly 
idiosyncratic and at odds with contemporaneous Western reception of the sculptural arts. 
His notion of a “kinship” among artists and art-things, as well as the power of sculpture 
to protect one from the intrusions of the urban environment, is clearly part of some 
regressive fantasy. Taking these ideas seriously, however, is highly productive for 
understanding a crucial aspect of Rilke’s contemporaneous poetic production. His 
attempt to stage mimetic and animistic relations to things in the 1905/06 Rodin lecture, as 
discussed in the previous section, already indicates that Rilke was well aware of the 
difficulties involved in evoking this kind of experience of objects. In many of the poems 
collected in the Neue Gedichte, Rilke moves beyond strategies of merely evoking and 
staging such encounters with things for his audience and readers. In a number of 
instances, as I will show, Rilke engages with the poetic medium as a means not only to 
stage an encounter with things, but also to performatively enact their transformative 
influence on the reader. The kind of transformative effects that Rilke himself experiences 
through the work of Rodin becomes the model for his poetry of things. The thing-poem 
must do to the reader what the art-thing does to the viewer. It is in this sense that I read 
Rilke’s attempt to produce geschriebene Dinge in resemblance to the plastische Dinge of 
Rodin. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Art und Wesenheit wie die alten Kathedralen, wie die Dinge im Louvre.” Both letters in Rilke, 
Briefe aus den Jahren 1902 bis 1906, pp. 44 and 57–58, respectively.  
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The Thing-Poem 
In his innovative 1984 study Batterien der Lebenskraft, Christoph Asendorf takes his title 
directly from a formulation of Rilke’s. The phrase originates in an apologetic 1919 letter 
to Ilse Erdmann, where Rilke admits of his “ins Bürgerliche und Zimmerliche 
verringerten Mythisierung” of things (B II, 134). In the letter, Rilke further acknowledges 
a potentially pathological dimension of his fixation on Dinge, and yet defends himself 
nonetheless for holding to a certain “superstitious belief” (Aberglaube) in the most 
insignificant objects as “bearers of powers” (Träger von Mächten) over humans: 
“Spardosen: ja das wars, was ich von Anfang an meinte, so kamen mir immer alle diese 
Talismänner vor, sie sammeln, kleine Batterien der Lebenskraft, von uns geladen, mit 
dem, was wir sonst an die zufällige zerstreuende Luft abgeben” (B II, 135). As Asendorf 
explains it, this retrospective account reveals a crucial aspect of Rilke’s earlier 
Dinggedichte, and his Dingkult more generally: “der Vergleich mit der Batterie verweist 
ironisch auf die Parallelität der technischen und der imaginativen Transformations-
verfahren.”122 Unleashing the power of things requires that they first be figuratively 
“charged” (geladen) with some vital life-force of humans. The comparison with 
“Talismänner” suggests only further that the affecting force of the thing is derived from a 
power beyond itself. To bring about an imaginative transformation in his reader’s 
experience of things, Rilke admits the need for an artificial, poetic procedure.  
Rilke’s shift to staging (rather than simply evoking) mimetic relations to objects 
in his 1905/06 Rodin lecture is already a strong indication of his new attempt to control 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
122 Christoph Asendorf, Batterien der Lebenskraft: Zur Geschichte der Dinge und ihrer 
Wahrnehmung im 19. Jahrhundert (Gießen: Anabas-Verlag, 1984), p. 136.  
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and instantiate a transformative experience of things for his audience. In subsequently 
written poems found in the Neue Gedichte (1907) and Der Neuen Gedichte anderer Teil 
(1908), Rilke uses the poetic medium to take this one step further: not only for staging an 
experience of things, but also for performatively enacting their powers on the reader. In 
specific instances, the poem becomes a means of artificially producing this force of 
things. Rilke’s 1919 letter suggests that things are not agents in themselves, but rather 
intentional sites for the storage and transfer of human-derived forces. In the vitalistic 
language of Rilke’s 1919 letter, this procedure is imagined through a direct contact with 
things in order to transfer some human life-force, which would otherwise dissipate in the 
blowing breeze.      
Among his so-called “thing-poems,” Rilke’s 1907 poem “Der Ball” holds a 
special place for a number of reasons. Most well-known is an anecdotal account of 
Rilke’s proclaiming: “Da habe ich gar nichts als das fast Unaussprechbare einer reinen 
Bewegung ausgesprochen – und darum ist es mein bestes Gedicht.”123 Beyond its formal 
characteristics, which are indelibly linked to the rising and falling motion of a thrown 
ball, Rilke’s poem also entails a charging and transferring of human energies, in a 
manner similar to his 1919 account of things as “Batterien der Lebenskraft.” Rilke’s “Der 
Ball” is not only a poetic rendering of the flight of the thrown object, but also a treatment 
of the ball as a thingly medium for enacting a transformative relationship between 
humans. The thing functions as both a storage site for the vital human warmth of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
123 See Elisabeth von Schmidt-Pauli, Rainer Maria Rilke: Ein Gedenkbuch (Basel: Benno 
Schwabe & Co., 1940), p. 20. 
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thrower and a site for that energy’s transformation as it is transferred to the catcher of the 
ball.  
Du Runder, der das Warme aus zwei Händen 
im Fliegen, oben, fortgiebt, sorglos wie 
sein Eigenes; was in den Gegenständen 
nicht bleiben kann, zu unbeschwert für sie, 
 
zu wenig Ding und doch noch Ding genug, 
um nicht aus allem draußen Aufgereihten 
unsichtbar plötzlich in uns einzugleiten: 
das glitt in dich, du zwischen Fall und Flug 
 
noch Unentschlossener: der, wenn er steigt, 
als hätte er ihn mit hinaufgehoben, 
den Wurf entführt und freiläßt – , und sich neigt 
und einhält und den Spielenden von oben 
auf einmal eine neue Stelle zeigt, 
sie ordnend wie zu einer Tanzfigur, 
 
um dann, erwartet und erwünscht von allen, 
rasch, einfach, kunstlos, ganz Natur, 
dem Becher hoher Hände zuzufallen. (KA I, 583–84) 
 
Like Rilke’s 1919 letter, the poem obscures any direct statement of what this human 
energy might be (“was in den Gegenständen / nicht bleiben kann”). Similar to the warmth 
of hands that is dispersed during the ball’s flight, there is a something (“zu wenig Ding 
und doch noch Ding genug”) that is stored and transferred in the ball. As in the letter, it is 
a something, “was wir sonst an die zufällige zerstreuende Luft abgeben.” However Rilke 
understands this vital force exactly, it is perhaps far less interesting in itself than the 
transformation that its transference entails.  
Consistent with my argument thus far, the transformation described in Rilke’s 
“Der Ball” implies a mimetic relationship between human and thing. One aspect of this is 
simply the immediate, tactile contact and correspondence between the ball and the “cup” 
of human hands (Becher hoher Hände). Here, the mimetic plays out in the direct 
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corporeal contact with the material thing and the human body shaping itself to match the 
contours of the thing. On a more abstract level, the flight-path of the ball also provokes 
an additional mimetic reaction in the players’ bodies: in tracing out the balls trajectory 
and moving to meet it at “eine neue Stelle,” the players are transformed into a 
“Tanzfigur” that resembles the flight-path of the ball. Their imitation of the ball’s 
movement in the air amounts to an aesthetic transformation akin to a dance. In both of 
these senses, the thrown ball provokes an mimetic reaction in the human, a movement to 
match and correspond to the animated nature of the thing. Rilke’s suggestion of a human 
thrower at the beginning of the poem (whose warmth of hands is transferred to the ball) 
adds a further complexity to the mimetic relationship between human and thing. The ball 
is additionally a mediator between human thrower and catcher, tying them together 
through the vital energy that is stored and transferred in the throw. Through this 
connection, the mimetic transformation provoked by the ball can be traced back to an 
original human action: the throw.    
The figure of the ball-throw in Rilke’s larger body of work is complex and 
heterogeneous. In appears early on in the first section of his Stunden-Buch (1899) as part 
of a meditation on God (KA I, 167), and reappears in later poems as a vision of human 
life at the mercy of natural laws and cosmic forces.124 Rilke’s figure of the ball-throw and 
thrower also exhibits poetological dimensions, and it is here that I situate my reading. An 
earlier poem from the Neue Gedichte, “Eranna an Sappho,” already suggests such a 
reading, describing the Greek poetess as a “wilde weite Werferin,” whose reader Eranna 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
124 See for example, “Solang du Selbstgeworfnes fängst” (KA II, 195–96), and “Das (nicht 
vorhandene) Kindergrab mit dem Ball”  (KA II, 367–68). 
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is figuratively “thrown” and transformed by her poetry: “Dein Erklingen / warf mich 
weit” (KA I, 451). I take a further cue from a 1915 letter of Rilke’s to Marianne Mitford, 
in which he reflects on his difficulties as a poet: “Ich komme mir ehrlich vor wie ein Ball, 
der immer wieder aus guten Händen ins Helle und Heitre hinaufgeworfen wird, dorthin, 
wo er so von Herzen rund und leicht sein darf, – aber was ist das? – Er fällt nicht wieder 
in seine Hände zurück, er verrollt schmählich” (KA I, 1003). In describing this failed 
instance of the thrown ball, a failed reception, Rilke’s letter suggests a poetological 
reading for the successful ball-throw in his earlier poem: the ball as a metaphor for the 
poetic medium; the throw as a model for the successful or failed exchange between poet 
and reader. For the poet, the identification with a thrown-and-dropped ball indicates a 
failed rapport with the reader; the ball has been thrown, but fails to be met with receptive 
hands. Rilke’s “Der Ball” exemplifies rather the ideal transfer between thrower and 
catcher, with the thrower’s action creating a mimetic transformation in the receiver of the 
ball. Read metaphorically and poetologically, the ball comes to stand for the poem, and 
the throw for the poetic act of the writer. In Rilke’s language, the ball liberates and 
abducts (entführt) the creative act itself (den Wurf), gives it an extended, embodied form 
(der Ball), and enables the thrower to secure from a distance a transformative influence 
on the receivers (sie ordnend wie zu einer Tanzfigur). 
Rilke’s “Der Ball,” I would argue, can also be read as an important programmatic 
text within the Neue Gedichte. The poem’s depiction of the thrown ball’s transformative 
effects provides a more general model for the operation of the successful “thing-poem.” 
In a good number of instances, as I will demonstrate, Rilke treats the poetic medium as a 
means for provoking a related transformation in the reader. The thing of the poem 
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operates in a manner similar to the thrown ball: as a mediator between the poet (thrower) 
and the reader (catcher), which simulates a mimetic transformation in the reader of the 
poem. The exact nature of the thing represented is perhaps of less interest than the 
transformative effect that Rilke intends it to have on the reader. As in “Der Ball,” the 
thing serves to embody some intentional, external force. In his extensive reflections on 
things, Rilke generally avoids attributing this force to himself as the poet, and suggests 
rather that it is latent in the object itself. Yet, as his later “Batterien der Lebenskraft” 
formulation acknowledges, it ultimately rests with the human to artificially construct 
these effects. Through his analogy with batteries, Rilke admits of the technical procedure 
required to bring about an imaginative transformation in the experience of things. 
Whatever mimetic powers Rilke finds latent in things themselves, he must resort to 
artificially staging their experience and performing their effects through the medium of 
poetry.  
I have already suggested such a reading for Rilke’s 1907 poem “Die 
Rosenschale.” I will now turn to a selection of poems that demonstrate Rilke’s attempt to 
perform and actualize for the reader the type of mimetic powers he finds latent in things. 
These include “Tanagra” written in July 1906, “Der Käferstein” from the summer of 
1908, and the series of three Buddha poems composed in late 1905, July 1906, and the 
summer of 1908. These selections appear across both volumes of the Neue Gedichte, and 
might also be situated in relation to the shifting concerns and poetic refinement of Rilke’s 
middle period.125 My readings, however, will not tackle the tricky question of an internal 
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development in Rilke’s production of the two-volume Neue Gedichte, nor will I attempt 
to make general claims about these poetry collections in general. As is frequently noted, 
the heterogeneity of the collections and their frequent use of biblical and classical 
references make their overall designation as “thing-poems” highly suspect. Instead, I 
want to focus on those poems that most closely engage with the type of stable and 
edifying relations to things, which Rilke privileges in his early writings from Paris. Not 
surprisingly, the poems that fit most closely with my reading concern sculptural objects 
that exhibit a close kinship with the “art-things” of Rodin. In turning to Rilke’s poetry, 
we can observe how the poet attempts to secure and instantiate a related influence of art-
things––not simply evoked for the viewer of sculptural art––but rather staged and 
performed through the medium of poetry. In the poetic texts, as in his treatment of 
Rodin’s sculpture, Rilke derives the agency of the “Kunst-Ding” from its materiality and 
its power to cause mimetic transformations in the human.  
The title of Rilke’s poem “Tanagra” evokes a set of famous terracotta figurines 
produced in the fourth and third centuries BCE. Unearthed in the second half of the 
nineteenth century in tombs around the ancient Greek city of Tanagra, the figurines were 
quickly acquired and exhibited in the Musée du Louvre. It was here that Rilke first saw 
them in September 1902, writing back to his wife from Paris: “Tanagra. Das ist eine 
Quelle unvergänglichen Lebens!”126 While late nineteenth-century audiences valued the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 See for example, Brigitte L. Bradley, “Rilkes Buddha-Gedichte von 1905 und 1906: 
Werkstufen in der Auffassung und Realisierung von ‘Geschlossenheit,’” in Rilke heute, ed. 
Ingeborg H. Solbrig and Joachim W. Storck (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975), pp. 27–35.  
 
126 Rilke, Briefe aus den Jahren 1902 bis 1906, p. 45. Rilke may very well had the Tanagra 
figurines in mind when writing the Rodin monograph later that year: “[Im Louvre] waren Steine, 
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small figurines for their realistic depictions of human figures and fashions, Rilke entirely 
ignores their status as figurative representation. His poem appeals instead to their 
materiality as “ein wenig gebrannter Erde,” and suggests to the reader a gesture of 
reaching and grasping, which transforms the viewer into a likeness of the thing: 
Ein wenig gebrannter Erde, 
wie von großer Sonne gebrannt. 
Als wäre die Gebärde 
einer Mädchenhand 
auf einmal nicht mehr vergangen; 
ohne nach etwas zu langen, 
zu keinem Dinge hin 
aus ihrem Gefühle führend, 
nur an sich selber rührend 
wie eine Hand ans Kinn. 
 
Wir heben und wir drehen 
eine und eine Figur; 
wir können fast verstehen 
weshalb sie nicht vergehen, – 
aber wir sollen nur  
tiefer und wunderbarer 
hängen an dem was war 
und lächeln: ein wenig klarer 
vielleicht als vor einem Jahr. (KA I, 477–78) 
 
The poem sustains a tension throughout between the temporal persistence of the art-
thing––its “unvergängliches Leben,” as Rilke calls it in his letter––and a fleeting gesture 
of grasping at nothing, the hand closing in on itself: “ohne nach etwas zu langen, / zu 
keinem Dinge hin / aus ihrem Gefühle führend, / nur an sich selber rührend.” As 
suggested in the first stanza, something like this fleeting gesture is preserved in the baked 
earth of the Tanagra figurine. As the poem turns from the first to second stanza, a 
collective and inclusive viewership (wir) is introduced to appreciate the work. In a close 
imitation of the work’s gestural quality, the “we” is impelled to sustain a grasp of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[...] die eine Bewegung trugen, eine Gebärde, die so Frisch geblieben war, als sollte sie hier nur 
aufbewahrt und eines Tages irgend einem Kinde gegeben werde, das vorüberkam” (KA IV, 406). 
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figurine: both in the literal sense of “lifting” (heben) and “turning” (drehen) the figurine, 
and as a figurative “understanding” (verstehen) of the art-things persistence. Through a 
repeated negation of the verb “vergehen,” the lasting material existence of the thing in the 
second stanza is solidly linked to the grasping gesture of the “Mädchenhand” in the first. 
At the same time, the grasping gesture inherent to the sculpture in the first stanza appears 
repeated by the collective “we” in the second. Thus the “we” appears transformed into an 
imitative likeness of the thing. As the concluding lines of the poem suggest, this gestural 
imitation of the art-thing results in an obscure, yet edifying transformation in the viewer 
of the work: “wir sollen nur / tiefer und wunderbarer / hängen an dem was war / und 
lächeln: ein wenig klarer / vielleicht als vor einem Jahr.” Whatever clarity is gained 
through the experience, it is indelibly linked to a mimetic resemblance between human 
and thing, a kinship through a shared persistence of gesture. 
As the “Tanagra” poem clearly demonstrates, there can be little talk of “objective 
description” (objektive Beschreibung) in Rilke’s so-called Dinggedichte, as Oppert 
claims. Without the title to indicate a referent-object, the exact thing of the poem would 
in fact remain largely unidentifiable. Even Oppert admits as much of Rilke, undercutting 
much of his own definition of the Dinggedicht: “doch ohne Titel [müßte] manches seiner 
Gedichte gar ein Rätsel bleiben. Der Titel ist die eigentliche Voraussetzung fürs Gedicht: 
setzte nicht er uns im voraus das Ding als ein Ganzes, fast wie ein Bild, das mit dem 
Zeigestock ‘gedeutet’ werden soll, vors innere Auge, so wären wir eben nicht ‘im 
Bilde.’”127 The function of many titles in Rilke’s Neue Gedichte is simply to point to an 
original prototype-object that would otherwise remain obscure in the poetic text. The 
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poem then re-presents the named objects––but not in the manner of mimetic realism. 
Rather, representation is just as much about the physical materiality of the artwork itself 
and its ability to stand in for some intentional force that lies beyond the thing and yet is 
manifested through it. In the case of Rilke’s poems, this quality of representation has 
little to do with textuality or the materiality of the poetic text itself. Rather it is engaged 
in a performative manner, by evoking a somatic experience of the thing’s materiality and 
performing the effect of its agency on the reader. As Oppert suggests, the poem’s title 
produces an image of the represented thing in the reader’s mind. The poem is thus set up 
to stage for the reader an artificial encounter with the thing in question. In the example of 
“Tanagra,” this staged, fictional encounter can even transcend the corresponding real-life 
experience, allowing the reader to imagine “lifting” and “turning” an ancient figurine in 
their hands, an encounter expressly forbidden by its exhibition in the Louvre. As such 
poems of Rilke’s unfold, the reader finds not a mimetically realistic depiction of the 
titular thing, but rather is led to experience the simulated effects of its supposed agency 
over the human. The production of these effects, as further examples will attest, lies in 
the mimetic powers that Rilke imagines in things: their ability to produce edifying 
similarities between human and thing. In this way, Rilke’s use of the poetic medium 
attempts to control and artificially produce a positive, mimetic relationship with things. 
In the “Tanagra” poem, the reader is invited to experience the transformative 
effects of the sculptural work through the inclusive pronoun “wir.” In other poems like 
“Die Rosenschale,” Rilke addresses the reader even more directly with the pronoun “du.” 
Here, the poet is even more explicit in his attempt to stage for his readers an experience 
of things and to perform their imagined agency over the human. Rilke’s 1908 poem “Der 
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Käferstein,” which appears near the end of Der Neuen Gedichte anderer Teil, proceeds in 
a similar manner: 
Sind nicht Sterne fast in deiner Nähe 
und was giebt es, das du nicht umspannst, 
da du dieser harten Skarabäe 
Karneolkern gar nicht fassen kannst 
 
ohne jenen Raum, der ihre Schilder 
niederhält, auf deinem ganzen Blut 
mitzutragen; niemals war er milder, 
näher, hingegebener. Er ruht 
 
seit Jahrtausenden auf diesen Käfern, 
wo ihn keiner braucht und unterbricht; 
und die Käfer schließen sich und schläfern 
unter seinem wiegenden Gewicht. (KA I, 585) 
 
In this case, the thing of the poem is quite clear: a small scarab amulet, sculpted in 
carnelian. An experience of the sculpted object is directly staged for the reader, 
encouraging one to imagine grasping these hard, stone figures in one’s hand. The 
transformative effect that is performed through the poem, however, is far more obscure 
and can be better elucidated with a look at Rilke’s other writings on “Egyptian things” 
(Bw 316). What is clear from the beginning, though, is that the transformative effect of 
the thing works to affirm the unlikely, opening proposition: “Sind nicht Sterne fast in 
deiner Nähe / und was giebt es, das du nicht umspannst”?  
Rilke’s interest in “Egyptian things” was first piqued through his wife Clara’s 
extended stay in Cairo beginning in January 1907. While she had direct experiences of 
ancient Egyptian art and architecture in the land of their origin, Rilke was left to imagine 
their forceful effects from afar. Studying an atlas of Egypt in a villa residence on the 
island of Capri, Rilke wrote to his wife with a speculative account of the powerful 
	  
	   101	  
presence of the Egyptian Sphinx––a work he could only experience at the time as a 
photographic image:  
Die Morgen von Jahrtausenden, ein Volk von Winden, der Aufstieg und 
Niedergang unzähliger Sterne, der Sternbilder großes Dastehen, die Glut dieser 
Himmel und ihre Weite war da und war immer wieder da, einwirkend, nicht 
ablassend von der tiefen Gleichgültigkeit dieses Gesichtes, so lange, bis es zu 
schauen schien, bis es alle Anzeichen eines Schauens genau dieser Bilder 
aufwies, bis es sich aufhob wie das Gesicht zu einem Innern, darin alles dies 
enthalten war und Anlaß und Lust und Not zu alledem. [...] Ich denke mir: es 
muß so sein, unendlicher Raum, Raum, der hinter den Sternen weitergeht, muß, 
glaub ich, um dieses Bild [die Sphinx] herum entstanden sein. (B I, 164) 
 
Rilke’s discussion of the Sphinx in this 1907 letter exhibits remarkable similarities with 
his poetic treatment of the scarab in his poem from the following year. In both cases, 
Rilke imagines a millennia-long influence of celestial forces (Sterne), preserved and 
contained in these ancient manmade things, and a cosmic space (Raum) that comes to rest 
and cling to their sculpted surfaces. As should be clear from both texts, Rilke’s 
understanding of the power of these artifacts is not based on any anthropological or 
historical knowledge of their original meaning or purpose. Rather, they become for him 
further material markers for the kind of transformative power that he imagines to emanate 
from “art-things.”  
For the present purposes, Rilke’s knowledge about Egyptian artifacts (or lack 
thereof) is of much less interest than his treatment of their imaginary powers in the poetic 
medium. By juxtaposing the letter account with the poem, it becomes clear that Rilke is 
attempting to reproduce in miniature, through his “Käferstein” poem, the kind of thingly 
power that he imagines preserved in the Sphinx. Like Rilke’s Sphinx, the ancient scarab 
continues to rest, for thousands of years (seit Jahrtausenden), under the gently rocking 
weight of space (unter seinem wiegenden Gewicht).  Like Rilke’s Sphinx, the scarab is 
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surrounded by an endless space that expands beyond the stars (unendlicher Raum, Raum, 
der hinter den Sternen weitergeht). While Rilke can only evoke this powerful presence 
for the massive Sphinx, his poem finds a way to enact something similar through the 
smaller artifact. The millennia-long condensation of cosmic space around the scarab can 
be experienced by the human as well, as the poem suggests, by simply enclosing these 
things in the palm of one’s hand: “da du dieser harten Skarabäe / Karneolkern gar nicht 
fassen kannst / ohne jenen Raum, der ihre Schilder / niederhält, auf deinem ganzen Blut / 
mitzutragen.” Enclosing the artifact in one’s hand enables a magical transference of 
properties from the thing to the body of the human. The human assimilates the same 
cosmic, spatial quality in the likeness of the thing. In affirming the opening proposition 
(Sind nicht Sterne fast in deiner Nähe), Rilke’s poem again relies on a mimetic 
transformation: the human undergoes a positive transformation through a somatic contact 
and mimetic imitation of the thing.  
The final selection of poems I will discuss can be read to exemplify a full range of 
positive, mimetic relations that Rilke imagines between humans and things. Examples of 
an edification of the human through a resemblance with things. The thing of the poems is 
once more a sculptural object: a statue of Buddha, most likely modeled on a Buddha 
sculpture in the garden of Rodin’s Meudon residence, where Rilke stayed between 
September 1905 and May 1906.128 The three Buddha poems that Rilke wrote between 
late 1905 and 1908 and included in his two-volume Neue Gedichte are each complex in 
themselves, and can be read collectively to demonstrate shifting emphases in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
128 On Rodin’s Buddha statue, see Rilke’s letters to his wife Clara on September 20, 1905 and 
January 11, 1906, in Briefe aus den Jahren 1902 bis 1906, pp. 262–63 and 290.  
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Dinglyrik of Rilke’s middle period.129 To conclude the discussion, however, I would like 
to turn to these poems in an attempt to categorize the different mimetic registers that 
appear throughout Rilke’s thing-centered poetry. While the thing of all three poems is 
ostensibly the same––a Buddha statue––the three poems perform for the reader a range of 
different, mimetic relations through which to experience the sculptural work. These 
correspond roughly to three different aspects of the sculptural work: (1) its figurative 
quality; (2) its materiality; and (3) its thingness, which (as in the scarab, the Tanagra 
figurines, and the sculpture of Rodin) corresponds to the artwork’s undying persistence, 
its self-containment, and yet its close resemblance to the human, despite being forever 
closed off to their mortal lives. In staging an encounter with the Buddha statue in 
contrasting but related manners, Rilke’s poems reveal the different ways by which the 
human comes to resemble the thing.          
  In the first “Buddha” poem of the Neue Gedichte, written toward the end of 1905, 
Rilke encourages a collective “wir” to respond to the sculpture’s figurative nature: 
Als ob er horchte. Stille: eine Ferne … 
Wir halten ein und hören sie nicht mehr. 
Und er ist Stern. Und andre große Sterne, 
die wir nicht sehen, stehen um ihn her. 
 
O er ist Alles. Wirklich, warten wir, 
daß er uns sähe? Sollte er bedürfen? 
Und wenn wir hier uns vor ihm niederwürfen, 
er bliebe tief und träge wie ein Tier. (KA I, 462) 
 
As Rilke stages it for the reader, the collective encounter with the Buddha figure 
proceeds according to imitative reactions, as if the statue were a living figure. It appears 
to be listening, and “we” attempt to listen closely, as well. It appears to be looking, but 
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“we” cannot see what it sees. If “we” were to lower ourselves before it, it would respond 
with mute indifference––lowly as well, “wie ein Tier.” Through this staged mimetic play, 
the Buddha figure is revealed in its thingly otherness to the lives of humans. The poem 
concludes: 
Denn das, was uns zu seinen Füßen reißt, 
das kreist in ihm seit Millionen Jahren. 
Er, der vergißt was wir erfahren 
und der erfährt was uns verweist. (KA I, 462) 
 
The affinity is maintained between the human and thing, yet the poem ultimately denies 
any profound transformation. 
A similar conclusion is reached in the second “Buddha” poem composed in the 
summer of 1906. Here, however, the connection between human and thing is not 
established through the imitation of the sculpture’s figurative qualities, but rather through 
its materiality:  
Schon von ferne fühlt der fremde scheue 
Pilger, wie es golden von ihm träuft; 
so als hätten Reiche voller Reue 
ihre Heimlichkeiten aufgehäuft. 
 
Aber näher kommend wird er irre 
vor der Hoheit dieser Augenbraun: 
denn das sind nicht ihre Trinkgeschirre 
und die Ohrgehänge ihrer Fraun. 
 
Wüßte einer denn zu sagen, welche 
Dinge eingeschmolzen wurden, um  
dieses Bild auf diesem Blumenkelche 
 
aufzurichten: stummer, ruhiggelber 
als ein goldenes und rundherum 
auch den Raum berührend wie sich selber. (KA I, 489) 
 
The final line of the poem anticipates the later “Käferstein” poem with a similar 
“touching of space” on the sculpture’s surface. The closeness between the human and this 
spatial quality of the thing, however, is arrived at in a different manner. Here it is the 
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material accretion of domestic belongings, which entwines the human and thing. The 
approaching pilgrim knows that the sculpture is made of melted-down domestic objects 
(“Trinkgeschirre” and “Ohrgehänge”), but cannot determine, “welche Dinge 
eingeschmolzen wurden, um / dieses Bild [...] / aufzurichten.” The poem includes the 
pilgrim, too, in this kingdom-wide accretion of metallic things. He feels a part of the 
sculpture’s material formation, “wie es golden von ihm träuft.” Through the pilgrim’s 
approach, this sense of a material accretion in the metal sculpture is given a human 
dimension: as a gathering site for humans and their material possessions. Through this 
material connection between the statue and the domestic lives of humans, the poem 
evokes a collective gathering around the thing, which forms a peaceful and closed-off 
center to the human life that circles around it. 
The third Buddha poem from 1908 (and the concluding poem of Der Neuen 
Gedichte anderer Teil), “Buddha in der Glorie,” presents an emphatic encounter with the 
sculptural work, and this time attempts to perform its transformative effect on the reader 
directly. As in “Der Käferstein” and “Die Rosenschale,” one is addressed directly with 
“du,” and is incited to transform oneself in the likeness of the titular thing. Following an 
opening stanza, in which the Buddha figure is greeted as “Mitte aller Mitten, Kern der 
Kerne,” the poem continues: 
Sieh, du fühlst, wie nichts mehr an dir hängt; 
im Unendlichen ist deine Schale, 
und dort steht der starke Saft und drängt. 
Und von außen hilft ihm ein Gestrahle, 
 
denn ganz oben werden deine Sonnen 
voll und glühend umgedreht. 
Doch in dir ist schon begonnen, 
was die Sonnen übersteht. (KA I, 586) 
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What was denied in the first two “Buddha” poems comes to fruition in the third. Whereas 
before, the human was left to the periphery of the Buddha’s center, denied any 
knowledge of its thingly existence, the “Buddha in der Glorie” poem performs for its 
reader the transformation of becoming like the Buddha, becoming like an eternally 
centered and self-enclosed thing, “was die Sonnen übersteht.” The two-volume Neue 
Gedichte thus concludes with perhaps the most emphatic and powerful instance of 
Rilke’s performative strategy.  
In simulating this “kinship” between humans and things through the poetic 
medium, Rilke is clearly evoking an impossible and fantastic transformation that is 
expressly denied in modernity. As Benjamin would later argue, the mimetic powers that 
things had exhibited in the past have entirely withered away for the modern human. 
Residues of a mimetic kinship with things are preserved in the behavior of children, 
however any widespread mimetic relations in modernity are limited to their distorted and 
pathological forms, as Adorno would later describe. Yet, by situating Rilke’s Dinglyrik 
and writings on Rodin in relation to his accounts of urban experience, we can observe a 
similar dialectic in the poet’s understanding of thing-relations. Rilke’s discussions of a 
“mimicry” and “kinship” between humans and things are of particular interest in relation 
to early twentieth-century mimetic theory, since these discussions emerge out of Rilke’s 
direct, concrete experiences of urban modernity and visual art. In his attempts to stage 
positive, mimetic or animistic relations to things in his Rodin lecture and perform them 
through his contemporaneous poetic work, Rilke is implicitly aware of the impossibility 
of returning to such an intimate “kinship” with things. The broader assessment of Rilke’s 
writing at the time, including his Parisian letters and Malte novel, displays the instability 
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and pathological potential of such mimetic relations. In attempting to control and shore 
up a more positive, mimetic relation with things through his poetry, Rilke remains 
thoroughly aware of the fictionality of his “kinship of things.” In the absence of any real 
transformative power or agency of the artwork, Rilke must perform their imagined effects 










































THE URBAN UNCANNY, 1910:  




A wall which is alive is dreadful; but 
utensils, furniture, houses and their 
roofs also lean, crowd around, lie in 
wait, or pounce. 
  
–– Gilles Deleuze 
  
 
In a short literary sketch first published in 1909, the Austrian writer and critic Alfred 
Polgar presented his readers with a vivid portrayal of the neurotic city-dweller. The text, 
titled simply, “Die Dinge,” consists of a first-person account of the narrator’s neurosis: 
his fear that the inanimate objects in his apartment are conspiring against him. 
Ich bewohne ein kleines, stilles Quartier. Ich weiß nicht, wer nebenan, wer über 
und unter mir haust. Ruhige Leute jedenfalls, denn außer der verworrenen 
Unruhe der Straße dringt kein Geräusch in meine Wohnung. [...] Ich liebe die 
Einsamkeit; aber die Einsamkeit meiner Wohnung liebe ich nicht. Weil ich ein 
tiefes Mißtrauen gegen die Dinge in ihr, gegen Möbel, Stühle, Spiegel und die 
ganze unbelebte Staffage habe und mich ihnen in meinem stillen Daheim 
ausgeliefert fühle. Es sind viele gegen einen. Ich spüre, daß sie mich anstarren, 
und ahne Zeichen der Verständigung zwischen ihnen.130 
 
Polgar’s narrator goes on to describe the relative quiet and stillness of his apartment as 
like an animal lying in wait, his familiar decorations and furniture as if they were ready to 
come alive and pounce at any moment. Closing his windows to the street noises below 
only intensifies the effect, revealing a quiet yet troubling “spider-web of sounds” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
130 Alfred Polgar, “Die Dinge,” in Bewegung ist alles: Novellen und Skizzen (Frankfurt am Main: 
Rütten & Loening, 1909), pp. 95–105, quoted here pp. 95–96. Polgar’s “Die Dinge” also exists in 
a revised and shortened 1926 version, reprinted in Polgar, Kleine Schriften, vol. 2: Kreislauf, ed. 
Marcel Reich-Ranicki (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1983), pp. 17–21. 
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(Spinnengewebe von Tönen) suggestive of a hostile, living presence amongst the 
inanimate things in his room.131 His anxieties arise most acutely upon hearing noises in 
the night and when sensing a trace of abruptly silenced commotion upon returning to his 
apartment. Such animistic anxieties, as Polgar’s text makes clear, are not the product of 
some regressive or childish mentality. Rather, they are predicated upon the narrator’s 
particularly modern living conditions. His “mistrust of things” (Mißtrauen gegen die 
Dinge) is the consequence of his solitary urban existence, the result of being alone and 
quietly isolated amidst the city’s ceaseless commotion and anonymous residents. 
In describing the narrator’s fears, Polgar’s text presents a convergence of 
experiences that have featured prominently in theoretical accounts of “the uncanny” (das 
Unheimliche) ever since Sigmund Freud’s famous 1919 study. First, as the term 
immediately suggests, there is the experience of unhomeliness, which, in Freud’s 
analysis, links what is strange and disturbing to what is secretly and most intimately 
familiar.132 In spatial terms, the feelings of anxiety and estrangement particular to the 
uncanny find their proper place in the domestic enclosures of the home (das Heim), a 
space thus transformed from that of the familiar to the strange, from that of shelter and 
protection to homelessness and threat.133 As Martin Heidegger describes it in a 1925 
lecture: “Wir sagen dann: es wird einem unheimlich. Man ist in der nächstvertrauten 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
131 Polgar, “Die Dinge,” in Bewegung ist alles, p. 95. 
 
132 Sigmund Freud, “Das Unheimliche” [1919], in Studienausgabe, vol. 4: Psychologische 
Schriften, ed. Alexander Mitscherlich et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1981), pp. 241–74: “Das 
Unheimliche sei jene Art des Schreckhaften, welche auf das Altbekannte, Längstvertraute 
zurückgeht” (244).    
 
133 On aspects of a spatial uncanny in modern architecture and urban space, see Anthony Vidler, 
The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1992).     
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Umwelt nicht mehr zu Hause.”134 For Polgar’s narrator, the unhomeliness of his urban 
housing also coincides with a second, more dynamic aspect of the uncanny: an anxious 
uncertainty as to the animacy of things. In Ernst Jentsch’s original 1906 description, “Zur 
Psychologie des Unheimlichen,” the experience of the uncanny is attributed to this very 
uncertainty: “Zweifel an der Beseelung eines anscheinend lebendigen Wesens und 
umgekehrt darüber, ob ein lebloser Gegenstand nicht etwa beseelt sei.”135 While Freud’s 
later analysis is quick to challenge the equation of uncanny feelings with intellectual 
uncertainty, there is no denying the accuracy of Jentsch’s descriptive account.136 
Uncanny sensations indeed arise most forcefully when objects appear to blur the line 
between animate and inanimate. As Polgar’s “Die Dinge” suggests, this anxiety as to the 
animacy of things finds a particular home in the unhomely, domestic interiors of the 
modern city. 
Polgar was not the only writer to draw a connection between the experiential 
conditions of urban housing and a fear of objects coming alive. Around the very same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
134 Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 20, ed. 
Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979), p. 400 (italics in original). For 
Heidegger in the 1920s, any talk of “Unheimlichkeit” would fall under a more fundamental 
condition of homelessness in the world at large (Nicht-zuhause-sein). See also, Sein und Zeit 
[1927] (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2006), pp. 188–89. As Hubert Dreyfus points out, after 1930 
Heidegger moves away from earlier existential accounts of anxiety and uncanniness, and instead 
interprets such conditions historically, “as a specific response to the rootlessness of the 
contemporary technological world.” Much of Heidegger’s later writings can be read as an attempt 
to reestablish a rootedness and being-at-home in the world through one’s mortal “dwelling” 
(wohnen) with things. See Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being 
and Time, Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 336–38, quoted here, p. 337.  
 
135 Ernst Jentsch, “Zur Psychologie des Unheimlichen,” Psychiatrisch-Neurologische 
Wochenschrift 8.22 (August 25, 1906): pp. 195–98, here p. 197. Jentsch’s article is concluded in 
the following issue, Psychiatrisch-Neurologische Wochenschrift 8.23 (September 1, 1906): pp. 
203–205.  
 
136 Cf. Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” pp. 244–45. 
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time, both Rainer Maria Rilke and Franz Kafka composed literary works that transformed 
their own domestic experiences into fictions of animate things. In Rilke’s 1910 novel, 
Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, the narrator describes the crashing noises 
of a “certain tin object” (ein gewisser blecherner Gegenstand) in his neighbor’s 
apartment and imagines this unruly object to stand in for a whole corrupt and hostile life 
of things in modern times.137 In Kafka’s 1915 “Blumfeld” fragment, the eponymous 
bachelor comes home to his apartment to find a pair of rebellious, bouncing celluloid 
balls, which go about disrupting his otherwise sedate and solitary home-life.138 With both 
texts, the fictional account of an uncanny life of things develops out of concrete 
observations from the authors’ experiences in urban housing. In a 1907 letter from Paris, 
during his work on the Malte novel, Rilke describes hearing “irgendwelche blecherne 
Dinge” that repeatedly crash and roll around on the floor of his neighbor’s apartment.139 
Kafka reports in a 1915 journal entry of an, “ewiges Rollen einer Kugel wie beim Kegeln 
unverständlicher Zweck,” heard through the floorboards above his apartment in 
Prague.140 As with Polgar’s narrator, the noises heard in Rilke’s and Kafka’s domestic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
137 See Rainer Maria Rilke, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge [1910], in Werke: 
Kommentierte Ausgabe in vier Bänden, vol. 3: Prosa und Dramen, ed. August Stahl (Frankfurt 
am Main and Leipzig: Insel, 1996), pp. 581–84, here p. 582. 
 
138 See the first half of the fragmentary story (first published posthumously as “Blumfeld, ein 
älterer Junggeselle”) in Franz Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente I, Kritische 
Ausgabe, ed. Malcolm Pasley (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1993), pp. 229–52.   
 
139 See the letter to his wife, “An Clara Rilke, 29, rue Cassette, Paris VIe, am 19. Juni 1907,” in 
Rainer Maria Rilke, Briefe aus den Jahren, 1906 bis 1907, ed. Ruth Sieber-Rilke and Carl Sieber 
(Leipzig: Insel, 1930), p. 271. 
 
140 Franz Kafka, Tagebücher, Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Hans-Gerd Koch et al. (Frankfurt am Main: 
S. Fischer, 1990), p. 732. 
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interiors provoke a fear that things might be taking on an autonomous and hostile life of 
their own.  
That Rilke, Kafka, and Polgar would all see fit to explore these anxieties in 
fictional writings suggests an importance of such episodes for an understanding of both 
German literary modernism and the experience of urban modernity. The picture is further 
enriched by contemporaneous developments in early cinema, which began to exploit 
various trick and animation techniques in order to produce the illusion of autonomously 
moving objects. Between 1907 and 1912, filmmakers such as James Stuart Blackton, 
Segundo de Chomón, Émile Cohl, Guido Seeber, and others produced a concentrated 
number of early trick-films that depict photographed objects––like utensils, tools, 
furniture, decorations, and commodities––taking on their own animated lives within 
ostensibly live-action, domestic scenes. The thematic connection alone suggests a 
surprising historical alignment between representations of modernist literature and 
cinematic attractions at a time when the relationship between literature and cinema was 
particularly contentious in aesthetic, cultural, and social debates.141 Despite perceived 
competition between the literary arts and the new mass medium of film, these 
contemporaneous representations of animated things point to a close––and largely 
unexplored––interrelationship between the two aesthetic media. 
In investigating this proliferation of films and literary texts around 1910, the 
present chapter pursues two distinct but intersecting lines of argumentation. On the one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
141 See Anton Kaes’s introduction to his edited collection, Kino-Debatte: Texte zum Verhältnis 
von Literatur und Film 1909–1929 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1978), pp. 1–35; as well as 
Thomas Koebner, “Der Film als neue Kunst: Reaktionen der literarischen Intelligenz: Zur 
Theorie des Stummfilms (1911–24),” in Literaturwissenschaft, Medienwissenschaft, ed. Volker 
Canaris and Helmut Kreuzer (Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1977), pp. 1–31. 
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hand, literary and cinematic depictions of animated things will be commonly situated in 
relation to broader, modernist discourses on the experiential ruptures and technological 
conditions of urban modernity as well as the consequent effects on the city-dwelling 
human. In the first section of the chapter, a close reading of Polgar’s “Die Dinge,” along 
with references to Rilke and Kafka, will help to establish the particularly modern, urban-
type character, who so fears an animate life of things. In the second section, I will discuss 
representations of animated objects in early trick-films as they relate to both uncanny 
experiences of urban modernity as well as modern fantasies and fears of technological 
automation. In both literature and film, representations of animated things involve an 
unsettling reflection on the new experiential conditions of modern life––but also differ in 
important ways given their contrasting, visual and acoustic dimensions. The second line 
of argumentation investigates representations of animated things in terms of a productive 
exchange between literature and film around 1910. This particular convergence of literary 
and cinematic imaginaries, I argue, plays a significant role in shaping both new 
representational strategies within modernist literature as well as an emerging, film 
aesthetics based on cinema’s unique capability to animate photographed objects. This 
aesthetic potential of cinema, as I will show, is especially embraced by writers and critics 
informed by the history of literature and who look to cinematic animation not only as a 
way of justifying cinema’s status as a unique art-form, but also as a means of realizing 
images that could only be evoked with words in past literary works. Alongside this 
emergence of a new cinematic aesthetics, literary writers also looked to the animation of 
objects in early trick-films as an impetus for developing new, representational strategies 
within modernist and avant-garde literature. The final section of the chapter will discuss 
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this productive exchange between literature and film, with various textual examples, 
before concluding with a paired reading of the specific, animated objects in Rilke’s Malte 
and Kafka’s “Blumfeld” story. Throughout the discussion, the notion of an “urban 
uncanny” will help provide a unifying frame through which to investigate the animistic 
experience of things, as it appears in literary and cinematic production around 1910. 
My use of the term “animistic” in this context is at once loose and historically 
informed. By the time Freud’s essay, “Animismus, Magie und Allmacht der Gedanken,” 
was published in Totem und Tabu (1913), the concept of animism had already been 
expanded beyond a strict “doctrine of souls” as elaborated by Edward Burnett Tylor and 
others in the second half of the nineteenth century.142 While Freud, for example, still 
holds to the notion of animism as a supposedly primitive “system of thought” (which 
populates the world with innumerable spirits and animate objects), he also stresses the 
continuity between the beliefs of non-Western “animists” and the psychology of children 
and neurotics in modern European societies. Moreover, Freud points to the field of art in 
modern civilization as retaining aspects of earlier animistic beliefs. In all of these cases, 
he argues, one finds a similar overvaluation of psychical acts (Allmacht der Gedanken), 
whereby relations between ideas about things are thought to hold for the things 
themselves.143 In contrast to Freud, I have little interest in analyzing aesthetic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
142 For Edward B. Tylor’s original interpretation and invention of “Animism” as the groundwork 
of early religion, see his study, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of 
Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom [1871], vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2010). Tylor’s notion of animism was later expanded upon in the ethnographic writings of James 
George Frazer, Wilhelm Wundt, and others. In the early twentieth century, Tylor’s systematic 
account of animism based on a “doctrine of souls” was subjected to considerable critique and 
revision by the likes of Freud, Émile Durkheim, and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl.  
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representations in terms of projection or the “omnipotence of thoughts.” Nor do I intend 
to read the animated things of modernist fiction and early film as somehow analogous to 
the magical worlds of “primitive” animism. I use the term animistic, rather, to indicate a 
particular quality of experience, which (at least in the historical period I investigate) 
appears strongly related to the uncanny interior spaces of the city and the animated 
objects of early cinema. In texts from around 1910, these experiences are deemed 
sufficient in themselves to account for an unsettling anxiety as to the animacy of things 
and need not be explained in terms of a return of the repressed or surpassed beliefs of the 
child or “primitive.” In short, as I will show, the animistic quality of uncanny experience 
can be found very readily “at home” in the modern city environment of the early 
twentieth century.144 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 See Freud, “Animismus, Magie und Allmacht der Gedanken” [1913], in Totem und Tabu: 
Einige Übereinstimmungen im Seelenleben der Wilden und der Neurotiker (Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer, 1991), pp. 125–50. In Freud’s later 1919 essay, “Das Unheimliche,” the term 
“animistisch” is extracted even further from its original ethnographic context to apply to aesthetic 
experience and the depicted worlds of literary texts. While Freud makes no direct reference to 
cinema in this context, Stefan Andriopoulos points out that his German formulation “Technik der 
Magie” (in paraphrase of Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss’s General Theory of Magic) 
“simultaneously invokes cinema as a modern ‘technology of magic.’” See Andriopoulos, “The 
Terror of Reproduction: Early Cinema’s Ghostly Doubles and the Right to One’s Own Image,” 
New German Critique 99 (Fall 2006): pp. 151–70, quoted here, p. 166. Freud’s 1919 phrase refers 
back to a related formulation in Totem und Tabu. Cf. “Das Unheimliche,” p. 263.  
 
144 For a relevant attempt at defining a modern uncanny at the intersection of urban 
phantasmagoria and technological media, see also the introduction and essays collected in Jo 
Collins and John Jervis (eds.), Uncanny Modernity: Cultural Theories, Modern Anxieties 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). It is telling that, 
in Polgar’s text, the narrator’s attempt to justify his “mistrust of things” should draw on a 
supposed “Tradition” belonging not to the non-Western “primitive” but rather to the culture and 
philosophy of 19th century Europe. See Polgar, “Die Dinge,” in Bewegung ist alles, p. 97. The 
narrator refers to the animate objects in Hans Christian Andersen’s popular fairy tales (p. 103), 
the turning tables of the spiritualist séance (p. 99), and even German Idealism with its tenet, “daß 
nur in uns als bemerkenden Subjekten die Dinge existent seien,” making one all the more wary 
what these “philosophisch entkernte Dinge” might be up to when out of our sights (p. 98). 
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Focusing on this collection of texts and films from around 1910 has the added 
benefit of challenging a number of assumptions that hold sway in current critical 
discussions of the uncanny. First, following Freud’s famous reading of E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s “Der Sandmann,” there has been a strong tendency to overvalue an 
exclusively visual realm of uncanny experience, to stress only the uncanny effects of 
optical instruments and media, or objects whose visible appearance seems to blur the 
lines between human and thing.145 My analysis will seek to complicate this picture by 
resituating the uncanny in relation to an isolation and interference of the senses––hearing 
and seeing, in particular––which appears in the literary texts I discuss and emerges 
forcefully through a direct comparison between these works and contemporaneous, 
cinematic representations of animate things. By situating such representations historically 
with respect to modernist discourses on urban experience, one can also avoid falling into 
older arguments about literary genre, which would seek to fit these uncanny fictions into 
a lineage with fantastic tales from the nineteenth century.146 Of interest is not some 
destabilization or blurring of the familiar and supernatural, leaving characters or readers 
uncertain as to the true state of things. Polgar’s narrator and Rilke’s Malte are clearly 
suffering from some sort of psychological anxiety; and the animated things in Kafka’s 
“Blumfeld” and early animation films are presented as bizarre, yet self-evident matters of 
fact. These are not instances of representational uncertainty, I would argue, but rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
145 For a delineation of a strictly visual uncanny, see Tom Gunning, “Uncanny Reflections, 
Modern Illusions: Sighting the Modern Optical Uncanny,” in Uncanny Modernity, pp. 68–90. 
 
146 The study of the uncanny as a literary genre can be attributed largely to the influence of 
Tzvetan Todorov’s classic 1970 study, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, 
trans. Richard Howard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1975). 
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complimentary aspects of the same historical reflection on an uncanny, new relationship 
between humans and things in the early twentieth century. The close alignment between 
literary and cinematic representations in this manner also helps to counter deterministic 
arguments such as Friedrich Kittler’s, which describe the uncanny dying out in literature 
just as it is resurrected in film.147 On the contrary, as I will show, this specific instance of 
the uncanny emerges around 1910 at the historical intersection of modernist fiction, 
cinematic animation, and imaginaries of the modern city. 
 
Nerves and Noises 
Whether in Rilke’s Paris, Kafka’s Prague, or Polgar’s Vienna, a set of common features 
describes the character of one threatened by an apparently hostile, independent life of 
things. Beyond being a solitary and male city-dweller, such a figure is found to suffer 
from a specifically modern, yet famously vague malady: that of sensitive nerves.148 Kafka 
describes laying down, “mit förmlich zerrissenen Nerven,” after a particularly tormenting 
day in his noisy apartment.149 Rilke complains of a sensitivity to noises heard through his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
147 See Friedrich Kittler, Grammophon Film Typewriter (Berlin: Brinkmann & Bose, 1986), pp. 
229–30; and Kittler, Optische Medien: Berliner Vorlesung 1999 (Berlin: Merve, 2002), p. 227: 
“Die Theorie Tzvetan Todorovs, es sei die literarische Phantastik an ihrer Aufklärung durch 
Freud und die Psychoanalyse gestorben, ist zur Hälfte falsch: Das Phantastische erlebte im 
Spielfilm eine triumphale Auferstehung.” 
 
148 As Andreas Killen puts it in a recent study, nervousness is the “quintessentially modern 
condition,” which by 1900 had taken on the character of a mass phenomenon. To be nervous, 
“meant to live in a sped-up world, one saturated with new stimuli, demands, risks, messages, and 
pleasures, requiring constant adaptation to a wealth of new experiences.” See Killen, Berlin 
Electropolis: Shocks, Nerves, and German Modernity (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2006), 
p. 1. 
 
149 Kafka, Tagebücher, p. 733. 
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interior walls and of his neighbor’s own hopeless “nervous” (nervös) condition.150 In 
Polgar’s text, the “Nervenkrisen” and “Nervenstruktur” responsible for the narrator’s 
anxieties are even given a specific medical diagnosis. His animistic fear of things is 
attributed to a case of “Neurasthenikerdasein.”151  
In referring to the “neurasthenic” (Neurastheniker), Polgar’s text links its 
narrator’s anxieties to a specific, historical disease construct. First introduced around 
1870, neurasthenia was invented to encompass a range of nervous conditions supposedly 
brought on by the effects of rapid industrialization, modern media technologies, and the 
occupational hazards of mental overexertion. By 1900, the nervous illness had become 
gradually expanded beyond its original associations with the over-stimulated upper 
classes to describe a mass nervousness that cut across class and gender lines and was 
most strongly located in the rapidly modernizing urban-centers of America and Western 
Europe.152 The perceived mass nervousness of city-dwellers, according to popular and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
150 Rilke, Briefe aus den Jahren, 1906 bis 1907, p. 271. 
	  
151 For the above quotations, see Polgar, “Die Dinge,” in Bewegung ist alles, pp. 100, 104, and 
102, respectively.  
 
152 For a concise account of both the clinical and discursive history of neurasthenia, see Killen, 
Berlin Electropolis, pp. 1–14 and 49–52. Here, he provides a helpful summary of George Miller 
Beard’s original 1869 study, A Practical Treatise on Nervous Exhaustion, which first introduced 
the term neurasthenia: “‘Civilization excites,’ [Beard] wrote; and the higher classes were 
correspondingly more excited. Modern nervousness […] was attributable to the impact on 
modern life of five factors: steam power, the periodical press, the telegraph, the growth of the 
sciences, and the increased ‘mental activity’ of women. Above all nervousness was the result of 
mental overexertion, the occupational hazard of a new class of brain workers, men whose 
vocation demanded prolonged concentration amid conditions of ‘considerable excitement,’ such 
as politics or commercial activity” (p. 51). Translated editions of Beard’s study proved a 
considerable influence on French and German medical and sociological discussions in the late 
19th century. For the 2nd German edition, see George M. Beard, Die Nervenschwäche 
(Neurasthenia), ihre Symptome, Natur, Folgezustände und Behandlung, trans. M. Neisser 
(Leipzig: F.C.W. Vogel, 1883).      
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medical discussions of the time, was largely attributable to the multiplication and 
intensification of stimuli that had come to characterize urban life. Within this context, 
Georg Simmel’s famous account of the metropolitan type in his 1903 essay, “Die 
Großstädte und das Geistesleben,” remains only the best-known articulation of the 
psychological conditions of urban modernity understood as a “Steigerung des 
Nervenlebens.”153 In short, by the time of Polgar’s writing, the complex of nervous 
disorders covered by the term neurasthenia had become inextricably tied to the excessive 
shocks and intrusions of urban modernity on the mental and physical life of the city-
dweller.  
The insight of literary writers like Polgar, Rilke, and Kafka was that these states 
of nervous anxiety were not only triggered by the increased stimulation and disruptive 
shocks to be expected in the public, exterior spaces of the city. The general nervousness 
of urban life could also transform the relatively peaceful and supposedly protective 
spaces of the domestic interior into an uncanny and threatening site. In 1897 Émile 
Durkheim could suggest that the neurasthenic, “may live with a minimum of suffering 
when he can live in retirement and create a special environment, only partially accessible 
to the outer tumult; thus he sometimes is seen to flee the world which makes him ill and 
to seek solitude. But if forced to enter the melée and unable to shelter his tender 
sensitivity from outer shocks, he is likely to suffer more pain.”154 For Polgar’s narrator, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
153 See Georg Simmel, “Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben” [1903], in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 7: 
Aufsätze und Abhandlungen, 1901–1908, vol. 1, ed. Rüdiger Kramme et al. (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1995), pp. 116–131, here p. 116. 
 
154 Émile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology [1897], trans. John A. Spaulding and George 
Simpson (New York: The Free Press, 1951), p. 68. 
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however, even the quiet “solitude” (Einsamkeit) of one’s own apartment is accompanied 
by a severe nervous anxiety. As the famous opening pages of Rilke’s Malte show, there is 
of course the perpetual threat of violent breakdown between interior and exterior, inner 
and outer, with the disruptive noises of the street penetrating into the interior spaces of 
the home and body.155 Yet even with the windows closed, with a degree of protection 
from the “disquiet of the streets” (Unruhe der Straße), Polgar’s neurasthenic is still 
delivered over to countless, unidentifiable noises, which he amplifies and transforms in 
his mind into a fearful fantasy of hostile, animate things. At stake is thus not only the 
breakdown between inner and outer, but also an uncanny inversion: between the bare, 
threatening life of the streets and an otherwise protected, interior life of the home. While 
Walter Benjamin’s flâneur might make an interior dwelling out of the city’s busy streets 
and crowds, the flipside is an urban, domestic interior deprived of comfort and in which a 
no less dynamic and threatening life appears to have awakened.156 Benjamin’s further 
description of the “uncanny” aspects (das Unheimliche) of the urban phantasmagoria and 
crowds finds its counterpart in a phantasmal host of animate furniture, utensils, and 
domestic trappings in the unhomely apartment.157 Within this urban environment of 
general nervousness, Polgar’s text therefore offers an alternative remedy: “Ach, schickt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
155 See Rilke, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, in Werke, vol. 3, p. 455: “Daß ich es 
nicht lassen kann, bei offenem Fenster zu schlafen. Elektrische Bahnen rasen läutend durch meine 
Stube. Automobile gehen über mich hin.” 
 
156 Cf. Walter Benjamin, “Das Paris des Second Empire bei Baudelaire” [1938], in Gesammelte 
Schriften, vol. 1.2, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1974), p. 539: “Die Straße wird zur Wohnung für den Flaneur, der zwischen 
Häuserfronten so wie der Bürger in seinen vier Wänden zuhause ist.” 
 
157 See Benjamin, “Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire” [1940], in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.2, 
p. 629. 
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den Neurastheniker nicht in die Einsamkeit und verschafft ihm nicht ‘Ruhe!’ Das heißt, 
ihn von dem gewöhnlichen Krawall der Dinge befreien, um ihn ihrem weit qualvolleren 
heimlichen Lärm auszuliefern. Wo ist die Einsamkeit des Neurasthenikers? Im 
Caféhaus!”158 
The big-city setting of these literary episodes already indicates the modernity of 
the animistic anxieties described by Polgar, Rilke, and Kafka. The mental constitution of 
the relevant literary figures only reinforces the point. Rilke’s Malte, Kafka’s Blumfeld, 
and Polgar’s neurasthenic are neither childish nor superstitious, but rather exceedingly 
rational. In fact, it is their rational disposition and observations that structure their fearful 
relationship with an apparent life of things. Kafka learns from his landlady that the room 
above him is unoccupied, and is thus led to “logically negate the existence of the noise” 
(den Lärm logisch zu negieren); however, with no possible human agency behind this 
“Illusion eines Kegelspiels” heard through the ceiling, he is left to attribute the noise to 
some autonomous, thingly “Lärmapparat.”159 For Polgar’s neurasthenic, a similar 
inability to establish a “causal connection” (kausale Verknüpfung) between sound and 
source is what drives him to a fearful mistrust of things. The effect on his nerves of the 
soft rustling, rattling, and creaking of objects in his room cannot be combatted with a 
dose of “Menschenverstand.” Instead, his attempt to establish a logical “Allianz zwischen 
Ursache und Wirkung” leads to frustration and a further crisis of nerves. The constant, 
futile attempt to fit all thingly noises into a “Schlinge eines logischen Zusammenhanges” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
158 Polgar, “Die Dinge,” in Bewegung ist alles, p. 105. 
 
159 See Kafka’s letter from March 21, 1915, cited in Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und 
Fragmente I: Apparatband, Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Malcolm Pasley (Frankfurt am Main: S. 
Fischer, 1993), p. 76.  
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only strengthens the narrator’s anxieties that his domestic objects are in possession of 
their own animate life.160  
In all of these literary examples, the intellectual uncertainty that gives rise to 
uncanny fears is thus closely related to the material conditions of urban living. Alone in 
an apartment, the city-dweller is subjected to frequently unlocalizable and unidentifiable 
noises, whether emanating from outside of the building or through the walls of adjacent 
rooms. Tight quarters and thin walls combine with the intensification and closer 
proximity of noises in the city to create a disquieting separation between what is seen and 
what is heard. In Simmel’s and Benjamin’s more famous accounts, the unsettling aspect 
of urban experience is attributed to a supposed, “Übergewicht der Aktivität des Auges 
über die des Gehörs,” occurring in crowded spaces of public transit where people look at 
one another without speaking.161 A more accurate picture arises, however, when 
considering both public and private spaces of the city. Urban experience is not simply 
characterized by the predominance of one sense over the others, but rather in their mutual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
160 For the above quotations, see Polgar, “Die Dinge,” in Bewegung ist alles, pp. 96 and 99–100. 
Here is perhaps the pathological flipside to the rational, mental life of Simmel’s metropolitan 
character. In the absence of a multiplicity and intensity of stimuli, the urban type in Polgar’s story 
attempts to rationally process and organize even the most insignificant stimuli to the point of 
nervous exhaustion. 
 
161 See Benjamin, “Das Paris des Second Empire bei Baudelaire” [1938], in Gesammelte 
Schriften, vol. 1.2, p. 540. The above quotation is from a longer passage reverse-translated by 
Benjamin from a 1912 French translation of Simmel. The original text can be found in Simmel’s 
1908 study, Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung and is reprinted 
in Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.3, p. 1211: “der, der sieht, ohne zu hören, [ist] sehr 
viel verworrener, ratloser, beunruhigter als der, der hört, ohne zu sehen. Hierin muß ein für die 
Soziologie der Großstadt bedeutsames Moment liegen. Der Verkehr in ihr, verglichen mit dem in 
der Kleinstadt, zeigt ein unermeßliches Übergewicht des Sehens über das Hören Andrer [...]. Vor 
der Ausbildung der Omnibusse, Eisenbahnen und Straßenbahnen im 19. Jahrhundert waren 
Menschen überhaupt nicht in der Lage, sich minuten- bis stundenlang anblicken zu können oder 
zu müssen, ohne miteinander zu sprechen” (emphasis added).    
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separation and isolation.162 The visual experience of the streets establishes the city as a 
dynamic, overpopulated space of moving bodies, spectacles, objects, and machines. An 
awareness of this ubiquitous life persists even in the isolated confines of the urban 
apartment, yet here it is experienced primarily through sound. The inability to establish a 
firm connection between what is heard and its cause can provoke an uncanny relationship 
to all the surrounding, urban life. So when noises begin to emanate from within the 
apartment itself, a city-dweller like Polgar’s neurasthenic might be excused a certain fear 
that a similarly dynamic life has awakened within his very own home.163 
Around the same time as Polgar’s writing, Ernst Jentsch would also point to a 
separation of the senses as a key component of uncanny sensations: “das Ausfallen einer 
wichtigen Sinnesfunction kann solche Gefühle im Menschen stark steigern,” he writes of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
162 The isolation and conditioning of the senses around 1900, of course, involves far more than 
the experiential conditions of the city. As Jonathan Crary has argued, modernity involves a broad 
reshaping of human perception according to new norms and practices of attention that emerged 
historically in relation to discursive and technological forms of control and rationalization. See 
Crary, Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1999). For a detailed study of the historical interrelations between the acoustic 
experiences of urban modernity, scientific studies of hearing, and German modernist literature, 
see the forthcoming work of Tyler Whitney. 
	  
163 The connection between acoustic experience and animism is of course not unique to the 
soundscape of the modern city. As presented in the innovative work of Spyros Papapetros, 
nineteenth-century ethnographic accounts of animism, like Tylor’s Primitive Culture, frequently 
“situate the origin of animistic beliefs in auditory effects of inanimate objects.” See Papapetros, 
On the Animation of the Inorganic: Art, Architecture, and the Extension of Life (Chicago: Univ. 
of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 17. In regard to Papapetros’s larger project, the point of the present 
chapter is simply to offer further evidence of the infusion of animistic thinking in the modernist 
culture of turn-of-the-century Europe. Animistic anxieties arising in relation to the material 
conditions of urban dwelling present yet another case of what Papapetros terms “phobic 
animation”: the experience of a “hostile external environment” of living things, which describes 
far better the modern, technological environments of the Western world than the natural, 
“primitive” world to which it was originally ascribed (pp. 20–21).   
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the uncanny in 1906.164 Jentsch offers examples of a loss of vision at night or the 
breakdown of intelligible hearing in a noisy “Werkstätte oder Maschinenhalle.” In both 
cases, a breakdown of one sense in relation to another––hearing without being able to 
see, seeing without meaningful hearing––contributes to an experience of uncanny 
disorientation. For a particularly telling example, Jentsch also resorts to the realm of 
fantasy: “Ab und zu liest man in älteren Reisebeschreibungen, jemand habe sich im 
Urwalde auf einen Baumstamm gesetzt und plötzlich habe sich dieser Baumstamm zum 
Entsetzen des Reisenden zu bewegen angefangen und als eine Riesenschlange 
herausgestellt.”165 Here, the separation and interference between what one sees and what 
one feels gives rise to the uncanny realization of an animate being. In this world of 
fantasy evoked by Jentsch, such animate creatures and things are an accepted, external 
reality. For the modern city-dweller like Polgar’s narrator, however, a similar uncanny 
encounter is a matter of an internal fantasy of the mind––the turning of untraceable 
sounds into phantasmal, animate things. What is missing in Jentsch’s description of the 
uncanny is to bring together––under the sign of the modern––this fragmentation and 
interference of the senses with what he calls the “allgemein nervöse Veranlagung” of the 
individual.166 Under these conditions, located most strongly in the modern urban 
environment, even the metropolis can appear like a fantastic, enchanted realm. Thus, for 
Polgar’s neurasthenic, everyday life can seem like a walk through a mysterious Urwald:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
164 Jentsch, “Zur Psychologie des Unheimlichen,” Psychiatrisch-Neurologische Wochenschrift 
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überall mysteriöse Lebendigkeit; das Gefühl, von unsichtbaren Händen betastet, 
vom Atem geheimnisvoller Wesen gestreift zu werden; böse Laute, die wie 
gefährliche Tiere plötzlich über den Weg springen; trübes Licht, das nicht Licht 
zu sein scheint, sondern das blinzelnde Auge der Finsternis. Nun, das Leben des 
Neurasthenikers ist ein beständiger Gang durch solch dunkles Waldinnere. Das 
Lebendige ist für ihn überlebendig, das Tote regt sich, das Lautlose bekommt 




The psychological anxieties described in Polgar’s “Die Dinge” find a direct, experiential 
counterpart in the visual representations of early cinema. Whereas literary modernism 
imagines a phantasmal life of things out of the untraceable noises of the city, early films 
were understood to exhibit such possibilities as a visual reality. Insofar as early cinema 
presented the viewer with a fleeting, fragmentary series of scenes, shocks, and attractions, 
the emerging mass medium was already well correlated with the general nervousness and 
intensified experiences of the big city. As one writer observed in 1911:  
Die Psychologie des kinematographischen Triumphes ist Großstadt-Psychologie. 
Nicht nur, weil die große Stadt den natürlichen Brennpunkt für alle 
Ausstrahlungen des gesellschaftlichen Lebens bildet, im besonderen auch noch, 
weil die Großstadtseele, diese ewig gehetzte, von flüchtigem Eindruck zu 
flüchtigem Eindruck taumelnde, neugierige und unergründliche Seele so recht die 
Kinematographenseele ist.168 
 
The city-dweller’s specific anxieties as to an unseen, animate life of things, as described 
in literary texts around 1910, provides a striking instance of this historical connection 
between early cinema and the metropolitan psyche. The fraught psychological interiors of 
Polgar’s neurasthenic or Rilke’s Malte find themselves reinforced externally in the visual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
167 Polgar, “Die Dinge,” in Bewegung ist alles, p. 104. 
 
168 Hermann Kienzl, “Theater und Kinematograph,” Der Strom 1.7 (October 1911): pp. 219–21, 
quoted here, pp. 219–20. Also quoted in Kaes, Kino-Debatte, p. 6. 
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culture of early cinema (located as well in the big-city environment). Between roughly 
1907 and 1912, urban filmgoers encountered a considerable proliferation of animated 
trick-films in which real domestic objects were observed to move on their own. Tables 
appeared to set themselves, tools performed manual labor without the aid of human 
hands, and whole collections of furniture and domestic objects would pack themselves up 
and move from apartment to apartment. While the uncanny sensation produced by such 
images was in the service of mass entertainment, such films were also closely bound up 
with the fears and fantasies of the modern, technological environment of the city. The 
total automatization of objects as presented in early cinema was both a dream of futuristic 
luxury and a nightmare of an unpredictable and uncontrollable world of things. New 
techniques of animation provided an intensified vision of this changed relationship with 
things, which was already inherent to the experiences of the modern city and the moving 
images of early film.  
For a young Georg Lukács, cinematic animation suggested the possibility of a 
new, film aesthetics that could transcend the limitations of literary representation. In his 
short 1911 article “Gedanken zu einer Ästhetik des Kinos,” Lukács based his 
speculations “toward an aesthetics of cinema” on the “fantastic” (phantastisch) new life 
of humans and things on the screen. In contrast to the mortal “presence” (Gegenwart) or 
“being” (Dasein) of the theatrical actor on stage, he argues, cinematic pictures granted to 
both human actors and inanimate objects a qualitatively different kind of life: “ein Leben 
ohne Gegenwärtigkeit, ein Leben ohne Schicksal, ohne Gründe, ohne Motive; ein Leben, 
mit dem das Innerste unserer Seele nie identisch werden will, noch kann.”169 According 
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to Lukács, this new cinematic life was freed from the causality and meaningful, temporal 
progression of the theatrical arts. It existed instead in a realm of infinite possibility and 
open temporal succession: a world in which the very distinction between “possibility” 
and “reality” was nullified through the “empirical reality” of the cinematic image.170 
Even things could be granted a fantastic, animate life on the screen. The essay describes 
films of animated furniture, up-side-down images showing mysterious crawling forms, 
and reverse-motion projections in which smoking cigars grew longer and humans sprang 
back to life out from under the wheels of a racing car. Referring specifically to early-
nineteenth-century writers like Hoffmann, Poe, and Achim von Arnim, Lukács speculates 
that cinema could directly realize the type of animate worlds only imagined in Romantic 
literature: “äußerste, ungehemmteste Beweglichkeit der Gestalten, das völlige 
Lebendigwerden des Hintergrundes, der Natur und der Interieurs.”171  
In light of Lukács’s claims about film, Polgar’s appeal to the Romantic trope of 
the enchanted forest appears then not only as a reference to an earlier literary tradition. It 
also corresponds historically to a particular reception of film. Linked by their common, 
anachronistic references to the uncanniness of Romanticism, the animate things of 
Polgar’s story and Lukács’s film aesthetics appear rather as mutually reinforcing aspects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Lukács’s essay was first published as, “Gedanken zu einer Aesthetik des ‘Kino,’” in the 
German-language newspaper published in Budapest, Pester Lloyd 90 (April 16, 1911): pp. 45–46. 
I quote here from the later, slightly modified version of the essay published in the Frankfurter 
Zeitung (Sept. 10, 1913) and reprinted in Kaes (ed.), Kino-Debatte, pp. 112–18, quoted above, p. 
113. 
 
170 Ibid., p. 114: “‘Alles ist möglich’: das ist die Weltanschauung des ‘Kino,’ und weil seine 
Technik in jedem einzelnen Moment die absolute (wenn auch nur empirische) Wirklichkeit dieses 
Moments ausdrückt, wird das Gelten der ‘Möglichkeit’ als eine der ‘Wirklichkeit’ entgegen-
gesetzten Kategorie aufgehoben; die beiden Kategorien werden einander gleichgesetzt, sie 
werden zu einer Identität.”    
 
171 Ibid., p. 115–17, here p. 115.  
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of a new, modernist uncanny: an animistic experience of the world resituated in relation 
to the anxious interiority of the urban dweller, on the one hand, and the new, visual 
possibilities of the cinematic image, on the other. Taken together, Polgar’s and Lukács’s 
texts suggest that the earlier, psychological phantasms of Romantic literature find a 
popular approximation in the daily experiences of urban housing and cinematic 
entertainment in the early twentieth century. But whereas literature could only evoke the 
kind of animistic anxieties arising through the acoustic experience of the city, film 
offered a direct, visual equivalent to the feared animation of things. The early, German 
description of cinema as “living pictures” (lebende Bilder) already points to a certain 
animistic quality of the emerging, mass medium itself. This understanding of cinema is 
only intensified with the specific use of trick-techniques to animate individual objects 
depicted on screen. 
The understanding of cinema as a medium based in animation emerged early on 
in its history. German advertisements and publications addressing the earliest public 
exhibitions in the mid 1890s referred to cinema as both “lebende Bilder” and “lebende 
Photographien.”172 Here, the German closely paralleled comparable English and French 
descriptions of cinema as “animated photography” and “photographies animées.” While 
all phrases nicely evoke the impression of life found in the moving images of cinema in 
general, the term animation eventually took on a set of more specific meanings in French 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
172 The term “lebende Bilder” for cinema also evokes an earlier usage in reference to the 
nineteenth-century entertainment form of the tableau vivant, which reproduced static, painterly 
compositions through the use of real costumed actors, both professional and amateur. On the 
short-lived historical intersection between early cinema and public tableau vivant exhibitions, see 
Daniel Wiegand, “Stillstand im Bewegungsbild: Intermediale Beziehungen zwischen Film und 
Tableaux vivants um 1900,” Montage AV: Zeitschrift für Theorie und Geschichte audiovisueller 
Kommunikation 20.2 (Feb. 20, 2011): pp. 41–53.  
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and English. In Frederick A. Talbot’s popular 1912 book, Moving Pictures: How They 
Are Made and Worked, for example, film is not only referred to as “animated 
photography”; the author also gives detailed accounts of various trick techniques that 
were “means of imparting animation to a lifeless object.”173 By around 1910, “animation” 
in English thus referred at once to both specific techniques for making objects appear to 
live and move on their own as well as to the moving images of the cinematic medium 
itself. It was not until around 1920 that the term took on its now more familiar meaning 
as a designation for the specific film genre of cartoons or animated drawings (in French, 
dessins animés).174 In early-twentieth-century German usage, variations on the words “to 
live” (leben) and “to enliven” (beleben) frequently appeared to describe the animating 
effects of cinematic techniques as well as the moving image itself. However, in 
distinction to English and French, it was not until after WWII that the term “Animation” 
was consistently borrowed in German to designate the film genre of animated drawings 
or cartoons.175 Instead, during the early decades of the twentieth century, the German 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
173 For his extensive discussion of early trick and animation techniques, see Frederick A. Talbot, 
Moving Pictures: How They Are Made and Worked (London: William Heinemann, 1912), pp. 
197–263, quoted here, p. 209. Talbot’s introductory discussion of cinematic illusion is titled, 
“What Is Animated Photography?” (pp. 1–9).   
	  
174 The Oxford English Dictionary gives 1919 as the earliest instance of “animation” referring to 
films made up of a series of drawings. In Le Robert’s Dictionnaire Historique de la Langue 
Française, the earliest date for “dessin animé” is listed as 1916. This shift in usage of the word 
“animation” occurring between roughly 1915 and 1920 is consistent with primary texts 
documented in Donald Crafton’s study of early cartoon animation. See, for example, his book, 
Emile Cohl, Caricature, and Film (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990). 
    
175 Cf. early German publications on such films, listed in Jeanpaul Goergen, Bibliographie zum 
deutschen Animationsfilm (Berlin: CineGraph Babelsberg, 2002), pp. 14–19. In the early 20th 
century, the verb “animieren” (long borrowed from the Latin to describe the breath or granting of 
life) was used instead to refer to forms of social entertainment and prostitution as in the words 
“Animierkneipe” and “Animierdame.”  
	  
	   130	  
term “Trickfilm” served as a broad designation for both cartoon animation as well as 
photographically based films that were largely non-narrative and dominated by trick 
techniques. In what follows, I have little interest in delimiting what constitutes the 
animation or trick-film genre. Instead, my use of the term “animation” refers mainly to 
the cinematic trick-techniques used to bring objects to life in early cinema.   
Of particular importance is the cinematic technique referred to in Talbot’s Moving 
Pictures as “one turn one picture” movement.176 Better known today as “stop-motion 
animation” or sometimes “object animation” (Sachanimation), the technique involves the 
tedious process of slightly repositioning real, three-dimensional objects between single-
frame exposures, so that, when projected, the inanimate objects appear to move on their 
own.177 While this technical possibility was well known from the very beginning of film 
history (based as it was on the most elementary principle of cinematic illusion), it was not 
until around 1910 that it became a more prevalent feature of commercial production. 
Beginning around 1907, an international collection of filmmakers, including James Stuart 
Blackton, Segundo de Chomón, Émile Cohl, and Guido Seeber began to experiment more 
intensively with this particular technique of single-frame or frame-by-frame animation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
176 See Talbot’s discussion of the technique in Moving Pictures, pp. 235–40.   
	  
177 For a current, German-language account of “object animation” (Sachanimation) in the early 
history of cinema, see, for example, Annika Schoemann, Der deutsche Animationsfilm: Von den 
Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart 1909–2001 (Sankt Augustin: Gardez!, 2003), pp. 30–32. In his 
popular 1927 book on cinematic tricks, pioneering German cameraman Guido Seeber refers to the 
technique simply as a trick of “single-frame exposures” (Einzelbild-Aufnahme). See his, Der 
Trickfilm in seinen grundsätzlichen Möglichkeiten: Eine praktische und theoretische Darstellung 
der photographischen Filmtricks (Berlin: Verlag der Lichtbildbühne, 1927), pp. 18–19 and 159. 
On the technique, Seeber writes: “Besonders diese Art der Filmaufnahme, die des ‘Einzelbildes,’ 
gestattet die größten und verblüffendsten Wirkungen. Jeden beliebigen Gegenstand kann man so 
im Film beleben, indem man seine Lage nach der Aufnahme jedes Einzelbildes verändert und 
entsprechend seiner Natur einrichtet. Pinsel oder Stifte schreiben selbst, Werkzeuge verrichten 
ihre Arbeit allein, Möbel wandern von Ort zu Ort” (p. 18). 
	  







Figure 2.1. James Stuart Blackton. The Haunted Hotel, 1907. Film stills. 
 
With a stationary camera and a stable background setting, filmmakers were able to 
visually animate real, photographed objects in what appeared to be live-action sequences 
and scenes. If incremental changes in the positioning of objects were subtle and fluid 
enough, playing back the filmstrip would produce the eerie illusion of an object moving 
on its own without any evidence of human manipulation. With the help of invisible wires 
or reverse motion, everyday objects could even appear to levitate, jump, or flip over as if 
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exhibiting their own lively personalities or suggesting the malevolent work of some 
invisible, ghostly presence.  
This early animation of objects was also limited in that it could never synthesize a 
purely naturalistic movement of things. No matter how careful the repositioning of 
objects between frames, the animation would appear slightly jerky and mechanical, 
leaving the viewer in a state of uneasy awareness of the apparatus behind the illusion of 
(not quite) continuous motion. As Talbot himself states: “The interruption in exposure 
can often be detected unless the task is carried out with consummate skill, because the 
movement appears to be jerky in the picture.”178 One consequence of this technical 
challenge was, as Talbot notes, a “somewhat uncanny” effect, which could be intensified 
through the coordinated use of additional trick techniques like invisible wires and slow, 
fast, or reverse motion.179  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
178 Ibid., p. 237. 
 
179 Ibid., p. 239. It should be noted here that Talbot also uses the term “stop motion” as an 
alternative to “one turn one picture” movement (p. 235). This usage and the current term “stop-
motion animation” must be distinguished, however, from the “stop motion” or “stop-motion 
substitution” technique frequently discussed by scholars of early cinema. In reference to the 
earlier work of Georges Méliès, for example, “stop motion” refers not to longer, animation 
sequences but rather to isolated, substitution tricks that were popular before 1907. For early tricks 
of stop-motion substitution, filmmakers would supposedly stop the camera at a designated point 
in a live-action sequence, rearrange actors and props, and then resume turning the camera. In this 
manner, films could create the illusion of humans and things suddenly appearing, disappearing, 
transforming, or relocating as if out of thin air. Talbot preserves this earlier usage of “stop 
motion,” as well, in his broader discussion of trick techniques (see pp. 201 and 212–15). As Tom 
Gunning has argued, such illusions were often times far more complex and could also involve the 
cutting and splicing of film. See Gunning, “‘Primitive’ Cinema: A Frame-up? Or, The Trick’s on 
Us,” in Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. Thomas Elsaesser (London: British Film 
Institute, 1990), pp. 95–103. To avoid confusion, I prefer the term “object animation,” which has 
the added benefit of broadly including other trick techniques like invisible wires and reverse 
motion, which were often used in conjunction with the “one turn one picture” technique.      
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The very earliest films to suggest an animation of things often fell within the 
familiar genre of the haunted house film. In Edison productions, like Uncle Josh in a 
Spooky Hotel (1900), and numerous trick-films by Georges Méliès, including Le Manoir 
du diable (1896), Le Château hanté (1897), and L’Auberge du bon repos (1903), the 
gothic setting of the haunted house, castle, or hotel was used as a stage for an array of 
substitution tricks that created the illusion of ghosts, demons, and household objects 
suddenly appearing and disappearing, and of painted portraits that appeared to come alive 
(the painted image suddenly replaced by a human actor). It was not until about 1907, 
however, that a significant number of films began to exploit stop-motion animation 
techniques to create the illusion of real objects moving on their own.180 The first of such 
films, like Blackton’s The Haunted Hotel (figure 2.1) and Chomón’s La Maison hantée, 
both from around 1907, added longer object-animation sequences to the familiar 
repertoire of haunted house stop-tricks.181 Following a highly successful run of 
screenings of The Haunted House in Paris during the summer of 1907 (billed as L’Hôtel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
180 Even later trick-films like Méliès’s Le Diable noir (1905) and Edwin S. Porter’s Dream of a 
Rarebit Fiend (1906) do not yet contain more seamless object animation. Both films (Porter’s 
being the likely reference for the moving furniture described by Lukács) instead use a rough 
series of isolated stop-tricks to create the illusion of furniture appearing, disappearing, and 
leaping around a room.     
 
181 According to historian of early animation Donald Crafton, J. Stuart Blackton’s The Haunted 
Hotel (1907) was the first commercially successful film to exploit the technique of object 
animation. See Crafton, Before Mickey: The Animated Film, 1898–1928 [1982] (Chicago: Univ. 
of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 13–33; and his monograph on the early French animation, Emile 
Cohl, Caricature, and Film, pp. 125–138. In Crafton’s account, the object animation of Chomón, 
Cohl, and others developed only after Blackton’s initial commercial success. The dates of 
Chomón’s early object-animation films are uncertain however. For a tentative filmography, 
which places La Maison hantée in 1906, see Joan M. Minguet Batllori, Segundo de Chomón: The 
Cinema of Fascination (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, Institut Català de les Indústries 
Culturals, 2010). 
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hanté: fantasmagorie épouvantable), a staff writer for the French weekly L’Illustration, 
Gustave Babin, described for his readers the mysterious attractions of object animation:  
All amateurs and habitués of the cinema who know its repertoire have seen those 
mysterious scenes I mean: a table loaded with food which is consumed, no one 
knows how, by some invisible being […]. A bottle pours its own wine into a 
glass, a knife hurls itself onto a loaf of bread, then slices into a sausage; a wicker 
basket weaving itself; tools performing their work without the cooperation of any 
artisan. So many strange marvels that one could see every night for several 
months. And even tipped off as I was, and as my readers are, I still could not find 
the last word of the riddle.182 
 
The underlying attraction of such scenes, as Babin emphasizes, was the opportunity to 
observe the illusion of animation over longer periods of time (even repeatedly) with a 
sustained uncertainty as to the underlying mechanism. With the usual cinematic illusion 
of continuous motion (cinema itself being a form of animation), the workings of the 
apparatus remained imperceptible to the human eye. However, with the jerky and 
intermittent movements of object animation, the mechanical operation of cinema was 
foregrounded for the viewer in an uncanny manner. A fantastical, photographic 
representation of the animate thing was thus inseparable from an uneasy sensation of the 
automatic mechanism of the cinematic apparatus itself. As early German animator Guido 
Seeber would later emphasize: “Trick heißt ja nicht Täuschung des Publikums, sondern 
eine Sichtbarmachung der Phantastik des Films.”183 
The dual status of cinema as both a photographic and animating medium 
corresponds to distinct aspects of the uncanny as discussed by Freud and Jentsch. 
Drawing on Freud’s 1919 text, scholars like Tom Gunning and Stefan Andriopoulos have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
182 Gustave Babin, “Les Coulisses du cinématographe,” L’Illustration (April 4, 1908), translated 
and quoted in Crafton, Before Mickey, p. 17. 
 
183 Seeber, Der Trickfilm in seinen grundsätzlichen Möglichkeiten, p. 127. 
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convincingly stressed the role of ghostly doubles in early cinema.184 In their readings of 
early film, it is cinema’s status as a photographic medium that constitutes its uncanny 
effect. The moving image’s ability to provide ghostly traces or copies of the human––
through tricks of double exposure and split screen––linked the new medium historically 
to Western anxieties about spectral images (Gunning) and the legal right to one’s own 
image (Andriopoulos). Here, the animistic anxieties related to film had to do with the 
photographic image’s supposed capability to document or embody the immaterial soul of 
the human. As Andriopoulos points out, Edward B. Tylor’s original 1871 definition of 
the soul in animistic belief––as “a thin insubstantial human image […] a sort of vapour, 
film, or shadow”––already invokes the contemporaneous, visual medium of 
photography.185 When considering cinema as an animating medium, however, the 
uncanny is configured somewhat differently and tends (perhaps counter-intuitively) to 
suspend or at least problematize concerns over an animating spirit or soul of the moving 
image. As Lukács remarks in 1911, the animated life of humans and things on film is 
also: “ein Leben ohne Seele.”186 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
184 See Tom Gunning, “Phantom Images and Modern Manifestations: Spirit Photography, Magic 
Theater, Trick Films, and Photography’s Uncanny,” in Fugitive Images: From Photography to 
Video, ed. Patrice Petro (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1995), pp. 42–71; and 
Stefan Andriopoulos, “The Terror of Reproduction: Early Cinema’s Ghostly Doubles and the 
Right to One’s Own Image.” 
 
185 See Andriopoulos, “The Terror of Reproduction,” p. 158 nt. 29. Following the Oxford English 
Dictionary, he notes here that, “‘film’ is employed to describe a ‘copy’ of a photographic plate as 
early as 1845.” For the above quotation from Tylor, see Primitive Culture: Researches into the 
Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom [1871], vol. 1, 4th ed. 
(London: J. Murray, 1903), p. 429.   
 
186 Lukács, “Gedanken zu einer Ästhetik des Kinos,” p. 114. 
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Instead of Freud’s ghostly doubles, early animation films evoke the uncanny as a 
blurring of boundaries between animate and inanimate, organic life and mechanical 
movement, aligning the cinematic uncanny more with Jentsch’s 1906 description.187 
While Jentsch avoids any mention of cinema, his connection between uncanny sensations 
and an uncertainty as to the animacy of things corresponds strikingly well to the 
experience of early object-animation films, which appeared around the very same time as 
his writing. Ironically, his description of the psychological terror of the uncanny comes at 
a time when such sensations were first being popularized as mass visual entertainment. 
With object animation, cinema could simulate for its early audiences the same sensations 
of Jentsch’s uncanny, producing in the viewer a related uncertainty as to the cause of 
animate movements. Early cinema audiences were not naïve, of course. Whether they 
could discern the exact technique behind the animation or not, they were still very much 
at home with the illusion and could experience it as a captivating if somewhat disquieting 
pleasure. The very attraction of object animation rested (and continues to rest) in the 
uneasy sensation it creates of the mechanical apparatus behind the illusion. The uncanny 
effect of the technique thus has less to do with the suggestion of an animating spirit or 
soul of things. Rather, the strange attraction of object animation can be attributed to the 
uncanny tension that arises between the sensation of mechanical movement and a 
semblance of animate life. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
187 For a similar distinction between the uncanny of Freud and Jentsch in relation to early cinema, 
see Laura Mulvey, Death 24x a Second: Stillness and the Moving Image (London: Reaktion, 
2006), p. 46: “If the contemporary response to Lumière films aligns them on the side of Freud’s 
ghostly uncanny, Méliès transfers to cinema many characteristic attributes of Jentsch’s uncanny, 
exploiting technological novelty as well as the cinema’s ability to blur the boundary between the 
animate and inanimate with trick photography.” 
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As Vivian Sobchack has recently summarized, the term animation already 
contains an inner tension that accounts for this vexed and double meaning. According to 
a more long-standing definition originating in the Latin, “animation” is defined as the 
presence or divine granting of an animating spirit, anima, the vital principle or soul of 
living things. In more recent nineteenth-century usage, this definition is complicated and 
expanded to include the state of mere motion (as a sign of life) and the suggestion that 
even humans are capable of granting “life” to inanimate matter (through the creation of 
self-moving, technological entities, for example). Since the nineteenth century, animation 
is never without this tension between animateness as the presence of a true animating 
spirit and animateness as the mere state of self-propelled, mechanical movement.188 As 
Frederick A. Talbot succinctly notes in 1912, this ambivalent status of animation is at the 
very heart of cinematic illusion: “what we describe as animated photography is not 
animation at all. All that happens is that a long string of snap-shot photographs […] are 
passed at rapid speed before the eye.”189 
The clear distinction between an appearance and essence of animation becomes 
murky, however, in the case of early object-animation films. With the jerky, intermittent 
movement of the animated objects, the mechanical apparatus of cinema is visibly 
suggested to the viewer in a way that destroys any strict opposition between an outer 
surface of animated appearance and an inner animate life. Instead of concealing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
188 See Vivian Sobchack, “Animation and Automation, or, the Incredible Effortfulness of Being,” 
Screen 50.4 (Winter 2009): pp. 375–91, here pp. 381–82. For more on this paradox of animation 
in film and popular culture of the 20th century, see Scott Bukatman, The Poetics of Slumberland: 
Animated Spirits and the Animating Spirit (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2012). 
	  
189 Talbot, Moving Pictures, p. 7. 
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apparatus behind a surface of apparently continuous motion, the limitations of early 
object animation make the mechanical, cinematic life of the thing appear visibly 
dispersed throughout its lurching, material form. In this sense, object animation must be 
distinguished from other visions of artificial life in film. As Scott Bukatman has recently 
argued, cinema’s dream of an artificial creation of life, as represented in later narrative 
films like Der Golem (1920) or Metropolis (1927), is aligned not so much with the 
unhomely disturbances of the uncanny but rather with the terrifying excesses of the 
sublime.190 Through spectacular technological stagings, such films represent the 
animation of lifeless humanoid forms through the magical or technological transfer of 
some spark of animating energy or force. These stagings of sublime creation contrast 
strikingly with the uncanny life of things in early animation, which is restricted to the 
everyday settings and objects of the domestic sphere. The animate things in early object-
animation films find their successor not so much in the monstrous, animated bodies of 
Expressionist cinema, but rather in the congealed animacy of its leaning walls and 
buildings, distorted interiors, and skewed furniture. In describing the ghastly, animate 
environments of Expressionist films by Murnau, Robert Wiene, and others, Gilles 
Deleuze provides the accurate formulation of a “non-organic life of things,” which might 
just as well describe the animated objects of early cinema. “A wall which is alive is 
dreadful,” Deleuze writes, “but utensils, furniture, houses and their roofs also lean, crowd 
around, lie in wait, or pounce.”191 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
190 See Bukatman, “Disobedient Machines: Animation and Autonomy,” in Beyond the Finite: The 
Sublime in Art and Science, ed. Roald Hoffmann and Iain Boyd Whyte (New York: Oxford UP, 
2011), pp. 128–48; and the corresponding chapter in The Poetics of Slumberland, pp. 135–63. 
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While the very first object-animation films by Blackton and Chomón were set 
against the gothic backdrop of the haunted house, the technique was quickly relocated to 
more modern interiors of urban apartments and luxury hotels. The suggestion of a ghostly 
agency behind the animation of things was likewise replaced with a technological fantasy 
of electric or magnetic automation. Following up on the success of The Haunted Hotel, 
Blackton released in late 1907 the film Work Made Easy (in France, Le Travail rendu 
facile), which presented the fantasy of an automated carpentry shop in which vises, 
hammers, and saws performed their work without the aid of a human hand.192 Chomón’s 
1908 film Déménagement magnétique initiated a trend in early object-animation films by 
representing the fantasy of an automatic moving device: with the technology activated, 
furniture and belongings could be seen to pack themselves up, file out of an apartment, 
and relocate themselves automatically to a new domestic location.193 Films like Émile 
Cohl’s Le Mobilier fidèle (1910) and Roméo Bossetti’s Le Garde-meuble automatique 
(1912) followed the same theme of automatically moving furniture, further emphasizing 
the uncanny strangeness of domestic belongings that could move on their own and 
seemed possessed of their own rebellious personality.194 At the end of Cohl’s Le Mobilier 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 See Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1986), quoted above, pp. 50–51 (emphasis in 
original). On animation and animism in the architecture of Expressionist cinema, see, especially, 
Spyros Papapetros, “Malicious Houses: Animism and Animosity in German Architecture and 
Film from Mies to Murnau,” in On the Animation of the Inorganic, pp. 210–61. 
 
192 A detailed discussion of this film and its trick techniques (along with reproductions of film-
stills) can be found in Talbot, Moving Pictures, pp. 238–39. For further descriptions of the film, 
see Crafton, Before Mickey, pp. 18–19. Crafton initially misattributes the film to a French studio 
(following an incorrect attribution in his historical source), but corrects the error in, Emile Cohl, 
Caricature, and Film, pp. 126 and 327 n. 46. 
 
193 See Crafton, Before Mickey, pp. 24–25. 
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Figure 2.2. Émile Cohl. Le Mobilier fidèle, 1910. Film stills. 
 
fidèle, a human actor falls down in gratitude after finding his furniture returned to its 
rightful place in his apartment, yet the viewer is also left with an uneasy feeling, having 
just experienced the furniture eerily lurching back into its original positions (figure 2.2). 
In such films, the uncanny experience of the cinematic animation itself combines with an 
uncanniness on the level of thematic representation: in a world of technological 
automation, urban domestic interiors can appear a deeply unsettling and unhomely space. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 As Crafton explains, the film currently distributed in English as The Electric Moving Company 
(attributed to Cohl) is in fact Bossetti’s later 1912 film. See Crafton, Emile Cohl, Caricature, and 
Film, p. 355 (cat. 56).   
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In a 1913 article in Der Tag, the novelist and dramatist Paul Ernst would respond 
directly to such films of animated furniture and suggest a connection between cinematic 
representations of automation and cinema itself as an automated machine. Ernst describes 
films depicting an “Umzug, bei dem die Möbel sich von selber an ihre Stelle begeben und 
zuletzt ein Lampentischen ratlos umherirrt, bis es seinen Platz findet.”195 For Ernst, this 
animation trick is only one further indication of the artlessness of cinema and its 
unfortunate attempt to replace traditional artworks through the operations of a machine. 
The connection between the animated image and the animating machine, for Ernst, lay in 
their mutual denial of any human, spiritual relationship with objects. The animated, 
cinematic image, he argues, has none of the true animating “spirit” (Geist) of a Dürer 
painting for example, and the apparatus of cinema is itself responsible for a serious 
degradation in one’s human connection with things, which was already a general 
consequence of the age of machines: 
Unsere Zeit setzt ja überall an die Stelle der menschlichen Arbeit die Arbeit der 
Maschine. Heute beginnt allmählich den Menschen klarzuwerden, daß das 
Ergebnis – abgesehen von den Folgen für die beteiligten Arbeiter – doch sehr 
seine Bedenken hat, schon bei den einfachsten gewerblichen Gegenständen; 
überall wo wir eine seelische Beziehung zu dem Gegenstande haben wollen, 
wirkt die Maschinenarbeit roh und gemein. Im Kino wird der Versuch gemacht, 
die höchste Betätigung des Menschen, die Kunst, durch Maschinenbetrieb 
herzustellen.196 
 
Intentionally or not, the uncanny images of early object animation seem, 
ironically, to reinforce Ernst’s point about the human consequences of automated 
machines. This is perhaps nowhere more clear than in the object-animation films that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
195 Paul Ernst, “Möglichkeiten einer Kinokunst” [1913], reprinted in Kaes (ed.), Kino-Debatte, 
pp. 118–23, quoted here, p. 122. 
 
196 Ibid., pp. 122–23. 
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Figure 2.3. Segundo de Chomón. El Hotel eléctrico, 1907. Film stills. 
 
bring humans and things together in order to depict the ambivalent effects of automation. 
Perhaps the most spectacular film in this regard is Chomón’s El Hotel eléctrico, released 
in Paris in 1907.197 The trick-film depicts a vacationing couple checking into a modern, 
luxury hotel where all services are automated by the force of a central, electro-magnetic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
197 While Chomón’s production of the film is sometimes put at 1905, I follow Crafton’s argument 
that such an early date is unlikely given the El Hotel eléctrico’s later release date and clear 
borrowing of Blackton’s animation technique. The surviving film is the U.S. release, Electric 
Hotel, dated 1908. See Crafton, Emile Cohl, Caricature, and Film, pp. 133 and 329 n. 72.   
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generator. Their luggage appears to move on its own up to their hotel room where the 
bags then proceed to playfully unpack their contents. In extended close-up sequences, the 
film depicts animated brushes shining the man’s shoes and the couple being treated to 
separate hairstyling sessions carried out by animated combs, hairbrushes, razors, and 
towels. The film ends with a breakdown in automated technology: the main generator 
goes haywire, sending all the animated furniture and objects in the hotel into a frenzied 
and violent commotion. The human figures are caught in a maelstrom of rapidly moving 
objects, which persists until the very end of the film. Within the nightmare of 
uncontrollable automation, the human is rendered helpless and immobile, appearing like 
a lifeless prop in inverse relation to the liveliness of things (figure 2.3). 
To a large extent, the respective lifelessness of humans in object-animation films 
is a consequence of limitations inherent to the technique. To include human figures 
within object-animation sequences, as Chomón does, the actor had to remain fixed and 
stationary between frames as objects were slightly repositioned. In the hairstyling 
sequences, with the human face in close-up, the procedure was something like a 
cinematic sampling of the long sittings required for nineteenth-century photographic 
portraits. Instead of a discrete, long-exposure photograph, which smooths over all 
temporal variations into a final static image, the frames of the cinematic animation 
sequence consist of instant, photographic fragments of the slight variations in facial 
expression and position as they unfolded in real time during the shooting of the film. As 
the filmstrip plays back, the comb or hairbrush in Chomón’s El Hotel eléctrico appears to 
move about the actor’s face with its own animate life, while the human actor appears 
nearly stationary aside from a strange, mechanical twitching of the face. In this manner, 
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early object animation corresponds to both sides of Jentsch’s uncanny: an uncertainty as 
to the animacy of the supposedly lifeless thing as well as the apparently living human. In 
early object-animation sequences, the life of the human appears somewhere between the 
jerky, mechanical movements of the automaton and the unconscious twitchings of the 
spasmodic body. With the fantasy of the total automatization of things came an unsettling 
vision of the immobilized and nerve-wracked human.198 
When the technique of object animation was first commercially exploited around 
1907, it was merely one more cinematic novelty among many––and a late one at that. 
The production and short-lived popularity of object-animation films between 1907 and 
1912 might very well be understood as a last ditch attempt to uphold the appeal of the 
early trick-film during a period in which storytelling and narrative editing emerged as the 
dominant mode of cinematic production.199 As Donald Crafton has shown, the attractive 
mystery of early object animation was itself a product of advertisement campaigns and 
myths perpetuated by filmmakers and industry insiders. The technique of object 
animation was in fact well known and occasionally used before 1907. Thus, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
198 In early cinema, this strange effect on the human actor was simply an unavoidable byproduct 
of the object-animation technique. After World War II, the technique of animating human actors 
through similar frame-by-frame repositionings and exposures would be given the name 
“pixilation,” which aptly describes both the fragmentation of movement into individual pictures 
(pix) as well as the fantastic, crazed appearance of the depicted human (preserved etymologically 
in pixie and pixilated). The term and technique is usually attributed to the early 1950s work of 
Canadian filmmaker Norman McLaren. For a discussion of the technique used in his films 
Neighbours and Two Bagatelles (both 1952), see McLaren’s technical notes, reprinted in Robert 
Russett and Cecile Starr (eds.), Experimental Animation: An Illustrated Anthology (New York: 
Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1976), pp. 125–26. 
 
199 What Tom Gunning famously calls the “cinema of attractions” (that is, the early, exhibitionist 
cinema of actuality and trick-based films) dominated up until 1906–7, followed by a “true 
narrativization of the cinema” that culminated in the first feature films after 1910. See Gunning, 
“The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde,” in Early Cinema: 
Space, Frame, Narrative, pp. 56–62, here p. 60.  
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numerous accounts of an underlying mystery and sudden discovery of animation around 
1907 cannot be taken at face value. Rather, as Crafton has argued, the proliferation of 
object-animation films after 1907 can be attributed, at least partially, to economic factors. 
With the market saturation and declining appeal of familiar cinematic tricks at the time, 
along with the emergence of longer narrative films, it became advantageous to invest in 
the more expensive and tedious production of longer animation sequences in order to 
recapture the astonishment of early film audiences. Bolstered by advertisements and 
journalistic accounts extolling the impenetrable mysteries of animated objects on the 
screen, such films enjoyed a short-lived popularity that would not last much beyond 
1910.200 In German cinema around 1910, the technique of object animation also found an 
eerily fitting application in the nascent industry of advertisement films. As if to literalize 
Karl Marx’s famous description of the commodity fetish as an animated thing, film-
advertising pioneers Guido Seeber and Julius Pinschewer began exploiting the technique 
of object animation to present film audiences with commodities that magically moved 
and danced as if on their own.201 In all of its early manifestations, the technique of object 
animation remained largely peripheral to trends in the historical development of cinema 
toward the longer, dramatic narrative and feature film. Like much else of the early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
200 On the above points, see Donald Crafton, Before Mickey, pp. 13–33. Crafton also cites less 
frequent examples of animated objects, drawings, and text in films before 1907. It is only after 
1907, however, that object-animation films become a more common feature in film production. 
Crafton documents the numerous advertisements, articles, reviews, and statements that 
contributed to the myth of animation’s origins around 1907. 
 
201 For a discussion of Seeber and Pinschewer’s early advertisement films, including object-
animation films like Der Nähkasten and Sekt-Zauber (both 1912), see Jeanpaul Goergen, “Julius 
Pinschewer: A Trade-mark Cinema,” in A Second Life: German Cinema’s First Decades, ed. 
Thomas Elsaesser (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 1996), pp. 168–74; and Annika Schoemann, Der 
deutsche Animationsfilm, pp. 85–101.   
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“cinema of attractions,” the technique’s cinematic legacy consists largely in its 
underground connection to the practices and techniques of the 1920s cinematic avant-
garde (which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4). 
 
Literary Animations and Cinematic Aesthetics  
For the purposes of the present argument, early object-animation films are of particular 
interest for their close historical intersection with new, representational strategies in 
modernist literature. Previous accounts of the time period, such as Anton Kaes’s careful 
reconstruction of what he terms the “debate about cinema” (Kino-Debatte), stress the 
critical confrontation between literature and film carried out in German literary journals 
and newspapers after 1909. Common to cultural criticism of the time was the charge that 
the increasingly “literary” ambitions of cinema (that is, its appropriation of subject matter 
from both classic and popular literature and its offerings of alternative, narrative-based 
entertainment) were a direct and degrading encroachment on the bourgeois literary 
institutions of the theater and novel. In the early period of short actuality and trick-based 
films, the audiences were primarily urban and lower class and could be kept separate 
from the “official” literary culture of the educated bourgeoisie. However, with the rapid 
proliferation of permanent cinema venues in urban centers and the emergence of longer 
narrative films, by 1910 the German literary establishment felt forced into a critical 
confrontation with an industry that threatened its readership and cultural dominance. 
Responses were varied, as Kaes documents, from a staunch defense of cultural heritage 
(by conservative critics), to an elitist condemnation of film as part of a trivial, urban mass 
culture (by certain Expressionist writers), to attempts at radicalizing literary technique to 
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meet demands for an increasing speed, precision, and discontinuity in the more traditional 
arts within the age of cinema (by modernist writers like Alfred Döblin and Bertolt 
Brecht).202  
What goes missing in these charged debates are the significant ways in which 
literary and cinematic representations also converged historically in terms of new 
thematic content around 1910. The case of animated objects, I argue, presents an 
important intersection between literary and cinematic imaginations at a time when the old 
and new media were seen to be largely at odds. On the one hand, this convergence can be 
attributed to a common historical reflection on the increased animation and animosity of 
things experienced within the modern technological world (as previously discussed in 
terms of an “urban uncanny”). On the other hand, this point of intersection also provided 
a productive impulse for the fashioning of new modernist strategies of literary 
representation as well as an emerging cinematic aesthetics based on the transformed 
status of objects on film. With regard to the latter point, Georg Lukács’s tentative 
thoughts on an “aesthetics of cinema” already anticipate the importance of a “life” or 
animation of things in 1920s film theory and avant-garde cinema (to be explored in 
Chapter 4). The fashioning of a cinematic aesthetics based on a new “life of things” on 
film (found in various forms in the interwar film theory and practice of figures like Béla 
Balázs, Siegfried Kracauer, Jean Epstein, Fernand Léger, and Hans Richter) can be found 
to emerge first in earlier reflections on cinema from around 1910. Here, the contentious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
202 On the above points, see Kaes, Kino-Debatte, pp. 1–35. For an historical account of early film 
audiences and exhibition spaces in Germany before World War I, see also Miriam Hansen, “Early 
Silent Cinema: Whose Public Sphere?,” New German Critique 29 (Spring-Summer 1983): pp. 
147–84. 
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relationship between film and literature led more literarily oriented writers like Lukács 
and others (who will be discussed below) to isolate the visual animation of things as a 
unique capability of cinema, which distinguished it from literature and pointed toward 
new, aesthetic possibilities. At the same time, modernist literature itself responded to the 
new, visual possibilities of cinematic animation by experimenting with representational 
strategies that deliberately evoked a material life and agency of things. This productive, 
two-way exchange between modernist literature and an emerging, cinematic aesthetics 
will be explored in the remaining pages of the chapter.       
Anton Kaes already cites Alfred Döblin’s one-act play, Lydia und Mäxchen 
(1906) as an early instance of trick-films influencing the literary arts. As in the object-
animation film in which things take on a vexing, animate life in opposition to humans, 
Döblin’s play grants character status to all the otherwise inanimate props on stage, having 
them rebel against their assigned background roles, threaten the audience, and even attack 
the author of the play when he comes on stage to investigate the commotion. Alongside 
the human characters, Döblin provocatively lists under “Personen” in the play: “Der 
Stuhl. Das Spind. Der Kandelaber.”203 Although the staging of the play requires human 
actors to inhabit these inanimate objects, the overall effect of the performance was to 
evoke an uncanny life of things analogous to contemporaneous trick-films. The 
representations of early cinema were further integrated into the makings of a new 
modernist poetics with Döblin’s 1913 “Berliner Programm.” Here, Döblin calls for an 
emphatic rejection of nineteenth-century realism, psychology, and the “hegemony of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
203 See Alfred Döblin, Lydia und Mäxchen: Tiefe Verbeugung in einem Akt [1906], in Drama 
Hörspiel Film (Olten and Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter, 1983), pp. 9–31, quoted here, p. 9.  
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author” (Hegemonie des Autors), to be replaced by a literary “cinema-style” (Kinostil), 
which presents the reader instead with the hard, dynamic reality of the modern, material 
environment: “Die Darstellung erfordert bei der ungeheuren Menge des Geformten einen 
Kinostil. In höchster Gedrängtheit und Präzision hat ‘die Fülle der Gesichte’ 
vorbeizuziehen. Der Sprache das Äußerste der Plastik und Lebendigkeit abzuringen.”204 
With regards to modernist prose, Döblin demands further that the author renounce their 
hegemonic control over the world they represent and instead merge with and inhabit its 
material objects and events: “ich bin nicht ich, sondern die Straße, die Laternen, dies und 
dies Ereignis, weiter nichts.”205 The loss of authorial control coinciding with the 
animation of material things, as staged in Döblin’s 1906 play, becomes here the guiding 
principle for a new poetics of modernist prose. 
Around the very same time, the cinematic possibilities of object animation also 
captured the literary imaginations of both the American modernist poet Vachel Lindsay 
as well as the Italian Futurists. In proclaiming a Futurist literature and cinema after 1910, 
Filippo Tommaso Marinetti demanded a similar eradication of the human ego and 
psychology, to be replaced by dramas of animated objects, automata, machines, and 
forces of matter. Citing the “movements of matter” found in a variety of early trick-films, 
Marinetti’s 1912 “Technical Manifesto of Futurist Literature” initiates a poetic 
exploration of the dynamic life of “free-ranging objects and capricious engines” and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
204 Alfred Döblin, “An Romanautoren und ihre Kritiker [Berliner Programm],” Der Sturm 4 
(1913/14): pp. 17–18. Reprinted in Döblin, Schriften zu Ästhetik, Poetik und Literatur, (Olten and 
Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter, 1989), pp. 119–23, quoted here, pp. 121 and 122. Cf., Kaes, Kino-
Debatte, p. 25. 
 
205 Döblin, “An Romanautoren und ihre Kritiker,” p. 122.  
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replacement of the “psychology of man […] with the lyrical obsession for matter.”206 
Similar to Döblin, the goal was to isolate a mode of literary production that could 
adequately convey the hard technological realities of modernity, like the “solidity of a 
sheet of steel” or the “life of the motorcar.”207 While the poetics outlined here expressly 
deny the anthropomorphization of things, subsequent Futurist manifestos and productions 
would also push for a “drama of objects” in theater as well as their own cinematic works, 
which were to feature: “animated objects that are humanized, wearing makeup and 
clothes, given emotions, civilized, dancing––objects abstracted from their normal 
environments and placed in an unfamiliar situation which, by way of contrast, highlights 
their breathtaking construction and nonhuman life.”208 Making more explicit reference to 
earlier cinematic precedents, Vachel Lindsay’s 1915 book The Art of the Moving Picture 
discusses the “personality in furniture” found in a trick-film titled Moving Day (nearly 
identical in conception to Cohl’s Le Mobilier fidèle or Bossetti’s Le Garde-meuble 
automatique) and calls for even more productive use of similar animation techniques to 
make “the mechanical or non-human object […] the hero in most any sort of 
photoplay.”209 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
206 F.T. Marinetti, “Technical Manifesto of Futurist Literature” [1912], in Critical Writings, ed. 
Günter Berghaus, trans. Doug Thompson (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), pp. 107–
19, quoted here, p. 111 (emphasis in original). 
 
207 Ibid., p. 111. 
 
208 See Marinetti et al., “The Futurist Cinema” [1916], in Critical Writings, pp. 260–65, quoted 
here p. 264. For a programmatic statement on Futurist theater as a direct competition with cinema 
and featuring a “drama of objects” as in Marinetti’s 1915 play Vengono, see Marinetti et al., “A 
Futurist Theater of Essential Brevity” [1915], in Critical Writings, pp. 200–7, here, p. 205.  
 
209 Vachel Lindsay, The Art of the Moving Picture [1915] (New York: Modern Library, 2000), pp. 
40–41. 
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This collection of examples already demonstrates the broad range of productive, 
literary responses to the potentials of early cinematic animation. While writers like 
Marinetti and Döblin drew on early trick-films in their development of anti-humanist and 
avant-garde literary tactics, they also saw the provocative, comedic potential of animated 
and humanized objects on stage and on film. Lindsay, for his part, situates object-
animation films in continuity with an older, literary tradition of fairy tales and stresses the 
specifically narrative potential of such cinematic representations, given their ability to 
visually animate and lend dramatic, personality to things.210 The possibilities of cinematic 
animation thus provoke two seemingly contradictory responses in the imagination of 
literary writers after 1910. On the one hand, there is the dehumanized and absolute 
otherness of a quasi-hostile, material life of things in modernity. Here, as expressed in 
Döblin’s and Marinetti’s manifestos, literature must construct for readers a dynamic and 
dehumanized experience of things somehow comparable to their modern, material 
surroundings. On the other hand, the imaginative animation of things also has the 
potential to humanize and anthropomorphize one’s thingly environment, allowing 
formerly inanimate objects to become personalities in the artistic work and play an active 
part in its story. The literary response to early cinema thus presents a highly ambivalent 
understanding of object animation. The animated object is at once a representational 
approximation of the new, material environment of modern life––utterly threatening and 
other––and yet also somehow humanized and familiar, taking on a new humanlike 
personality and agency in the absence of a more traditional, human protagonist.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
210 See, in particular, Lindsay’s chapters, “The Motion Picture of Fairy Splendor” and “Furniture, 
Trappings, and Inventions in Motion,” in The Art of the Moving Picture, pp. 38–42 and 84–94, 
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Among modernist literary representations, the strange objects appearing in Rilke’s 
Malte novel and Kafka’s “Blumfeld” story, mentioned earlier on in the chapter, perhaps 
most convincingly encapsulate this ambivalent status of the animated thing. While the 
works of Rilke and Kafka have little directly in common with either Döblin and 
Marinetti’s avant-garde poetics of dynamic matter or Lindsay’s fairy tale objects, both 
modernist writers evoke animated things as part of a deliberate reflection on the 
threatening material environment of modern life and as more anthropomorphic figures for 
investigating familiar and interpersonal relations among humans and things. In both 
cases, a mix of domestic familiarity and threatening strangeness situates the animated 
object firmly within the realm of the uncanny. With similar origins in the acoustic 
disturbances of urban housing, Rilke’s and Kafka’s noisy, animated things make for a 
complex, literary complement to the visual representations of early object-animation 
films. Whether drawing directly on cinematic representations (as in Kafka’s “Blumfeld”) 
or merely contiguous with new cinematic animation techniques (as in Rilke’s Malte), the 
figure of the animated, living thing proves a powerful fiction for investigating both the 
animistic anxieties and uncertainties tied to the experiential conditions of urban life as 
well as modern, social relations among humans and things. 
On June 19, 1907, Rilke wrote to his wife from Paris, describing his difficulties 
getting settled back down in the big city: “ich weiß nicht, warum ich diesmal so 
schwerfällig bin im Eingewöhnen und Einwohnen. Die Nachbarschaft ist nicht schlimm, 
und doch, es ist wieder das Paris, das Malte Laurids aufgezehrt hat.”211 The particular 
situation troubling him, as Rilke describes in the letter, concerns a student in a 
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neighboring apartment and his tormented struggle to keep at his long hours of study. 
During moments of periodic desperation, the student can be heard stomping about his 
room and repeatedly throwing to the floor “some unknown tin objects” (irgendwelche 
blecherne Dinge), whose sudden crashing and rattling keep Rilke in a state of perpetual 
nervousness. Returning to his work on what would become his 1910 novel, Die 
Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, Rilke would later expand upon this initial 
description and include it in a series of sections in the second half of the novel. Mediated 
through Malte’s understanding of the incident, the student and his crashing tin object 
become a far-reaching allegory for the modern, corrupted relationship between humans 
and things. Out of the domestic noise disturbances of the city, Rilke’s novel develops a 
particular, animistic imaginary in which humans appear plagued by a phantasmal host of 
unruly, animate things.212 
In his insightful analysis of the role of sound and hearing in Rilke’s Malte, 
Michael Cowan reads this and related episodes of noise disturbance in the novel as 
contributing to a “kind of imaginary animism of noisy things,” whereby Malte, “imbu[es] 
the sounds he hears with a malevolent agency aimed against himself.”213 In Cowan’s 
account, Malte’s alleged animism serves a specific strategic function in the text: it is an 
attempt to externalize all the threatening noises of the city and thus preserve a sense of 
the artist’s hermetic interiority. If the novel ultimately demonstrates the impossibility of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
212 The whole episode can be found in Rilke, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, in 
Werke, vol. 3, pp. 578–85. 
 
213 See Michael Cowan, “Imagining Modernity Through the Ear: Rilke’s Die Aufzeichnungen des 
Malte Laurids Brigge and the Noise of Modern Life,” Arcadia 41.1 (2006): pp. 124–46, quoted 
here, p. 139. 
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closing oneself off to the noisy disturbances of modernity, Malte’s imaginative animation 
or anthropomorphization of things appears as a repeated attempt to project and displace 
his own nervous and fragmented state out onto the objects of the material world.214 While 
Cowan’s reading is convincing, I would like to shift attention away from the particular, 
psychological mechanisms involved in Malte’s “imaginary animism” and instead 
resituate such episodes in relation to a broader set of representations around 1910. Rather 
than reconfirming Rilke and his protagonist’s desire to fend off the disturbances of the 
modern city, I would like to highlight the productive (rather than reactive) dimension of 
Rilke’s representations of animated things, which they share with contemporaneous 
works of both literature and film. 
As I argue at length in Chapter 1, Rilke’s understanding of the “thing” (Ding) 
relies on an implicit conception of a mimetic relationship between the human and 
nonhuman. The episode of the neighboring student and the tin object in Malte holds to 
this conception and expands it to nightmarish proportions. Malte’s initial preoccupation 
with the struggling medical student leads to a far stronger fixation on the exact object 
responsible for all the crashing noises next door. Imagining the object to be some sort of 
“round, tin box or can” (eine runde Büchse) with a corresponding “lid” (Büchsendeckel), 
Malte describes a mimetic similarity between the corrupted state of humans and their 
corresponding world of things. In this particular case, the student’s inability to stay 
focused and on top of his task is the cause of a similar ill-temperedness on the part of the 
tin container, whose lid refuses to stay put in its proper place. Explaining further, “wie 
verwirrend der Umgang mit den Menschen auf die Dinge gewirkt hat,” Malte expands 
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upon his discussion of the tin object to offer a more universal vision of the corruption of 
things:  
Es ist kein Wunder, wenn [die Dinge] verdorben sind, wenn sie den Geschmack 
verlieren an ihrem natürlichen, stillen Zweck und das Dasein so ausnutzen 
möchten, wie sie es rings um sich ausgenutzt sehen. Sie machen Versuche, sich 
ihren Anwendungen zu entziehen, sie werden unlustig und nachlässig, und die 
Leute sind gar nicht erstaunt, wenn sie sie auf einer Ausschweifung ertappen. Sie 
kennen das so gut von sich selbst. Sie ärgern sich, weil sie die Stärkeren sind, 
weil sie mehr Recht auf Abwechslung zu haben meinen, weil sie sich nachgeäfft 
fühlen; aber sie lassen die Sache gehen, wie sie sich selber gehen lassen.215 
 
With its description of imitative aping and a near-slapstick conflict with rebellious 
things, the passage above could work just as well as a concept for any number of early 
object-animation films. On July 17, 1907, just a month after Rilke’s letter describing the 
crashing tin object in his neighbor’s apartment, Blackton’s L’Hôtel hanté opened at the 
largest cinema venues in Paris and ran twice daily till the end of the month.216 Given this 
close proximity of both time and place, Rilke’s subsequent work on the corresponding 
episode in the Malte novel reads as if he had translated his initial, acoustic experience 
into a literary account informed by the new, visual representations of object-animation 
films.217 Beyond speculations of influence, the more important insight to draw from this 
comparison involves a distinction in the manner of representing the animacy of things. 
Had Rilke drawn directly on visual, cinematic representations of animated objects, his 
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216 See Crafton, Before Mickey, p. 14. 
 
217 Given the popularity of Blackton’s L’Hôtel hanté and its aggressive advertising campaign, it is 
possible that Rilke had some awareness of the animation techniques then being exploited for mass 
entertainment in Paris. Since his literary rendering of the episode in Malte likely followed his 
letter by over a month, some peripheral influence of early trick-films on his literary imagination is 
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literary account would appear crudely comical at best. Malte never enters his neighbor’s 
room to see the rebellious object in question. In fact, it would be slightly ridiculous to 
represent Malte as experiencing the thing’s animate personality in any direct, visual 
encounter. Instead, Rilke’s Malte evokes the isolated sounds of unseen objects to 
adequately capture the uncanny presences and uncertainties that make up the experiential 
environment of the big city. 
In its account of a corrupt relationship between humans and things, the episode in 
Malte does, however, present a striking parallel to the images of contemporaneous trick-
films. As in the object-animation film, Malte’s account of the relationship between 
humans and things involves an uncanny inversion: a greater animacy on the side of things 
and an increasingly thinglike or mechanical quality on the side of humans. Instead of a 
direct visual presentation, Rilke’s novel achieves a similar effect through the symbolic 
representation of sound. Malte explains:  
so ein blecherner Gegenstand fiel nebenan, rollte, blieb liegen, und dazwischen, 
in gewissen Abständen, stampfte es. Wie alle Geräusche, die sich wiederholt 
durchsetzen, hatte auch dieses sich innerlich organisiert; es wandelte sich ab, es 
war niemals genau dasselbe. […] Es konnte heftig sein oder milde oder 
melancholisch; es konnte gleichsam überstürzt vorübergehen oder unendlich 
lange hingleiten, eh es zu Ruhe kam. Und das letzte Schwanken war immer 
überraschend. Dagegen hatte das Aufstampfen, das hinzukam, etwas fast 
Mechanisches.218 
  
The inner variation and humanlike personality of the tin object, which comes through in 
its crashing noises, contrasts starkly with the sounds of its human companion. In 
describing the accompanying, stamping noises of the student, Malte’s language suggests 
the mechanical regularity of an automaton or machine. The uncanny blurring of animate 
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and inanimate, human and thing, (as initially discussed in relation to Polgar’s “Die 
Dinge”) is again a consequence of hearing being severed from visual experience in the 
cramped domestic spaces of the city. The uncanny images of object-animation films can 
be understood to offer a popular, visual counterpart to the sound-based phantasms 
explored in modernist literature. In Rilke’s Malte, the thinglike quality of human 
behavior is further reinforced through a description of the student’s malady: his one 
eyelid purportedly lowers automatically, like a broken “Rouleau” or “Fenstervorhang.”219 
If visually represented, the literary description would no doubt translate nicely into a 
comical, cinematic close-up of the pixilated and nerve-wracked human. 
Where Rilke’s novel does attempt to visualize the animacy of things (in the final 
part of the section on the tin object), the reference is not to contemporaneous cinematic 
pictures, but rather to a much older tradition of Western painterly representation. Malte 
notes: 
Wie begreif ich jetzt die wunderlichen Bilder, darinnen Dinge von beschränkten 
und regelmäßigen Gebrauchen sich ausspannen und sich lüstern und neugierig 
aneinander versuchen, zuckend in der ungefähren Unzucht der Zerstreuung. 
Diese Kessel, die kochend herumgehen, diese Kolben, die auf Gedanken 
kommen, und die müßigen Trichter, die sich in ein Loch drängen zu ihrem 
Vergnügen. Und da sind auch schon, vom eifersüchtigen Nichts heraufgeworfen, 
Gliedmaßen und Glieder unter ihnen und Gesichter, die warm in sie 
hineinvomieren, und blasende Gesäße, die ihnen den Gefallen tun.220 
 
Critics who have commented on the passage identify the likely source for the description 
as images of the Temptation of Saint Anthony by Hieronymous Bosch or Pieter Bruegel 
the Elder (figure 2.4). The visual reference in Rilke’s novel succeeds in elevating the 
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220 Rilke, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, in Werke, vol. 3, pp. 583–84. 
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Figure 2.4. Pieter Bruegel the Elder. The Temptation of St. Anthony, 1556. Drawing. 
 
 
acoustic disturbances of urban housing to a whole hellish plague of hybrid creatures, 
demons, and monsters as depicted in paintings of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.221 
Malte’s reference to these “fantastic pictures” serves a twofold function. First, by evoking 
an honored representational tradition from the history of Western painting, he is able to 
provide a respectable justification for his peculiar, animistic fear of things. Second, the 
reference establishes an experiential rupture in the present, equivalent to the hellish 
torments of the third- and fourth-century Christian saint. In the image of Saint Anthony 
of Egypt, Malte imagines the modern artist to suffer a similar plague of hostile, 
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“degenerate things” (entartete Geräte) intent on hatefully disrupting and harassing the 
solitary artist. “Es gab Zeiten, da ich diese Bilder für veraltet hielt,” comments Malte: 
“Nun aber weiß ich, daß diese Arbeit [die lange Arbeit des Künstlers] genau so bestritten 
ist wie das Heiligsein; daß dies da um jeden entsteht, der um ihretwillen einsam ist, wie 
es sich bildete um die Einsamen Gottes in ihren Höhlen und leeren Herbergen, einst.”222 
This one episode from Rilke’s Malte, of course, cannot simply be taken in 
isolation from the complexities of the novel as a whole. As Andreas Huyssen has argued, 
Malte’s persistent identification with shattering and animate objects in the novel is 
closely interwoven with his disturbing fantasies of the fragmented body. The phantasm of 
the fragmented body, which links Malte’s childhood experience with his adult traumas in 
the city of Paris, involves a breakdown in boundaries between animate and inanimate, 
body and world, through which Malte comes to sympathize with and enliven a whole 
array of objects––from the “geistesabwesende, verschlafene Dinge” and “kleine, 
schwächliche Gegenstände” found in his grandfather’s manor-house when he was a child 
to the exposed, interior wall of a demolished house encountered during his adult stay in 
Paris.223 In Huyssen’s innovative, psychoanalytic reading (and repeated in Cowan’s more 
recent analysis) the animation of things in Rilke’s novel is attributed to a displacement 
and projection of Malte’s own traumatic symptoms out onto the world of inanimate 
things.224  
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My point here is not to contest the considerable insight of nuanced, 
psychoanalytically informed readings. Rather, I hope to add yet another layer of historical 
complexity to what has become one of the most pivotal texts in German modernism. In 
Chapter 1, I sought to fit the fearful identification with objects in Malte into a larger 
continuum of mimetic thing-relations in Rilke’s writings, which include the far more 
positive and stabilizing relations staged in many of the “thing-poems” (Dinggedichte) 
found in the two-volume Neue Gedichte. In the present reading, I hope to establish 
Malte’s troubling vision of a corrupted and inverted relationship between humans and 
things as part of a larger, historical and specifically urban imaginary that involves both 
modernist literary texts and early object-animation films. Huyssen’s reading of Rilke 
rightly emphasizes the Freudian uncanny of Malte’s psychic disturbances, which emerge 
out of an unstable relationship between repressed childhood anxieties and the 
fragmentary experiences of the metropolis. The specific incident of the tin object, 
however, also corresponds to Jentsch’s particular description of the uncanny, with its 
emphasis on uncertainty, sensory interference, and the blurring of experiential boundaries 
between animate and inanimate, human and thing. 
While Rilke’s extensive, literary exploration of things makes no direct reference 
to the emerging mass medium of cinema, commentators on early cinema draw 
surprisingly similar conclusions about the state of human-thing relations in modernity. 
And in both cases, the representation of animate things plays a decisive role. Rilke’s 
literary reflections are largely limited to the perspective of the solitary artist and aesthete, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 See Andreas Huyssen, “Paris/Childhood: The Fragmented Body in Rilke’s Notebooks of Malte 
Laurids Brigge” [1989], in Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 105–26, here pp. 115–17. 
	  
	   161	  
who finds his work disrupted by an unruly life of things in the city. Early cinema 
provided a popular, visual counterpart for expressing similar modern anxieties for a 
broader spectrum of city-dwellers. Correlating the precision, energy, and speed of the 
modern city with the “Leben eines Kinematographentheaters,” the Austrian writer and 
performer Egon Friedell argued in a 1912 lecture that the modern age marked an end to 
an older relationship with objects: “Für nichts haben wir ja heutzutage weniger Sinn als 
für jenes idyllisches Ausruhen und epische Verweilen bei den Gegenständen, das früher 
gerade für poetisch galt. Wir lassen uns nicht mehr behaglich über den Dingen nieder.”225 
Rilke’s poetic project of the Neue Gedichte, as I argue in Chapter 1, can be read as a 
literary struggle against this very situation––an attempt to artificially stage and instantiate 
the type of relationship with things that was denied by the experience of urban modernity. 
For Friedell by contrast––formulating his observations in relation to film––this 
experiential character of urban modernity offered to aesthetic representation a productive 
field of “Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten.”226  
In his 1912 lecture, “Prolog vor dem Film,” Friedell offers two main examples for 
the new aesthetic possibilities opened up in the age of cinema and the modern metropolis. 
One aspect was the increasing importance of gesture and facial expression in the arts, 
brought about both by the wordless, visual realm of cinema and the predominance of 
nonverbal communication on the crowded, bustling streets of the city. His other example 
had to do with the elevation of inanimate things to the status of dramatic actor:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
225 Egon Friedell, “Prolog vor dem Film” [1912], in Kaes (ed.), Kino-Debatte, pp. 42–47, quoted 
here, pp. 43–44. 
 
226 Ibid., p. 43. 
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bedenken Sie doch, welche Möglichkeiten sich für einen ingeniösen und 
temperamentvollen Dramatiker im Kino eröffnen würden, der es verstände, die 
unbelebte Umgebung des Menschen, also das, was man bisher ziemlich abfällig 
Dekoration genannt hat, entsprechend auszunutzen. Ich meine nicht bloß in dem 
äußerlichen Sinne, daß im Kino weniger technische Hindernisse bestehen als im 
Theater, und daß der Kinodichter eigentlich die ganze Erdoberfläche als Bühne 
zur Verfügung hat, sondern noch in dem anderen Sinne, daß ein solcher 
Dramatiker es verstehen müßte, die stumme Außenwelt als einen wirksamen 
Faktor in die Handlung einzuführen und in die Schicksale des Menschen als 
handelnde Person mit eingreifen zu lassen, nicht als bloße Ausstattungs-
angelegenheit, die man auch ebensogut weglassen kann, sondern als das 
Gegenteil von Staffage, so zwar, daß man eher den Eindruck hätte, daß die 
Menschen die Staffage, die Dekoration sind.227 
 
Friedell’s sense of the aesthetic possibilities of film corresponds closely to what Döblin, 
Marinetti, and Vachel Lindsay all found attractive about the new medium. At the same 
time, Friedell also looks backward to late-nineteenth-century works of Richard Wagner, 
Maeterlinck, and Zola as literary precursors that explored the role of nonhuman actors in 
literature.228 Whatever the role of the “dead things” (tote Dinge) that Friedell alludes to in 
these older works, they still lack the animated life of objects found in trick-films of the 
early twentieth century.  
Like Lukács’s allusion to Romanticism or Lindsay’s appeal to the fairy tale, such 
references clearly situate the new cinematic aesthetics of animated things as emerging out 
of a more long-standing, literary imagination. At the same time, the comparison with past 
literary works also underlines a distinction between the symbolic, fantastic, or 
phantasmatic life of things in literature and the new, direct experiences of visual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
227 Ibid., p. 44. 
 
228 See ibid., pp. 44–45: “Denken Sie an Richard Wagner oder an Maeterlinck; die Hauptfigur im 
‘Tod des Tintagiles’ ist ja eigentlich eine Tür. Auch bei Zola läßt sich der Versuch beobachten, 
tote Dinge gewissermaßen zu Romanhelden zu machen, das zeigen schon die Titel einiger seiner 
Werke.” For more on the theatrical roles of objects in the 18th and 19th centuries, cf. Volker 
Klotz, Gegenstand als Gegenspieler: Widersacher auf der Bühne: Dinge, Briefe, aber auch 
Barbiere (Vienna: Sonderzahl, 2000). 
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animation in cinema. While writers like Rilke and Polgar would situate the animacy of 
things as merely a phantasm of the fraught interiority of the modern city-dweller, 
modernist literature would also respond directly to the new cinematic life of things found 
in trick-films. Not merely contiguous or complementary to such cinematic 
representations, Kafka’s fragmentary 1915 story “Blumfeld, ein älterer Junggeselle” 
explicitly incorporates cinematic representations of animated things as a productive 
element within an experimental, modernist narrative. 
Kafka’s longstanding fascination and engagement with film has been well 
documented by Hanns Zischler, and the influence of the new medium on his experiments 
in literary narration has been a frequent focus in the work of Kafka scholars, Peter-André 
Alt most recently.229 Kafka’s own journals, as many critics have noted, can even be read 
as beginning (in 1909) with a textual reenactment of the primal scene of early cinema: the 
audience’s response to the Lumière brothers’ 1896 film, L’ Arrivée d’un train à la gare 
de La Ciotat.230 But while adequate attention has been paid to the influence of cinema on 
Kafka’s dynamic representations of moving vehicles and traffic, uncanny doubles, and 
silent gestural expression, there has been little serious consideration of early object 
animation in relation to his literary writing. On the bouncing balls in Kafka’s “Blumfeld” 
fragment, for example, Peter-André Alt simply notes: “Die komische Wirkung der Szene 
entsteht aus der Übertragung einer filmischen Verfolgungsdramaturgie auf den Kampf 
zwischen Mensch und Ding. Nicht zuletzt ist es die slapstickartige Körpersprache 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
229 See Hanns Zischler, Kafka geht ins Kino (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1996); and Peter-
André Alt, Kafka und der Film: Über kinematographisches Erzählen (Munich: Beck, 2009). 
 
230 See Kafka’s very first, surviving journal entry in his Tagebücher, p. 9: “Die Zuschauer 
erstarren, wenn der Zug vorbeifährt.” 
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Blumfelds, mit deren Hilfe Kafkas Sequenz ihren grotesken Effekt freisetzt.”231 The 
connection to film is obvious, but perhaps it also demands a closer investigation. 
Within the context (and as a culmination) of the present argument, I would 
suggest a more nuanced reading of the bouncing ball scene in Kafka’s “Blumfeld.” The 
episode can be read, I argue, as part of a complex literary experiment, which integrates 
the various aspects of an urban uncanny as I have historically reconstructed it. Drawing 
on Kafka’s own anxieties about unknown noises in his apartment, the “Blumfeld” story 
lends concrete existence to the kind of animate objects that, in Polgar’s and Rilke’s texts, 
exist only as psychological phantasms. The autonomous “Lärmapparat” that Kafka 
describes hearing through his apartment ceiling reappears within the represented world of 
the “Blumfeld” text as a directly observable, animate thing. Near the beginning of the 
story, Blumfeld returns to his apartment and hears through his front door, “ein 
eigentümliches klapperndes Geräusch, sehr lebhaft aber, sehr regelmäßig.”232 Upon 
entering and turning on the lights, he discovers the cause: “Das ist ja Zauberei, zwei 
kleine weiße blaugestreifte Celluloidbälle springen auf dem Parkett nebeneinander auf 
und ab; schlägt der eine auf den Boden, ist der andere in der Höhe und unermüdlich 
führen sie ihr Spiel aus.”233 The bizarre encounter and the ensuing comical interaction 
between Blumfeld and the bouncing balls certainly suggest a cinematic reference. But 
Kafka’s text does more than simply borrow its content from early trick-films. Rather, the 
visual representations of object animation provide Kafka with the fictional means to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
231 Alt, Kafka und der Film, p. 88. 
 
232 Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente I, p. 232. 
 
233 Ibid., pp. 232–33.  
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explore and narratively develop the kind of animistic anxieties that occur in the modern 
city. Blumfeld does not remain in his apartment fretting about noises and hostile, animate 
things. Instead, by materializing these anxieties as concrete entities, Kafka’s text draws 
its protagonist out of his isolation and explores his estranged, domestic situation in 
relation to a broader field of social relations involving his neighbors and coworkers. The 
key to this narrative development is the representational possibility––opened up by the 
new medium of cinema––to make the inanimate thing an actual agent or actor within the 
narrative. 
As a starting point, Blumfeld’s interaction with the animated balls might be 
understood, as Alt suggests, as structured according to the “Verfolgungsdramaturgie” of 
the early trick-film. In his 1911 essay on cinema, Georg Lukács describes one such film, 
which could have served as a model for Kafka’s literary text: “Die Kugeln, mit denen 
eine Gesellschaft Kegel schieben wollte, werden rebellisch und verfolgen sie über Berge 
und Felder, durch Flüsse schwimmend, auf Brücken springend und auf hohe Treppen 
hinaufjagend, bis endlich auch die Kegel lebendig werden und die Kugeln abholen.”234 
One can easily imagine such a film. It would be composed of a series of shots, 
interchanging between live-action scenes of the humans fleeing and scenes of the rolling 
and bouncing balls, either manipulated physically from off-screen or animated through 
object-animation sequences. This particular, cinematic illusion of a “Kampf zwischen 
Mensch und Ding,” however, bears little resemblance to the episode in Kafka’s 
“Blumfeld.” The close and dynamic interaction between Blumfeld’s bodily movements 
and the bouncing balls in his apartment would have found no precursor in early cinematic 
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representations. To animate things in that close proximity to a dynamic human figure 
would have been impossible to achieve visually given the limitations of early object 
animation. Instead of simply presenting a literary equivalent of a familiar, cinematic 
slapstick scene, as Alt’s reading suggests, Kafka’s text does something far more 
interesting. His literary rendering introduces into the diegetic space of the text a 
fantastical and specifically filmic entity. As a material manifestation, the balls already 
reference their medial origin. They are not just any balls, but balls made of a “thin, nearly 
transparent celluloid shell” (schwache fast durchsichtige Celluloidhülle).235 
Within an otherwise realistically portrayed, urban domestic scene, the bachelor 
Blumfeld finds himself forced into a confrontation with a dynamic object, whose very 
material existence bears a metonymic reference to the animated substrate of cinematic 
illusion. In the literary text, however, the human figure is also permitted to interact with 
the filmic object in ways that exceed the simply visual illusion of self-movement in 
cinema. For one, the celluloid balls are tactile material things, whose visual movements 
can be subjected to reality testing: “Blumfeld greift in die Luft, um festzustellen, ob sie 
nicht etwa an irgendwelchen Fäden hängen, nein, sie bewegen sich ganz selbstständig.236 
His experimental interaction with the animated things proceeds further with Blumfeld 
succeeding in grabbing hold of one of the balls, only to be attacked and hit by the other. 
At the same time, the balls themselves are not only materialized, filmic entities but also a 
concrete manifestation of the sound-phantasms described in Rilke’s and Polgar’s texts. 
By literally objectifying the uncanny noise-disturbances of the urban environment, 
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Kafka’s text poses a direct connection and challenge to its reclusive protagonist, leading 
him to interact with the external lives and realities beyond the walls of his apartment. In 
Kafka’s story, the animated thing is no longer the phantasm of the secluded neurasthenic 
but rather a real intrusion and interruption that breaks the spell of the protagonist’s 
isolation. As Blumfeld himself reflects: “Es ist doch nicht ganz wertlos als ein 
unbeachteter Junggeselle nur im Geheimen zu leben, jetzt hat irgendjemand, gleichgültig 
wer, dieses Geheimnis gelüftet und ihm diese zwei komischen Bälle hereingeschickt.”237 
The full narrative and critical potential of these strange objects will be taken up in 
detail in the chapter that follows. To conclude the present discussion, I would simply like 
to stress the cinematic origins of Kafka’s complex, literary representations of animated 
things. While his subsequent stories featuring similar objects––like “Der Kübelreiter” 
and, most famously, “Die Sorge des Hausvaters”––make no explicit reference to object-
animation films, the unfinished “Blumfeld” fragment indeed initiates Kafka’s broader 
literary experiments with representations of strangely animate things, suggesting the 
importance of cinematic animation for provoking new representational strategies within 
his modernist prose. In all of these stories, the narrative possibilities suggested by 
autonomously moving things occupy a central position in Kafka’s literary imagination 
and open up new, fictional strategies for reflecting critically on modern social relations 
among humans and things. Following a rigorous discussion of such issues in Kafka’s 
literary fictions, Chapter 4 will pick up the other thread, introduced here, of an emerging 
film aesthetics based on the transformed status of objects on the cinema screen. The film 
theory and experimental cinema of the 1920s, in particular, display a striking investment 
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in the aesthetic potential of animated, “living” things, first emphasized in the reception of 
film around 1910. Here, the writings and films of German, avant-garde filmmaker Hans 
Richter will serve as the primary focus for an explication of the complex role of 












































ON KAFKA’S THINGS:  




Die Grenze zwischen dem Menschlichen 
und der Dingwelt verwischt sich. 
  
–– Theodor W. Adorno 
  
 
Between 1915 and 1917, Franz Kafka produced several stories involving animated 
objects. These include not only the famous, spool-of-thread-like creature Odradek from 
“Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” but also a flying coal-bucket in “Der Kübelreiter,” and a pair 
of bouncing, celluloid balls in “Blumfeld, ein älterer Junggeselle.”238 Individually, such 
texts have long been counted among the most enigmatic of Kafka’s writings––due in no 
small part to these mysterious figures. Considered collectively, however, the same objects 
also come to exhibit striking similarities in terms of their narrative function. In all of the 
stories, the animated things appear suddenly to disrupt the isolated, domestic existence of 
the human protagonists and to draw them out into a wider world of social relations. The 
flying bucket delivers its impoverished rider to the home of the coal-dealer. The bouncing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
238 Although first published in journals in 1919 and 1921, respectively, Kafka’s “Die Sorge des 
Hausvaters” and “Der Kübelreiter” were likely written only months apart during the first half of 
1917. Kafka began work on the “Blumfeld” fragment in February 1915 and offered private 
readings of the draft as late as July 1916. The story became known under its current title only 
posthumously upon publication in the 1936 collection, Beschreibung eines Kampfes: Novellen, 
Skizzen, Aphorismen aus dem Nachlaß, edited by Max Brod. Further details on the dates of the 
three stories can be found in the commentary included in Franz Kafka, Schriften, Tagebücher: 
Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Jürgen Born et al. (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1982ff.). Here, see the 
following volumes: Drucke zu Lebzeiten: Apparatband, Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Wolf Kittler et al. 
(Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1996), pp. 349 and 542–45; and Nachgelassene Schriften und 
Fragmente I: Apparatband, Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Malcolm Pasley (Frankfurt am Main: S. 
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balls lead Blumfeld to interact with his neighbors. And Odradek poses a disturbing 
connection between the housefather and his future, familial generations. In each case, the 
animated thing plays an active role in mediating the estranged relations between human 
figures in the story. 
 While these curious objects––and Odradek in particular––have been the focus of 
extensive scholarly and theoretical discussions, their role as mediating agents in Kafka’s 
narrative fictions has received little to no attention. As I will explore in close readings of 
the texts, Kafka’s animated things function in various ways both as “living” extensions of 
particular human figures and as quasi-person- or animal-like entities in themselves, 
behaving as autonomous and unpredictable links between different characters in the 
stories. In their narrative roles, such objects are defined not only by their animated status 
but also their thing-like character. Although possessing an animated life, objects like 
Odradek, the flying bucket, and the celluloid balls in “Blumfeld” appear utterly useless 
and mysteriously broken-down, and prove stubbornly resistant to the intentions of 
humans. They are both animate creatures and crudely material constructions, living 
beings and yet undying things. For the reader as well as Kafka’s protagonists, these 
strange figures pose the problem of blurring the usual distinction between an acting 
subject and an inert world of objects. 
 In the writings of Theodor W. Adorno, the animation of figures like Kafka’s 
Odradek has been understood in dialectical relationship to the forces of reification. 
Informed by Marx’s account of commodity fetishism as well as Georg Lukács’s later 
theory of “reification” (Verdinglichung), Adorno reads the animated Odradek figure as a 
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sign of the alienated status of things under capitalism.239 In his 1953 “Aufzeichnungen zu 
Kafka,” Adorno goes further to describe not only how these strange objects come to 
occupy an estranged, “no-man’s-land between human and thing” (Niemandsland 
zwischen Mensch und Ding), but also how Kafka’s humans become aware of their 
thoroughly dehumanized and reified state.240 Under the modern social conditions that 
Adorno sees reflected in Kafka writings, the falsely autonomous “life” of things as 
commodities coincides with the alienated and thing-like status of humans. The animation 
of Kafka’s figures––be they human or thing––is due not to some inner subjectivity or 
volition, Adorno suggests. Rather, their dynamic movements are the result of some 
ubiquitous and external force, which throws them about as if they had fallen into “a 
magnetic field.”241 
 For Adorno, the animation of objects in Kafka is thus inextricably and 
dialectically related to the reified status of social relations. While I agree that Kafka’s 
animated things bear the marks of estrangement and distortion, such a reading also 
obscures the dynamic, narrative function of such objects in mediating social relations in 
Kafka’s stories. In becoming animated, Kafka’s things not only come to resemble his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
239 For Adorno’s reading of Odradek in terms of a “dialektisches Warenmotiv,” see his letters of 
December 17, 1934 and August 2–4, 1935, in Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, 
Briefwechsel: 1928–1940, ed. Henri Lonitz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), pp. 92–93, 
143, and, quoted here, p. 147. For the original, literary representation of Odradek, see Franz 
Kafka, “Die Sorge des Hausvaters” [1919], in Drucke zu Lebzeiten, Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Wolf 
Kittler et al. (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1994), pp. 282–84. 
 
240 Theodor W. Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zu Kafka” [1953], in Prismen: Kulturkritik und 
Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1955), p. 318 and, quoted above, p. 329.  
 
241 Ibid., p. 329: “Die Grenze zwischen dem Menschlichen und der Dingwelt verwischt sich. [...] 
[D]ie gebannten Menschen handeln nicht von sich aus, sondern als wäre ein jeglicher in ein 
magnetisches Feld geraten.” 
	  
	   172	  
reified humans; they also take on subject-like roles in the narrative, behaving in a manner 
similar to Kafka’s strangely dehumanized messenger and assistant figures. Like these 
human intermediaries, Kafka’s animated things appear not simply as representatives of a 
distorted and reified world; they in fact constitute the very social relations that give shape 
to this world in Kafka’s narrative fictions. Kafka’s animated things, I would like to 
suggest, function as if to literalize the more relational aspect of Lukács’s original (and 
roughly contemporaneous) 1923 definition of reification: “daß ein Verhältnis, eine 
Beziehung zwischen Personen den Charakter einer Dinghaftigkeit [...] erhält.”242 Yet in 
doing so, Kafka’s animated things also exceed the structures of Marxist interpretation. By 
literalizing the thingly aspects of human relations, Kafka’s stories succeed in representing 
the consequences of reification, while simultaneously exploring its limits and 
productively estranging the reader’s more habituated understandings of social relations. 
In Kafka, as I will show, the animation of things tells the story of reification––but in 
surprising and open-ended ways. 
In their innovative 1975 study, Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure, Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari present a reading of Kafka’s animated things in terms of 
reification, as well, but do so in an instructively different manner. Singling out Odradek 
and the bouncing balls in “Blumfeld” as specific examples, Deleuze and Guattari draw a 
distinction between the “animated” assemblages of Kafka’s novels and the “reified” 
machines found in several of his stories. In contrast to the “living political and social 
assemblages” involved in Der Process and Das Schloß, for example, objects like 
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Odradek and the celluloid balls, they argue, behave rather as strange and useless 
machines that remain, “too transcendental, too isolated and reified, and too abstract,” to 
connect up to the dynamic, legal and bureaucratic assemblages of Kafka’s longer 
writings.243 While such machinelike objects are highly animated in themselves, their 
animation remains isolated and disjointed, and tied to a crude thing-like structure that 
appears at once broken-down and of unknowable purpose. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
these objects exist simply as reified elements within the otherwise dynamic, socio-
political assemblages of Kafka’s writing.  
Within the schema of Deleuze and Guattari’s overall reading, Kafka’s animated 
things present an impasse of sorts. Figures like Odradek and the balls in the “Blumfeld” 
story seem to reassert the old, stubborn opposition between subject and object, and thus 
pose a stumbling block for the philosophers’ immanent system of dynamic flows, lines of 
flight, and dismantling assemblages. In both their metaphysical and material excesses, 
such objects mark a point of failure, breakdown, or discontinuity in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception of the assemblage, acting like some foreign obstruction that brings 
the machine to a halt. In other words, for Deleuze and Guattari, such animated figures in 
Kafka pose a problem not so much in their role as objects but rather in their disruptive 
capacity as things. This distinction, first mentioned in the introduction to the dissertation, 
will be discussed below in relation to Kafka’s literary representations of animated things. 
According to a distinction forwarded by the recent work of Bill Brown, Bruno 
Latour, and others, the word “thing” has come to denote a broad transformation or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
243 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature [1975], trans. Dana 
Polan (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 39–40; see also pp. 47–48.  
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inversion in the status of objects: from a position of subservience in relation to the human 
subject, to a role of stubborn resistance and person-like agency. Whereas the “object” 
appears as some inert and neutral entity (which the subject perceives and represents, 
attributes meaning to and understands scientifically), the “thing” designates a figure of 
excess, unpredictability, and obstinate materiality, able to subvert the will and 
instrumental intentions of the human in moments of breakdown and failure. The object’s 
innate tendency toward breakdown and unpredictability (its capacity to become thing in 
this emphatic sense) has been used in this fashion to theorize a supposed “agency” of 
technological artifacts, natural objects, and everyday things.244 In language relevant to my 
reading of Kafka, Bruno Latour makes a related distinction between understanding the 
roles of things as “intermediaries” or in terms of “mediation.” Considered as an 
intermediary, the thing is reduced to an object position, defined by its instrumental usage 
by a subject. In terms of mediation, however, the thing is granted an actor-like position, 
exceeding its intermediary role to become an active and unpredictable figure that is not 
only used by humans but also shapes their behavior and actions.245 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
244 On the distinction between object and thing, see Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry 
28.1 (Autumn 2001): pp. 1–22. For different approaches to the “life” or “agency” of technical, 
aesthetic, and everyday objects, see, for example, Bruno Latour, “Where are the Missing 
Masses?: The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts” [1992], in The Object Reader, ed. Fiona 
Candlin and Raiford Guins (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 229–54; Alfred Gell, Art and 
Agency: An Anthropological Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998); W.J.T. Mitchell, What Do 
Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 
2005); and Things That Talk: Object Lessons from Art and Science, ed. Lorraine Daston (New 
York: Zone, 2004). The distinction between object and thing in Brown and Latour, in particular, 
is highly indebted to Martin Heidegger’s analysis of objects and equipment found in Sein und Zeit 
[1927] (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), pp. 90–102. 
 
245 For a detailed account of Latour’s conception of “mediation,” see his chapter, “A Collective of 
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Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999), pp. 174–215; and in the same 
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In recent years, critics and theorists have even enlisted Kafka’s fictional writings 
as a relevant contribution toward the theorization of an autonomous “life” or “agency” of 
things. Art historian Peter Geimer, cultural and literary historian Hartmut Böhme, and 
social theorist Jane Bennett, for example, have all drawn on Kafka’s complex literary 
representation of Odradek in “Die Sorge des Hausvaters” as a productive fiction for 
thinking through the materiality, alterity, and power of things.246 In a recent article, Uwe 
C. Steiner has even suggested that Kafka’s writings articulate a “knowledge of things” 
somehow congruent with current, theoretical claims about the “agency” and “quasi-
subjectivity” of objects (such as found in the work of Latour and others).247 In all of these 
cases, Kafka’s literary representations have provided recent critics and theorists with an 
inspiration and model for articulating the power and complex materiality of things.  
While I remain skeptical of any easy identification of Kafka’s writings with 
current theoretical positions, I am interested in observing how, in these appropriations, 
Kafka’s fictional representations have served to provoke and complicate reflections on a 
supposed life or agency of things. Much of the recent, social and cultural theory of this 
sort, I would argue, can be understood to take deliberate recourse to literary and narrative 
representations of animated things, treating them as heuristic fictions in the service of 
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246 See Peter Geimer, “Theorie der Gegenstände: ‘Die Menschen sind nicht mehr unter sich’,” in 
Person/Schauplatz, ed. Jörg Huber (Vienna: Springer, 2003), pp. 209–22, here p. 220; Hartmut 
Böhme, Fetischismus und Kultur: Eine andere Theorie der Moderne (Reinbek bei Hamburg: 
Rowohlt, 2006), pp. 50–54; and Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things 
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247 See Uwe C. Steiner, “Widerstand im Gegenstand: Das literarische Wissen vom Ding am 
Beispiel Franz Kafkas,” in Literatur, Wissenschaft und Wissen seit der Epochenschwelle um 
1800: Theorie – Epistemologie – komparatistische Fallstudien, ed. Thomas Klinkert and Monika 
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new theoretical articulations. In contrast to literary scholars like Steiner and Böhme, or 
social theorists like Bennett, however, I do not wish to attribute some sort of heuristic 
potential or theoretical knowledge about things to Kafka’s literary texts themselves. 
Rather, in discussing these theoretical appropriations, I instead want to assert the often-
unacknowledged importance of fiction and narrative for the broader theoretical interest in 
objects and things. Looking beyond the appeal of the Odradek figure for recent social and 
cultural theory, the various animated things in Kafka’s stories also display greater 
complexity when considered both collectively and within the specific context of the 
individual texts. In my close analysis of the stories, I will stress both the particular 
narrative functions of these animated figures within the diegetic space of their respective 
texts, as well as the reader’s experience of the depicted objects, as mediated through 
Kafka’s complex, literary representations. Throughout my readings, I aim to affirm the 
texts’ experimental and open-ended nature, which, for better or for worse, has made 
Kafka’s writings continually attractive for theoretical borrowing. 
  In situating a close reading of Kafka’s animated things in relation to older, neo-
Marxist theories of reification, on the one hand, and more recent debates about an 
“agency” and “life” of things, on the other, I have a number of goals in mind. First, by 
emphasizing the complex interplay between animation and reification in Kafka’s literary 
representations, I hope to reassert a critical stance, which has been left out or actively 
rejected in current, theoretical discussions about things.248 At the same time, by 
borrowing from the recent, popularized distinction between objects and things, as well as 
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Bruno Latour’s notion of things as unpredictable “mediators,” I also hope to significantly 
challenge the staid, Marxist-inspired interpretations of figures like Odradek purely in 
terms of reification and commodity fetishism. Reading Kafka’s fictions at the intersection 
of these distinct theoretical currents has the benefit of highlighting conflicting tendencies 
in the literary representations themselves, while also revealing the limitations and 
simplifications involved in such theoretical appropriations. The function of animation in 
Kafka’s representation of things, as I will show, is not simply in the service of 
articulating a false or distorted relationship. The animation of things in Kafka does indeed 
tell a story of reification. But the story it also tells is (to quote Bill Brown): “the story of a 
changed relation to the human subject,” that is, “the story of objects asserting themselves 
as things.”249 
While my reading has been largely provoked and motivated by these divergent 
theoretical appropriations and trends, I also want to be careful to consider the particular 
historical and cultural contexts of Kafka’s writings. His fictions of animated things do not 
resemble fantastic worlds of fairy tales or fables, which are detached from points of 
immediate, historical reference. Rather, stories like “Der Kübelreiter,” “Blumfeld, ein 
älterer Junggeselle,” and “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” are all situated within a particular 
world, characterized by urban housing, industry, and market relations, corresponding to 
concrete aspects of Kafka’s work and home life in the early twentieth century. Within 
these specific contexts, Kafka’s animated things are all the more interesting for their 
estranging effects and narrative functions. At the same time, these objects must also be 
understood in relation to other dominant themes in Kafka’s writings such as familial 
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relations, religion, and the transcendence of law. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, 
reified objects like Odradek or the celluloid balls in “Blumfeld” display a marked affinity 
with the ossified and transcendental structures of guilt and unknowable authority found 
elsewhere in Kafka’s writing.250 In the conclusion of the chapter, I will speculate on this 
connection by looking closely at the mysterious appearance of moral imperatives in the 
stories, such as the commandment against killing found in “Der Kübelreiter” (“Du sollst 
nicht töten!”) and the notion of “real or imaginary rights” (wirkliche oder scheinbare 
Rechte) which appears at the very end of the “Blumfeld” fragment.251 Analyzing these 
stories alongside “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” I will argue that Kafka’s literary 
representations of animated objects entail a complex reflection on notions of “mediation” 
(Vermittlung) and “responsibility” (Verantwortung). 
 
Animated Things and Reified Humans 
As many critics have noted, Kafka’s “Der Kübelreiter” stands out among his writings for 
its direct connection to an immediate historical event: the coal shortage during Prague’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
250 See Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, pp. 47–48, and 72. On this point, Deleuze and Guattari 
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law. See Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: Zur zehnten Wiederkehr seines Todestages” [1934], in 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2.2, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt 
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251 See Franz Kafka, “Der Kübelreiter” [1921], in Drucke zu Lebzeiten, Kritische Ausgabe, ed. 
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severe winter of 1916/17.252 As the story begins, the narrator describes the cold and 
unforgiving conditions of the time through a jarring and disjointed list: 
Verbraucht alle Kohle; leer der Kübel; sinnlos die Schaufel; Kälte atmend der 
Ofen; das Zimmer vollgeblasen von Frost; vor dem Fenster Bäume starr im Reif; 
der Himmel, ein silberner Schild gegen den, der von ihm Hilfe will. (D, 444) 
 
The paratactic form of the story’s opening corresponds well to the physical situation 
described. Beginning with the absence of heating fuel, the fragmentary sequence 
proceeds by enumerating the progressive consequences of this lack. The equipment for 
heating the room has become useless, the room frozen, the outer world a cold and 
unforgiving expanse. While the sequence thus establishes a degree of continuity––from 
the frigid interior to the external environment and icy indifference of the heavens––the 
same fragmentary list also articulates the disconnected existence of the various objects. In 
their frozen and functionless states, the bucket, shovel, stove, room, trees, and sky appear 
as radically isolated and detached––both with respect to one another and in relation to 
any human figure that might look for help under these unforgiving conditions.  
 The frozen stasis of the opening scene is only broken with the introduction of the 
story’s animated object. Kafka’s first-person narrator decides he must beg some coal of 
the wealthy coal-dealer in town or otherwise freeze to death. Since regular pleas to the 
coal-dealer no longer work, the narrator decides he must go before him as a beggar. This 
appeal as a beggar, however, depends strangely on the active role of narrator’s coal-
bucket. “Meine Auffahrt schon muß es entscheiden,” he declares, “ich reite deshalb auf 
dem Kübel hin” (D, 444). The empty coal-bucket comes to life as a steed, its handle the 
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bridle, and the narrator is swiftly flown through the frozen streets to the coal-dealer’s 
home. In doing so, the animated thing breaks the spell of the frozen world and mediates a 
connection and interaction between the human characters. Through its dynamic flight-
trajectory, as I will show, the animated bucket functions to translate the physical 
conditions of coldness in the story into a narrative fiction of reified, social relations.     
 In its capacity as a mediating agent, Kafka’s flying coal-bucket takes on multiple 
functions within the narrative. First, in accordance with the narrator’s intentions, the 
bucket serves not only as a means of physical transport to the coal-dealer’s home but also 
as a visible sign of destitution and need. These two functions coincide in the emptiness of 
the bucket, as the narrator’s own plea acknowledges: “bitte Kohlenhändler, gib mir ein 
wenig Kohle. Mein Kübel ist schon so leer, daß ich auf ihm reiten kann” (D, 445). Here, 
the repurposing of the object exceeds a purely, instrumental function and takes on a 
symbolic meaning within a social context. Roland Barthes notes a very similar dynamic 
in his 1964 essay, “Semantics of the Object”: “in order to find absolutely improvised 
objects, we should have to proceed to completely asocial states; we can imagine that a 
tramp, for example, improvising footwear out of newspaper, produces a perfectly ‘free’ 
object; but even this is not so––very quickly, this newspaper will become precisely the 
sign of the bum.”253 In Kafka’s story, the material lightness of the bucket also has 
unintended and uncontrollable consequences for the narrator and thus serves another 
function within the narrative. After failing to appeal to the coal-dealer directly, the flying 
“Kübelreiter” is confronted at the front door by the coal-dealer’s wife, who succeeds in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
253 Roland Barthes, “Semantics of the Object” [1964], in The Semiotic Challenge, trans. Richard 
Howard (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1994), pp. 179–90, quoted here, p. 
183 (emphasis in original). 
	  
	   181	  
driving him away with just a wave of her apron. As the narrator explains: “Alle Vorzüge 
eines guten Reittieres hat mein Kübel; Widerstandskraft hat er nicht; zu leicht ist er; eine 
Frauenschürze jagt ihm die Beine vom Boden” (D, 447). At the end of the story, the 
narrator is found having been blown far away to “die Regionen der Eisgebirge,” never to 
be seen again (D, 447). 
 The physical trajectory of the flying bucket is shaped largely by contrasting 
temperatures in Kafka’s story: 
Durch die fest gefrorene Gasse geht es in ebenmäßigem Trab; oft werde ich bis 
zur Höhe der ersten Stockwerke gehoben; niemals sinke ich bis zur Haustüre 
hinab. Und außergewöhnlich hoch schwebe ich vor dem Kellergewölbe des 
Händlers, in dem er tief unten an seinem Tischchen kauert und schreibt; um die 
übergroße Hitze abzulassen, hat er die Tür geöffnet. (D, 445) 
 
As it carries its rider through the city streets, the flying bucket moves as if tracing out an 
isothermal path, travelling evenly along the frozen alleyways and lifted higher with the 
increased temperatures found along the fronts of the heated buildings. Reaching its 
destination, the bucket is buffeted even higher by the hot air pouring out of the coal-
dealer’s home. The narrator’s intent to present his empty bucket as a visible sign of need 
is in fact thwarted by the object itself. The “Kübelreiter” fails to present himself visually 
to the coal-dealer, since his mount (in its lightness) is not only a sign of want but also an 
index of wasted heat. “Aber ich sitze doch hier auf dem Kübel,” the narrator cries out 
from high above the coal-dealer’s home, “bitte seht doch herauf; Ihr werdet mich gleich 
entdecken; um eine Schaufel voll bitte ich” (D, 446). Although the flying bucket draws 
the narrator along a line of dependence toward the coal-dealer’s door, it also repels its 
rider from his ultimate goal. As an index of temperature, the empty bucket is also an 
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index of the narrator’s dehumanized and devalued existence, pulling him along with the 
wasteful flow of disposable resources. 
In tracing out these vectors of waste and want, the physical path of Kafka’s flying 
bucket structures the story’s narrative of reified, social relations. Although the animation 
of the bucket breaks the initial spell of the narrator’s frozen room and establishes a 
dramatic, social connection between the narrator and the coal-dealer, it also reveals the 
cold, reified relations that exist between the two, and ultimately banishes the narrator to 
the cold expanses of the distant ice-mountains. For the coal-dealer, the narrator is just one 
extra “Kundschaft” to call out prices to (D, 446); for the dealer’s wife, he is simply a 
“Nichts,” whom she can quickly blow away like so much trash (D, 447). Without 
reducing Kafka’s story to some crude Marxist interpretation regarding the alienated 
nature of commodity exchange, it is clear that a process of reification is central for an 
understanding of the “Kübelreiter.” The figure corresponds to the crucial moment that 
Adorno recognizes in Kafka: “Der Augenblick des Einstands [...], auf den alles bei 
[Kafka] abzielt, ist der, da die Menschen dessen innewerden, daß sie kein Selbst – daß sie 
selbst Dinge sind.”254 The animated bucket thus not only reveals the reified relations 
between humans; it also literalizes the consequent, dehumanized state of the human, who 
is reduced to a disposable object. This reified existence is already suggested by the 
strange compound noun of the story’s title: an absurd, hybrid creature that fuses human 
and thing. In Kafka’s story, the animation of the thing is inseparable from the reified state 
of human relations. 
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 In critical readings of Kafka’s “Der Kübelreiter,” this dynamic interplay between 
animation and reification has been largely ignored. In recent interpretations, the bucket-
rider figure is most often read as a meta-reflection on the author’s creative yet isolated 
existence as a writer. Inspired largely by Kafka’s own biographical struggles, such 
interpretations read the flight of the bucket in terms of a conflict between the lonely 
struggle of the artist (represented by the narrator) and the comfortable life of the 
bourgeois family (represented by the coal-dealer). The attempt to reconcile these two 
existences––an attempt enacted by the flight of the bucket––is shown to fail in the course 
of the story. In the end, the narrator is again left in cold solitude, continuing on in his 
creative flight of artistic fancy. In such readings, the ethereal lightness and endangered 
state of the “Kübelreiter” figure come to symbolize Kafka’s own isolated yet imaginative 
life, which he struggled through as a bachelor artist.255  
While the association of the bucket-flight with artistic imagination is plausible, 
such readings overlook the complex role of the animated thing itself, as well as its 
similarities with other such objects in Kafka’s stories. As I have tried to demonstrate, the 
animated bucket takes on multiple functions as it traces out and reveals the forces of 
reification in the story. Initially a useless object, the bucket is repurposed in the narrative 
to serve as both a sign of the narrator’s desperation and as a vehicle for provoking a 
confrontation between the human characters. In the end, this transformation into the 
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ethereal and beggarly “Kübelreiter” is the narrator’s undoing, and he himself is relegated 
to the status of a disposable thing. The ability to tell this story of reification hinges on the 
animation of the object, which powers the narrative reflection on human relations in the 
story.  
As “Der Kübelreiter” clearly demonstrates, Kafka’s animated things are not 
simply anomalous and fantastic figures; they also serve important, narrative functions 
within fictions that allude to real historical conditions (here, the domestic coal-shortage 
during World War I). What is so fascinating about Kafka’s story is how, in relation to this 
historical context, the clearly absurd fiction of a flying bucket can produce an almost 
palpable sense of the physical coldness and reification of relations that characterized the 
period. While in the published version of the story, the ending suggests a lonely flight 
into the realm of artistic fantasy, Kafka’s original conclusion is far less ambiguous. In a 
final paragraph crossed out in the notebook draft of the story, the narrator puts a decisive 
end to his flight: “Mein Reiten hat den Sinn verloren, ich bin abgestiegen und trage den 
Kübel auf der Achsel.”256 With a return to the normal use of the now-lifeless object, the 
narrative is brought to a close. As the crossed-out conclusion emphasizes, the animation 
of the thing was not part of some imaginative escapism, but was intended to have a 
purpose and meaning (Sinn). The complex function of the animated bucket in the story 
entails not only a meaning within the diegetic space of the text, as discussed above, but 
also a meaning for the reader, who is able to experience the consequences of reification in 
a compact, graphic, and visceral form. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
256 Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente I: Apparatband, Kritische Ausgabe, p. 275. 
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While Kafka’s “Der Kübelreiter” tells the story of a human transformed into a 
thing, the 1915 “Blumfeld” fragment tells the story of the limits and breakdown in 
treating others as things. Like “Der Kübelreiter,” Kafka’s “Blumfeld” story begins with 
an isolated protagonist confined to his apartment. And while, in both texts, the animated 
thing functions to disrupt this isolated existence and provoke broader, social interactions, 
the “Blumfeld” story proceeds according to a very different narrative structure.  
Instead of tracing out a dynamic, narrative arc like the flying bucket, the 
bouncing, celluloid balls introduce an abstract configuration that is repeated in the course 
of Kafka’s fragmentary story. Blumfeld’s interactions with these strange, animated things 
come to bear a resemblance to his relations with human figures in the story. In this way, 
the animated thing introduces a pattern of reified, social relations that are in turn 
explicated according to the model of the animated balls. With their origins in the 
experiential realms of urban housing and early cinematic animation (as argued in Chapter 
2), these strange objects also take on a socio-critical significance within the larger story, 
which explores the protagonist’s relationships with his neighbors and employees at work. 
In resemblance to these human figures, the bouncing, celluloid balls present both a model 
of Blumfeld’s objectifying treatment of others and a kind of “thingly” resistance to such 
treatment. 
Kafka’s “Blumfeld” story starts off innocently enough with the eponymous, 
elderly bachelor climbing the stairs to his lonely apartment after work and weighing the 
pros and cons of purchasing a dog for companionship. The appeal of owning the animal, 
he reflects, lies in its subservience to its master: its “Bellen, Springen, Händelekken” 
could be at his disposal when desired, while the animal could also be disposed of with a 
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kick or be left out in the street overnight (N I, 232). Blumfeld expects the impossible of a 
pet: that it be both independent and yet entirely under his will and control. What he 
despises above all is the thought of some dependent creature, or “untergeordnetes 
lebendiges Wesen,” requiring his constant maintenance and care (N I, 231). The organic 
life of the animal is the primary drawback for Blumfeld. Dogs get filthy, attract parasites, 
dirty apartments, and require care when they get sickly and age (N I, 230–31). Due to his 
egocentrism and compulsive cleanliness, Blumfeld desires the mechanical subservience 
of the pet without any of its bodily limitations or needs.257 
When Blumfeld opens the front door to his apartment his wish is ironically 
granted with the strange appearance of the two celluloid balls. Instead of barks, jumps, 
and hand-licks they offer their bouncing and a strange rattling noise, and they will even 
spin around in Blumfeld’s hand when caught (N I, 232–34).258 It is as if he were 
presented with an abstract, mechanical model of a dog, stripped of all of its inherent 
biological limitations. Blumfeld even nervously speculates that the balls might continue 
their strange, animated life when broken down into pieces (N I, 238). Things might be 
destroyed of course, but unlike animals they can never become injured or die.  
Thus abstracted into thingly form, the balls seem a material realization of 
Blumfeld’s ideal pet. And yet they also make a total mockery of his expectations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
257 In their close reading of the story, I.A. and J.J. White stress the moral failings of intolerance 
and egocentrism as characteristic of Blumfeld’s attitude toward other humans and animals alike. 
See their article, “Blumfeld, an Elderly Bachelor,” in The Kafka Debate: New Perspectives for 
Our Times, ed. Angel Flores (New York: Gordian Press, 1977), pp. 354–66. 
 
258 As Clayton Koelb has argued, the balls (“Bälle springen”) serve as a replacement for the dog 
(“Bellen, Springen”) on a phonetic level, as well (N I, p. 232). See Koelb, Kafka’s Rhetoric: The 
Passion of Reading (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1989), p. 36. 
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Wie untergeordnete Begleiter, suchen sie es zu vermeiden, vor Blumfeld sich 
aufzuhalten. Bis jetzt haben sie es scheinbar nur gewagt, um sich ihm 
vorzustellen, jetzt aber haben sie bereits ihren Dienst angetreten. (N I, 235) 
 
While initially appearing to enter into his service, the celluloid balls develop an 
increasingly autonomous life, at first mimicking Blumfeld’s movements and then actively 
rebelling against his control. As the evening progresses, Blumfeld even finds himself 
having to care for the unruly balls as if they were a pampered dog: “Es ist als hätte er 
einen kleinen Hund, den er weich betten will” (N I, 240). Even as an abstract, thingly 
approximation of a dog, the animated balls still assert the stubborn as well as dependent 
existence of a real, living creature. 
 In this first episode of Kafka’s fragmentary story, the animated objects serve as 
both a materialized model for Blumfeld’s objectifying and instrumental desires, as well 
as a narrative device for challenging and frustrating these very same expectations. At the 
same time, Blumfeld’s frustrating interactions with the balls find him returning to his 
usual, instrumental disposition toward living things: “Jetzt könnte Blumfeld einen Hund 
gut brauchen, so ein junges wildes Tier würde mit den Bällen bald fertig werden; [...] es 
ist leicht möglich, daß sich Blumfeld in nächster Zeit einen Hund anschafft” (N I, 237). 
Without a dog on hand, however, the next morning he decides on his maid’s ten-year-old 
son as a means of ridding himself of the celluloid balls. The strange, animated objects 
thus provoke Blumfeld to engage with a wider circle of neighbors whom he otherwise 
avoids. The young boy proves too dense to understand Blumfeld’s instructions for 
retrieving the balls in his apartment, so he reluctantly enlists the two daughters of his 
building’s “Hausmeister” to take the key to his wardrobe where the balls have been 
captured. The decision initiates a proliferation of mediating figures that are required to 
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realize Blumfeld’s goal of passing on the troublesome objects to the young boy. He must 
first use the girls, who must retrieve his apartment key from the boy’s mother (the maid) 
in order to retrieve the balls for the boy from Blumfeld’s locked wardrobe. On the girls’ 
part, they recognize they must themselves use the boy as a means of accessing the 
mysterious objects: 
„Wir werden ihm die Bälle holen“, rufen da die Mädchen. Sie sind schlau, sie 
haben erkannt, daß sie die Bälle nur durch irgendeine Vermittlung des Jungen 
erhalten können, daß sie aber auch noch diese Vermittlung selbst bewerkstelligen 
müssen. (N I, 251) 
 
The repeated usage of the term “mediation” (Vermittlung) already points to an internal 
tension in the term when applied to a human figure: the sense of both an autonomous 
agent, who serves as a go-between, versus the purely instrumental treatment of the human 
as a means to an end. 
In a recent article, Timothy J. Attanucci characterizes the chain of instrumental 
relations in Kafka’s “Blumfeld” as inherently parasitic.259 In contrast to familial relations 
(denied to the elderly bachelor), Blumfeld’s social interactions develop in the story 
according to a proliferation of parasitic figures that try to realize their goals by latching 
onto others. The figure of the dog introduces and underscores this theme of the parasite in 
the text: first, Blumfeld frets about a dog bringing in fleas (“die ständigen Begleiter der 
Hunde” (N I, 230)); then, there are the strangely dependent and dog-like balls 
(themselves parasitic “Begleiter” of Blumfeld); and finally, the double-ball figure 
initiates a sequence of similar figures, including the Hausmeister’s daughters and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
259 See Timothy J. Attanucci, “Kafka: Junggeselle – Maschine. Überlegungen zu einer 
historischen Kopplung,” in Literarische ‘Junggesellen-Maschinen’ und die Ästhetik der 
Neutralisierung, ed. Annette Runde (Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann, 2011), pp. 169–85.  
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Blumfeld’s assistants at work, who appear in multiples to latch on to other figures in the 
story. As Attanucci argues, this parasitism is also reciprocated on the part of the bachelor. 
(As Kafka himself states in a 1910 diary entry: “[der Junggeselle] kann nur als Einsiedler 
oder als Schmarotzer leben.”260) With his orderly and hermetic life disrupted by the 
strange appearance of the celluloid balls, Blumfeld becomes suddenly dependent on his 
neighbors. Finding himself in possession of a toy-like object that he can neither enjoy 
himself nor pass on to his own child, he is forced to initiate a string of instrumental and 
parasitic relations in order to achieve something quite easily done within the social 
structures of the family: handing down possessions to the next generation.261    
 This analysis of parasitism in “Blumfeld” identifies an important aspect of 
Kafka’s representation of social relations, but it is only one side to the story. The role of 
the celluloid balls as Blumfeld’s “Lebensbegleiter” (N I, 248) poses the problem not only 
of parasitic relations, but also a notion of extended personhood. As Kafka’s narrative 
makes clear, Blumfeld’s main anxiety with respect to these strange animated things is 
that they somehow be taken as directly connected to or somehow representative of him: 
“Solange [die Bälle] hinter ihm her waren, konnte man sie für etwas zu ihm Gehöriges 
halten, für etwas, das bei Beurteilung seiner Person irgendwie mit herangezogen werden 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
260 Kafka, Tagebücher, Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Hans-Gerd Koch et al. (Frankfurt am Main: S. 
Fischer, 1990), p. 125. 
 
261 See Attanucci, “Kafka: Junggeselle – Maschine,” pp. 177–80. Attanucci draws here on Michel 
Serres’s distinction between the genealogical tree-structure of familial relations and the cascading 
reproduction-schema of parasitic chains. See Serres, The Parasite [1980], trans. Lawrence R. 
Schehr (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2007). As Adorno notes, the parasitism of 
Kafka’s figures in general is displaced from the oppressive power of the patriarch to impotent and 
superfluous bachelor figures, like Gregor Samsa, who are parasitic both in their domestic lives 
and in their jobs, which lack a dimension of socially useful work. As a middle manager in a 
forgotten department of a textile factory, Blumfeld’s parasitism likewise straddles the spheres of 
home and work. See Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zu Kafka,” p. 318–19.     
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mußte” (N I, 247). Like unruly children, the seemingly impudent and rebellious behavior 
of the celluloid balls would reflect poorly on their owner, Blumfeld thinks. And it is for 
this reason that he must restore them to their “proper place” (eigentliche Bestimmung) in 
the games of children (N I, 247). Passing the balls on to his maid’s son would both 
terminate this incriminating ownership as well as sever his parent-like relation to the 
objects, thus restoring Blumfeld to his orderly and isolated, bachelor existence. 
 The existence of the celluloid balls as both uncontrollable, “living” extensions and 
dependent parasites contrasts strongly with Blumfeld’s desired instrumental relations 
with things. As technological objects, the bouncing balls can be read, I would argue, as 
embodying a tension similar to Bruno Latour’s contrast between intermediaries and 
mediation. On the one hand, they present an abstract, technological model for Blumfeld’s 
desired instrumental and objectified relationship to others (in the first case, a dog, who 
would serve as a means-to-an-end for Blumfeld). On the other hand, the celluloid balls 
also mark a breakdown and challenge to such expectations by becoming rebellious, 
stubborn, and uncontrollable in relation to human intentions. Their strange animation 
transforms an instrumental object into an obstinate thing, an inert intermediary into a 
mediating agent. What appear first as dependent parasites are also thingly extensions that 
implicate and entangle individuals in a larger network of social relations. In terms similar 
to Latour, the theme of “Vermittlung” introduced in the first half of the story (see the 
block quote above), nicely encapsulates this tension between a treatment of others as 
objects or intermediaries and the open-ended suggestion that such a treatment can also be 
resisted and ultimately fail. 
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This general dynamic, introduced by Blumfeld’s interactions with the celluloid 
balls, is repeated throughout the story in analogous, triangular configurations: first the 
Hausmeister’s two daughters (who “bounce around” Blumfeld (herumspringen) (N I, 
249)); followed by the two childlike “apprentices” (Praktikanten) at his workplace, who 
make mechanical movements like the bouncing balls, “skipping” (auf den Fußspitzen 
hüpfend) about Blumfeld’s office (N I, 264). The configuration is repeated as well in a 
passage later crossed out in the draft of the story. Here it appears as a mise en abyme in 
which Blumfeld contemplates a magazine photograph depicting the 1914 meeting of 
French President Raymond Poincaré and Czar Nicholas II (both accompanied by two 
attendants a piece) in St. Petersburg shortly before the outbreak of World War I.262  
In all of these episodes, a fantasy of instrumental control on the part of Blumfeld 
is undermined by a proliferation of uncontrollable, mediating agents that resist their 
objectified and reified treatment. Most dramatic in this sense is the extended workplace 
episode in the second half of the story, where Blumfeld’s middle-management position in 
a textile factory has him plagued by the insubordinate behavior of his two childlike 
assistants. Replaying the parent-child problematic in terms of a “new generation” 
(Nachwuchs) in the workplace (N I, 255), these assistant figures pose a similarly 
insurmountable challenge to Blumfeld’s desire for instrumental relations with others as 
independent extensions of his will. Contrast, for example, the assistants’ unruly behavior 
with Blumfeld’s vision of hierarchical authority, order, and control: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
262 On the historical source of this photograph as well as the function of photography in Kafka’s 
critical reflections on this historical event, see Carolin Duttlinger, Kafka and Photography 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), here, pp. 207–19; as well as her earlier article, “Snapshots of 
History: Franz Kafka’s ‘Blumfeld ein älterer Junggeselle’ and the First World War,” Modern 
Austrian Literature 39.1 (2006): pp. 29–43. 
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Ursprünglich hatte [Blumfeld] sich vorgestellt, daß die Praktikanten ihn in den 
unmittelbaren Handreichungen unterstützen würden, welche zur Zeit der 
Warenverteilung so viel Anstrengung und Wachsamkeit erforderten. Er hatte 
gedacht er würde etwa in der Mitte hinter dem Pult stehn, immer die Übersicht 
über alles behalten und die Eintragungen besorgen, während die Praktikanten 
nach seinem Befehl hin und her laufen und alles verteilen würden. Er hatte sich 
vorgestellt, daß seine Beaufsichtigung, die so scharf sie war, für ein solches 
Gedränge nicht genügen konnte, durch die Aufmerksamkeit der Praktikanten 
ergänzt werden würde und daß diese Praktikanten allmählich Erfahrungen 
sammeln, nicht in jeder Einzelheit auf seine Befehle angewiesen bleiben und 
endlich selbst lernen würden, die Näherinnen, was Warenbedarf und 
Vertrauenswürdigkeit anlangt, von einender zu unterscheiden. (N I, 259) 
 
Instead of conforming to Blumfeld’s instrumental vision, the assistants replicate the 
uncontrollable and resistant behavior of the celluloid balls. Whether in the workplace, in 
the domestic setting, or even in the international, political arena staged in the magazine 
photograph, the dynamic behavior of these animated things functions both to model and 
assert a limit to the reification and instrumentality of relations. 
In Carolin Duttlinger’s close analysis of the Poincaré and Nicholas II photograph 
in the “Blumfeld” fragment, she rightly emphasizes the unnerving and uncanny effects of 
the doubled figures in the image––the mirrored sets of two “attendants” (Begleiter) 
standing behind both the French President and the Russian Czar––and reads this 
constellation in terms of a de-individualization, loss of control, and specter of military 
uniformity in relation to World War I.263 Considering the entire story, however, the 
proliferation of these doubled figures marks not only a destabilizing crisis, but also an 
open-ended challenge to hierarchical and instrumental relations. The uncannily doubled 
attendants in the photograph are unnerving not only as subordinate duplicates of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
263 See Duttlinger, Kafka and Photography, p. 214. For the relevant passage, crossed out in the 
draft of the story, see Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente I: Apparatband, Kritische 
Ausgabe, pp. 205-7, here p. 206: “Hinter dem Kaiser wie hinter dem Pr[äsident] stehn je zwei 
Herren. Gegenüber den freudigen Gesichter des Ka[isers] und des P[räsidents] sind die Gesichter 
der Begleiter sehr ernst, die Blicke jeder Begleitgruppe vereinigen sich auf ihrem Herrscher.” 
	  
	   193	  
superiors, but also––like the celluloid balls, the Hausmeister’s daughters, and Blumfeld’s 
own assistants––because they suggest a stubborn resistance and limit to instrumental 
control. The destabilizing challenge of Kafka’s story is that all of these multiplying, 
subordinate figures (whether human, animal, or thing) are also asserting some form of 
autonomous existence and resistance. In an ominous and uncertain manner, the 
fragmentary story breaks off with a demand for protecting the “real or imaginary rights” 
(ihre wirklichen oder scheinbaren Rechte) of these subordinate figures (N I, 266). 
The concrete references in “Blumfeld” to a crucial, historical moment in the 
photograph as well as real, factory work-conditions (which Kafka knew firsthand from 
the safety inspections he performed as a civil servant for the Arbeiter-Unfall-
Versicherungs-Anstalt für das Königreich Böhmen in Prag264) suggest the complicated 
role of animated things in Kafka’s fictions. As with the flying bucket in “Der 
Kübelreiter,” the celluloid balls are not simply fantastical figures within the diegetic 
space of the text; they are also part of a complex, literary representation that alludes to a 
particular historical context. Given these extra-textual references, Kafka’s fictions of 
animated things deserve to be read not only in terms of their narrative function but also as 
a critical response to historical events and conditions. Kafka’s literary representations of 
animated things in particular, I would argue, can be read as an imaginative response and 
resistance to the dehumanizing and reifying forces at work in the world he observed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
264 On Kafka’s legal and administrative duties in relation to factory safety, see documentation and 
articles collected in Hans-Gerd Koch et al. (eds.), Kafkas Fabriken, Marbacher Magazin 100 
(Marbach: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 2002). As Attanucci notes, Kafka’s representation of 
Blumfeld’s particular department (Heimarbeit), as an increasingly marginalized yet still growing 
part of the textile industry, is historically accurate. See Attanucci, “Kafka: Junggeselle – 
Maschine,” p. 179, note 27.   
	  
	   194	  
The particular irony of Kafka’s “Blumfeld” story is that this challenge to 
objectified and reified relations arises out of the very thing-like quality of the story’s 
proliferating doubles. Like the “assistants” (Gehilfen) in Kafka’s Das Schloß, the 
mechanical apprentices in “Blumfeld” give the uncanny impression that they might not 
be truly alive.265 In Blumfeld’s treatment of the figures as instrumental intermediaries, 
they appear as entirely objectified and dehumanized. Yet in this reified state, they also 
exhibit a degree of humanity, paradoxically, by asserting a form of thing-like resistance, 
becoming uncontrollable and unpredictable in their mediating roles. For related reasons, 
perhaps, Walter Benjamin would later describe Kafka’s strangely liminal assistant and 
messenger figures as undermining any sense of order and hierarchy and as representing a 
limited sense of hope in Kafka’s fictions.266 In such representations of reified humans, 
Adorno would also recognize a limited form of social resistance. In Kafka’s dehumanized 
worlds, he writes: “Der Bann von Verdinglichung soll gebrochen werden, indem das 
Subjekt sich selbst verdinglicht.”267  
What my readings have hopefully demonstrated is how the limits of reification in 
Kafka’s representations of humans are also inextricably tied to his fictional animation of 
things. On the one hand, Kafka’s fictions of animated things tell the story of humans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
265 Cf. Kafka, Das Schloß, Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Malcolm Pasley (Frankfurt am Main: S. 
Fischer, 1982), p. 371: “es genügte auch dieser nicht sehr appetitliche Gehilfe, dieses Fleisch, das 
manchmal den Eindruck machte, als sei es nicht recht lebendig.” In a possible, intertextual 
reference to the animated things in “Blumfeld” and “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” Kafka’s Das 
Schloß describes the same assistants as curling up together in a corner to resemble “a large, 
tangled ball” (ein großes Knäuel) (p. 73).  
 
266 See Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: Zur zehnten Wiederkehr seines Todestages,” in Gesammelte 
Schriften, vol. 2.2, pp. 414–15.    
 
267 Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zu Kafka,” p. 340. 
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being treated as objects. On the other hand, the story of objects asserting themselves as 
animated things also coincides with the story of reified humans asserting themselves 
through thingly resistance. Where the flying bucket in “Der Kübelreiter” fails in this 
sense, the unruly, celluloid balls in the “Blumfeld” story become a replicating model of 
subordinate figures stubbornly defending their rights. 
 
The Case of Odradek   
The Marxist concept of reification (Verdinglichung) was first popularized in the mid 
1920s following the publication of Georg Lukács’s 1923 collection, Geschichte und 
Klassenbewußtsein. Derived in part from Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism, 
Lukács’s notion of reification indicates, broadly speaking, the situation in which a 
relationship between people has taken on the character of a thing––whether that pertains 
to the objectification and alienation of human labor in the form of a commodity; the 
instrumental treatment of other humans as mere things; or even the objectification of 
one’s own abilities as a profitable resource. In the historical context of 1920s Germany, 
the concept of reification took on a particular currency for critiquing the pervading 
conditions of a cold and calculating purposefulness in social relations, which arose during 
this period of economic crisis, inflation, and extreme unemployment.268 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
268 For a brief overview and historical contextualization of Lukács’s theory of reification, see 
Axel Honneth, Verdinglichung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005), pp. 11–28; as well as 
Martin Jay’s introduction to the English translation, Honneth, Reification: A New Look at an Old 
Idea, ed. Martin Jay (New York: Oxford UP, 2008), pp. 3–13. On the broader culture of 
“coldness” during the Weimar period, see Helmut Lethen, Verhaltenslehren der Kälte: 
Lebensversuche zwischen den Kriegen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994). 
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Franz Kafka died in 1924 and did not live to see most of the political, cultural, 
and social upheavals of the Weimar period, nor its nightmarish end. But when his novels 
and other writings began appearing in posthumous publications between 1925 and 1931, 
Kafka’s work found a renewed interest and especially astute reception among a number 
of German-Jewish intellectuals now commonly associated with the Frankfurt School, 
namely: Adorno, Benjamin, and Siegfried Kracauer. For such readers of the 1920s and 
early 30s, Kafka’s literary fictions appeared not only as a keen, historical observation of 
the dehumanization and rationalization of the modern world, but also as a literary ally in 
the critical analysis of the present.269 In a 1931 review of Kafka’s posthumously collected 
stories, for example, Kracauer reads the wall-and-hole-like structures found in “Der Bau” 
and “Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer” as representations of the distorted products of 
instrumental reason: reified structures that serve only to blind and imprison.270 For 
Benjamin and Adorno, the short text, “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” collected in Kafka’s 
Ein Landarzt from 1919/20, also took on a particular significance. In their contrasting 
readings of the story, the strange, spool-of-thread-like creature named Odradek becomes 
symptomatic and metonymic of a broader, “thingly alienation” (dingliche Entfremdung) 
within modernity.271 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
269 For a concise reconstruction of this particular reception history of Kafka in the 1920s and 30s, 
see Tobias Wilke, “Tückische Objekte: Dinglichkeit und Repräsentation bei Kafka,” Colloquia 
Germanica: Internationale Zeitschrift für Germanistik 37 (2004): pp. 51–72, here, p. 51. 
 
270 See Siegfried Kracauer, “Franz Kafka” [1931], in Das Ornament der Masse (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1963), pp. 256–68: “Also ist unsere Welt ein Ort der Unfreiheit, und wir 
schuften an einem Gebäude, das uns den Ausblick verbaut. Es ließe sich denken, daß Kafka bei 
der Beschreibung der Maulwurfshöhle jene menschlichen Organisationen vorgeschwebt hätten, 
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The context for these readings was a lively debate that Adorno and Benjamin 
carried out through letters in the mid-1930s. While the immediate concern was Adorno’s 
critical response to Benjamin’s 1935 draft of the exposé, “Paris, die Hauptstadt des XIX. 
Jahrhunderts,” for his ongoing Passagen-Werk, the letters touch on their respective 
understandings of dialectical structures and commodity fetishism, and enlist Kafka’s 
Odradek as a particularly useful figure for thinking through such issues. The authors’ 
respective readings of this strange figure––a bizarre hybrid of person and thing, a 
meaningless though animated assemblage, and an uncanny object of obsessive concern––
not only shed light on Benjamin and Adorno’s differing conceptions of the distorted 
status of things in modernity, but also suggest the irreducible complexities of Kafka’s text 
itself, which ultimately resists and subverts any easy appropriation into theories of 
commodity fetishism and reification.  
This strange, animated object had already been discussed at length in Benjamin’s 
1934 essay on Kafka. As Benjamin formulates it here: “Odradek ist die Form, die die 
Dinge in der Vergessenheit annehmen. Sie sind entstellt. Entstellt ist die ‘Sorge des 
Hausvaters,’ von der niemand weiß, was sie ist.”272 In his well-known reading of the 
story, the figure of Odradek is significant for its association with a nameless guilt and the 
postponement of judgment. For Benjamin, Odradek is one of the many “discarded, 
forgotten objects” (ausrangierte, vergessene Effekte), which remain hidden in the liminal 
spaces of domestic life: material things, which, although tucked away in attics or under 
staircases, will never completely disappear and thus preserve a lasting sense of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 For this particular construction, see Adorno’s letter from December 17, 1934, in Adorno and 
Benjamin, Briefwechsel, p. 91. 
 
272 Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2.2, p. 431.  
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remnants of the past.273 Benjamin’s use of “Vergessenheit,” here, cannot simply refer to 
forgetting, since it is the housefather’s recurring encounters with Odradek that account 
for his unknown concerns, cares, or worries (Sorge). As David Kaufmann suggests, this 
“Vergessenheit” should rather be located somewhere between the “forgetting of guilt” 
and the “guilt of forgetfulness,” both of which are recalled by the thing’s repeated 
appearances.274 This, and not simple forgetting, is Benjamin’s strategy for understanding 
the damaged and estranged relationship between people and things that Kafka’s text 
represents. In Benjamin’s reading, Odradek thus functions as a receptacle of a guilt that is 
the cause of its distorted form. This form, however, has its origins not in the thing itself, 
but rather in the distorted concerns and worries of a housefather, whose unknown guilt is 
able to transfigure even the most insignificant, domestic object into a marker of neglected 
responsibility and uncertain fate. 
Adorno was well familiar with Benjamin’s Kafka essay and provided critical 
feedback on the text in an extensive letter from December 1934. Here, Adorno already 
critiques Benjamin’s reading of Odradek for regressively assuming some original, 
undistorted relationship between human and thing, which might be reclaimed.275 When 
he wrote to Benjamin again in early August 1935 to comment on the Passagen-Werk 
exposé, Adorno returned to Odradek in order to draw a new connection between Kafka’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
273 Ibid. For a wide-ranging discussion and categorization of related objects in Western literature, 
including Odradek, see Francesco Orlando, Obsolete Objects in the Literary Imagination: Ruins, 
Relics, Rarities, Rubbish, Uninhabited Places, and Hidden Treasures [1993], trans. Gabriel Pihas 
and Daniel Seidel (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2006), here, p. 280. 
 
274 See David Kaufmann, “Beyond Use, Within Reason: Adorno, Benjamin and the Question of 
Theology,” New German Critique 83 (2001): pp. 151–73, quoted here, pp. 157–58.  
 
275 See Adorno’s December 17, 1934 letter in Adorno and Benjamin, Briefwechsel, pp. 89–96, 
here, pp. 92–93. 
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figure and the structure of the commodity form, and, at the same time, to critique 
Benjamin’s insufficiently dialectical understanding of commodity fetishism. Interpreted 
in terms of the commodity fetish, Odradek’s distortion could not be due to the 
housefather’s “Sorge,” as it was in Benjamin’s reading. Rather, as Adorno reminds 
Benjamin, the thing’s own structure as commodity is what produces the distorted 
consciousness of the human.276 Read in terms of the Marxist opposition between use-
value and exchange-value, however, Odradek also takes on a special status within 
Adorno’s critique. In its apparently useless state, Odradek becomes an instance of an 
absolute commodity: the “nutzlos überlebende Ware.”277 Holding to his dialectical 
method to the bitter end, Adorno is forced to acknowledge a surprising flipside to his 
reading: that in a totally reified world, the utterly alienated and useless Odradek is also a 
figure of transcendence and immortality. Sounding somewhat like Benjamin in his 
privileging of the obsolete object, Adorno describes this as, “die Rettung der Dinge; 
derer, die nicht länger in den Schuldzusammenhang verflochten, die untauschbar, unnütz 
sind.”278 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
276 See Adorno’s August 2–4, 1935 letter, in Briefwechsel, p. 139: “Der Fetischcharakter der 
Ware ist keine Tatsache des Bewußtseins sondern dialektisch in dem eminenten Sinne, daß er 
Bewußtsein produziert.”  	  	  
 
277 Ibid., p. 143.  
 
278 Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zu Kafka,” p. 341. In his August 1935 letter to Benjamin, Adorno 
describes this as the “entscheidende Erkenntnischarakter” of Kafka’s Odradek. See, here, Adorno 
and Benjamin, Briefwechsel, p. 143; and see also, p. 142: “Ware ist einerseits das Entfremdete, an 
dem der Gebrauchswert abstirbt, andererseits aber das Überlebende, das fremd geworden die 
Unmittelbarkeit übersteht. An den Waren, nicht unmittelbar für die Menschen haben wir das 
Versprechen der Unsterblichkeit.” In Adorno’s earlier December 1934 letter to Benjamin, 
Odradek is already identified as a “Motiv des Transzendierens” and “Aufhebung des Todes,” but 
it was not until later (in a penciled-in addition to the letter) that Adorno ascribes this characteristic 
to the structure of commodities. See Briefwechsel, p. 93; and notes on the letter, p. 462. For an 
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Turning to Kafka’s short text itself, even a cursory reading of “Die Sorge des 
Hausvaters” immediately calls into question the validity of both Benjamin’s and 
Adorno’s interpretations. If Odradek were indeed distorted, as Benjamin claims, this 
implies that the thing had an original state that had become somehow altered. Kafka’s 
text, however, denies this very possibility, or at least denies the possibility of ever 
knowing if Odradek had an original, undistorted form: 
Man wäre versucht zu glauben, dieses Gebilde hätte früher irgendeine 
zweckmäßige Form gehabt und jetzt sei es nur zerbrochen. Dies scheint aber 
nicht der Fall zu sein; wenigstens findet sich kein Anzeichen dafür; nirgends sind 
Ansätze oder Bruchstellen zu sehen, die auf etwas Derartiges hinweisen würden; 
das Ganze erscheint zwar sinnlos, aber in seiner Art abgeschlossen. (D, 283) 
 
Adorno’s reading of Odradek as a “nutzlos überlebende Ware” is similarly suspicious, in 
that is presupposes an exchange value that would make the thing a commodity. But 
Odradek appears worthless through and through. More importantly, it also has no 
discernible, prior use that would even give it exchange value in the first place. Clearly, 
the housefather could not even give away the thing if he tried.   
As Tobias Wilke has convincingly argued, Kafka’s “Die Sorge des Hausvaters” 
consistently undermines any interpretive schema designed to make sense of the strange 
Odradek figure.279 Binary oppositions like Benjamin’s distorted/undistorted or Adorno’s 
use-value/exchange-value not only fail in the ways discussed above. The text itself also 
stages a variety of other methodological approaches to understanding the object, all of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
insightful reconstruction that triangulates Adorno and Benjamin’s readings of Kafka with the 
theological influence of Gershom Scholem on these same debates, see Kaufmann, “Beyond Use, 
Within Reason: Adorno, Benjamin and the Question of Theology.”   
 
279 See Wilke, “Tückische Objekte: Dinglichkeit und Repräsentation bei Kafka.” My preceding 
presentation of Adorno’s and Benjamin’s respective interpretations of the text is indebted to 
Wilke’s own careful reconstruction. In what follows, I draw on other points from his detailed 
analysis of Kafka’s “Die Sorge des Hausvaters” before marking a point of departure in my own 
reading of the story.   
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which are ultimately frustrated and deemed insufficient. In the first paragraph of the text, 
the linguistic, etymological approach to the name Odradek leads only to “uncertainty” 
(Unsicherheit) and an utter lack of any true “meaning of the word” (Sinn des Wortes) (D, 
282). This is followed by a detailed description of the object’s appearance and material 
structure. Yet the exacting, objective description is also persistently undermined and 
blurred by a language of appearances and indeterminacy: “Es sieht zunächst aus wie eine 
flache sternartige Zwirnspule, und tatsächlich scheint es auch mit Zwirn bezogen [...]” 
(D, 282; emphasis added). Finally, as the strange animated life of Odradek is gradually 
revealed, the narrator describes attempts of interpersonal dialogue with the thing, but this 
elicits only circular and indefinite responses: “‘Wie heißt du denn?’ fragt man ihn. 
‘Odradek,’ sagt er. ‘Und wo wohnst du?’ ‘Unbestimmter Wohnsitz,’ sagt er und lacht” 
(D, 284). 
The title of Kafka’s short text, as Wilke argues, underlines its hermeneutic 
structure on multiple levels.280 “Die Sorge des Hausvaters” is at once the title of a unique 
textual object, the overall theme of the story, and a reference to the particular object of 
concern (named Odradek) represented in the text. The story both represents and itself 
enacts an investigation into what this “Sorge” might be, while at the same time 
problematizing any sense of a stable and definitive meaning, both within the diegetic 
space of the story as well as on a meta-fictional level in relation to the reader’s 
interpretation of the text. Like the Odradek figure, which retains its utter strangeness and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
280 On the following points, see Wilke, “Tückische Objekte,” pp. 54–56, here, p. 54: “Dass die 
Erzählung einen Prozess hermeneutischer Anstrengung thematisiert, geht dabei bereits aus ihrem 
Titel hervor, der das reflexive Verhältnis benennt, ohne indes den Gegenstand der Reflexion oder 
‘Sorge’ näher zu bezeichnen.” 
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otherness throughout the story, Kafka’s short text itself appears to be, “sinnlos, aber in 
seiner Art abgeschlossen” (D, 283). The importance of Kafka’s text, according to Wilke, 
is thus not the meaning of the Odradek figure itself, but rather how the attempt at 
constructing meaning––as both staged in the text and provoked in the reader––is in fact 
mediated and reflected through a narrating subject.281  
 In both Adorno and Benjamin’s readings, the primary dynamic represented in 
Kafka’s “Die Sorge des Hausvaters” is that of reification. In Adorno’s reading, it is the 
transcendent reification of a thing so useless and estranged that it has escaped from the 
use/exchange structure of the commodity. For Benjamin, reification in Kafka’s story 
occurs as a kind of second nature of distorted relations to things arising out of a state of 
“Vergessenheit.” In this sense, Benjamin’s reading of Odradek resonates well with 
Adorno’s famous formulation in Dialektik der Aufklärung: “Alle Verdinglichung ist ein 
Vergessen.”282 If there is any lasting importance of the concept of reification for a 
reading of Kafka’s “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” I would argue, it must be brought into a 
more dynamic interplay with the narrative function of animation in the story. In this way, 
the undeniable effect of an estranged thinghood, which is so palpable in the story, can be 
better situated in terms of the open-ended and imaginative animation of the thing, which 
is mediated through Kafka’s narrative fiction. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
281 Ibid., p. 54: “In Kafkas Text [steht] nicht die objektive Beschaffenheit oder ‘Bedeutung’ 
Odradeks zur Debatte, sondern dessen Vermittlung durch ein erzählendes Subjekt.”  
 
282 Theodor W. Adorno [and Max Horkheimer], Dialektik der Aufklärung: Philosophische 
Fragmente [1947], Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1981), p. 263. The formulation is undoubtedly Adorno’s, originating in a February 29, 
1940 letter to Benjamin. See Briefwechsel, p. 417. 
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To understand the strange animation of Kafka’s Odradek, however, the fiction of 
an animated life of things must first be disassociated from its usual function in Marxist 
theory. In Marx’s famous section on “Der Fetischcharakter der Ware und sein 
Geheimnis” in Das Kapital, most notably, the fiction of an animated, acrobatic table is 
intended to illustrate the inverted and false relationship to objects-of-use as soon as they 
are produced as commodities for profitable exchange:  
sobald [der Tisch] als Ware auftritt, verwandelt er sich in ein sinnlich 
übersinnliches Ding. Er steht nicht nur mit seinen Füßen auf dem Boden, sondern 
er stellt sich allen andren Waren gegenüber auf den Kopf, und entwickelt aus 
seinem Holzkopf Grillen, viel wunderlicher, als wenn er aus freien Stücken zu 
tanzen begänne.283 
 
In general, Marx’s strange language of fetishism, spiritualism, and mysticism in relation 
to the commodity form is intended––in an Enlightenment manner––as a strategy of 
disillusionment. To treat commodities as if they had some autonomous “life” apart from 
human labor is, for Marx, a falsehood to be critically dissected and eventually corrected 
through revolution. For Lukács––who did his best to ignore and obscure this strange 
language in Marx––the notion of a “life” of things was situated differently (on the side of 
use-value) as a supposedly “immediate character of things as things” (unmittelbarer 
Dingcharakter aller Dinge), whose “außerökonomisches Leben” revealed itself in 
moments of crisis for the usual rules of reified thinking.284 In both cases (though on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
283 Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie [1867] (Vienna: Verlag für Literatur 
und Politik, 1932), p. 76 (emphasis in original). 
 
284 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, pp. 267 and 281 (emphasis added). The latter 
quote reads in full: “Das qualitative Sein der ‘Dinge,’ das als unbegriffenes und ausgeschaltetes 
Ding an sich, als Gebrauchswert sein außerökonomisches Leben führt, das man während des 
normalen Funktionierens der ökonomischen Gesetze ruhig vernachlässigen zu können meint, 
wird in den Krisen plötzlich (plötzlich für das verdinglichte, rationelle Denken) zum 
ausschlaggebenden Faktor” (p. 281).   
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opposing sides), the notion of a “life” of things in Marxism functions to mark a 
distinction similar to the Kantian opposition between appearance (Erscheinung) and 
thing-in-itself (Ding an sich). 
 In Benjamin and Adorno’s respective readings of Kafka’s “Die Sorge des 
Hausvaters,” the strange animation of the Odradek figure (though not directly commented 
upon) functions in a roughly similar manner: as a mark of distinction between a primary 
thingness of things and their distorted or alienated appearance. In what follows, I would 
like to suggest that a better way of understanding the strange, animated life of Odradek is 
not in terms of distortion but rather as a productive and open-ended, “heuristic fiction.”285 
In this way, the autonomous and animated “life” of the thing can be considered not as a 
marker of false appearances (as it is in Marx) or as an unmediated substantiality of things 
as things (as in Lukács), but rather as a deliberate fiction for estranging and rediscovering 
our everyday relations to the world of objects.  
In my reading of Kafka’s things, animation is thus not considered as merely a sign 
or expression of reification. Rather, the two terms are involved in a dynamic interplay of 
movements and counter-movements––between becoming animated and becoming thing-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
285 The notion of “heuristische Fiktionen,” although originating in Kant’s First Critique 
(A771/B799), is best known in the context of Hans Vaihinger’s popular 1911 work, Die 
Philosophie des Als Ob. Here, Vaihinger develops a defense of theoretically untrue or incorrect 
ideas, which, despite their falsity, have significant value and practical use. Suggestively, 
Vaihinger refers to “personifikative Fiktionen” as “der eigentliche bestimmende Faktor in der 
Kategorie des ‘Dinges,’” since we often treat the objective reality of things as if some interior 
personality, soul, or force were at work. See Vaihinger, Die Philosophie des Als Ob: System der 
theoretischen, praktischen und religiösen Fiktionen der Menschheit auf Grund eines 
idealistischen Positivismus [1911], 4th ed. (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1920), here, p. 50. 
Interestingly, in an autobiographical sketch on the origins of this philosophical study (included in 
an early English translation), Vaihinger mentions discussing the 1879 novel Auch Einer with its 
author Friedrich Theodor Vischer: the novel responsible for popularizing the German phrase, “die 
Tücke des Objekts.” See Vaihinger, The Philosophy of “As if”, trans. C.K. Ogden, 2nd ed. 
(London: Cox & Wyman, 1935), p. xxxix, note 2.        
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like––that develop over the course of the story. The animation of Odradek is not some 
fixed characteristic; rather, it unfolds progressively in Kafka’s narrative fiction. The 
animation of Odradek tells the story of an object asserting itself as a thing (to borrow Bill 
Brown’s phrase), but in a way that both marks an estrangement, distortion, and reification 
of relations, as well as an increased awareness of the material entanglements and power 
of everyday things in the lives of humans. It is a story, that is to say, of both 
thingification and animation at the very same time. In this way, reification does not 
become a totalizing state or force, but rather a critical reminder of the tendencies toward 
ossified and un-reflected relations. 
 In describing animation as a heuristic fiction, this is not to say that specific, 
literary figures like Kafka’s Odradek lead one to discover the nature of some inherent 
“life” of things (whether that is conceived as the false life of the commodity, a non-
reified life of things as things, or in terms of more recent theories of a material agency of 
things). In agreement with Wilke’s analysis, I would stress rather how Kafka’s 
representation of Odradek problematizes any sense of a meaning or essential nature of the 
animated thing. At the same time, however, the self-reflexive textual representation of 
Odradek exists not as some static, indecipherable object, but rather as an indeterminate, 
narrative construction that develops over time and suggests open temporal and spatial 
horizons. In addition to its role in the domestic context of the story’s setting, Odradek is 
also explicitly presented to the reader as a thing whose life extends beyond its immediate 
association with the housefather into temporal expanses of the past and distant future, 
spatial reaches outside the home, as well as to broad scholarly debates on the thing’s 
origin. Imagining this extensional life of the thing, I would argue, involves a kind of 
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artificial animism based in fictional narrative. While Kafka’s literary texts are far more 
complex, the use of narrative, fictional constructions links Kafka’s animation of objects 
to recent theoretical writings on the life and agency of things. Although little discussed in 
itself, Latour, Bennett, Brown, and others have not only taken deliberate recourse to 
fictional representations (like Kafka’s Odradek, for example), but also developed their 
own imaginary narratives in developing their respective, theoretical accounts of things. 
After analyzing the progressive, narrative animation of Odradek in Kafka’s short story, I 
will show, in the next section, how imaginative narrative constructions have been 
employed as heuristic fictions in recent theoretical writings. 
 “Am Anfang war das Wort.” The story of Kafka’s “Die Sorge des Hausvaters” 
begins as if in deliberate parody of the Gospel of John. But rather than the mysterious 
word “Odradek” becoming animated flesh, Kafka’s story immediately rescinds the 
primacy of the word and instead asserts the word’s origin in the material object: 
“Natürlich würde sich niemand mit solchen Studien [i.e. studies of the word’s origin] 
beschäftigen, wenn es nicht wirklich ein Wesen gäbe, das Odradek heißt” (D, 282). The 
account of Odradek that immediately follows (quoted above) reads like a close, objective 
description of one of those odd yet familiar objects that find their way into the family 
junk-drawer. As Kafka’s text goes on, however, the familiar quality of this spool-of-
thread-like thing becomes increasingly blurred. Odradek seems at first to be just some 
makeshift spool for storing leftover thread, yet it begins to take on a bizarre hybrid 
quality. It is, the reader learns, quite literally anthropomorphic:  
Es ist aber nicht nur eine Spule, sondern aus der Mitte des Sternes kommt ein 
kleines Querstäbchen hervor und an dieses Stäbchen fügt sich dann im rechten 
Winkel noch eines. Mit Hilfe dieses letzteren Stäbchens auf der einen Seite, und 
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einer der Ausstrahlungen des Sternes auf der anderen Seite, kann das Ganze wie 
auf zwei Beinen aufrecht stehen. (D, 283, emphasis added) 
 
And as the text proceeds, the thing is also personified on a linguistic level with the 
initially neutral pronoun “it” (es), used in referring to Odradek, quickly replaced by the 
masculine “he” (er). Odradek is even reported to speak in a limited sense and produce an 
uncanny sound similar to laughter: “es ist aber nur ein Lachen, wie man es ohne Lungen 
hervorbringen kann. Es klingt etwa so, wie das Rascheln in gefallenen Blättern. [...]; oft 
ist er lange stumm, wie das Holz, das er zu sein scheint” (D, 284).  
 Considered in terms of a narrative development, Odradek’s animated and 
anthropomorphic existence thus progresses from a word to a thingly construction to a 
living creature, while, all along, the story consistently undercuts this animated state by 
reasserting Odradek’s inert, material existence as some mundane and domestic, wooden 
object. Odradek is presented as a household thing very much disremembered and 
distorted, as in Benjamin’s reading. And yet throughout, the text works with and against 
this reified state of the object to reanimate its presence in the minds of both the reader 
and narrator. Animation in this sense is not some static mark of distortion, but rather a 
narratively constructed technique of estrangement, with the overall effect of transforming 
an otherwise disregarded object into a substantial, thingly presence. 
 Animation in Kafka’s “Die Sorge des Hausvaters” also functions in an additional 
way, which relates the story closely to “Der Kübelreiter” and the “Blumfeld” fragment. 
As the reader learns, “Odradek [ist] außerordentlich beweglich und nicht zu fangen,” and 
therefore prevents any closer scrutiny or meaningful understanding (D, 283). Thus, in a 
very literal sense, animation––understood here as movement––further undermines the 
possibility of fixing any meaning to the thing. At the same time, however, this literal 
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animation also resituates the significance of the object away from its mysterious nature 
and to its active role in mediating relations between human figures. The story concludes, 
in fact, with the rather troubling notion that Odradek’s uncanny life outside of its 
immediate relations with the housefather might implicate and entangle him in other 
relationships extending both spatially and temporally.  
First, being autonomously animate, Odradek can be found all about the 
housefather’s apartment building and beyond:  
Er hält sich abwechselnd auf dem Dachboden, im Treppenhaus, auf den Gängen, 
im Flur auf. Manchmal ist er monatelang nicht zu sehen; da ist er wohl in andere 
Häuser übersiedelt; doch kehrt er dann unweigerlich wieder in unser Haus 
zurück. (D, 283) 
 
Second, being not only animate but also a thing, Odradek not only connects the 
housefather with the external spaces and lives of his immediate, human neighbors; the 
undying creature also connects the narrator, through time, to his future relations: 
Vergeblich frage ich mich, was mit ihm geschehen wird. Kann er denn sterben? 
Alles, was stirbt, hat vorher eine Art Ziel, eine Art Tätigkeit gehabt und daran hat 
es sich zerrieben; das trifft bei Odradek nicht zu. Sollte er also einstmals etwa 
noch vor den Füßen meiner Kinder und Kindeskinder mit nachschleifendem 
Zwirnsfaden die Treppe hinunterkollern? Es schadet ja offenbar niemandem; 
aber die Vorstellung, daß er mich auch noch überleben sollte, ist mir eine fast 
schmerzliche. (D, 284) 
 
In the concluding paragraph of the story, Adorno’s notion of Odradek’s transcendent 
reification is shown to coincide with an animation of human relations, which are 
mediated by the undying thing. Rather than simply escaping the tyranny of the family (as 
in Benjamin’s reading) or the tyranny of use as commodity (as in Adorno’s)––as an 
utterly reified thing––the animated Odradek also functions to generate and problematize 
human relations extending over time and space. 
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The “Sorge” of the housefather, announced by the title, thus might be best 
understood as a concern over the object’s fate and its unpredictable role in mediating the 
housefather’s relations with his neighbors and future, familial generations. The strange 
object is obviously of some personal significance, but the real concern here is how this 
personal attachment might be implicated and reflected out among broader associations. 
The real significance of the animated thing is not what it might mean in itself, but rather 
how it serves as an undying nexus for the preservation and generation of human, social 
relations. The dynamic interplay of animation and reification in the story brings out these 
movements and counter-movements between the forgetting and ossifying of relations and 
their estrangement and reanimation.   
 
Animistic Fictions 
Despite––or very much because of––the problematization of meaning in Kafka’s “Die 
Sorge des Hausvaters,” critics and scholars have insisted on interpretive strategies that 
attempt to stabilize the Odradek figure according to allegorical readings or to anchor it to 
some external, historical reference. In the large body of secondary criticism on the text, 
there is to be found: symbolic interpretations of the star-shaped Odradek as a sign of 
Kafka’s Jewishness or Jewish tradition in general; Marxist readings that take the text as 
an allegory for alienated life under capitalism; meta-fictional readings of Odradek as a 
cipher for a particular work of Kafka’s or even the author himself; and even detailed 
etymological studies of the word Odradek, despite the text’s explicit prohibition on such 
approaches.286 Or, for two examples from more recent trends in German literary studies: 
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a media-historical reading of Odradek as an electromagnetic spool used in early wireless 
telegraphy; and a cultural-historical study linking Kafka to occultism, where Odradek is 
interpreted as akin to spiritualist devices (Psychographen) used for communicating with 
the dead (something like the pointer device (Planchette) used on Ouija boards).287  
In recent years, Kafka’s short text has also found a different kind of reception 
with little interest in adding on to this already long list of interpretations. A number of 
scholarly readers have recently revisited Kafka’s Odradek figure not with the aim of 
determining what it means, but rather of exploring what it might do. That is, how Kafka’s 
literary imagination might help to complicate and transform our understanding of objects 
and things, as well as their complex roles in relation to humans. The German, cultural and 
literary studies Professor, Hartmut Böhme, for example, has recently integrated Kafka’s 
Odradek into a wide-ranging reassessment of the roles of the fetish and fetishism in 
modern culture. Böhme argues, that despite our intellectual adherence to forms of modern 
rationality, the behavior and actions of modern-day humans betray a persistent belief in 
the autonomous power and agency of nonhuman things. Within the context of his larger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 On these last two readings, see most notably, Malcolm Pasley, “Drei literarische 
Mystifikationen Kafkas,” in Kafka-Symposion, ed. Jürgen Born et al. (Berlin: Klaus Wagenbach, 
1966), pp. 21–37, here pp. 26–31; and Werner Hamacher, “The Gesture in the Name: On 
Benjamin and Kafka,” in Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature from Kant to Celan, 
trans. Peter Fenves (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996), pp. 294–336, here pp. 318–27. The connection 
between Odradek and a specifically modern, Jewish “Desorientiertheitsgefühl” can be found in 
the earliest review of the story. See Felix Weltsch, “Bedeutende literarische Neuerscheinungen,” 
Selbstwehr (December 19, 1919), collected in Franz Kafka: Kritik und Rezeption zu seinen 
Lebzeiten, 1912–1924, ed. Jürgen Born (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1979), pp. 101–2. For an 
overview of other early, interpretive strategies, see Heinz Hillman, “Das Sorgenkind Odradek,” 
Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie 86.2 (1967): pp. 197–210.  
 
287 See, respectively, Wolf Kittler, “Schreibmaschinen, Sprechmaschinen: Effekte technischer 
Medien im Werk Franz Kafkas,” in Franz Kafka: Schriftverkehr, ed. Wolf Kittler and Gerhard 
Neumann (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1990), pp. 75–163, here pp. 157–60; and Andreas B. 
Kilcher, “Geisterschrift: Kafkas Spiritismus,” in Schrift und Zeit in Franz Kafkas Oktavheften, ed. 
Caspar Battegay et al. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), pp. 223–44, here pp. 242–44.  
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argument, Kafka’s complex, literary representation of Odradek serves as a primary 
resource for addressing our paradoxical relationship to things: our ability to assess them 
in a rational and detached manner, on the one hand, and yet the undeniable hold they 
have over our behavior and thoughts, on the other. For Böhme, as well, Odradek provides 
a model for articulating the irreducible entanglement of crude materiality and animating 
spirit—characteristic of the fetish-object—in language that is more complex than casual 
anthropomorphism. In Böhme’s appropriation of Kafka’s text, it is thus not a matter of 
interpretation, but rather of putting the literary text to work in the service of inciting and 
complicating theoretical reflection.288  
Likewise, we find Odradek again in a recent book by political theorist Jane 
Bennett, titled Vibrant Matter. Odradek serves here as a kind of prototype for developing 
a theory of the active, social roles and vitalistic materiality of nonhumans in what Bennett 
calls a “political ecology of things.”289 Yet another example can be found in an article by 
German art-historian Peter Geimer, titled simply “Theorie der Gegenstände,” in which 
Kafka’s “Die Sorge des Hausvaters” stands alongside the theoretical work of thinkers like 
Heidegger, Baudrillard, Latour, and Vilém Flusser as a primary reflection on the uncanny 
persistence and temporality of things. In other words: that uncomfortable knowledge we 
have, that even our most intimate, thingly attachments and possessions will, like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
288 See Böhme, Fetischismus und Kultur, here pp. 50–54.  
 
289 See Bennett, Vibrant Matter, here pp. 6–8. For Bennett’s related appropriations of Kafka, see 
her earlier articles, “The Force of Things: Steps toward an Ecology of Matter,” Political Theory 
32.3 (June 2004): pp. 347–72; and “Kafka, Genealogy, and the Spiritualization of Politics,” The 
Journal of Politics 56.3 (August 1994): pp. 650–70. 
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Odradek, still be hanging out somewhere or other, long after we are dead and gone.290 
And perhaps most ambitiously, J. Hillis Miller, in a very recent article, makes explicit 
“use” of Kafka’s “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” as a “thought experiment” or “way of 
thinking” about things, which might help resituate ecological thinking from an organicist 
to a technological model.291 In all of these instances, it is the strange, hybrid and 
irreducible status of Odradek, as well as the experimental and open-ended structure of 
Kafka’s complex representations, that make “Die Sorge des Hausvaters” such a powerful 
text for estranging our habitual relations to objects and rediscovering them anew in their 
active roles as things.292 
In a more general sense, recent social, cultural, and anthropological theory has 
explicitly employed what might be termed an animistic imaginary as a deliberate 
heuristic strategy for resituating methodological approaches to understanding the roles of 
objects and things. In the study of the “social lives” of commodities for example, an 
innovative collection of essays edited and introduced by Arjun Appadurai declares the 
need for a “methodological fetishism” in order to understand the concrete, historical roles 
(or “biographies”) of circulating commodities, rather than considering them as inert and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
290 See Geimer, “Theorie der Gegenstände,” pp. 209–22. 
 
291 See J. Hillis Miller, “Ecotechnics,” in Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, 
vol. 1, ed. Tom Cohen (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press, 2012), pp. 65–103, quoted here 
p. 66. 
 
292 The apparent use or uselessness of Kafka’s writings was, interestingly enough, a key issue in 
Benjamin’s 1934 discussions with Bertolt Brecht. Brecht, who found much of Kafka to be 
“Geheimniskrämerei,” would no doubt be surprised to know that one of the most enigmatic and 
ostensibly useless figures in Kafka would find such direct appropriation and social-theoretical 
application. See Benjamin, “Gespräche mit Brecht: Svendborger Notizen” [1934], in Versuche 
über Brecht, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), pp. 121–23, quoted here 
p. 122.       
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mute objects to which meaning is externally attributed.293 Here, the animation of the 
commodity is taken up not as a critical gesture to dispel false beliefs (as in Marx), but 
rather as a productive fiction for generating new knowledge about the social roles of 
things. In the realm of visual art, W.J.T. Mitchell and social anthropologist Alfred Gell 
have both forwarded theoretical approaches that consider the potential for art-objects to 
embody person-like lives, actions, or desires (while acknowledging that, in a strict sense, 
this is also a fiction).294 In the context of “Actor-Network-Theory,” Bruno Latour even 
makes explicit the productive potential of the specifically literary arts for contributing to 
an understanding of the social agency of things: 
the resource of fiction can bring––through the use of counterfactual history, 
thought experiment, and ‘scientification’––the solid objects of today into the 
fluid states where their connections with humans may make sense. Here again, 
sociologists have a lot to learn from artists.295 
 
My interest here is not to champion or subscribe to any of these contemporary 
theoretical developments or methodologies, but rather to observe their recourse to literary 
fictions––and animistic ones, in particular––for generating new knowledge in different 
fields of research. Latour, as an incredibly playful, literary, and self-reflective writer 
himself, demonstrates further the specific power of fictional narrative for both estranging 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
293 See Arjun Appadurai (ed.), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986), pp. 3–63, here p. 5. In addition to Appadurai’s introductory 
essay, see also, in the same volume, Igor Kopytoff, “The Cultural Biography of Things: 
Commoditization as Process,” pp. 64–94.  
 
294 See Gell, Art and Agency; and Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want? In reference to the obvious 
animism of his book’s title, Mitchell stresses the heuristic potential of the fiction, remarking: “I 
want to proceed as if the question were worth asking, partly as a kind of thought experiment, 
simply to see what happens, and partly out of a conviction that this is a question we are already 
asking, that we cannot help but ask, and that therefore deserves analysis” (p. 30).   
 
295 Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 2005), p. 82.   
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and clarifying the everyday roles of things. Writing under a pseudonym in the pages of 
the reputable and long-standing, sociological journal, Social Problems, Latour develops a 
narrative, literary strategy for articulating the thingly existence of what we take to be 
objects. His goal is to develop a more general language to talk about the social agency of 
nonhumans in a sociological context, but he starts with a very simple object as his 
example—a door-hinge—and through counterfactual, subjunctive, and narrative 
structures, succeeds in transforming this humble object into a full-blown thing. “Walls 
are a nice invention,” Latour writes, 
but if there were no holes in them, there would be no way to get in or out; they 
would be mausoleums or tombs. The problem is that, if you make holes in the 
walls, anything and anyone can get in and out (bears, visitors, dust, rats, noise). 
So architects invented this hybrid: a hole-wall, often called a door, which, 
although common enough, has always struck me as a miracle of technology. The 
cleverness of the invention hinges upon the hinge-pin: instead of driving a hole 
through the walls with a sledge hammer or a pick, you simply gently push the 
door. (I am supposing here that the lock has not been invented; this would over-
complicate the already highly complex story of the door). Furthermore, and here 
is the real trick, once you have passed through the door, you do not have to find 
trowel and cement to rebuild the wall you have just destroyed; you simply push 
the door gently back [...].  
So, to size up the work done by hinges, you simply have to imagine that 
every time you want to get in or out of the building you have to do the same work 
as a prisoner trying to escape or a gangster trying to rob a bank, plus the work of 
those who rebuild either the prison’s or the bank’s walls.296 
 
Latour’s story of the door-hinge certainly does not match the complexity of 
Kafka’s literary writings. But the combination of an exact yet playful description of a 
banal, material object and its construction, alongside a seemingly simple situation 
transformed into a Sisyphean task, does indeed resemble aspects of Kafka’s own great 
stories of walls and holes, like “Der Bau” and “Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer.” In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
296 Bruno Latour [as Jim Johnson], “Mixing Humans and Nonhumans Together: The Sociology of 
a Door-Closer,” Social Problems 35.3 (June 1988): pp. 298–310, here pp. 298–99 (emphasis in 
original). 
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contrast to the static, reified structures identified in Kracauer’s reading of these same 
texts, this intertextual comparison with Latour emphasizes the potential of Kafka’s 
fictions to estrange and reanimate our understandings of material objects, leading to 
surprising discoveries about their significant roles in relation to humans.  
Situating this one “story” of a familiar but disregarded object (the door-hinge) 
next to Odradek, it is perhaps easier to understand the appeal and function of Kafka’s 
writings, and fictional narrative in general, within recent theoretical accounts of a life and 
agency of things. Such theories require a degree of rhetorical estrangement in order to 
challenge habitual understandings of the traditional hierarchical relationship between 
subjects and objects, humans and things. While the bizarre, thingly “life” of Odradek 
remains decidedly a fiction, theorists like Jane Bennett have taken the story as a “literary 
dramatization” of “nonorganic life,” helpful for heightening one’s awareness of the 
hybrid existence and ecological effects of all manner of technological, chemical, and 
waste objects, which extend well beyond our own temporal and spatial horizons.297 While 
I have my own criticisms of the affirmative politics and nostalgic dimension of much of 
the recent theoretical work on a “life of things” (which will be addressed in the 
conclusion of the dissertation), such appropriations do provide compelling evidence of 
the irreducible, experimental, and open-ended nature of Kafka’s literary animations. 
While the inherent estrangement of animation has its own particular functions within 
Kafka’s own narratives, the fiction of living things has also taken on a broad, heuristic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
297 See Bennett, Vibrant Matter, quoted here, p. 7. 
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role in recent attempts to newly situate humans in an increasingly complex and 
technologically animated world.298 
 
A Responsibility for Things  
The comparison between Franz Kafka’s fictions and the methodological animism at work 
in recent social, cultural, and anthropological theory requires some additional 
commentary and qualification. As David Kaufmann reminds the reader: while Kafka has 
been pulled in many interpretive and appropriative directions, his intellectual coordinates 
are decidedly not some stylish paganism, but rather situated in relation to the 
monotheistic structures of Judaic thought and belief.299 Kafka’s own reflections, 
however, also display a subtle sympathy and unique understanding of animistic thinking, 
which deserves closer inspection. Suggestively enough, Kafka’s consideration of such 
issues can be located in notebook writings that roughly coincide with his work on 
“Blumfeld,” “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” and “Der Kübelreiter,” between 1915 and 
1917. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
298 Interesting in this regard, to give a more commonplace example, is a recent New York Times 
Op-Ed on the surveillance capabilities of so-called “smartphones.” Quoted in the Op-Ed is 
Columbia University Law Professor Eben Moglen, who employs a highly fictional language of 
anthropomorphism, animism, and hybridity to arrive at a better intuitive understanding of what 
these electronic devices truly are and do: “Smartphones see everything, they’re aware of our 
position, our relationship to other human beings and other robots, they mediate an information 
stream around us.” “They are robots for which we––the proud owners––are merely the hands and 
feet.” See Peter Maass and Megha Rajagopalan, “That’s No Phone. That’s My Tracker,” New 
York Times (July 13, 2012).    
 
299 This point is made in Kaufmann’s critical review of Roberto Calasso’s introductory text 
included in the Michael Hofmann translation of Kafka’s Zürau Aphorisms. See David Kaufmann, 
“Kafka in the Countryside,” Forward (September 8, 2006). 
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In a series of journal entries from June 1916, Kafka took down detailed notes on 
the various creation myths of “primitive” peoples that he found described in Das Werden 
des Gottesglaubens by Swedish cleric and anthropologist Nathan Söderblom. Through 
Söderblom’s popular 1916 study––a book reviewed favorably in Kafka’s journal as, 
“ganz wissenschaftlich ohne persönliche oder religiöse Teilnahme”300––he would have 
been well acquainted with then-recent, anthropological theories on “primitive” belief 
systems and the origins of religion, as well as the associated critiques and reformulations 
of E. B. Tylor’s famous, nineteenth-century concept of animism by the likes of Wilhelm 
Wundt, Émile Durkheim, and others. 	  
In Söderblom’s own account of the development of religious beliefs, Tylor’s 
theory of animism is defended against critics (Durkheim most notably) and reassessed as 
a still valuable explanation for some of the earliest forms of religious life. Söderblom not 
only considers animism as the earliest, evolutionary stage in the development of modern 
monotheistic religions, and draws comparisons between “primitive” animism and modern 
religions, but also follows contemporaneous anthropologists of the Oxford School in 
arguing that animistic thinking be understood as the first step toward human self-
consciousness and a knowledge of the self as, “eine denkende, wollende, handelnde 
persönliche Einheit.”301 For Söderblom, the recognition of an animating, intentional life 
of things coincides with a related recognition of one’s own animating spirit. In contrast to 
Tylor, however, Söderblom rejects a strict theory of souls to account for animistic beliefs, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
300 See Kafka, Tagebücher, Kritische Ausgabe, p. 787. 
 
301 See Nathan Söderblom, Das Werden des Gottesglaubens: Untersuchungen über die Anfänge 
der Religion (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1916), here p. 29.  
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whereby a belief in the spirits or souls of things originates by analogy with the belief in a 
human soul. Instead, he suggests a far looser conception of animism to include all forms 
of thinking that perceive the world of external objects as animated and living, as 
personified and anthropomorphized, regardless of whether these objects are considered to 
be inhabited by spirits or souls. 
While Söderblom holds to a certain evolutionary model of religion, he is far more 
interested in emphasizing the lasting connections between modern religion and earlier 
beliefs, rather than denigrating the supposedly primitive. As Ritchie Robertson explains, 
Söderblom can be considered alongside the better-known, contemporaneous work of 
Rudolf Otto and Gershom Scholem as part of a reaction against the rationalist 
interpretation of religion and for a foundation of religion in the immediacy of experience 
common to mystics and “primitive” peoples. As Robertson notes: “Reading [Söderblom] 
would strengthen Kafka’s conviction that the religious impulse was innate in human 
nature and increase his interest in primitive manifestations of it. One of the Zürau 
aphorisms says, rather wistfully: ‘Was ist fröhlicher als der Glaube an einen 
Hausgott!’”302 
While I would hesitate to identify the worrisome Odradek with this cheerful 
“Hausgott,” Kafka’s interest in “primitive” religious beliefs, I would argue, has an 
important relevance for his stories about animated things. Two years after reading 
Söderblom’s book, Kafka would compose his own anthropological fiction to account for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
302 See Ritchie Robertson, Kafka: Judaism, Politics, and Literature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985), pp. 244–47, here p. 245. For the quotation of Kafka, see, “Aphorismus 68” [1918], in 
Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente II, Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Jost Schillemeit (Frankfurt am 
Main: S. Fischer, 1992), p. 128. 
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the origin of beliefs in the power of things over humans. As another of the so-called 
Zürau aphorisms––collectively published by Max Brod in the posthumous 1931 volume, 
Betrachtungen über Sünde, Hoffnung, Leid und den wahren Weg––this short text fits in 
well with the vaguely theological themes of the collection as a whole. But while Kafka’s 
reference is specifically to the Old Testament polemic against idolatry, his exact account 
of “the first worship of idols” (die erste Götzenanbetung) is flexible enough to describe a 
more general relationship to things and not just the worship of manmade objects or 
images in the likeness of deities: 
Die erste Götzenanbetung war gewiß Angst vor den Dingen, aber damit 
zusammenhängend Angst vor der Notwendigkeit der Dinge und damit 
zusammenhängend Angst vor der Verantwortung für die Dinge. So ungeheuer 
erschien diese Verantwortung daß man sie nicht einmal einem einzigen 
Außermenschlichen aufzuerlegen wagte, denn auch durch Vermittlung bloß eines 
Wesens wäre die menschliche Verantwortung noch nicht genug erleichtert 
worden, der Verkehr mit nur einem Wesen wäre noch allzusehr von 
Verantwortung befleckt gewesen, deshalb gab man jedem Ding die 
Verantwortung für sich selbst, mehr noch, man gab diesen Dingen auch noch 
eine verhältnismäßige Verantwortung für den Menschen.303 
 
Kafka’s dense and enigmatic account of the origin of idolatry presents a complex 
constellation of concepts, which, considered more generally, provide the structure for an 
animistic thinking, in which “things” (Dinge) are attributed an active “responsibility” 
(Verantwortung) for the state of the world. In contrast to anthropological theories on the 
origins of animism, Kafka’s short text offers no ætiological argument to account for the 
animation and anthropomorphization of things in early religions (e.g. the conception of a 
human soul derived from the experiences of dreams and death, which is then projected 
onto nonhumans). Instead, his anthropological fiction presents a constellation of 
“interconnected” (zusammenhängend) concepts that emerge out of a primal fear or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
303 Kafka, “Aphorismus 92” [Spring 1918], in Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente II, p. 134. 
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anxiety: “Angst vor den Dingen,” “Angst vor der Notwendigkeit der Dinge,” and “Angst 
vor der Verantwortung für die Dinge.” As in Söderblom’s treatment of animism, Kafka 
offers no underlying theory to explain the beliefs he describes, i.e. how fear results in the 
personification of things as bearers of responsibility. More important is the formulation 
of coincident and multiplying responsibilities shared by humans and things.        
By crossing out the “mediation” (Vermittlung) of a single “außermenschliches 
Wesen” or monotheistic God, Kafka’s short text effectively suspends the structure of 
responsibility between an absolute and oppressive responsibility of the individual human, 
on the one hand, and a complex, multiplying notion of a shared responsibility distributed 
throughout the world of things, on the other. Kafka’s original draft of the text is even less 
ambiguous on this point. With two extra sentences (later removed), the text quoted above 
instead begins, “Durch Auferlegung einer allzu großen oder vielmehr aller 
Verantwortung erdrückst Du Dich,” and concludes with the sentence: “Man konnte sich 
nicht genug tun in der Schaffung von Gegengewichten, diese naive Welt war die 
komplicierteste die es jemals gab, ihre Naivität lebte sich ausschließlich in der brutalen 
Konsequenz aus.”304 Kafka’s text does not affirm a monotheistic structure of 
responsibility before God, as some have argued,305 but rather situates a notion of 
responsibility somewhere between the absolute oppression of the individual and the 
brutal and naïve world of animism.     
Interestingly, in Kafka’s narrative fictions of animated things, we do not find a 
relinquishing of human responsibility and its attribution to things, as suggested in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
304 Ibid., p. 79.  
 
305 See Kaufmann, “Kafka in the Countryside.” 
	  
	   221	  
aphorism. Rather, as I have argued, the same theme of “mediation” (Vermittlung) asserts 
itself in such animated objects and in fact raises the stakes of human responsibility. 
Kafka’s fictions of animated things are in fact accompanied by moral imperatives like the 
commandment against killing in “Der Kübelreiter” (“Du sollst nicht töten!” (D, 444)), the 
assertion of the “rights” (Rechte) of subordinate figures in “Blumfeld,” and the specter of 
an unknowable guilt in “Die Sorge des Hausvaters.” Kafka’s strange, animated things, I 
would like to suggest, take up a mediating role similar to the “außermenschliches Wesen” 
in the aphorism, but manifest their demands on human responsibility in a miniaturized, 
multiplied, and particularized manner.306 In Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Kafka, 
they are explicit in comparing the animated things of Odradek and the celluloid balls in 
“Blumfeld” to the transcendental structures of law and absolute authority found 
elsewhere in Kafka.307 Perhaps, like some strange representatives of the law, these 
animated things proliferate in Kafka’s writings in order to place demands on humans and 
hold them accountable for their actions. 
The structure of a crossed out religious authority might also be related to the 
suspension of familial patriarchy in the stories. The complex mediating roles of animated 
things in “Blumfeld” and “Der Kübelreiter” arise in absence of more traditional structures 
of familial reliance. The social isolation of the two bachelor protagonists, that is to say, 
forces them to enter into complex and conflicted, social negotiations with nonrelatives in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
306 In relation to Bruno Latour’s theory of the “nonmodern,” we might consider here how Kafka 
fictions of animated things similarly relocate the work of “mediation” (Vermittlung) from the 
heavenly margins and place it center stage in the daily interactions among humans and things. Cf. 
Latour, We Have Never Been Modern [1991], trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
UP, 1993).      
 
307 See Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, pp. 47 and 72. 
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order to achieve goals that would be easily managed within the typical bourgeois family 
(i.e. handing down property to the next generation in “Blumfeld” and maintaining a 
heated home in “Der Kübelreiter”). Rather than an absolute responsibility in relation to 
one’s father or children, the stories depict webs of distributed and mediated responsibility 
among various human and thingly figures, which proliferate beyond the confines of the 
home. The Odradek figure in “Die Sorge des Hausvaters,” by contrast, seems to embody 
the very structures of patriarchal responsibility and carry them down through familial 
generations. In all of these cases, one would have to critique the strongly male-dominated 
sense of responsibility in Kafka’s writings and identify the roles allocated to the stories’ 
female characters, who serve mainly to intervene and interfere in male relations (as in the 
coal-dealer’s wife in “Der Kübelreiter” and the two daughters of the Hausmeister in 
“Blumfeld”).308 As materializations of mediated relations and responsibility, the animated 
objects in Kafka’s three stories cannot be so easily disassociated from these complex 
issues of religious authority, familial relations, and gender difference. 
 As various scholars have reconstructed, the specific theme of responsibility was 
central for Kafka’s literary production during this period. He even intended to publish 
“Der Kübelreiter” and “Die Sorge des Hausvaters” (along with other texts that would end 
up in Ein Landarzt) in a collection titled “Verantwortung.”309 By looking closely at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
308 For a critique of gender difference in Kafka’s “Blumfeld,” see Annette Runtes, “(Ver-) Gabe 
des Geschlechts: Junggesellentum und Schrift in Kafkas ‘Blumfeld’-Fragment,” in Lesarten der 
Geschlechterdifferenz: Studien zur Literatur der Moderne (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2005), pp. 143–
74.  
 
309 See Robert Kauf, “Verantwortung: The Theme of Kafka’s Landarzt Cycle,” Modern 
Language Quarterly 33.4 (December 1972): pp. 420–32; and Malcolm Pasley, “Kafka and the 
Theme of ‘Berufung’,” Oxford German Studies 9 (1978): pp. 139–49.   
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Kafka’s stories of animated objects, I hope to have suggested how this theme of 
responsibility intersects and is asserted by the active mediating roles of objects. While the 
structures of reification in Kafka’s stories show how the treatment of things as objects 
tends to bleed over into the treatment of humans as things, the narrative function of 
animation counters such structures by asserting both the resistance of things as things and 
humans as humans.310 The point is not that Kafka’s stories have anything definitive to say 
about a theory of things or our ethical treatment of others, but rather that these stories 
provoke powerful reflections on such issues and raise the open-ended challenge of a 























	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
310 On the ethics of this interrelationship, considered from a philosophical point of view, see 
Silvia Benso, The Face of Things: A Different Side of Ethics (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000). 
For a related discussion situated with respect to wider, literary representations, see Barbara 
Johnson, Persons and Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2010).  
	  










[D]er Film [ist] das erste Kunstmittel, 
das in der Lage ist zu zeigen, wie die 
Materie dem Menschen mitspielt. 
 
                                — Walter Benjamin 
 
 
With his programmatic 1929 book Filmgegner von heute – Filmfreunde von morgen, 
German filmmaker and avant-garde artist Hans Richter took comprehensive stock of 
cinema’s technical “means” (Mittel) of representation as well as its potential for the 
production of artistic films or “Filmpoesie.” Published in coordination with the Deutsche 
Werkbund’s famous 1929 Film und Foto exhibition in Stuttgart, Richter’s book lays out 
an ambitious project of educating filmgoers on the basics of cinematic techniques, with 
the aim of generating demand for higher quality artistic films and broad protest against 
the commercial offerings of the film-industry. Numerous filmstrips and stills are 
reproduced in the large-format book in order to heighten the reader’s awareness of the 
new and unfamiliar experiences that could be realized in cinema––through camera and 
optical tricks, editing and printing practices. Sensitivity to the full range of cinematic 
possibilities, Richter suggests, could transform the disappointed filmgoer of the present 
into an informed advocate for the poetic films of the future.311 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
311 See Hans Richter, Filmgegner von heute – Filmfreunde von morgen (Berlin: Hermann 
Reckendorf, 1929). Produced in collaboration with Werner Graeff, Filmgegner von heute 
(originally published in large 26 x 19 cm format) amounts to an unofficial compendium to the 
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While Richter’s examples in Filmgegner von heute are drawn from a wide variety 
of works––including Soviet narrative and documentary films, educational Kulturfilme, 
and cinematic experiments tied to Dada and Surrealism––he repeatedly emphasizes the 
fundamental importance of rhythm and motion in cinema. Richter writes: “Rhythmus im 
Film bedeutet nicht weniger, als die künstlerisch klar geregelte Folge der Bewegungen.   
–– Der Rhythmus bestimmt jede filmische Ausdrucksform, jedes künstlerische Mittel 
innerhalb des Films.”312 By subordinating all other cinematic means to the primacy of 
rhythm, Richter bases his understanding of film not in its photographic or reproductive 
nature, but rather in its capabilities for producing articulated movements in time and 
space. That cinema could produce a controlled illusion of contrasting motion was far 
more important than its objective reference to the external world. For Richter, in other 
words, the true art of cinema was based not in photography but rather in animation: 
cinema’s fundamental ability to produce the experience of movement out of still images, 
whether those images originated in photographic representations of nature, hand-drawn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
film program organized by Richter for the Film und Foto show. In addition to avant-garde 
selections curated by Richter (including films by Man Ray, Viking Eggeling, Germaine Dulac, 
René Clair, Fernand Léger, and Richter himself), El Lissitzky’s program of Russian cinema 
famously introduced a wider German audience to the latest developments in Soviet documentary 
and montage. For details, see the reprinted catalog from the exhibition, Film und Foto: 
Internationale Ausstellung des Deutschen Werkbundes [1929], ed. Karl Steinorth (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979). 
 
312 Richter, Filmgegner von heute, p. 42. Elsewhere, Richter refers to rhythm as, “die Grundform, 
das Skelett eines Films” (p. 34). Beyond cinema, rhythm also figured prominently as a broader 
principle of formal construction in modernist painting and poetics. The influence of such aesthetic 
discussions during Richter’s formative years as an Expressionist painter no doubt played a 
decisive role in his understanding of cinema. On the visual rhythms of abstract painting, see 
Wassily Kandinsky, Über das Geistige in der Kunst: Insbesondere in der Malerei [1912] (Bern: 
Benteli Verlag, 2004); and Oswald Herzog, “Der abstrakte Expressionismus,” Der Sturm 10.2 
(1919/20): p. 29. Here, Herzog declares the “Form” of abstract painting as “Bewegung-
Rhythmus.” For a related statement in Expressionist poetics, see Herwarth Walden, “Das 
Begriffliche in der Dichtung,” Der Sturm 9.5 (August 1918): pp. 66–67: “Das Material der 
Dichtung ist das Wort. Die Form der Dichtung ist der Rhythmus” (p. 66).  
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pictures, or textual, symbolic, and abstract forms. 
Throughout the book, Richter provides ample evidence for the central importance 
of motion in 1920s cinema, bolstering Gilles Deleuze’s later claim of a “movement-
image” that dominated film before World War II.313 With respect to the experimental 
avant-garde in particular, Richter discusses the production of movement not only as 
inherent to the cinematic medium (cinema as a type of animation), but also as a prevalent 
strategy for the purposeful animation of non-living things. “[Der Rhythmus] kann einen 
sich drehenden Kragen zu einem lebendigen Wesen machen,” Richter writes, drawing an 
example from Man Ray’s 1926 film Emak Bakia.314 Discrete objects could also be 
brought to life through montage or be magically transformed through visual associations 
of animated forms, as illustrated by Fernand Léger’s Ballet mécanique (1924) and 
Richter’s own Filmstudie (1928), respectively (figure 4.1). By producing a “feeling” 
(Gefühl) of movement, Richter asserts, cinema could effectively destabilize the boundary 
“between artificial and natural life” (zwischen künstlichem und natürlichem Leben), 
granting otherwise lifeless things the same animated presence as truly living beings.315 In 
his discussion of avant-garde films, Richter thus juxtaposes two different meanings of 
animation: the production of movement and the imparting of life. Understood as the 
underlying force of cinema, rhythmic motion could produce a cinematic life that was 
common to things and humans, abstract forms and photographed objects (figure 4.2). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
313 See Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1986). 
 
314 Richter, Filmgegner von heute, p. 94. 
 
315 Ibid., p. 89. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the word “animation” in reference to film was 
common to English language usage by around 1910, as a description not only for a range 
of cinematic techniques used to bring objects to life, but also for the cinematic medium 
itself (as a case of “animated photography”).316 By around 1920, the term took on a more 
specific meaning, in both English and French, to designate the growing popular genre of 
cartoon films or “animated drawings” (dessins animés).317 In German, by contrast, the 
term “Trickfilm” continued to serve as a broad designation for not only animated 
cartoons, but also photographically based films dominated by trick-techniques as well as 
the cinematic experiments of the avant-garde.318 While the word “Animation” in 
reference to film was still foreign to German usage of the 1920s, I employ the term here 
both in its earlier English sense (to articulate an understanding of cinema as a means of 
simulating life and a medium based in movement-production) as well as in the broader 
German sense of the trick-film genre. In this way, the concept of cinematic animation is 
not limited to the frame-by-frame technique (familiar from animated drawings or stop-
motion films), but also includes the full range of cinematic means for producing 
articulated motion (which Richter enumerates in Filmgegner von heute): the manipulation 
of camera speed, position, and movement; the use of close-up shots, distorting optics, and 
reverse motion; multiple fields and exposures; live-action sequences; and accelerated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
316 See, for example, the discussion of cinematic illusion and trick techniques in Frederick A. 
Talbot, Moving Pictures: How They Are Made and Worked (London: William Heinemann, 1912).    
 
317 On the interrelated histories of early French and American cartoon animation, see Donald 
Crafton’s biographical study, Emile Cohl, Caricature, and Film (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990).  
 
318 For a detailed presentation of the techniques and genre of the trick-film, see Guido Seeber, 
Der Trickfilm in seinen grundsätzlichen Möglichkeiten: Eine praktische und theoretische 
Darstellung der photographischen Filmtricks (Berlin: Verlag der Lichtbildbühne, 1927).  
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rhythmic editing and montage. Articulated through these various means, Richter’s 
emphatic notion of rhythm can be understood as the underlying and controlled structure 
of cinematic animation and its effects.319 
In the case of avant-garde filmmaking of the 1920s, the cinematic production of 
movement (Bewegung) and the animateness (Belebung) of objects perceived on-screen 
also coincides with an emphasis on the physiological impact of cinema: its ability to tap 
into and affect the vital rhythms of the human body. Here, cinematic motion evokes an 
additional meaning of animation preserved in its etymological connection to breath and 
breathing (lat. anima). Discussing the aim of his and Eggeling’s abstract films in a 1924 
article, Richter writes: 
man ist – ausgeliefert – zum „Fühlen“ gezwungen – zum Mitgehen im Rhythmus 
– Atmen – Herzschlag; – . . . der durch das Auf und Ab des Vorgangs, das 
deutlich machen kann, was Fühlen und Empfinden eigentlich ist . . . ein Prozeß – 
Bewegung.320 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
319 A discussion of the frame-by-frame technique used in both animated drawings and the abstract 
films of the avant-garde is notably limited in Richter’s Filmgegner von heute. See pp. 9–10. The 
brief presentation of the technique, alongside images from scientific and documentary films, 
provides further evidence that Richter saw little ontological distinction between moving images 
based in drawings, abstract forms, and text, on the one hand, and photographic representations of 
the external world, on the other. In current theory, Lev Manovich has attempted to undo the 
marginalization of animation as a fringe element of cinema by considering photographically 
based, live-action cinema as merely, “one particular case of animation.” While Manovich’s 
polemic originates in response to new digital animation technologies of the 1990s, the emphasis 
on animation and movement in the 1920s avant-garde offers qualified, historical support for 
challenging the dominance of film theories based on photographic referentiality. See Lev 
Manovich, The Language of New Media (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 298–308, 
quoted here, p. 302. 
 
320 Richter, “Die schlecht trainierte Seele,” G: Zeitschrift für elementare Gestaltung 3 (June 
1924): pp. 44–47, here, p. 45 (emphasis in original). Page references to G. are from the reprint, 
ed. Marion von Hofacker (Munich: Kern, 1986). This text and other short articles by Richter from 
the 1920s can also be found reprinted in Jeanpaul Goergen et al. (ed.), Hans Richter: Film ist 
Rhythmus [Kinemathek 95] (Berlin: Freunde der Deutschen Kinemathek, 2003), here p. 28. 
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In Richter’s emphasis on rhythm, it is crucial that cinematic motion not simply be seen 
but also felt in the body of the viewer, as a compulsory influence on vital, internal 
processes like “breathing” (Atmen). Richter thus imagines an embodied spectator, who 
participates in and is transformed by the cinematic effects of articulated movement. By 
asserting this connection between cinematic motion and the physiological rhythms of the 
body, Richter stakes his claim within the broader avant-garde project of reorganizing and 
training human perception.321 This sense of a direct “animation” of an embodied viewer’s 
feelings and sensations, however, enters into a complex relationship with the conscious 
experience of cinematic movement and a simulated life of things––especially with 
Richter’s mid-1920s turn from pure abstraction to representational, photographic 
imagery. In analyzing Richter and the avant-garde’s strategic engagement with film 
during the 1920s, this chapter will explore the particular interrelations and conflicts that 
arise between these various aspects of cinematic animation. 
In recent studies, the relationship between animation and the interwar avant-garde 
has been largely situated in two different ways. On the one hand, scholars of cultural 
history and film have focused on the purely abstract animations of Richter, Walter 
Ruttmann, and Viking Eggeling from the early 1920s. Here, the supposedly hermetic 
project of developing a “universal language” or “visual music” through abstract film has 
been productively explicated in terms of its historical connections to broader, modernist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
321 Raoul Hausmann’s and Viking Eggeling’s understandings of avant-garde production, for 
example, articulate related aims of increasing the viewer’s “somatic functionality” (somatische 
Funktionalität). See their manifesto, “Zweite präsentistische Deklaration: Gerichtet an die 
internationalen Konstruktivisten,” MA 8.5/6 (1923). For an account of the relationship between 
film and the avant-garde’s project of sensory training, see Tobias Wilke, “Tacti(ca)lity 
Reclaimed: Benjamin’s Medium, the Avant-Garde, and the Politics of the Senses,” Grey Room 39 
(Spring 2010): pp. 39–55.    
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discourses on abstraction and space, body culture and dance, the psychology of 
advertising, and the experience of technological modernity.322 On the other hand, scholars 
informed by Critical Theory (and interested in the political ramifications of film) have 
drawn conceptual links between the avant-garde and commercial animation, largely 
mediated by Walter Benjamin’s reflections on technology and mass culture in relation to 
early Disney cartoons.323 While this range of scholarship informs the present discussion, 
my approach is to investigate the intended role of cinematic animation within the specific 
theory and practice of the 1920s avant-garde. Richter proves exemplary in this regard due 
to his broad exploration of animation techniques and varied experimentation with 
elements of abstraction, photographic representation, and narrative in film. As a central 
organizer, editor, polemicist, and practitioner within many crucial movements and 
moments of the historical avant-garde, Richter represents a full range of avant-garde 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
322 For a comprehensive overview of such cultural-historical connections in relation to Richter 
and Eggeling’s abstract films, see the essays collected in Hans Richters Rhythmus 21: 
Schlüsselfilm der Moderne, ed. Forschungsnetzwerk BTWH (Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann, 2012). For essays and primary texts on Ruttmann’s early animation work, see Jeanpaul 
Goergen, Walter Ruttmann: Eine Dokumentation (Berlin: Freunde der Deutschen Kinemathek, 
1989).  
 
323 On the importance of early Disney animation for Benjamin’s reflections on politics, history, 
and technology, see Miriam Hansen, “Of Mice and Ducks: Benjamin and Adorno on Disney,” 
South Atlantic Quarterly 92.1 (Winter 1993): pp. 27–61; as well as her updated piece, “Micky-
Maus,” in Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. 
Adorno (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2012), pp. 161–82. Esther Leslie has also charted 
the many productive encounters between avant-garde filmmakers and commercial cartoons, but 
with little sensitivity to the particular milieus, practices, and discourses of avant-garde cinema. 
See Leslie, Hollywood Flatlands: Animation, Critical Theory, and the Avant-Garde (London: 
Verso, 2002). More recently, Andrés Mario Zervigón has presented a concrete, historical 
reworking of Benjamin’s theories of Dada and Disney through an exciting study of George Grosz 
and John Heartfield’s plans to produce somatic shocks through the use of animated drawings and 
puppets in WWI-era propaganda films. See Zervigón, “‘A Political Struwwelpeter?’: John 
Heartfield’s Early Film Animation and the Wartime Crisis of Photographic Representation, 1917–
1918,” in John Heartfield and the Agitated Image: Photography, Persuasion, and the Rise of 
Avant-Garde Photomontage (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2012), pp. 95–135. 
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activities and positions, and, within each context, places the rhythms, movements, and 
animations of cinema at the forefront of aesthetic experimentation. 
As a key document on the relationship between cinema and the historical avant-
garde, Benjamin’s mid-1930s text, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen 
Reproduzierbarkeit, provides a telling formulation to encapsulate my reading of avant-
garde animation. In a less frequently discussed note in the famous essay, Benjamin 
condensed a by then common, theoretical claim about cinema: in contrast to theater, film 
was capable of inverting the traditional relationship between actor and prop, “showing” 
(zeigen) how material things could subversively “play” with the lives of humans (wie die 
Materie dem Menschen mitspielt).324 Throughout the chapter, Richter’s 1928 film 
Vormittagsspuk, in particular, will be taken up as a complex engagement with this very 
capability. Employing the full range of techniques listed above, Vormittagsspuk presents 
the dynamic animation of everyday objects and their playful rebellion against human 
control. In Richter’s avant-garde treatment, however, this simple theme (familiar from 
earlier slapstick- and trick-films) is newly situated within the context of a formally 
experimental and self-reflective cinematic work. The interplay between human actors and 
animated things exists not only on the level of inscription within the image content of the 
film; in Richter’s structuring of cinematic movement, humans and things also function as 
abstract, formal elements directed at the viewer’s embodied reception of rhythmic 
motion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
324 Walter Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit [3rd 
(now 5th) version, 1936–39], Werke und Nachlaß: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 16, ed. 
Burkhardt Lindner (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2012), p. 229. The same formulation appears as well in the 
earlier 2nd (now 3rd) version of the Kunstwerk essay (1936). See, in the same volume, p. 118. 
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The goal of the present chapter is to discuss how, in avant-garde works like 
Richter’s Vormittagsspuk, this ability to show (zeigen) a material “life” of things on film 
coincides with a demonstration of the techniques, effects, and material basis of cinematic 
animation. A guiding assumption of the argument is that the avant-garde’s engagement 
with animation and rhythm must be emphatically distinguished from the productions of 
both cartoons and commercial live-action films. In contrast to the seamless animations of 
Disney cartoons as well as the drive toward an “equipment-free aspect of reality” (der 
apparatfreie Aspekt der Realität), which Benjamin identifies in commercial studio films, 
avant-garde cinema can be understood to develop complex strategies for demonstrating 
the material basis and means of cinematic production.325 Nowhere is this more evident 
than in the cinematic avant-garde’s animation of material objects, which exhibit a visibly 
ambiguous status as both magically “living” things on the level of image-content and 
abstract, formal constructions related to the productive capabilities of cinema. Analyzing 
a range of films and texts by prominent artists and thinkers of the 1920s, I will show how 
animated objects serve as a important focal point in avant-garde cinema for encouraging 
a self-conscious experience of cinematic techniques and effects, as well as opening up a 
space for the viewer’s active participation and imaginative play vis-à-vis the moving 
image. This last claim will be substantiated through a close reading of Vormittagsspuk 
toward the end of the chapter. Throughout the discussion, Richter’s specific trajectory as 
a filmmaker, theorist, and long-standing promoter of experimental film will provide a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
325 Cf. Benjamin’s famous description of the artifice of “immediate reality” sought in studio film 
production in ibid., pp. 234–35, quoted here, p. 235. In his 1941 notes on Walt Disney, Sergei 
Eisenstein, for example, emphasizes the obscure and undetectable technological basis of animated 
cartoons. See Eisenstein on Disney, ed. Jay Leyda, trans. Alan Upchurch (Calcutta: Seagull 
Books, 1986), in particular, p. 55.    
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unifying thread for assessing the broader significance and substantial role of animation 
within avant-garde cinema of the 1920s.  
 
Der absolute Film 
While Richter’s presentation in Filmgegner von heute closely reflects his own personal 
interests as a filmmaker, his overall assessment of cinema in terms of rhythmic motion 
and animation also reinforces longstanding priorities within the general theory and 
practice of the interwar avant-garde. Published in 1929, Richter’s book coincides with a 
critical juncture in the history of avant-garde cinema, characterized by the dissolution of 
previous strands of experimental filmmaking (whether Dadaist, Constructivist, or 
Surrealist), the introduction of sound film, a situation of increasing political hostilities, 
and attempts at broad international coordination among innovative directors, camera-
operators, and film-theorists.326 At a time when experimental filmmakers were moving 
more and more into commercial territories of advertising, industry films, and narrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
326 This confluence of historical challenges was addressed most directly with the 1929 Congres 
international du cinématographe indépendant. Occurring just months after the Film und Foto 
exhibition in Stuttgart, the congress gathered key theorists and avant-garde filmmakers in La 
Sarraz, Switzerland with the aim of consolidating larger, international audiences for artistic films. 
Facing the emerging dominance of commercial sound-film and mounting political tensions, the 
meeting sought to foster a financially independent and politically engaged cinema, without 
bowing to the conventions of the narrative feature-film. Among the participants were Richter, 
Ruttmann, Béla Balázs, Alberto Cavalcanti, and Léon Moussinac, as well as Sergei Eisenstein, 
who coordinated with Richter in directing the impromptu, allegorical film, La guerre entre le film 
indépendant et le film industriel (Tempête sur La Sarraz) during the event. In Malte Hagener’s 
detailed study, the meeting in La Sarraz marks both the peak and breaking point of a supposedly 
autonomous, avant-garde cinema, revealing its financial dependence on and partial subservience 
to either wealthy patrons or commercial studios and advertisement companies. See Hagener, 
Moving Forward, Looking Back: The European Avant-garde and the Invention of Film Culture, 
1919–1939 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2007). For a reconstruction of the meeting in La Sarraz, 
see Helma Schleif (ed.), Stationen der Moderne im Film II: Texte, Manifeste, Pamphlete (Berlin: 
Freunde der Deutschen Kinemathek, 1989), pp. 200–19. 
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cinema (Richter included), Filmgegner von heute marks an attempt at assessing the 
distinct characteristics and oppositional nature of avant-garde cinema in order to 
consolidate its enduring potentials. Richter’s continued emphasis on rhythmic movement 
and simulated life highlights the central importance of animation for the cinematic 
practice of the historical avant-garde. 
Richter’s first explorations in cinematic animation came with his early series of 
abstract Rhythmus films between 1921 and 1925. Along with the Swedish avant-gardist 
Viking Eggeling, Richter turned explicitly to cinema in order to realize a pure “art of 
movement” (Bewegungskunst) that could develop beyond the limitations of static 
painting.327 While Eggeling worked toward the animated orchestration of complex, linear 
forms found in his Symphonie Diagonale (1923–24), Richter radically limited all graphic 
elements in his films in order to explore the articulation of movement for its own sake. In 
his first cinematic work Film ist Rhythmus (1923), alternatively titled Rhythmus 21, 
Richter used the simple darkened or illuminated rectangle of the cinema screen, not as a 
geometrically significant form in itself, but rather as a means of expressing relationships 
of movement through varying positions, speeds, sizes, shades, and directions.328  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
327 Their collaborative work toward abstract animation began around 1920 and was assisted by 
the funding and technical support of the Universum Film AG (UFA) studio. For a theoretical 
statement on their work, see the programmatic text attributed to Richter (but largely conceived by 
Eggeling), “Prinzipielles zur Bewegungskunst,” De Stijl 4.7 (July 1921): pp. 109–12. 
	  
328 Richter and Eggeling’s abstract film work was publicized as early as 1921 through their 
writings and drawings as well as through third-party accounts based on studio visits. Contrary to 
Richter’s retrospective accounts and preferred Rhythmus 21 title, however, his first abstract film 
could not have been publicly screened before 1923. For a detailed account that carefully dates the 
making and exhibition of the film, see Holger Wilmesmeier, “Entstehungsgeschichte: Le Film 
100 Titres,” in Hans Richters Rhythmus 21, pp. 33–44. See also, Goergen et al. (ed.), Hans 
Richter: Film ist Rhythmus, pp. 87–93. 	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Despite their differing emphases, both Richter’s and Eggeling’s early cinematic 
experiments resonated with the broader, constructivist aesthetics of the interwar avant-
garde, which sought to isolate the productive potentials of specific media, while rejecting 
the conventions of mimetic realism and narrative. Making explicit reference to the work 
of Richter and Eggeling, László Moholy-Nagy’s important 1922 essay “Produktion-
Reproduktion,” for example, declares the primary task of film as, “die Gestaltung der 
Bewegung an sich.” Alongside related discussions of other technological media, Moholy-
Nagy defines the functional essence of cinema (“Bewegungsbeziehungen der 
Lichtprojektionen”) in order to direct its productive (rather than merely reproductive) 
capabilities toward the development of new relations and experiences.329 A year earlier, 
the art critic (and early proponent of Richter and Eggeling’s work) Adolf Behne claimed 
similarly:  
Filmkunst ist Bewegungskunst. Aber wiederum zu beachten: Soweit der Film 
fremde (natürliche oder gestellte) Bewegungen aufzeichnet und wiedergibt, ist er 
reproduktiv, nicht Kunstwerk. Die Bewegungen selbst müssen das Kunstwerk 
ausmachen. Dann, nur dann kommen die Bewegungsvorgänge und der Film zur 
Deckung. Der Film wird Materialisierung des Bewegungskunstwerks und damit 
ein besonderes, neues, eigenartiges künstlerisches Mittel.330 
    
For both Moholy-Nagy and Behne, the legitimacy of film as an art form depended on the 
isolation and exploration of the medium’s unique capabilities. Conceived as an “art of 
movement” in the purest sense, cinema thus precluded any basis in the photographic 
reproduction of natural movements or dramatic action. Tellingly, Behne refers to the 
marginalized genre of cartoon animation (gezeichnete Trickfilme) as a model for a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
329 For the above quotes, see László Moholy-Nagy, “Produktion-Reproduktion,” De Stijl 5.7 (July 
1922): pp. 235–36 (emphasis in original). 
 
330 Adolf Behne, “Der Film als Kunstwerk,” Sozialistische Monatshefte 27 (1921): pp. 1116–18, 
here, p. 1117. 
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cinematic art based solely on the medium’s productive capabilities. For Behne, the 
advancement made by Richter and Eggeling’s films was to take the principle of the 
animated trick-film but reduce its pictorial elements to pure abstraction. In this way, the 
artists could explore the laws of cinematic movement as such and produce well-ordered, 
filmic constructions that presented, “eine logische Abwickelung [sic] abstrakter Formen 
von geometrischer Präzision.”331 
Richter’s early experiments in cinematic abstraction first reached a wider 
audience with the famous 1925 Absoluter Film matinee in Berlin, where his work 
appeared alongside the films of Eggeling, Ruttmann, Léger, and René Clair.332 While the 
films shared similar origins in the milieu of avant-garde provocation (Richter’s early 
Rhythmus work was screened at the notorious 1923 Dada Soirée du coeur à barbe in 
Paris, for example), their mainstream presentation under the collective rubric of 
“absoluter Film” underscored divergent tendencies in experimental cinema. Like the 
German designation of absolute film, the French cinéma pur defined itself largely in 
opposition to the literary and theatrical aspirations of the feature-film and focused instead 
on the productive capabilities of cinema itself. There were key differences, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
331 Ibid., p. 1118. On the animated trick-film, Behne writes: “Nur die gezeichneten Trickfilme 
schieden die Natürlichkeit aus. Das, was aufgenommen werden sollte, hatte von vornherein zur 
Bezug auf den Film, existierte außer ihm nicht. [...] Nun liegen aber, die Vorstadien der 
gezeichneten Filme hinter sich lassend, zwei Versuche [i.e. Richter’s and Eggeling’s] vor den 
Film als ein selbständiges neues Kunstwerk zu verwirklichen.” (pp. 1116–17). 
 
332 Organized by the Novembergruppe, the famous avant-garde cinema program “Der absolute 
Film” screened over two days (May 3 and 10, 1925) at the Ufa-Theater on Kurfürstendamm. In 
addition to films by those listed above, the program also included the colored light-projections 
Dreiteilige Farbensonatine by Bauhaus artist Ludwig Hirschfeld-Mack. For a detailed account of 
the event, see Holger Wilmesmeier, Deutsche Avantgarde und Film: Die Filmmatinee “Der 
absolute Film” (Münster: LIT Verlag, 1994). 
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between the abstract films of Richter, Ruttmann, and Eggeling, on the one hand, and the 
Dadaist provocations of Léger’s Ballet mécanique and René Clair’s Entr’acte (both 
1924), on the other.333 While all films were based in the media-specific possibilities of 
cinematic motion, the chaotic impression made by Léger’s and Clair’s photographic 
images was far removed from the appearance of logically constructed movement found in 
abstract animation.334  
Within the broad, production aesthetics of avant-garde film, an inherent conflict 
seemed to arise as soon as photographic imagery and live-action sequences were used as 
constructive materials. Appearing in the pages of Richter’s journal G: Material zur 
elementaren Gestaltung (1923–26), René Clair himself explained this tension in relation 
to his film Entr’acte:  
Ehe ich mich über den Klebetisch beugte, dachte ich, daß es sehr leicht wäre, 
dem Film einen regelmäßigen Rhythmus zu geben. Ich unterschied drei Faktoren, 
mit deren Hilfe sich eine Kadenz erzielen lassen könnte, nicht unähnlich 
derjenigen der lateinischen Verse. 
1. Dauer eines Bildes. 
2. Abwechslung der Szenen oder Motive der Handlung (innere Bewegung). 
3. Bewegung der von dem Objektiv photographierten Gegenstände (äußere 
Bewegung, Spiel des Darstellers, Bewegung der Dekoration). 
Man kann die Verhältnisse dieser drei Faktoren nicht leicht definieren, denn 
der rhythmische Wert dieser Bildchen hängt ja auch von den äußeren Bewegung 
des Films oder dessen sentimentalen Eigenschaften ab, und die sind unwägbar; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 Entr’acte presents perhaps the clearest, historical case of a Dadaist film. Produced by Clair in 
collaboration with Francis Picabia, the film was first screened as prelude and intermission to 
Picabia’s 1924 ballet Relâche and served a crucial role in the overall provocation of the Dada 
performance. On the relationship between the ballet and film, see George Baker, “Entr’acte,” 
October 105 (Summer 2003): pp. 159–65. The film known as Ballet mécanique premiered in 
1924 as well, in Vienna, and appeared under the title Images mobiles at the 1925 Absoluter Film 
matinee in Berlin.     
 
334 For a contemporaneous account that underscores this distinction, see Rudolf Kurtz’s 
discussion of “absolute Kunst” in, Expressionismus und Film (Berlin: Verlag der Lichtbildbühne, 
1926), pp. 86–108. Kurtz’s discussion of individual films is conspicuously limited to the very 
ones screened at Der absolute Film matinee. Kurtz thanks Richter himself for assistance in 
preparing the book, offering evidence that Richter may have shaped Kurtz’s understanding of the 
films. (p. 5)      
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die metrischen Gesetze halten da nicht stand. Der Zuschauer eines Autorennens 
im Film wird zur handelnden Person, ergreift das Steuerrad, beobachtet den 
Geschwindigkeitsmesser, und in seine Augen stürzen sich die Bäume der 
Landstraße. 
Ich persönlich könnte mich leicht dazu entschließen, in der Welt der Bilder 
auf Regel und Logik zu verzichten; die wunderbare Barbarei einer solchen 
Möglichkeit entzückt mich, endlich Urwelt, Natur, unberührtes Land. Sätze kann 
man nicht unlogisch machen, ohne sie umzubringen, aber warum sollen sich 
Bilder, die an sich keinen absoluten Wert haben, mit Logik beschweren?335 
 
Titling his essay “Rhythmus,” Clair asserts here the incommensurability of a rational, 
rhythmic structuring of film with the chaotic mass of moving images recorded from life. 
Using the racing automobiles found in Entr’acte as his primary example, Clair affirms 
the viewer’s active participation (“Der Zuschauer [...] wird zur handelnden Person”) in 
the dynamic succession of shocking and fragmented images, while suppressing any 
overall logic to the cinematic construction of movement. 
This conflict between a rational, constructivist, and abstract strand of filmmaking, 
on the one hand, and a subversively illogical and chaotic one, on the other, has long been 
a sticking point in characterizing and delimiting the cinematic works of the interwar 
avant-garde. How does one define a collection of films that includes both the anarchy of 
Dada and the abstract purity of Constructivism? Rather than attempting to reconcile, 
periodize, or otherwise divide up these conflicting developments, I would like to trace 
their contradictory aspects back to a common root: the overriding emphasis on movement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
335 René Clair, “Rhythmus,” G: Zeitschrift für elementare Gestaltung 5/6 (April 1926): p. 116. 
The original French version of the essay was published a year earlier as, “Rythme,” Cahiers du 
mois 16/17 (1925): pp. 13–16. Richter’s journal, although better known under its original subtitle 
Material zur elementaren Gestaltung, was renamed starting with the third issue. On Richter’s 
understanding of “Gestaltung” and its relationship to international constructivism, see Detlef 
Mertins and Michael W. Jennings, “Introduction: The G-Group and the European Avant-Garde,” 
in their recent, edited translation of the journal, G: An Avant-Garde Journal of Art, Architecture, 
Design, and Film, 1923–1926, trans. Steven Lindberg et al. (Los Angeles: Getty Research 
Institute, 2010), pp. 3–20.   
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within the cinematic avant-garde. In this way, the conflict can be understood not as one 
between different principles or types of cinema, but rather as an internal friction between 
the form and content of the animated image. So long as the image content was reduced to 
abstract elements, the formal production of movement could maintain an appearance of 
logical order. With the introduction of photographic reproductions of external objects and 
movements, however, an underlying formal construction of motion could very well 
appear at odds with the suggestive content of the image. In avant-garde cinema in 
particular, a dominant fascination with the dynamic animation of everyday objects, 
machines, human figures, and shapes seemed to undermine any formal order or logic to 
the cinematic composition. This increased tension between the form and content of the 
animated image, I would like to propose, can be understood as a characteristic feature of 
avant-garde cinema in general. Richter’s own diverse body of films will serve as case and 
point.336 
Likely inspired by the French contributions to the 1925 Absoluter Film matinee, 
Richter thereafter dropped his strict adherence to cinematic abstraction and began to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
336 Not surprisingly, Richter’s varied cinematic work has featured prominently in past debates on 
the classification of avant-garde films. For a definition of Dadaist cinema that loosely includes 
both Richter’s early Rhythmus films and later works like Filmstudie and Vormittagsspuk, see 
Rudolf E. Kuenzli, “Introduction” and Thomas Elsaesser, “Dada/Cinema?,” in Dada and 
Surrealist Film, ed. Kuenzli (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996),  pp. 1–12 and 13–27, 
respectively. By contrast, Justin Hoffmann makes the case for situating Richter’s films as part of 
international Constructivism. See his article, “Hans Richter: Constructivist Filmmaker,” in Hans 
Richter: Activism, Modernism, and the Avant-Garde, ed. Stephen C. Foster (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1998), pp. 72–91. More recently, Malcolm Turvey has attempted to reconcile the 
Rhythmus films with the aims of Dada by following Richter’s own retrospective (and rather 
suspect) account of the interwar avant-garde in his articles and interviews of the 1950s and 60s. 
See Turvey, “Dada Between Heaven and Hell: Abstraction and Universal Language in the 
Rhythm Films of Hans Richter,” October 105 (Summer 2003): pp. 13–36.   
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experiment with traditional photography and figurative imagery in his films.337 Richter’s 
work on Filmstudie after 1925 marked a first move in this direction by integrating 
photographic images of moving faces, eyeballs, and a flock of birds into the overall 
composition of cinematic motion.338 While Richter had expanded the image content of 
his films, he still emphasized the primacy of an underlying rhythmic structure in film. In 
a short 1926 article published in the influential, American literary journal Little Review, 
Richter reaffirmed his allegiance to cinematic rhythm as, “the unity binding all parts into 
a whole.”339 And Richter’s Filmstudie indeed marks a certain continuity with his early 
Rhythmus films by integrating similar, geometric abstractions as well as new animated 
compositions of circles and lines. (Filmstudie was in fact first privately screened under 
the title Rhythmus.340)  But with its introduction of multiplying photographic images of 
faces, eyes, and birds, the experience of Filmstudie becomes less that of a logical and 
well-ordered construction of movement and more one of floating chaos and confusion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
337 For an account stressing the influence of Clair and Léger on Richter’s turn away from pure 
abstraction, see Joel Westerdale, “3 May 1925: French and German Avant-Garde Converge at 
Der absolute Film,” in A New History of German Cinema, ed. Jennifer M. Kapczynski and 
Michael D. Richardson (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2012), pp. 160–65. As Westerdale 
points out, Richter himself, in later writings, would closely associate his subsequent film work 
with Entr’acte and Ballet mécanique. See, for example, Richter’s 1930s book manuscript, Kampf 
um den Film: Für einen gesellschaftlich verantwortlichen Film [1939], ed. Jürgen Römhild 
(Munich: Hanser, 1976), pp. 42–44. On this influence, see also R. Bruce Elder, Harmony and 
Dissent: Film and Avant-Garde Art Movements in the Early Twentieth Century (Waterloo, 
Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier UP, 2008), pp. 163–67. 
	  
338 Although typically dated 1925–26, when Richter began work on the film, Filmstudie was not 
shown until 1928, first at a private screening hosted by the Gesellschaft neuer Film in Berlin and 
shortly thereafter at the Ufa-Theater on Kurfürstendamm. See Goergen et al. (ed.), Hans Richter: 
Film ist Rhythmus, p. 93.  
 
339 Richter, “Rhythm,” The Little Review (Winter 1926): p. 21. 
	  
340 See Goergen et al. (ed.), Hans Richter: Film ist Rhythmus, p. 93 
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Figure 4.3.	  Hans Richter. Vormittagsspuk, 1928. Film stills. 
 
As Siegfried Kracauer described it at the time: “Film-Studie [...] läßt durch ein 
Wolkenchaos Kugeln steigen, die sich in Augen verwandeln; setzt Pflastersteine in ein 
Gittergeflecht um, das zu taumeln beginnt.”341 
This unruly animation of objects was developed further in Richter’s film 
Vormittagsspuk, which was produced in 1927 and first screened in 1928. In this 
somewhat longer, quasi-narrative film, Richter employs various means of animating 
objects (including bowler hats, water hoses, pistols, and teacups) to stage an all-out 
rebellion of things against their usually subservient and functional roles (figure 4.3). The 
sequences of moving objects appear along with live-action shots of humans attempting to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
341 Siegfried Kracauer, “Abstrakter Film” [1928], in Kino: Essays, Studien, Glossen zum Film, ed. 
Karsten Witte (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), pp. 45–46.  
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Figure 4.4. Hans Richter. Filmgegner von heute, 1929. Page reproduction. 
 
control the rebellious things, creating an overall chaotic composition not unlike the flurry 
of objects and bodies found in Léger’s Ballet mécanique or the fragmented chase scene at 
the end of Clair’s Entr’acte. At the same time, however, Richter’s Vormittagsspuk also 
suggests abstract formal elements, which inform its pictorial compositions and dynamic 
montage-sequences. Richter draws attention to this aspect of Vormittagsspuk in 
Filmgegner von heute by juxtaposing stills of the film with Eggeling’s Symphonie 
Diagonale (figure 4.4). The film is additionally structured by the prominent, rhythmic 
punctuations of a ticking clock, as will be discussed later on in the chapter. But while 
Richter insists on an overall rhythmic structure to his film, Vormittagsspuk indeed gives 
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the exact opposite impression of formal cohesion. The film’s content––of a chaotic and 
anarchic life of things––appears at odds with any overall compositional logic. 
 In an anecdote often repeated in postwar publications on his paintings and films, 
Richter recounts Sergei Eisenstein’s troubled response to Vormittagsspuk: “Eisenstein 
asked me repeatedly what I wanted to say when I made [Vormittagsspuk]. He could 
hardly believe that the content, the story––rebellion of objects against daily routine––
developed, so to say, as the by-product of a rhythmical conception and by 
improvisation.”342 According to Richter’s retrospective account, the content of the film 
emerged solely out of his continued experimentation with rhythmical form. Rather than 
take Richter simply at his word, however, I would like to focus instead on the tension 
underlined by this anecdotal exchange: that is, the irritating divergence between formal 
construction and image content in the viewer’s experience of the film. Here, Eisenstein’s 
own Battleship Potemkin (1925) provides a convenient point of contrast. In the film’s 
famous montage sequence of the awakening lion statue, Eisenstein achieves a 
sophisticated coordination between the form and content of cinematic animation. The 
constructed animation of a stone lion through successive stills of different statues not 
only marks a crucial turning point in the narrative content of the film (i.e. the battleship’s 
retaliation for the violent massacre on the Odessa steps); the statue’s artificially produced 
movement also enacts a corresponding awakening of resistance and response in the mind 
of the viewer (figure 4.5). In Eisenstein’s montage construction, the shot lengths are 
carefully timed so that the formal impression of natural movement develops 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
342 Quoted here from Hans Richter by Hans Richter, ed. Cleve Gray (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 
and Winston, 1971), p. 145. 
	  







Figure 4.5. Sergei Eisenstein. Battleship Potemkin, 1925. Film stills. 
 
simultaneously with the meaning of the image series. The animated thing itself, that is to 
say, synchronizes an emerging symbolic meaning in relation to the film’s content with a 
visceral experience of a formally constructed, rhythmic movement.343 
For a filmmaker like Eisenstein, the animated objects in Richter’s Vormittagsspuk 
must have seemed arbitrary and hopelessly severed from any meaningful construction of 
motion. What the Eisenstein of Richter’s anecdote seems to miss, however, is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
343 See Eisenstein’s discussion of this montage sequence in his, “The Dramaturgy of Film Form 
(A Dialectical Approach to Film Form)” [1929], in Selected Works, Volume 1: Writings, 1922–
34, ed. Richard Taylor (London: British Film Institute, 1988), pp. 161–80, here, pp. 172–74. 
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importance of movement for its own sake. In contrast to Eisenstein’s formalist approach, 
the experimental cinema of the European avant-garde reveled in the basic productive 
capabilities of film to generate new experiences of movement beyond any ostensible 
meaning––whether these experiences corresponded to the well-ordered motion of abstract 
animation or the visual shocks and anarchy of Dada. In combining these two divergent 
tendencies of earlier avant-garde cinema, Richter’s later film Vormittagsspuk allows the 
viewer to experience a widened rift and interference between the deliberate and logical 
construction of abstract movement in cinema, on the one hand, and the rather irrational 
sensation of a dynamic and unruly life of photographed objects, on the other. Rather than 
consider this a shortcoming of Richter’s film, I would like to highlight it as indicative of 
the unique, aesthetic potential of the avant-garde’s engagement with cinematic animation.      
 
Things and Cinema 
	  
The role of animated objects specific to avant-garde cinema gains additional clarity in 
relation to the larger context of interwar film theory. Much like in the reception of early 
cinema, critics and theorists of the 1920s repeatedly emphasized cinema’s capabilities to 
foreground and animate nonliving things, making them no less significant than human 
actors on screen. As discussed in Chapter 2, the concentrated production of stop-motion 
trick-films between 1905 and 1912 addressed the animation of things in a quite literal 
manner––through the frame-by-frame animation of objects in what appeared to be live-
action settings. Despite the crude and jittery appearance of such films, this unique 
potential of cinema drew the attention of numerous writers and critics, including Alfred 
Döblin, Franz Kafka, Georg Lukács, F.T. Marinetti, and Vachel Lindsay. In the 1920s, 
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the fascination with a “life of things” on film became even more pronounced and 
constituted, “a key topos of film aesthetics in interwar Europe,” as Miriam Hansen 
recently described it.344 On one level, this continued fascination with the animation of 
things was merely a replay of earlier rhetoric, which looked to the new significance of 
objects in film as a way of legitimizing cinema as a unique and independent art form. In 
contrast to theater, that is, film could elevate what were once lifeless props and backdrops 
to the status of actors in the cinematic drama.345 In the 1920s, however, cinema’s ability 
to bring objects to life was also treated to more sophisticated, theoretical reflection and 
was situated in a differentiated manner with respect to various cinematic techniques of 
representation. While the broad interest in a “life of things” in both the theory and 
practice of 1920s cinema has been frequently acknowledged, little attempt has been made 
to draw relevant distinctions with respect to different theoretical approaches and modes 
of filmmaking.   
 Within German-language film theory of the 1920s, Béla Balázs’s Der sichtbare 
Mensch presents probably the most well known articulation of a cinematic “life of 
things.” Published in 1924, Balázs’s book declares the unique atmosphere of cinema to 
arise out of its transformation of visible objects: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
344 Hansen, Cinema and Experience, p. 346, note 67. In contrast to the present focus on 
animation, Hansen’s discussion of things in film is indebted largely to Kracauer’s sense of an 
opaque and stubborn “materiality” of things arising through photographic realism. See, in 
particular, Chapter 1 and Chapter 9 or her book: “Film, Medium of a Disintegrating World” (pp. 
3–39) and “Theory of Film” (pp. 253–79), respectively. For a related application of Kracauer’s 
film theory to postwar cinematic representations of everyday objects, see Lesley Stern, “Paths 
That Wind through the Thicket of Things,” Critical Inquiry 28.1 (Autumn 2001): pp. 317–54.  
 
345 For an early example of this argument see, Egon Friedell, “Prolog vor dem Film” [1912], in 
Kino-Debatte: Texte zum Verhältnis von Literatur und Film 1909–1929, ed. Anton Kaes 
(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1978), pp. 42–47. Friedell’s text along with related, contemporaneous 
discussions of animated things in early cinema are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
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In der Welt des sprechenden Menschen sind die stummen Dinge viel lebloser und 
unbedeutender als der Mensch. [...] [Im Film] sind die Dinge nicht so zurück-
gesetzt und degradiert. In der gemeinsamen Stummheit werden sie mit dem 
Menschen fast homogen und gewinnen dadurch an Lebendigkeit und Bedeutung. 
Weil sie nicht weniger sprechen als die Menschen, darum sagen sie gerade so 
viel. Das ist das Rätsel jener besonderen Filmatmosphäre, die jenseits jeder 
literarischen Möglichkeit liegt.346 
 
As Tobias Wilke has recently argued, Balázs’s sense of the new significance of things on 
film is based on an operational transformation of the world into the realm of the purely 
optical. Humans and things in film and photography are not only cut off from a 
corresponding world of verbal language and sound, but also a range of synaesthetically 
correlated experiences, touch most notably.347 For Balázs, this sensual impoverishment of 
the cinematic image is in fact the source of its unique effects. As purely visual 
phenomena, the moving images of humans and things in film become strangely akin, 
both exhibiting their own expressive “faces” and “physiognomies.”348 Balázs focuses, in 
particular, on the cinematic technique of the close-up shot as a means of intensifying the 
visual isolation of the human face and things, by tightly framing distinct objects and 
training the viewer attention on the expressive and otherwise unnoticed details of the 
visual world. In analogy to the expressive “Mienenspiel” of the human face, Balázs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
346 Béla Balázs, Der sichtbare Mensch oder die Kultur des Films [1924] (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2001), pp. 31–32 (emphasis in original). Balázs proclaims later in the book that, “die 
Lupe des Kinoapparates wird dir [...] das geheime – weil unbeachtete – Leben aller Dinge 
[zeigen]” (p. 49). 
 
347 See Tobias Wilke, Medien der Unmittelbarkeit: Dingkonzepte und Wahrnehmungstechniken, 
1918–1939 (Munich: Fink, 2010), pp. 52–62. 
 
348 See, for example, Balázs, Der sichtbare Mensch, p. 59: “Es gibt keine Kunst, die so berufen 
wäre, dieses »Gesicht der Dinge« darzustellen, wie der Film. Weil er nicht nur eine einmalige, 
starre Physiognomie, sondern ihr geheimnisvoll-geheimes Mienenspiel zeigen kann.” 
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describes the “lebendige Physiognomie, die alle Dinge haben.”349 This inherent, outer 
physiognomy of things, Balázs argues, could reveal an inner essence of objects when 
experienced through the cinematic close-up. 
 Balázs was not alone in essentializing the cinematic technique of the close-up in 
this manner. In a 1921 article, the French filmmaker and writer Jean Epstein extolled the 
close-up as the “soul” and “keystone” of cinema.350 In a later text published the same 
year as Balázs’s Der sichtbare Mensch, Epstein expressed his enthusiasm for the close-up 
in terms of its transformative effect on inanimate objects: 
The almost godlike importance assumed in close-ups by parts of the human body, 
or by the most frigid elements in nature, has often been noted. Through the 
cinema, a revolver in a drawer, a broken bottle on the ground, an eye isolated by 
an iris, are elevated to the status of characters in the drama (la dignité du 
personnages du drame). Being dramatic, they seem alive, as though involved in 
the evolution of an emotion. […] To things and beings in their most frigid 
semblance, the cinema thus grants the greatest gift unto death: life. And it confers 
this life in its highest guise: personality (la personnalité).351 
 
Whether formulated in terms of Balázs’s discussion of physiognomy or Epstein’s 
photogénie, the animation of things through the cinematic close-up depended primarily 
on the photographic nature of cinema. While both writers stress the importance of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
349 Ibid., p. 59 (emphasis in original). See also, pp. 48–50. On the broader 1920s discourse that 
situated the revelatory potential of cinema in relation to the conjunction of the human face and the 
close-up shot, as well as its historical precedents in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
science of physiognomy, nineteenth-century photography, and early cinema, see Tom Gunning, 
“In Your Face: Physiognomy, Photography, and the Gnostic Mission of Early Film,” 
Modernism/modernity 4.1 (January 1997): pp. 1–29.    
 
350 See Jean Epstein, “Magnification” [1921], reprinted in translation in French Film Theory and 
Criticism: A History/Anthology, vol. 1: 1907–1929, ed. Richard Abel (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1988), pp. 235–41, here, p. 236. Balázs declares similarly in Der sichtbare Mensch: “Die 
Großaufnahmen sind das eigenste Gebiet des Films” (p. 49). 
 
351 Jean Epstein, “On Certain Characteristics of Photogénie” [1924], in French Film Theory and 
Criticism, vol. 1, pp. 314–18, here pp. 316–17. For the French original, see “De quelques 
conditions de la photogénie,” Cinéa-Ciné-pour-tous 19 (August 15, 1924): pp. 6–8, here p. 7. 
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object’s inherent motion as a necessary component of the cinematic close-up, it is 
ultimately the role of photographic representation that accounts for the new character-
status of things in cinema. “Was die Photographie nicht ausdrücken kann, das wird der 
Film nicht enthalten,” as Balázs puts it.352 For both Balázs and Epstein, there existed a 
latent physiognomy or personality in all nonliving things, which was revealed not 
through any artificial construction of cinematic movement but rather through the isolation 
and estrangement of things achieved through close-up photographic reproductions. 
 The close-up technique alone, however, was not sufficient for elevating things to 
the status of dramatic “characters” in film. As Gertrud Koch argues in an article on 
Balázs, the expressive physiognomy of things could only arise in close-ups if the effect of 
the shot was “embedded in the fictional relationship with a narrationally inscribed 
character.”353 The physiognomy or personality of things, that is to say, only has meaning 
in relation to a diegetic world of human characters and their emotions. Koch summarizes 
Balázs’s understanding of film experience as a “kind of anthropomorphic visualization of 
objects, of inanimate things, [that] permits transforming the whole world of dead matter 
into an animistic cosmos, rendering it as pure expression.”354 Epstein, for his part, spoke 
directly of an “animistic tendency” (tendance animiste) in film, with its ability to attribute 
a “semblance of life” (apparence de vie) to things.355 Yet for both writers, this radical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
352 Balázs, Der sichtbare Mensch, p. 95. 
 
353 See Gertrud Koch, “Béla Balázs: The Physiognomy of Things,” New German Critique 40 
(Winter 1987): pp. 167–77, here p. 169. 
 
354 Ibid., p. 168. 
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vision of cinema was in fact couched in a more traditional mode of narrative filmmaking, 
which they both tirelessly championed. In the end, for both Balázs and Epstein, the 
“physiognomies” and “personalities” of things on film were primarily mirrors for the 
expressive emotions of human actors in the cinematic drama.356 
 It should perhaps go without saying that the avant-garde’s approach to a “life of 
things” on film was a great deal different. In Filmgegner von heute, Richter himself 
openly mocked the cinematic actor’s exaggerated facial expressions and gestures, which 
were so important Balázs and which provided the model for his notion of an expressive 
physiognomy of things.357 Richter agreed that cinema altered the traditional hierarchy 
between humans and things. But rather than elevating things to the status of human-like 
characters, Richter saw the human actor as mere “Material” to be placed within the 
“Gesamtrhythmus des Films.” “Der Wert des Schauspielers im Film,” he continues, “ist 
relativ nicht größer als der irgendeines anderen im Film wirkenden Objekts.”358 Instead 
of an immediate window into an expressive, diegetic world of humans and things, the 
avant-garde treated the cinematic image as rather a productive surface for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 Epstein, “On Certain Characteristics of Photogénie,” p. 316; “De quelques conditions de la 
photogénie,” p. 7. For more on the animistic aspects of cinema with recourse to both Balázs and 
Epstein, see Rachel O. Moore, Savage Theory: Cinema as Modern Magic (Durham, NC: Duke 
UP, 2000).    
 
356 For Balázs, even cinematic motion was significant mainly as an “Ausdrucksmittel” or 
“Symbol” for the emotions of human characters in the narrative. See, Der sichtbare Mensch, p. 
80.   
 
357 See Richter, Filmgegner von heute, pp. 99–105. Richter’s larger conflict with Balázs was most 
directly played out during the 1929 meeting in La Sarraz, where he defended the abstraction of 
absolute film against Balázs’s demands to make films that were comprehensible to the broader 
public. For a contemporaneous account of the exchange, see M.H.K Franken, “Het congres van 
den onafhankelijken film in La Sarraz,” Filmliga 2 (1929): p. 115. 
 
358 Richter, Filmgegner von heute, p. 57. 
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constructive assembly of photochemically inscribed materials. In its rejection of both 
narrative and the expressive immediacy of photography, the avant-garde’s approach to a 
cinematic “life of things” must be distinguished from the theories of Balázs and 
Epstein.359 
 In a 1929 article, “Neue Mittel der Film-Gestaltung,” Richter singles out Fernand 
Léger’s Ballet mécanique as an exemplary avant-garde transformation of the inanimate 
object. “Das Objekt, vorerst tote Dekoration,” he writes, “wird bei [Léger] zum 
filmischen Lebewesen.”360 After quoting Léger’s own emphatic critique of the narrative 
and literary aspects of film, Richter goes on to dismiss the animating potential of 
photographic representation. “An und für sich ist [...] der Gegenstand, sofern er nur 
einfach abfotografiert (gefilmt) ist, noch eine tote Sache,” Richter writes.361 Rather, it is 
only through the productive shaping of light and movement, he continues, that an object 
could be freed from a mere photographic reproduction of naturalistic appearances and 
movement and be elevated to a truly animate, “filmic being.” Here, Richter resituates the 
cinematic animation of objects according to the earlier production aesthetics of absolute 
film, which understood the art of cinema (in Moholy-Nagy’s words) as “Bewegungs-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
359 In his discussion of Balázs, Tobias Wilke develops a reading of Richter’s Vormittagsspuk as a 
reflection on the transformation of objects in film into a “ghostly” realm of optical isolation and 
untouchability. While I take issue with his close pairing of Balázs and Richter, my reading of 
avant-garde cinema is directly encouraged by Wilke’s insistence on a self-reflective dimension to 
Richter’s work. But rather than focus on the photographic close-up, I follow the avant-garde’s 
avowed ambivalence toward the photographic nature of cinema and focus instead on animation 
and movement. This should not detract, however, from Wilke’s valuable discussion of Balázs in 
relation to larger media-historical debates on an “immediate” perception of things. Cf. Wilke, 
Medien der Unmittelbarkeit, pp. 62–70.      
 
360 Richter, “Neue Mittel der Film-Gestaltung,” Die Form 4.3 (1929): pp. 53–56, here p. 54. 
 
361 Ibid., p. 54. 
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beziehungen der Lichtprojektionen.” Taking shape in relation to the specific productive 
capabilities of cinema, the animation of objects in the cinematic avant-garde, as I will 
show, also foregrounds the material operations of the cinematic apparatus itself, as well 
as the specific cinematic techniques used to animate things. If one can speak of an 
“animistic tendency” in the experience of cinematically animated objects, the avant-garde 
persistently undercuts and disrupts this experience by visibly demonstrating the material 
mechanisms behind the effects. Taking a hint from Richter’s article, Léger’s Ballet 
mécanique will prove an exemplary film for briefly explicating these issues. 
 
Avant-Garde Animation 
In a 1922 essay on the feature film La Roue, Léger described how, “the machine [a 
speeding locomotive] becomes the leading character, the leading actor. It will be Abel 
Gance’s honor that he has successfully presented an actor object (acteur objet) to the 
public.”362 When Léger began work on his own film the following year, he expressly 
avoided developing a similarly dramatic “actor object” within a cinematic narrative. In 
unpublished notes taken down shortly after his 1923–24 production of Ballet mécanique, 
Léger claimed instead that the goal of avant-garde cinema was to “construct films 
without scenarios by treating the moving image [itself] as the leading character (l’image 
mobile comme personnage principal).”363 Produced in collaboration with American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
362 Fernand Léger, “La Roue: Its Plastic Quality” [1922], in French Film Theory and Criticism, 
vol. 1, pp. 271–74, here p. 272. (emphasis in original). For the French original, see Léger, “Essai 
critique sur la valeur plastique du film d’Abel Gance La Roue,” in Fonctions de la peinture 
(Paris: Éditions Gonthier, 1965), pp. 160–63, here p. 160. 
 
	  
	   255	  
	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure 4.6a. Fernand Léger and Dudley Murphy. Ballet mécanique, 1924. Film stills. 
 
cameraman Dudley Murphy, Ballet mécanique’s “leading character” presents itself as a 
shocking and heterogeneous flurry of manufactured commodities, kitchen utensils, 
abstract shapes, numbers and text, moving machinery, amusement park rides, and 
isolated fragments of the human body and face (figure 4.6a). The disparate objects appear 
less significant in themselves than as mechanical components within the overall 
cinematic composition, linked together by visual rhythms (constructed both within and 
between individual shots) as well as abstract similarities of shape, shade, texture, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 Fernand Léger, “Ballet Mécanique” [c. 1924], in Functions of Painting, ed. Edward F. Fry 
(New York: Viking Press, 1973), pp. 48–51, here p. 49 (emphasis in original). For the French, see 
Léger, “Autour du Ballet mécanique,” in Fonctions de la peinture, pp. 164–67, here p. 165. 
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composition. While Léger emulates the visual fragmentation and accelerated, rhythmical 
editing found in the opening train sequence of Gance’s La Roue, his Ballet mécanique 
denies any reference or significance of his objects within a self-enclosed, diegetic world 
of human actors and things. Instead, by eliminating all “dramatic” and “emotional” 
content, Léger’s film presents its leading character (the moving image) as a purely 
“plastic event” that confronts the cinematic viewer directly.364 
In language similar to Balázs and Epstein’s, Léger also essentialized the technique 
of the close-up as a means of animating things. In the same notes on Ballet mécanique, he 
writes: “I used the close-up, which is the only cinematographic invention. Fragments of 
objects were also useful; by isolating a thing you give it a personality (personnalise).”365 
Léger’s film is indeed shot largely in close-up, functioning to optically isolate, estrange, 
and heighten the significance of objects (as theorized by Balázs and Epstein). But without 
a narrative context, Léger’s use of close-up appears more in the spirit of what Tom 
Gunning has famously called the “cinema of attractions”: “The enlargement is not a 
device expressive of narrative tension; it is in itself an attraction and the point of the 
film.”366 In a further resonance with the “attractions” of early cinema, Léger’s Ballet 
mécanique contains close-ups of a woman’s face––that of Man Ray’s companion, Kiki de 
Montparnasse––which both stages and returns the gaze of the viewer, thus disrupting any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
364 Léger’s distinction between a dramatic, emotional, and plastic state of film can be found in 
“La Roue: Its Plastic Quality,” pp. 271–72. For a broader reading of Léger’s and the French 
cinematic avant-garde’s reception of Gance’s La Roue, see Standish Lawder’s classic study, The 
Cubist Cinema (New York: New York UP, 1975), pp. 79–97. 
 
365 Léger, “Ballet Mécanique,” p. 50 (my emphasis). “Autour du Ballet mécanique,” p. 166. 
 
366 Tom Gunning, “The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde” 
[1986], in Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. Thomas Elsaesser (London: British Film 
Institute, 1990), pp. 56–62, here p. 58.  
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voyeuristic absorption in the moving image with a direct exhibitionist appeal. If the 
close-ups on Kiki’s face present any “personality,” as Léger claims, it is certainly without 
an expressive “physiognomy” through which to read emotional depth. Her features are 
reduced rather to repetitive movements and a blank doll-like appearance. The overall 
“personality” of Léger’s moving-image “character” emerges rather through an erotic 
resonance between the pervasive, machinic rhythms of the film and the fragmented close-
ups on Kiki’s mechanically blinking, smiling, and rotating face. Combining the direct 
eroticism of early cinema with the shocking, mechanical fragments of Gance’s La Roue, 
Léger’s Ballet mécanique presents a clear case of an exhibitionist cinema of attractions: a 
visually dynamic and shocking moving-image, which also looks back at the viewer.367  
To focus on Léger’s images mainly as visual attractions, however, would be to 
overlook the ways that the film visibly foregrounds its own means of production. The 
representation of animated objects in Léger’s Ballet mécanique is not only a series of 
shocking attractions but also a self-reflection on the cinematic techniques and material 
apparatus behind the effects. To start with the close-up technique, the film does not 
simply tightly frame objects giving the viewer an immediate experience of the close- 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
367 Cinema’s unique power of “making images seen,” which marks Gunning’s point of departure, 
is itself borrowed from Léger’s essay on Gance’s La Roue. While Gunning does not mention 
Léger’s own film here, Ballet mécanique provides perhaps one of the most convincing 
connections between early cinematic attractions and the avant-garde. For Gunning’s discussion of 
Léger as well as the exhibitionism of early and avant-garde cinema, see ibid., pp. 56–57. While it 
is beyond the scope of the present discussion, representations of the fragmented female body and 
stagings of the male gaze in films like Ballet mécanique and Richter’s Vormittagsspuk demand a 
thorough feminist critique. Beyond more familiar critiques of the gaze, the focus on cinema as an 
“art of movement” also points toward a new field of critical feminist inquiry, which links 1920s 
cinema to modern dance. For work in this direction, see Michael Cowan, “Bewegungskunst,” in 
Hans Richters Rhythmus 21, pp. 58–72; and, along with Barbara Hales, their special edition on 
dance and film of Seminar: A Journal of Germanic Studies 46.3 (September 2010). 
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Figure 4.6b. Fernand Léger and Dudley Murphy. Ballet mécanique, 1924. Film stills.	  
 
range vision of isolated fragments. Rather, Léger’s close-ups are themselves additionally 
fragmented within the frame through the use of distorting optics as well as a portable 
aperture that is variously placed to isolate and obscure parts of Kiki’s face. If isolated 
objects gain a “personality” in cinematic close-up, Ballet mécanique reveals this effect to 
be an artificial construction by making the isolating frame a material element of the 
film’s visual content. Through the use of a prism or set of teleidoscopic mirrors, Léger’s 
film demonstrates further that an object in close-up could just as easily be visually 
multiplied to form abstract compositions of moving light. In perhaps the most overtly 
self-reflective moment of the film, a reflective metallic sphere is filmed swinging along 
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the axis of the camera. Oscillating between an abstract composition of bending light and 
a convex reflection of the camera and its operator in the studio, the dynamic moving 
image reveals itself as but a product of selective framing and the manipulation of light 
and movement in front of a stationary camera (figure 4.6b).368 
Beyond the coordinated use of photographic close-ups and mirrors, Léger’s Ballet 
mécanique also engages directly with techniques of artificially constructed animation. In 
sequences that Richter himself points out in Filmgegner von heute, the film produces the 
semblance of autonomously moving things through a montage of still images (see figure 
4.1). In the concluding section of the film, in particular, Léger presents an image-series of 
variously positioned mannequin legs, which, as the montage is accelerated, gives the 
impression of dancing legs. Establishing the images first as reproductions of stationary 
arrangements, Léger’s film enables its viewers to perceive the mechanism behind the 
illusion, by showing how the separate static images only gradually coalesce into an 
animated thing.369 The clearly missing phases of movement in the montage sequence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
368 Postwar British avant-garde filmmaker Malcolm Le Grice credits this sequence in Ballet 
mécanique as, “the first direct reference to the machinery of cinema as part of the content of 
film.” See Le Grice, “On Léger, Vertov and the Flicker Film” [1977], in Experimental Cinema in 
the Digital Age (London: British Film Institute, 2001), pp. 41–53, quoted here, p. 43. 
 
369 Here again, Léger’s film might be understood as a replay and radicalization of early cinematic 
attractions. Rereading the myth of early responses to the first screenings of the Lumière brothers’ 
L’ Arrivée d’un train à la gare de La Ciotat, Tom Gunning explains how early cinema sought to 
astonish audiences by staging the transformation of a still projected image into an animated one. 
Rather than being terrified by a mistaken reality of the moving image, early audiences were thus 
prepared to experience the transformative power of the apparatus behind the illusion. See 
Gunning, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)Credulous Spectator,” in 
Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing Film, ed. Linda Williams (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 
1995), pp. 114–33. In his discussion of L’ Arrivée d’un train, Gunning provides the following 
formulation, which parallels my understanding of avant-garde animation: “What is displayed 
before the audience is less the impending speed of the train than the force of the cinematic 
apparatus. Or to put it better, the one demonstrates the other” (p. 118). 
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serve as a visually irritating reminder that the experience of a meaningful animation of 
things (the experience of “dancing” or “nodding,” for example) is as much a product of 
the viewer as it is of the cinematic apparatus itself. The viewer’s animistic imagination is 
provoked even further by the replication of similar, rhythmic movements with objects 
like wine bottles and kitchen utensils, which bear no direct anthropomorphic 
resemblance.  
In its self-reflective treatment of the close-up frame and animation sequence, 
Ballet mécanique also points to cinema’s material substrate: the serial frames of the 
celluloid filmstrip. The film’s strategies of spatial and temporal fragmentation, that is to 
say, already suggest to the viewer a sense of the static sequence of frames behind the 
illusion. In the film’s famous loop of a washerwoman climbing a set of stairs, Léger 
confronts the viewer even more directly with the materiality of the animated image (with 
its basis in repeatable, photographic inscription and the splicing together of celluloid 
strips). As Rudolf Kurtz indicates in his 1926 study Expressionismus und Film, the 
irritating rhythmic repetition of the woman’s movements in Ballet mécanique provokes 
the viewer to intuit the film’s materiality. Describing the looped movements in a long, 
fragmented, and repeating sentence, Kurtz’s text in fact verbally performs this visual 
irritation for the reader before ending with the sudden realization of the sequence’s 
material construction:  
[eine alte Frau] marschiert plötzlich einen Feldweg herauf, grüßt freundlich 
winkend, erreicht das Ziel und ist plötzlich wieder am Anfang, strebt emsig 
hinauf, grüßt freundlich, ist aufatmend oben und beginnt wieder unermüdlich zu 
steigen [...] und wieder, unten, oben, unten, oben, unten, winkend, lächelnd, 
anfangsfreudig, oben, unten . . . das Filmband ist ein Dutzendmal aneinander 
geklebt.370 
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In Kurtz’s performative reconstruction of the viewer’s experience, Léger’s calculated 
loop-sequence thus succeeds not only in producing shock; the viewer also comes to a 
sudden recognition of the effect’s material basis. 
In his 1923 film Retour à la raison, Man Ray drew attention to the materiality of 
film just as forcefully through a direct animation of things.371 As Noam Elcott carefully 
describes, Man Ray used a cameraless technique similar to his still photograms or 
“rayographs,” producing segments of the film by placing small objects like thumbtacks, 
pins, salt crystals, and coiled wire directly on celluloid filmstrips before exposing them to 
light in his darkroom.372 When cinematically projected, the rayographically inscribed 
filmstrips (printed in both positive and negative) appear as frenetic and rhythmically 
animated things, alternating between the visual “noise” and fragmentation of salt and 
pins, on the one hand, and a synthesized image of animated tacks and springs, on the 
other (figure 4.7). As Richter well recognized, Man Ray approached photography not as a 
means of objectively reproducing external realities but rather as “lichtempfindliches 
Material” for the productive shaping of new, visual experiences though interactions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 Kurtz, Expressionismus und Film, pp. 104–5 (emphasis added). 
 
371 Retour à la raison would itself have considerable influence on Ballet mécanique through 
cameraman Dudley Murphy’s close association with Man Ray. On this connection, see Rudolf E. 
Kuenzli, “Man Ray’s Films: From Dada to Surrealism,” in Avant-Garde Film, ed. Alexander Graf 
and Dietrich Scheunemann (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007), pp. 93–104, here pp. 95–96. 
 
372 See Noam M. Elcott, “Darkened Rooms: A Genealogy of Avant-Garde Filmstrips from Man 
Ray to the London Film-Makers’ Co-op and Back Again,” Grey Room 30 (Winter 2008): pp. 6–
37. Here, Elcott provides a historically and conceptually rich discussion of Man Ray’s filmstrips 
and their important legacy in relation to postwar British and American, “material” or “structural” 
films. On the production of Retour à la raison, see also Man Ray’s own account in his 
autobiography, Self Portrait (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1963), p. 260. 
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Figure 4.7. Man Ray. Retour à la raison, 1923. Film stills. 
 
 
light, material substrates, and developing and printing techniques.373 Through a related, 
productive use of cinematic materials, Man Ray’s Retour à la raison bases its perceptual 
effects on the materiality of the celluloid filmstrip and, as a result, underlines an inherent 
tension between the fragmentation of the film-frame series and its synthesis in the 
projected image.374 While the materiality of the filmstrip itself is not directly visible in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
373 Richter, “Der Amerikaner Man Ray … ,” G: Zeitschrift für elementare Gestaltung 3 (June 
1924): p. 42. Here, Richter describes a new “photographische Kultur” arising from material 




	   263	  
the projected image, the seemingly incidental and contrasting rhythms of the rayographed 
sequences indeed suggest the inner tension between fragmentation and synthesis in film, 
allowing the viewer to experience the objects as both a rapid, mechanical presentation of 
fragmented stills and a synthesized image that coalesces into an animated thing. In a 
recent article, Samantha Lackey describes Retour à la raison as a fragmented “series of 
small jolts,” but points to the rayographed sequences as a unique complication of the 
overall shock-effect of the film. In these sequences, she explains, the viewer is effectively 
suspended between experiencing an “illusion of movement” and “a series of 
discontinuous still images of the same objects.” 375 With the viewer’s attention fixed on 
the rayographed pins, thumbtacks, and springs, the objects’ fragmentary and shocking 
rhythms provoke a heightened awareness of the paradoxical nature of cinematically 
produced animation. 
 This analysis of cinematic animation indeed complicates more familiar readings 
of interwar avant-garde cinema. Through the influence of Walter Benjamin’s Kunstwerk 
essay, the notion of shock has long been a dominant category for understanding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 As Noam Elcott correctly emphasizes, the raw materiality of the rayographed filmstrips must 
be distinguished from the immateriality of their fleeting, projected image. While the material 
nature of Man Ray’s film was rediscovered within the context of postwar experimental cinema, it 
went unacknowledged throughout the 1920s. During the period of the historical avant-garde, as 
Elcott convincingly argues, it was only through Man Ray’s more famous still photograms that the 
material substrate of the film was made directly legible for the viewer. One such photogram, 
rayographically inscribed with an uncoiled filmstrip-role of Retour à la raison, appears on the 
cover of Richter’s special 1926 issue on film of G: Zeitschrift für elementare Gestaltung. See 
Elcott, “Darkened Rooms,” pp. 22–28. One might also point to the first illustration in Filmgegner 
von heute where Richter reproduces in actual size a folded filmstrip from V.I. Pudovkin’s Mother 
(1926), revealing the sprocket holes, edge lettering, gaps between frames, and transparency of the 
material strip. See Filmgegner von heute, p. 7. 
	  
375 See Samantha Lackey, “‘A series of fragments’: Man Ray’s Le Retour à la raison (1923),” in 
Between Still and Moving Images, ed. Laurent Guido and Olivier Lugon (New Barnet, Herts, UK: 
John Libbey, 2012), pp. 59–70, quoted here, p. 65. 
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perceptual effects of avant-garde film.376 As my readings have hopefully demonstrated, 
however, the shock-effects of avant-garde cinema cannot always be taken as ends in 
themselves. Rather, they are frequently part of a larger, avant-garde strategy of 
demonstrating the work’s material construction. In his book Theorie der Avantgarde, 
Peter Bürger notes the tendency of the avant-garde work to proclaim itself openly as an 
“artificial construction” (künstliches Gebilde) and explains further how the experience of 
“Schock” produced by the work––along with its refusal to provide any coherent 
meaning––provokes the viewer instead to determine the “Konstruktionsprinzipien” 
behind the effect.377 Like Benjamin, Bürger relates this dynamic most vividly to the raw 
material constructions of collage paintings by Dadaists like Kurt Schwitters (and by the 
Cubist painters before him).378 Yet when turning to film, Bürger stresses rather the 
incompatibility of the technological medium with such experiential dynamics, noting 
how cinema tends to obscure or make undetectable its material construction.379 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
376 In an early essay, Anton Kaes, for example, draws on Benjamin to describe the films of 
Richter, Léger, and Clair as aimed at the perceptual “Verblüffung, Verwirrung und Schock” of 
the viewer. See his, “Verfremdung als Verfahren: Film und Dada,” in Sinn aus Unsinn: Dada 
International, ed. Wolfgang Paulsen and Helmut G. Hermann (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1982), pp. 
71–83, here p. 80. Just recently, Andrés Mario Zervigón’s work on John Heartfield has put 
Benjamin’s discussion of shock to productive use in understanding the attraction of cartoon 
animation for the avant-garde. See his, “‘A Political Struwwelpeter?’,” in John Heartfield and the 
Agitated Image (2012), pp. 95–135. 
 
377 Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), pp. 97 and 109. 
 
378 See ibid., pp. 99–104. In his elusively brief discussion of Dadaist shocks in the Kunstwerk 
essay, Benjamin makes limited reference to the “Wortsalat” of Dadaist poetry as well as a 
Schwitters-like painting with “Knöpfe oder Fahrscheine” mounted on the canvas. See Benjamin, 
Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, Werke und Nachlaß, vol. 16, 
p. 243. 
 
379 See Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 104. Thomas Elsaesser argues similarly about 
cinema’s tendency to hide or make “fantasmatic” its own material components and instead finds 
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foregrounding of materiality, that is to say, supposedly dissipates with the fleeting, 
temporal effects of cinema. This contrast between film and the avant-garde artwork, 
however, only makes sense when failing to consider closely the actual films of the 
cinematic avant-garde. Even in their films, the avant-garde develops complex, 
representational strategies for correlating perceptual shock-effects with a self-reflexive 
demonstration of the effect’s construction.  
Benjamin, for his part, never directly addresses the films of the European avant-
garde, but asserts rather a “tactical” (taktisch) connection between the “moral” shock-
effect of Dada poetry and painting, on the one hand, and a more popularized, “physical 
shock-effect” (physische Chockwirkung) of cinema, on the other.380 For Benjamin and 
those following him, the link between avant-garde provocations and the mass medium of 
cinema is made possible through their shared technique of montage, which could produce 
jarring and estranging juxtapositions, whether in the spatial constructions of Dadaist 
collage painting and photomontage or the rapid, temporal sequences of cinematic 
montage. Yet as Miriam Hansen points out, Benjamin’s approach to cinema also moves 
well beyond the aesthetic strategies of the European avant-garde to include concerns over 
photographic indexicality and psychological mechanisms of identification, as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the overt constructions of the avant-garde work exemplified rather by Duchamp’s ready-mades 
and meta-cinematic machines. See Elsaesser, “Dada/Cinema?,” in Dada and Surrealist Film, pp. 
13–27, quoted here, p. 25. 
	  
380 As Tobias Wilke explains, Benjamin’s account of the related “tactile” (taktisch) shock-effects 
of Dada and film coincides with a “tactical” (taktisch) alignment, whereby cinema takes over the 
avant-garde’s task of tactically training and reorganizing human perception but on a much larger 
scale of collective, mass audiences. See Wilke, “Tacti(ca)lity Reclaimed.” Wilke’s work restores 
this important double meaning of the word “taktisch,” which had become obscured in German 
editions and translations of Benjamin’s writings. Cf. the early (1st) 1935 and later (3rd) 1936–39 
versions, quoted here, in Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk, pp. 86 and 243–44, respectively.   
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engagements with empirical realities and the propagandistic potentials of cinema. In this 
sense, she explains, “Benjamin advocates an avant-gardist film aesthetics that is less 
constructivist than citational, iconoclastic, and transformative, closer to Vertov and Vigo 
than, say, Richter, Eggeling, or even Léger and Murphy.”381 As Hansen notes elsewhere, 
one must also stress Benjamin’s affinity with certain aspects of the montage aesthetics of 
Eisenstein, whose Battleship Potemkin directly inspired a passage in the Kunstwerk 
essay.382 For Benjamin, that is to say, the shocking somatic effects of cinema have to be 
thought in complex relationship with the photographic and political content of films like 
those of the experimental Soviet cinema.  
In contrast to Benjamin’s film aesthetics or the works of Vertov and Eisenstein, 
the European avant-garde approached cinematic montage in a far more basic and directly 
material manner. Introducing the technique in Filmgegner von heute, Richter situates 
montage as simply one means of rhythmically animating objects (in addition to the 
movements of the camera and the object itself) (figure 4.8). Juxtaposing an image of 
hands splicing together film with an arrangement of montage stills, Richter’s static 
presentation ties the suggested animation of the thing (a spinning alarm clock) to its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
381 A rich discussion of Benjamin’s film aesthetics can be found throughout Hansen’s extensive 
writings. For a concise statement on the above issues along with the quoted passage, see Cinema 
and Experience, p. 200. As Anton Kaes correctly points out, the seemingly chaotic juxtapositions 
of European avant-garde films must be distinguished as well from the narrative, symbolic, and 
propagandistic function of montage in contemporaneous Soviet cinema. See Kaes, “Verfremdung 
als Verfahren,” p. 80. 
 
382 See Miriam Hansen, “Of Lightning Rods, Prisms, and Forgotten Scissors: Potemkin and 
German Film Theory,” New German Critique 95 (Spring–Summer 2005): pp. 162–79. The 
passage in question originates in a 1927 reply to a review of Eisenstein’s Potemkin and includes 
Benjamin’s famous formulation about cinema’s relationship to the “prison-world” of modern life: 
“Da kam der Film und hat diese Kerkerwelt mit dem Dynamit der Zehntelsekunden gesprengt.” 
See Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk, pp. 130 and 240; and the 1927 reply to Oscar A.H. Schmitz, in 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, pp. 751–55.    
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Figure 4.8. Hans Richter. Filmgegner von heute, 1929. Page reproduction. 
 
material substrate in a manner complementary to the fragmentary, moving animations of 
Man Ray and Léger. In an earlier, shorter version of his 1929 text, “Neue Mittel der 
Film-Gestaltung,” Richter states directly that the choice of the depicted thing is largely 
arbitrary, so long as it is constructed and rediscovered as a plastic, “cinematic object.” 
First published in Czech in 1928 and later in French in 1930, Richter’s article, with a title 
that translates as “Der Gegenstand in Bewegung,” makes reference to not only Ballet 
mécanique but also Man Ray’s 1926 film Emak Bakia, which includes the same 
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rayographed sequences as Retour à la raison. Such avant-garde films, Richter argues, 
succeed in making the first steps toward a “discovery of the cinematic object” 
(Entdeckung des filmischen Gegenstands) by “denaturalizing” (denaturalisieren) the 
normal movement of things according to the laws of cinema.383  
 Denied any narrative significance or ostensible meaning in themselves, the 
animated objects of avant-garde cinema become rather the focal points for the viewer’s 
self-reflective experience of cinematic movement. Animated objects (like the mannequin 
legs in Ballet mécanique or the spinning thumbtacks in Retour à la raison) serve as a 
nexus for such reflections given their visibly ambiguous status as both formal, artificial 
constructions of rhythmic movement and seemingly animate “Lebewesen” (to use 
Richter’s language). With regard to denaturalized motion and rhythm, Richter contests 
any hard distinction between the photographically based films of Man Ray and Léger and 
the purely abstract animations that he and Eggeling produced. In “Der Gegenstand in 
Bewegung,” Richter states: “Ich sehe keinen Unterschied zwischen den neuen Filmen, 
die natürliche Gegenstände benutzen, und solchen, die reine, sog. abstrakte Formen 
verwenden.”384 In the same 1928 article, however, he quickly revises this position by 
contrasting the “unambiguous expression” (eindeutiger Ausdruck) of abstract forms with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
383 The article was first published in Czech as “Predmet V Pohybu,” Studio 2 (1928): pp. 46–47; 
and later, slightly abridged, in French as “L’objet en mouvement,” Cercle et Carré 3 (June 30, 
1930). A German translation of the Czech version is reprinted as “Der Gegenstand in Bewegung,” 
in Goergen et al. (ed.), Hans Richter: Film ist Rhythmus, pp. 42–43, quoted here, p. 42: “Der neue 
Film beruht in der Entdeckung der natürlichen Gesetze der Kinematografie [...]. In ihren Filmen 
Ballet mécanique und Emak Bakia machten Léger und Man Ray die ersten überraschenden 
Schritte zur Entdeckung des filmischen Gegenstands. Statt des Szenariums einer naturalistisch-
theaterhaften Handlung die plastisch reale Form. [...] Theoretisch ist es gleichgültig, was für ein 
Gegenstand für den Film gewählt wird, entscheidend dabei ist nur, wie er sich bewegt, welche Art 
der Bewegung für ihn gefunden wird.”  
 
384 Richter, “Der Gegenstand in Bewegung,” p. 43. 
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the “associations” (Assoziationen) and “contingencies” (Zufälligkeiten) that come with 
photographic representations of external objects.385 As Richter later indicates in 
Filmgegner von heute, the use of photographic objects in his own cinematic works of the 
late 1920s produce experiences of motion and feeling, which are not precisely calculable 
but rather contingent upon the viewer’s own associative and imaginative involvement in 
the moving image.386 
 Despite or because of their differing effects, Richter declares both abstract, 
animated forms and the movement of photographed objects as essential components in 
the “film of tomorrow” (Film von morgen).387 Appearing the same year as “Der 
Gegenstand in Bewegung,” the 1928 film Vormittagsspuk embodies most decisively 
these contrasting tendencies in Richter’s exploration of cinematic movement. In the 
concluding section, I will discuss the productive tensions that arise in Vormittagsspuk 
between abstract constructions of formal rhythms, on the one hand, and the viewer’s 
active and associative participation in the film’s photographic content, on the other. What 
I earlier described as a widened rift in avant-garde cinema––between the well-ordered, 
formal construction of abstract animation and an unruly life of animated things on the 
level of content––will appear in Vormittagsspuk as a deliberate, aesthetic strategy for 




386 See Richter’s section of the book, “Assoziationen bilden!,” in Filmgegner von heute, pp. 79–
89. In contrast to the logical “associations of ideas” (Ideenassoziationen) found in the Soviet 
montage (pp. 80–81), Richter highlights the motion-based “associations of feeling” 
(Gefühlsassoziationen) provoked by his 1928 films Rennsymphonie and Filmstudie (pp. 88–89). 
The images selected from Rennsymphonie illustrate associations of tactile motion, while those 
from Filmstudie suggest the transformative and poetic potential of movements associated on a 
purely visual level. For the latter, see figure 4.1. 
 
387 Richter, “Der Gegenstand in Bewegung,” p. 43. 
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empowering viewers in relation to the moving image. Under the influence of filmmakers 
like Léger, Man Ray, and René Clair, Richter’s late 1920s work developed beyond the 
precise, formal construction of abstract rhythms. Just as important became the viewer’s 
active participation in the visual content of cinematic work. In addition to the “very 
deliberate, very calculated mobility and rhythm” of animated objects, emphasized by 
Léger in his notes to Ballet mécanique, avant-garde film had to distinguish itself as well 
through the “imagination and play” (la fantaisie et le jeu) that it offered its viewers.388   
 
Animating Rhythms 
Produced for the 1928 Deutsche Kammermusik festival in Baden-Baden, Richter’s 
Vormittagsspuk emerged in collaboration with Werner Graeff (co-writer of Filmgegner 
von heute) as well as Paul Hindemith, who composed the now lost, accompanying music 
for the film.389 According to a 1928 interview with Hindemith, the producers of 
Vormittagsspuk considered the work: “eine Abart des abstrakten Films, bei dem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
388 Léger, “Ballet Mécanique,” p. 49–50. “Autour du Ballet mécanique,” p. 165–66. In the same 
notes, Léger makes the telling remark that any future of avant-garde film will lie in the “limitless 
possibilities” of “animation” (le Dessin Animé). See the English and French versions, pp. 51 and 
167, respectively. Even when working with photographic and live-action images, the freedom of 
animation played a crucial role in inspiring the avant-garde’s cinematic imagination and 
experimentation with representational strategies and rhythmic techniques. 
	  
389 For details and documentation on the first screenings of Vormittagsspuk, see Goergen et al. 
(ed.), Hans Richter: Film ist Rhythmus, pp. 95–98. Appearing around the time that the dominance 
of sound film was established, the different screenings of Vormittagsspuk hold an interesting 
position with regard to shifting debates on film music in response to synchronized sound (first 
screening with accompaniment on mechanical piano in 1928 and at the same festival a year later 
with the music recorded on sound film). On Hindemith’s position within this historical context, 
see Michael Beiche, “Musik und Film im deutschen Musikjournalismus der 1920er Jahre,” Archiv 
für Musikwissenschaft 63.2 (2006): pp. 94–119. Little can be said about Vormittagsspuk’s music 
itself, however, as neither the sound version of the film nor Hindemith’s score survives.      
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Menschen nur Staffage bedeuten werden.”390 Beyond this abstract use of human figures, 
the film is most recognizable for its animation of objects, a feature highlighted even more 
prominently in the original 1928 title of the film: Bewegte Gegenstände.391 While the 
interaction between human figures and animated objects is an obvious focus in most 
readings of the film, little serious attention has been paid to the exact constructions and 
effects of the differing movements of humans and things. Given Richter’s complex 
consideration of cinematic animation and its effects, Vormittagsspuk must be read with a 
close eye to the distinctions and interactions between not only the production of 
movement and the imparting of “life” to objects, but also the animating effects of 
cinematic rhythms on the viewer’s body.   
 Prior readings of Vormittagsspuk frequently address the interaction between 
humans and animated objects as an allegory for the social and political upheavals of the 
1920s. Richter’s own retrospective comments have largely encouraged such readings, as 
does the introductory note he later added to the surviving version of the film: “The Nazis 
destroyed the sound version of this film as ‘degenerate art.’ It shows that even objects 
revolt against regimentation.”392 Furthermore, Vormittagsspuk has been commonly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
390 See Lotte Eisner’s article, “Kammermusik oder Filmmusik – die Hauptsache ist gute Musik: 
Ein Gespräch mit Professor Paul Hindemith,” Film-Kurier 155 (June 30, 1928), reprinted in 
Goergen et al. (ed.), Hans Richter: Film ist Rhythmus, quoted here p. 96.  
	  
391 Vormittagsspuk was initially the alternate, second title of the film and only became the 
primary title with the work’s rescreening as a sound film in 1929. See ibid., p. 95. 
 
392 See also the account of the film in Richter’s postwar reconstruction of the international avant-
garde, Dada – Kunst und Antikunst (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1964), p. 203: 
“[Vormittagsspuk] zeigte Rebellion der Objekte, der Hüte, Tassen, Krawatten, Schläuche etc. 
gegen den Menschen. Schließlich stellte sich dann die alte Rangordnung des Menschen-Herrn 
über die Objekt-Sklaven wieder her. Aber für diese kurze Zeit mag doch ein Zweifel an der 
Allgültigkeit der gewöhnlichen Subjekt-Objekt-Ordnung im Publikum eingetreten sein.” 
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situated as marking a major shift in Richter’s cinematic production, from an earlier 
interest in abstraction, animation, and rhythm to a broader exploration of live-action 
photography, figurative imagery, and quasi-narrative content. Marion von Hofacker 
references Vormittagsspuk’s photographic imagery, in particular, as evidence of Richter’s 
departure from earlier, aesthetic concerns of the Rhythmus films and to an explicit 
engagement with contemporaneous, sociopolitical events.393 As should be clear by now, 
however, Richter’s interest in movement and animation was not limited to his early 
abstract films. Without denying any subversive, political intent to Vormittagsspuk, I wish 
to reestablish its position among Richter’s films as both a continuation and significant 
transformation of his earlier experiments with cinema as an “art of movement.”    
 In forwarding her political reading of Vormittagsspuk, von Hofacker refers to a 
revealing 1972 interview with Richter, where he discusses the production of the film: 
We all had bourgeois bowler hats like the businessmen wore in Wall Street or in 
London. So we put black strings through the bowler hats, a piece of cardboard 
inside, a long stick, and swung these bowler hats in front of the camera. And it 
looked awfully nice. It looked like a swarm of pigeons. We mobilized any other 
objects. We tried to de-naturalize the natural movement of the objects. And we 
studied their movements. In other words, we got into the swing of the thing, into 
the swing of their lives. And we studied their lives and we conversed with them, 
so to say. In playing with them, in letting them do what they want, suddenly a 
kind of rhythm developed which became a kind of political satire.394 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
393 Due to its “concrete images and narrative content,” von Hofacker aligns Richter’s 
Vormittagsspuk more with his overtly political films like the didactic essay-film Inflation (1928) 
or the unfinished semi-documentary Metall (1931–33). See Marion von Hofacker, “Richter’s 
Films and the Role of the Radical Artist, 1927–1941,” in Foster (ed.), Hans Richter: Activism, 
Modernism, and the Avant-Garde, pp. 122–59, here p. 124; and for her political, allegorical 
reading of Vormittagsspuk, see pp. 131–36. While I do not follow this line of argumentation here, 
it should be noted that Foster’s volume as a whole does an admirable job of restoring the 
importance of Richter’s substantial, political and organizational activities for his experimental 
aesthetics. 
 
394 Richter’s comments are reproduced in Barbara Frances Lass’s dissertation, “Hans Richter: 
Film Artist” (Teachers College, Columbia University, 1987), pp. 107–8. Von Hofacker’s 
bibliographic and citation errors have been corrected here. Cf. von Hofacker, pp. 132 and 157. 
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Von Hofacker hones in on the comment about “political satire,” and indeed, as she 
explains, the figure of the flying hat in the film has a rich history as a symbol of 
individual and social crisis from Franz Schubert’s Winterreise to the films of Charlie 
Chaplin. (On Chaplin’s famous derby hat, for example, Walter Benjamin notes: “seine 
Melone, die auf dem Kopf keinen festen Ort mehr hat, verrät, daß die Herrschaft der 
Bourgeoisie wackelt.”395) While a metaphoric reading of the flying hat is valid, I would 
like to focus instead on Richter’s description of the moving image’s production: the 
denaturalizing and animistic play with the movement of things and the imaginative 
generation of visual associations.  
Like Léger’s and Man Ray’s films, Richter’s Vormittagsspuk is particularly 
striking for the way it foregrounds its means of animating objects and makes this part of 
the film’s visual content. A similarly percussive and temporally fragmented animation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Contrary to von Hofacker’s claim, the source of the interview is not unknown, but originates in 
Cecile Starr’s short 1972 film-interview with Richter (four years before his death), titled “Richter 
on Film” and included on the video release, Hans Richter: Early Avant-Garde Films (New York: 
Arthouse, 1996). As a rule, I have avoided relying on Richter’s extensive, post-WWII writings 
and commentary on his avant-garde production of the 1920s. The vast majority of scholarship on 
Richter is marred by an uncritical replication of Richter’s self-mythologizing interpretations of 
his own work, stressing a teleology of aesthetic progress with his shift from painting to film, as 
well as questionable accounts of his roles in various avant-garde movements and provocations. 
See, for example, Richter, “Easel–Scroll–Film,” Magazine of Art 45 (Feb. 1952): pp. 78–86; 
“Dada und Film,” in Dada: Monographie einer Bewegung, ed. Willy Verkauf (Teufen: Arthur 
Niggli, 1958), pp. 57–67; as well as Dada – Kunst und Antikunst (1964). An exception is made 
here, however, where Richter addresses in concrete terms the manner of producing his films.   
 
395 See von Hofacker, “Richter’s Films and the Role of the Radical Artist,” pp. 133. Quoted here 
is Walter Benjamin, “Hitlers herabgeminderte Männlichkeit” [1934], in Gesammelte Schriften, 
vol. 6, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1985), pp. 103–4, here p. 104. The flying hat as a symbol of personal crisis appears in Schubert’s 
“Der Lindenbaum” (with text by Wilhelm Müller) from the Winterreise song cycle (1827). To 
von Hafacker’s examples, we might also add the flying hat in Jakob van Hoddis’s famous 
“Weltende” (1911), a poem that Richter would have been intimately familiar with from his early 
days in expressionist circles.  
	  
	   274	  
          
       
          
	  	  	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  
	  
Figure 4.9. Hans Richter. Vormittagsspuk, 1928. Film stills. 
 
things can be found in Richter’s stop-motion sequences of a rotating bowtie and collar 
and a collection of pistols. While the animation is more seamless than in Léger’s and 
Man Ray’s films, a related self-reflective gesture is clearly at work. After a stop-motion 
sequence showing a bowtie coming magically undone against the will of its wearer, 
Richter animates the same collar and tie alone on a bare white surface as if to 
demonstrate the technique to the viewer. And the sequences of animated pistols appear in 
both positive and negative prints, suggesting the illusion’s basis as but a photochemical 
reality (figure 4.9). With its animation of the flying bowler hats, Richter’s film also enters 
into a different territory of live-action filming. But here too, the basis of the illusion is 
revealed to the viewer. The means of animating the hats is clearly inscribed in the image-
content of the film through the visible inclusion of the strings and long sticks that were 
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Figure 4.10. Hans Richter. Vormittagsspuk, 1928. Film stills. 
 
 
used to suspend and manipulate the hats (figure 4.10a). The cameraman’s struggle to 
keep the flying hats in view also underscores that their apparent animation is simply the 
effect of visual isolation and framing, achieved by the coordinated movements of the 
suspended objects and a portable camera. It would be a mistake to take this all as simply 
a shortcoming of the film, however. Richter’s work is intentionally not an illusionary 
cinema. 
 While Vormittagsspuk clearly foregrounds its means of animating things, the film 
also encourages the viewer to participate in these constructed movements. The flying hats 
are frequently framed so that only the human actor’s hands can be seen reaching to 
subdue the rebellious objects (figure 4.10b). The viewer is therefore able to identify with 
the chase and get “into the swing of the thing, into the swing of their lives” just like 
Richter and his crew. The animistic play behind the production of the film is thus re-
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produced in the viewer’s embodied experience of the projected movements. As Richter 
notes in Filmgegner von heute, the difference between artificial and natural motion is 
erased through the “feeling” (Gefühl) of cinematic movement.396 Vormittagsspuk exploits 
this insight as a general productive principle by purposefully denaturalizing the 
movements of objects through cinematic techniques of camera movement, editing, slow 
and reverse motion, as well as stop-motion animation. The result is a dynamic series of 
animated objects, which draw the viewer in with their playful and flowing rhythms of 
repetition and reversal: windows open and shut, hoses unwind and magically coil back 
up, a tea set smashes to the ground and later leaps back into the air unbroken, etc.397 
As Tom Gunning has recently argued, cinematic motion “need not be realistic to 
have a ‘realistic’ effect, that is, to invite the empathic participation, both imaginative and 
physiological, of viewers.”398 The denaturalizing animation of objects in Richter’s 
Vormittagsspuk engages the viewer in very similar ways. Like René Clair’s account of 
the viewer becoming an “active person,” Richter’s audience is invited to take part in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
396 Richter, Filmgegner von heute, p. 89. 
	  
397 With its use of playful repetitions and trick techniques, Richter’s film converges with aspects 
of Benjamin’s notion of a filmic “Spielraum.” Avant-garde works like Richter’s, however, lack 
an emphasis on photographic indexicality, which is crucial for Benjamin’s related conception of 
the “optical unconscious.” See, in particular the 2nd version of Das Kunstwerk, pp. 130–33 and 
the note on mimesis, pp. 119–21. For a detailed discussion of the concept of play in Benjamin’s 
film aesthetics, see Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Room-for-Play: Benjamin’s Gamble with Cinema,” 
October 109 (Summer 2004): pp. 3–45.   
 
398 Gunning, “Moving Away from the Index: Cinema and the Impression of Reality,” differences: 
A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 18.1 (2007): pp. 29–52, here p. 46. Gunning’s theoretical 
discussion of movement and animation in cinema (in contrast to its photographic nature), as he 
makes clear, has historical precedent in the theory and practice of 1920s avant-garde cinema. 
While Gunning does not mention Richter, the filmmaker’s late 1920s writings on cinema present 
remarkably similar arguments to Gunning’s about the “realistic” effects of artificially produced 
motion. Cf. Filmgegner von heute, pp. 28–33; and “Neue Mittel der Film-Gestaltung,” p. 56.        
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moving image, identifying with the embodied, physiological movements involved in 
chasing after the animated objects. The viewer’s imaginative participation is also 
encouraged as the sequences of flowing and repeating animations suggest a whole array 
of visual associations, which multiply far beyond the birds and flying hats mentioned in 
Richter’s retrospective comments to include coiled hoses, clocks, targets, balls, ladders, 
and legs. Critics have frequently noted the surreal and dream-like nature of these 
resemblances, but rarely identify the crucial importance of motion for tying them 
together. If Vormittagsspuk achieves a sort of animistic empathy and imagination with 
respect to the “lives” of things, as Richter’s retrospective comments suggest, this is 
achieved through the viewer’s playful involvement in the film’s denaturalized 
movements and rhythms.         
 In general, the individual animated objects in Richter’s Vormittagsspuk appear in 
longer sequences with flowing trajectories. At the same time, these individual animation 
sequences are perpetually interrupted in the film by staccato, formal rhythms achieved 
through rapid editing. In a deliberate inversion, the flowing movements of animated 
things are frequently disrupted by regular, mechanical rhythms constructed from images 
of human actors: repetitive movements of men marching in unison, aiming guns, 
searching, crawling, boxing, and climbing ladders. (The clear overtones of regimentation 
and militarism in the film’s representation of humans indeed make one quick to side with 
the rebellious objects!399) This conflict is played out as well, on an abstract formal level, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
399 As von Hofacker notes, Richter’s Vormittagsspuk originated with a script by his collaborator 
Werner Graeff involving a “rebellion of revolvers.” Richter opposed and modified the script, 
arguing that revolvers that rebel would not shoot and instead added numerous other animated 
objects to this initial motif. See von Hofacker, pp. 131–32.  
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through the contrasting, rhythmic movements themselves: an animated and flowing 
“play” of things, on the one hand, and an accelerated, regular cadence associated with the 
movements of humans. The reflexive device of the clock, which both begins and ends the 
film, encompasses both of these rhythmic regimes. At times, it ticks in regular cadence in 
quick cuts along with the mechanical rhythms of the human actors. Appearing in between 
longer sequences of animated things, however, the changing position of the clock hands 
indicates a stretching, compression, or reversal of time commensurate with the objects’ 
denaturalized movements. At the same time, the clock also figures throughout the film as 
an extra-diegetic element aligned with the mechanical workings of the cinematic 
apparatus itself. It ticks off a duration of time at the very beginning and then reappears 
periodically throughout the film in order to punctuate the action as a formal, rhythmic 
element in itself. 
 In his detailed study of 1920s rhythm debates, Michael Cowan outlines a 
distinction between two different types of rhythm inherited from turn-of-the-century 
work science, Karl Bücher’s Arbeit und Rhythmus (1896), most notably. In works like 
Vom Wesen des Rhythmus (1923) by vitalist philosopher Ludwig Klages, Bücher’s 
distinction between pre-modern, communal work rhythms and the mechanical rhythms of 
modern industrial production becomes amplified as part of a pessimistic diagnosis of 
modern, technological culture. Klages, in particular, emphatically distinguishes the vital, 
physiological and cosmic rhythms of biological processes and planetary cycles 
(Rhythmus) from the rational, mechanical cadences of modern technology and clock-time 
(Takt).400 While this distinction was treated with far more ambivalence in cultural 
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production of the 1920s, artists frequently looked to rhythm (especially in time-based, 
visual arts like dance and film) as a means of affecting the vital, physiological rhythms of 
the human body. For avant-garde filmmakers in particular, as Cowan explains, cinematic 
rhythms were seen as a way of accessing and influencing the emotions and sensations of 
the viewer directly without appealing to their conscious involvement in the plot and 
images of the filmic content. As a mechanical technology itself, Cowan argues, cinema 
could be engaged as an interface or mediator between vital rhythms of the body and the 
measured Takt of the machine.401       
 The distinction between flowing and mechanical rhythms fits nicely with the 
contrasting movements in Vormittagsspuk. But as Richter himself acknowledges in 
Filmgegner von heute, the direct rhythmical element is far more pronounced in purely 
abstract film: “stärker muß der Rhythmus sein in Filmen ohne eigentliche Handlung, am 
stärksten aber in Filmen ohne Gegenstände, an denen sich das Bewußtsein des 
Beschauers orientieren kann.”402 Richter goes on to cite the power of rhythm to improve 
the efficiency of human labor (and includes a large photograph of men performing 
manual labor), before concluding: “Der Rhythmus wirkt gleichsam als Naturprinzip 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 For a detailed discussion of these rhythm debates and their cultural historical connections, see 
Michael Cowan, Technology’s Pulse: Essays on Rhythm in German Modernism (London: 
Institute of Germanic and Romance Studies, 2011). 
 
401 See, in particular, Michael Cowan, “The Heart Machine: ‘Rhythm’ and Body in Weimar Film 
and Fritz Lang’s Metropolis,” Modernism/modernity 14.2 (2007): pp. 225–48. In addition to 
Richter, Cowan cites prominently the writings of French filmmaker Germaine Dulac for an 
articulation of the unconscious, embodied and emotional effects of cinematic rhythms. See, for 
example, Dulac, “Aesthetics, Obstacles, Integral Cinégraphie” [1926], in French Film Theory 
and Criticism, vol. 1, pp. 389–97. Here, Dulac describes: “a rhythm of arranged movements in 
which the shifting of a line, or of a volume in a changing cadence creates emotion without any 
crystallization of ideas” (p. 394).      
 
402 Richter, Filmgegner von heute, p. 93. 
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unwiderstehlich –– .”403 Turning the page after the dash, the reader of Filmgegner von 
heute is abruptly transitioned from an image of laboring humans to the purely abstract 
compositions of avant-garde filmstrips (see figure 4.2). Cowan focuses on such passages 
in Richter’s writing as evidence of his knowledge of Bücher’s writings and the related 
rhythm debates of the 1920s. The direct comparison between bodily work-rhythms and 
the abstract rhythms of avant-garde animation provides a sound basis for reading 
Richter’s early Rhythmus films as an attempt at tapping into and directly affecting not 
only the viewers’ sensations and emotions but also the physiological rhythms of their 
bodies. Citing Richter’s important 1924 treatise on abstract film, “Die schlecht trainierte 
Seele,” Cowan reads Richter’s Rhythmus films as a means of bringing these primal 
aspects of human life under the rational control of the artist’s constructivist will.404 
Returning to Richter’s Vormittagsspuk, however, the situation is complicated 
considerably by the film’s photographic depiction of concrete objects and human actors. 
On close analysis, Richter’s constructive use of photographic materials in Vormittagsspuk 
bears a frequent, formal resemblance to his early Rhythmus films. Human figures move in 
and out of the frame according to regular, repetitive, and symmetrical rhythms just like 
the rectangular shapes in Rhythmus 21 (as if to perform the direct transformative effects 
of cinematic rhythms on the human body) (figure 4.11). As mentioned before, however, 




404 See Richter, “Die schlecht trainierte Seele,” G 3 (1924): pp. 44–47. See also Cowan’s reading 
of this text along with the passage from Filmgegner von heute quoted above (within the related 
context of 1920s advertising films) in his recent article, “Advertising, Rhythm, and the Filmic 
Avant-Garde in Weimar: Guido Seeber and Julius Pinschewer’s Kipho Film,” October 131 
(Winter 2010): pp. 23–50, here pp. 33–35. For the broader, cultural-historical resonances of 
Richter’s abstract films, see Forschungsnetzwerk BTWH (ed.), Hans Richters Rhythmus 21.  
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Figure 4.11. Hans Richter. Vormittagsspuk, 1928 and Rhythmus 21, 1923. Film stills. 
 
these regular, mechanical rhythms of human actors are in constant interference with the 
flowing movements of the animated things, which invite the viewer’s active and 
conscious participation in the image’s content. (They are, as Richter suggests, 
“Gegenstände, an denen sich das Bewußtsein des Beschauers orientieren kann.”) These 
two types of cinematic movement are mutually disruptive in the film. Any immersive 
participation in the movement of animated objects is quickly destroyed by the percussive, 
editing rhythms used in the depiction of the humans’ mechanical movements. In turn, any 
attempt at directly influencing the viewer through these strong, abstract rhythms is also 
disrupted by the viewer’s playful and imaginative involvement in the images’ content: 
their participation in “playing” with things and imagining associations among the various 
visual elements in the film. Along with the deliberate exposure of the film’s means of 
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production, the result of this interference is a powerful distancing effect on the viewer, 
who is enabled to experience the various cinematic effects without loosing sight of their 
artificial construction.405  
 After this closer analysis of the film, the difference between Richter’s early 
abstract films and Vormittagsspuk appears not so much as a shift from issues of 
movement and rhythm to that of photographic imagery and narrative content. It is instead 
a decisive move to incorporate the earlier avant-garde emphasis on perceptual training 
within a broader, popular project of empowering the cinematic viewer. This shift is 
paralleled in Richter’s own writing, which moves from provocative manifestos in early-
1920s avant-garde periodicals (on the artist’s willful, psychic and physiological training 
of the viewer through cinematic rhythms), to a transparent project of educating the viewer 
about cinematic techniques and their effects in popular late-1920s publications like 
Filmgegner von heute. Elsewhere, Richter directly states his desire to produce films for a 
broader audience without compromising the imaginative possibilities and estranging 
effects that were crucial to avant-garde cinema.406 The general public should demand 
such films, Richter claims, once they have familiarized themselves with the full range of 
cinematic techniques and possibilities. Lacking such knowledge (which Richter attempts 
to impart in Filmgegner von heute), one might still come to it intuitively through regular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
405 One might argue that this tension is already nascent in Richter’s Rhythmus 21, which, in 
contrast to Ruttmann and Eggeling’s abstract films, perpetually disrupts the viewer’s absorption 
in regular rhythms through abrupt jump cuts and disruptions of the relationship between 
foreground and background. Cowan himself notes as much and cites the close formal analysis of 
the film by Standish Lawder and Malcolm Turvey. See Cowan, “The Heart Machine,” pp. 245–
46, note 44. 
 
406 See, for example, Richter’s 1929 articles, “Der absolute Film braucht die Industrie” and 
“Leitsätze einer Vorhutarbeit,” both reprinted in Goergen et al. (ed.), Hans Richter: Film ist 
Rhythmus, pp. 43–45 and 46, respectively.  
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visits to the cinema. Since the commercial, narrative films are largely identical, Richter 
argues in “Der Gegenstand in Bewegung,” the sheer repetition of the experience might 
lead one to uncover the “Rhythmus, Tempo, Takt und der plastische Wert der einzelnen 
Formen,” which comprise the inner structure of the cinematic image.407 At the conclusion 
of Filmgegner von heute, Richter offers an optimistic picture of the new film culture that 
could emerge in Germany: larger, appreciative audiences informed about the cinematic 
arts and a more widespread, independent production of experimental low-budget films, 
funded by private investors and disseminated according to the models of French avant-
garde theaters and ciné-clubs.408 
* * * 
Richter’s vision obviously did not come to pass. For one, he grossly underestimated the 
eclipsing effect that the advent of sound film would have on the earlier visual strategies 
of the cinematic avant-garde. (As late as 1929, Richter still claimed that synchronized 
sound did not change the basic principles of film, but that sound might be used 
productively as yet another constructive element alongside the optical rhythms of 
cinema.409) More importantly, the late 1920s and 30s brought economic and political 
realities, which forced Richter to seek out commercial and industrial film work as well as 
more direct, political engagements, such as his work on the unfinished 1931–33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
407 The same argument is repeated in “Neue Mittel der Film-Gestaltung.” See Goergen et al. (ed.), 
Hans Richter: Film ist Rhythmus, pp. 47–48 and, quoted here, p. 42. 
	  
408 See Richter, Filmgegner von heute, pp. 118–21. 
	  
409 See the section, “Ändert der Tonfilm die Situation?,” in ibid., p. 117. For an example of 
Richter’s rhythmic and non-naturalistic use of spoken words, music, and sound in cinema, see his 
sound film Alles dreht sich, alles bewegt sich! (1929) as well as relevant documentation in 
Goergen et al. (ed.), Hans Richter: Film ist Rhythmus, pp. 100–5. 
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production of the semi-documentary film Metall on the brutal suppression of a 1930 
metalworkers’ strike in Hennigsdorf outside of Berlin.410 The case of a changing 
aesthetics within Weimar cultural production is more complicated and deserves a short 
closing discussion in itself, especially in light of Devin Fore’s recent rereading of Neue 
Sachlichkeit and the return of realism during the interwar period. 
Following his superlative study Realism After Modernism, Richter’s shift from 
abstract animation to photographic figuration in the Vormittagsspuk film might be 
productively situated in relation to what Fore terms the “rehumanization” of German art 
in the 1920s.411 With Vormittagsspuk, that is to say, Richter’s initially abstract 
experiments with cinematic motion in the Rhythmus films become reinscribed in relation 
to the scale and movements of the human body. As in Fore’s discussion of interwar 
realism, the return of human figuration is not simply on the level of subject matter or 
motif. Rather, the human body also fundamentally structures the work on the level of 
technique and form.412 In Richter’s 1928 film, that is, the formal, rhythmic composition 
of the work is largely structured according to the motion of human bodies and their 
playful interactions with various objects belonging to the sphere of human use. That the 
appearance and movement of these bodies and objects is not realistic is beside the point. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
410 On this period of Richter’s film work, see Heide Schönemann’s contribution to Hans Richter: 
Film ist Rhythmus, ed. Goergen et al., pp. 115–22; and, in the same volume, the filmography to 
Richter’s 1930s work for the Swiss Werkbund and Philips Radio in the Netherlands, pp. 107–11 
and 133. On the latter, see also Hans Richters Rhythmus 21, ed. Forschungsnetzwerk BTWH, pp. 
172–82. 
 
411 See Devin Fore, Realism After Modernism: The Rehumanization of Art and Literature 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012). 
	  
412 See ibid, pp. 1–15. 
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As in Fore’s analysis, the realism is of a second order, related to artistic form. Richter’s 
disregard for the photographic nature of film resituates cinema’s realism from a straight 
reproduction of the external, natural motion of objects to an artificial production of 
articulated movements, which invite the viewer’s embodied participation. As Tom 
Gunning notes, the realism of cinematic motion lies not in the reproduction of real 
movements but rather in the repeatable production of a realistic impression of movement 
(whether those movements are in themselves naturalistic or not).413  
In the end, this larger analysis of Richter’s engagement with cinematic animation 
and its effects presents a far richer and more nuanced picture of the cinematic avant-garde 
during the 1920s. The avant-garde’s overt enthusiasm for cinematic motion cannot be 
reduced to notions of “visual music” as is often the case in readings of abstract animation. 
Nor can it be understood solely in terms of the moral and somatic shocks of Dadaist 
provocation. The cinematic production of the avant-garde indeed seeks to disrupt and 
problematize the normal, immersive and absorptive viewing habits of the film audience. 
At the same time, however, the self-reflective treatment of animation and motion in films 
by Richter and others is also aimed at a different type of cinematic reception: one in 
which the viewer is empowered to consciously experience the construction and effects of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
413 Gunning’s discussion of the “impression of reality” in cinematic motion draws on the early, 
phenomenological film-theory of Christian Metz. See Gunning, “Moving Away from the Index,” 
pp. 40–48. Devin Fore’s analysis of interwar realism does not extend to cinematic movement, as 
he is primarily interested in the re-appropriation of the techniques and genres of more traditional 
realism (linear perspective, the novel, naturalistic drama, autobiography, and portraiture, in 
particular), which reappear in new forms after the ruptures of aesthetic modernism, social 
modernity, and technological modernization. While the birth of cinema belongs to this very 
period of modernist rupture, I would argue that forms of cinematic motion undergo a parallel 
transformation (in miniature) to that described by Fore––from the early, photographic realism of 
movement in the “actuality films” of the Lumière brothers, through avant-garde experiments in 
abstract motion, and onto a rehumanized self-reflection on the realistic impression of cinematic 
movement by filmmakers like Richter and Dziga Vertov.   
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cinematic motion and actively participate and play with its visual elements. If cinematic 
technologies had fundamentally changed the nature of human perception, as Benjamin 
claims, the avant-garde not only predicted and instantiated such perceptual 
transformations through non-cinematic means. The very films of the avant-garde also 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In postwar comments related to his 1928 film Vormittagsspuk, Hans Richter provided an 
additional explanation for his cinematic animation of things. “Even objects are God’s 
children,” he writes: 
My love for objects (in my films, in preference to people, or anyhow, people only 
as objects!) does not mean a disregard for man, not a neglect. Rather it is a 
confirmation that humans are also objects, objects of historical, political, celestial 
happenings or simply objects of their own stupidity. Let them come together. 
People and objects in a space of friendly and mutual respect. Maybe the teaching 
“Love your neighbor as yourself”––the neighbor you cannot stand––will then 
approach reality, will lead to a general tendency towards an attention to the life 
of ordinary things, to an unexpected respect for the co-beings of the human 
sphere. Because, if you would become aware of Everything around you, 
constantly and without prejudice, you might then even include your neighbor.414 
 
Included under the heading “Objects are people,” Richter’s playful remarks assert a 
strangely ethical dimension to the inversion of relations between subjects and objects, 
humans and things. With regard to Vormittagsspuk, the film’s representations of 
animated objects and the mechanical, thing-like movements of humans are thus 
interpreted as a transformative vision of broad respect for one’s neighboring “co-beings.” 
Such estranging inversions, Richter claims, not only acknowledge the damaging effects 
of objectification and reification on humans, but also lead to a greater, ethical regard for 
other humans and things alike––helping to undermine the prejudiced or instrumental 
treatment of both. Ironically, the respectful treatment of other people (“the neighbor you 
cannot stand,” for example) depends on relegating humans to the newly elevated status of 
things.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
414 Hans Richter by Hans Richter, ed. Cleve Gray (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 
1971), p. 145. The above comments originate in a 1969 text, titled “Questions to Myself,” 
produced in collaborative preparation of Gray’s 1971 volume of Richter’s writings and visual art. 
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Richter’s ironic, happy vision belies, of course, the uncanny threat inherent to 
such animistic experiences of things in modernity. His own ghostly animation of 
everyday objects in Vormittagsspuk indeed revives the same uncanny effects of early 
object-animation films from around 1910. In the stop-motion films of the early “cinema 
of attractions,” there is little suggestion of a “friendly and mutual respect” among humans 
and things. Rather, the cinematic animation of domestic objects provides an unsettling, 
visual counterpart to the new, animistic anxieties arising in the unhomely environment of 
the modern city. In the writings of Rilke, Kafka, and others, the hostile presence of 
animated things (suggested by the unlocalizable sounds found in urban, domestic spaces) 
does coincide with an increased awareness and regard for one’s physical surroundings 
and human neighbors. But this attention to the surrounding life of other humans and 
things is not the basis of friendly cohabitation, but rather the symptom of anxiety, 
isolation, and estrangement. Rilke’s Malte, for his part, speaks of his neighbors as 
infectious, noisy creatures on par with the corrupted household things he imagines to live 
on the other side of his apartment walls.415 And yet Rilke turns to animation, as well, as a 
poetic means of staging and performing a more edifying relationship with things in his 
Neue Gedichte. And while Kafka might speculate on the happy belief in a household 
spirit or deity (Hausgott), his representations of the animated Odradek and the bouncing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
415 See Rainer Maria Rilke, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge [1910], in Werke: 
Kommentierte Ausgabe in vier Bänden, vol. 3: Prosa und Dramen, ed. August Stahl (Frankfurt 
am Main and Leipzig: Insel, 1996), pp. 581–84; and on the neighbor as a noisy, parasitic creature, 
pp. 572–73.  
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celluloid balls in Blumfeld’s apartment are anything but a comforting, domestic 
presence.416   
In the collected literary and cinematic works analyzed in the preceding chapters, 
the representations of animated things are shot through with these conflicting tendencies.  
The animistic imaginations present in the works of Rilke, Kafka, and Richter all display a 
profound ambivalence, capable of rendering an autonomous life of objects as an uncanny 
distortion and threat, or as a potentially transformative presence leading to a closer and 
more conscious association among humans and things. The inherent estrangement of 
animation allows it to take on this central role within modernist representational 
strategies. In modernist cultural production, as I have argued, the animation of things 
serves both as a reflection on a supposed crisis in relations between humans and things, 
as well as an alternative means of reimagining these relations. 
 Beginning with a proclaimed crisis in relations between humans and things in 
early modernist texts around 1900, the dissertation has explored a diverse set of aesthetic 
strategies for both reflecting on and remediating relations with external objects. The 
representations of animated things in Rilke’s poetry, Kafka’s prose, and Richter’s films 
develop out of common modernist insights into a perceived rupture in the very basic 
human association with the external world of things. While such representations can be 
traced back to the emergence of modernist aesthetics around 1900, they also take on a 
particular social-critical currency within the historical context of the interwar Weimar 
years. As I have shown, prominent 1920s discourses on reification, social estrangement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
416 Cf. Franz Kafka, “Aphorismus 68” [1918], in Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente II, 
Kritische Ausgabe, ed. Jost Schillemeit (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1992), p. 128: “Was ist 
fröhlicher als der Glaube an einen Hausgott!” 
	  
	   290	  
and coldness, and critiques of scientific objectivity and technology––found in various 
forms in the leftist writings of Lukács, Kracauer, Benjamin, and Adorno, as well as the 
conservative philosophies of Heidegger and Klages, among others––had a considerable 
influence in shaping the reception of literary and cinematic representations of animated 
things in modernist and avant-garde cultural production of the early twentieth century.  
Rilke’s reputation as a writer of Dinggedichte and a nostalgic preserver of things 
against modern destructive forces emerges largely out of this interwar context 
(particularly around the time of his death in 1926), with a new appreciation for the 
intimate and mimetic connections to things represented in the poet’s earlier, two-volume 
Neue Gedichte from 1907 and 1908. The strangely autonomous life of things in Kafka’s 
representation of animated figures like Odradek would become a central object of 
reflection in Benjamin and Adorno’s epistolary debates in the mid 1930s about the 
structures of commodity fetishism, reification, and the distorted status of things in 
modernity. In cinema, an early literary-informed interest in the actor-like status of 
animated objects in early trick films would develop into a major feature of interwar film 
theory and aesthetics. Beyond strictly aesthetic concerns, Béla Balázs, in his 1924 book 
Der sichtbare Mensch, would even contrast the “life” and “immediate experience of 
things” in cinema with the dominant “abstraction” and “reification” of relations under 
capitalism.417 While the avant-garde animation of things would exhibit certain discursive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
417 Béla Balázs, Der sichtbare Mensch oder die Kultur des Films [1924] (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2001), p. 104. Identifying the “Verdinglichung” and “entmaterialisierte Abstraktheit 
unserer Kultur” with the “Wesen des Kapitalismus,” Balázs begins the last paragraph of his 1924 
film-theoretical treatise with the following statement: “Diese geistige Atmosphäre der 
kapitalistischen Kultur widerspricht dem Wesen des Films, der, obwohl in ihr entstanden, einer 
Sehnsucht nach konkretem, unbegrifflichem, unmittelbarem Erleben der Dinge entspricht.”  
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connections to Balázs’s neo-Romantic notion of an inherent “physiognomy of things,” as 
well as Klages’s notion of primal “rhythms,” the experimental films of Richter and others 
would seek rather to rediscover the modern, dynamic world of objects in relation to the 
productive capabilities of the cinematic medium. Radicalizing the object-animation 
techniques of the early “cinema of attractions,” avant-garde films of the 1920s would 
directly challenge the dominant, narrative and realist-photographic modes of commercial 
filmmaking and reorient the viewer’s attention to the construction and techniques of 
cinematic animation itself.  
While the theoretical fascination with a “life of things” in the interwar years 
provides striking evidence of the diagnostic, heuristic, and therapeutic power of 
modernism’s “animistic fictions,” it also obscures an important feature of such 
representations. As argued throughout the dissertation, the representations of living things 
in the works of Rilke, Kafka, and Richter proceed with a conscious awareness of the 
artificiality of animation as a deliberate, aesthetic procedure. Here, the self-conscious 
animation of things occurs in different manners according to different, aesthetic media: in 
Richter and the avant-garde, the self-reflexive construction of animation and movement 
through visual, cinematic techniques; in Kafka, the complex narrative construction of 
interwoven relations among humans and things, with open-ended temporal and spatial 
horizons; and in Rilke, the momentary and epiphanic, personal experience of things as 
emphatically and artificially staged in the Dinggedicht. Without giving up the possibility 
of a more immediate and unestranged relationship with external objects, the modernist 
works of Rilke, Kafka, and Richter, explicitly acknowledge the role of the respective 
verbal or visual media in constituting relations with things. In this regard, early twentieth 
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century representations of animated things cannot be easily identified with currently 
fashionable theories that take “life,” “agency,” or “force” as inherent properties of things 
themselves. Internalizing the rupture between subjects and objects, humans and things, 
announced around 1900, modernist artists instead explored the complex effects of 
aesthetic media in reconstituting relations to external objects, when more immediate, 
human associations with things were deemed irretrievably lost to the past. 
Placed alongside the avant-garde production aesthetics of Richter and the 
experimental prose of Kafka, even Rilke’s decidedly more nostalgic consideration of 
things takes on more interesting contours than are usually acknowledged. In the 1946 
lecture “Wozu Dichter?” commemorating the twentieth anniversary of Rilke’s death, 
Martin Heidegger would cite a 1925 letter of the poet’s, contrasting modern, counterfeit 
things (calling them “Schein-Dinge” and “Lebens-Attrappen”) with the “living” and 
“lived” things of a longstanding, but quickly disappearing past (die belebten, die erlebten, 
die uns mitwissenden Dinge).418 Aligning Rilke’s comments with his own account of the 
modern demise of the “thingness of things” (das Dinghafte der Dinge), Heidegger 
attributes this loss to the scientific objectification and technological production of things, 
as well as their exchange and circulation in the world market.419 Four years later, in his 
famous lecture, “Das Ding,” Heidegger would attempt to resurrect the “essence of the 
thing” (das Wesen des Dinges) through the example of an earthenware jug in his Black 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
418 Quoted here, see the poet’s Nov. 13, 1925 letter to Witold Hulewicz, the Polish translator of 
his Duineser Elegien, in Rainer Maria Rilke, Briefe, vol. 2, ed. Rilke-Archiv in Weimar 
(Wiesbaden: Insel, 1950), p. 483. For Heidegger’s quotation, see his lecture, “Wozu Dichter?” 
[1946], in Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950), pp. 269–320, here, p. 291. 
  
419 Heidegger, “Wozu Dichter?” in Holzwege, p. 290–92, quoted here, p. 292. 
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Forest hut.420 Rilke’s later poetry and letters, written from his fortified retreats at the 
Duino Castle near Trieste and the Château de Muzot in Switzerland, can be easily aligned 
with a similarly nostalgic consideration of things of the past.421 In Rilke’s writings before 
1910, however, there appears a far more interesting and open-ended exploration of the 
effective power of things. Emerging out of his joint experiences of urban traumas in Paris 
and the visual arts of Rodin and others, Rilke develops a sense not of some lost essence 
of things, but rather their complex, mimetic relationship to humans. While Rilke attempts 
to construct and control more positive relations through the artifice of poetry in the Neue 
Gedichte, his broader contemporaneous writings also provide numerous accounts of the 
instability and destructive side of a mimetic “similarity” or “kinship” with things. 
* * * 
In many ways, the “turn toward things” in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries can be interpreted as a reaction to the dominant textual and subject/object 
models of social and cultural theory in preceding decades. While poststructuralist theories 
seemed to have buried the material world of things under a field of signs, signifiers, and 
texts, the postwar iterations of Marxism rearticulated the old subject/object paradigm in 
ways that made the external reality of the thing utterly inaccessible in an age of rampant 
commodification and disembodied images. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420 See Martin Heidegger, “Das Ding” [1950], in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 7: Vorträge und Aufsätze 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), pp. 165–87, quoted here, p. 176.	  
 
421 Like Heidegger’s “Das Ding,” Rilke’s above-quoted 1925 letter, written from Muzot, imagines 
the ideal thing of the past as a vessel (ein Gefäß). See Rilke, Briefe, vol. 2, p. 483. The nostalgic 
focus on traditional artisanal objects is also a predominant feature in the ninth of Rilke’s Duineser 
Elegien, where, in sections he wrote in 1922, the poet references the artisanal production of rope 
and pottery as a lost art of making things, which must be preserved through their transformation 
into some sort of invisible, poetic interiority. See Rilke, Duineser Elegien [1923], in Werke, vol. 
2: Gedichte, 1910 bis 1926, ed. Manfred Engel and Ulrich Fülleborn, pp. 228–29. 
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Appropriating and broadly extending Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism, Guy 
Debord’s Society of the Spectacle (1967), for example, described an unbridgeable 
separation between the qualitative reality of things as things and their status as 
commodities and images. Congealed into an all-encompassing spectacle, the total 
commodification of the world, according to Debord, replaced “lived experience” with the 
“self-movement of the spectacle” as the dominant reality of postwar capitalistic 
society.422 Around the very same time, Jean Baudrillard would describe the wholesale 
transformation of traditional “living objects” (like tools, furniture, or a house) into mere 
“signs” through the processes of commodification and consumption; and he would later 
give up any notion of a non-reified, non-commodified state of things, dissolving reality 
into the hyperreal of simulation.423 Addressing a similar phantasmagoric status of things 
as signs and commodities in his 1977 book Stanzas, Giorgio Agamben would deem this 
situation: “the World of Odradek.”424 
While the things of modernist literature have often suffered a comparable fate, 
becoming either signs or commodities in postwar interpretations, astute literary readers 
like Roland Barthes made efforts to acknowledge the challenge posed by aesthetic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
422 See Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle [1967], trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New 
York: Zone, 1995), quoted here, p. 26. 
 
423 See, respectively, Jean Baudrillard, The System of Objects [1968], trans. James Benedict 
(London and New York: Verso, 2005), quoted here, p. 218; and his essay, “The Precession of 
Simulacra,” in Simulacra and Simulation [1981], trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor, MI: 
Univ. of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 1–42. On Baudrillard’s move away from his 1960s use of 
Marxist concepts like reification and alienation, see Andreas Huyssen, “In the Shadow of 
McLuhan: Baudrillard’s Theory of Simulation” [1989], in Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a 
Culture of Amnesia (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 175–90. 
 
424 See the second part of Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture 
[1977], trans. Ronald L. Martinez (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 29–60. 
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representations. In a 1964 paper outlining a “Semantics of the Object,” Barthes singled 
out modernist literature and film as presenting a very different understanding of things 
beyond reified signification: “The object very quickly assumes in our eyes the appearance 
or the existence of a thing which is non-human and which persists in existing, somewhat 
against us.” And he goes on to describe literary accounts of “the stubbornness the object 
has in being external to man” and the “extraordinary proliferation of objects [that] invade 
man, who cannot protect himself,” or, in film, “a more esthetic treatment of the object, 
presented as harboring a kind of essence to be reconstituted.”425 In the end, however, 
Barthes chalks this up to “the meaning of a non-meaning; [the object] is there to signify 
that it has no meaning; hence, even in such a perspective, we find ourselves in a more or 
less semantic climate.”426  
Between the simulations and spectacle of commodity culture and postwar, 
structural theories of signification, it is perhaps no wonder that art and literary scholars 
like Christoph Asendorf (in the 1980s) and Bill Brown (beginning in the late 1990s) 
would look to the cultural production of modernism for its direct challenge to the 
emerging abstraction, commodification, and semanticization of things. While there is an 
inherent nostalgia to championing this version of “modernism’s resistance to modernity” 
(as Brown calls it), there have been clear benefits for cultural-historical understanding in 
reconstructing the complexity and richness of modernism’s struggle against the supposed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
425 See Roland Barthes, “Semantics of the Object” [1964], in The Semiotic Challenge, trans. 
Richard Howard (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1994), pp. 179–90, 
quoted above, pp. 180–81. Sticking strictly to French literature and film, Barthes associates 
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426 Ibid., p. 181. 
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rupture in relations between subjects and objects, humans and things.427 As I hope to have 
demonstrated in my own readings, this modernist response was in itself highly 
ambivalent and open-ended, and involved important self-reflections on the roles that 
aesthetic media like literature and film play in constituting relations between humans and 
things. While inspired by the work of Asendorf and Brown, I have also attempted to 
avoid the more nostalgic and recuperative moods of much recent scholarship on things. 
This dimension of recent work, I would argue, can be linked to a renewed currency and 
popularization of the philosophical understanding of objects and things in Martin 
Heidegger’s work and deserves of a short critique of its own before closing the 
dissertation. 
As discussed in the introduction, the recent theorization of objects and things––in 
anthropology, social theory, and cultural, media, and science studies––has drawn 
extensively on Heidegger’s philosophical distinction between the “Objekt” or 
“Gegenstand” and the privileged “Ding.” The popular appropriation of this distinction 
and its extrapolation within contemporary theory can be traced back to the work of Bruno 
Latour, in particular. Entirely bypassing the fraught, modern relationship between 
subjects and objects, Latour has sought broadly, since the early 1990s, to collapse the 
traditional distinctions between nature and culture, reality and representation, in order to 
rearticulate society as a “collective” of humans and nonhumans, involved in a “political 
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process by which the cosmos is collected in one livable whole.”428 As he freely admits, 
Heidegger’s philosophical investigations into the being and essence of humans and things 
plays a central role in all of this, by designating a “central point where everything holds 
together, remote from subjects and objects alike.”429  
While Latour never tires of ridiculing Heidegger’s technophobia and privileging 
of pre-modern objects and tools (justifiably so, I would add), he also reiterates his own 
version of Heideggerian nostalgia in relation to the contemporary world of networked 
technologies. For one, Heidegger’s famous account of the breakdown of equipment in 
Sein und Zeit (the moment in which the functioning object becomes conspicuous in its 
thingliness), occupies a privileged position in Latour’s account of political collectives of 
humans and nonhumans. For Latour, collectives come into being most prominently with 
the breakdown or catastrophic destruction of technology.430 The latent nostalgia behind 
Latour’s cynicism about technology’s potential for breakdown and destruction also 
extends to his conception of the “nonmodern.” Attacking the alleged rationality of the 
“modern constitution” in We Have Never Been Modern, he writes: “We too are afraid that 
the sky is falling. We too associate the tiny gesture of releasing an aerosol spray with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
428 Quoted here, Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999), p. 304. 
 
429 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern [1991], trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard UP, 1993), p. 65. 
 
430 In Latour’s account of collectives and parliamentary gatherings, it matters little whether the 
technological crisis is real or invented. In his opening essay for the 2005 exhibition Making 
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taboos pertaining to the heavens.”431 In his overarching meta-critique of modernity’s 
professed separation of subject and object, nature and culture, Latour thus presents a 
picture of continuity between the structures of “primitive” magic and those of the 
contemporary, scientific world. Latour’s conception of the nonmodern is doubly 
nostalgic, I would argue: it hides a desired return to premodern magic and wholeness 
behind a cynical embrace of modern, technological breakdown. 
Having located the allegedly disowned animism of the modern mind, Latour also 
draws explicitly on Heidegger’s 1950 conception of the “Ding” as a “Versammlung” (of 
earth, sky, divinities, and mortals) and has gone about identifying all manner of “things” 
(like the hole in the ozone layer, for example) as irreducible, social gatherings of natural 
phenomena, technologies, human activities, beliefs, and representations. In its more 
popularized versions, Latour’s anthropology of the nonmodern has come to resemble the 
return of a happy animism or vitalism in the late Anthropocene. With various, 
contemporary writers arguing for an “equal footing” of humans and nonhumans in social 
relations, these popularized Latourian visions are often presented in such an affirmative 
and unreflective manner that they might eagerly adopt Hans Richter’s above statement 
about “people and objects in a space of friendly and mutual respect,” without any of the 
requisite irony.432 In the present age of diffuse violence and irrational beliefs, stark 
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inequality, globally linked markets, nonstop digital media, and ecological collapse, a 
more skeptical reading of Latour helps to identify the real structure and purpose of his 
seemingly happy notions of the “collective” or “parliament of things.” They are, in short, 
institutional models for the crisis management of a perpetually endangered world. 
More recently, politically- and technologically-informed critics like Alexander 
Galloway have ventured direct attacks on the affirmative nature of much current 
philosophizing about objects and things. Drawing structural parallels between computer 
networks and “object-oriented” programming languages, on the one hand, and the 
ontological and relational accounts of things in recent theory, Galloway argues that 
Latour and associates merely hold up an uncritical mirror to the logic and infrastructure 
of contemporary cybercapitalism.433 While these “realist” philosophies and social 
theories might succeed in descriptively tracing out the networked social interactions 
among humans and nonhumans, they deliberately avoid any critical investment in 
analyzing structures of inequality, power, control, and ideology.434 The retrograde, 
affirmative politics of Latour and others is perhaps obvious to any reader informed by the 
broad twentieth-century tradition of critical theory. But given the surprising currency and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
most prolific popularizer is Graham Harman, whose numerous books and online writings draw on 
both Latour and Heidegger in order to forward a vision of “speculative realism” or “object-
oriented” philosophy aimed at providing a phenomenological account of how objects interact. 
See, for example, his recent book, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics 
(Melbourne: re.press, 2009). 
 
433 See Alexander R. Galloway, “The Poverty of Philosophy: Realism and Post-Fordism,” Critical 
Inquiry 39 (Winter 2013): pp. 347–66. 
 
434 For his perhaps most polemical statement against critique, see Bruno Latour, “Why Has 
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proliferation of these affirmative, theoretical attitudes it is encouraging to find critics 
willing to address the problems head-on. 
Far closer to the aesthetic concerns of the present dissertation are Galloway’s 
related discussions about the need for new poetic and representational strategies to 
properly understand today’s complex networks of information and data, as well as the 
diffusion of power and control throughout these networked technologies. Posing the 
important question of how to represent complex technological systems, Galloway points 
out that the intricate structures of distributed networks seem to elude meaningful forms of 
visualization.435 While Latour makes concepts of “mediation” and “representation” 
central to his social theory, these terms are used rather in reference to mediating and 
representational objects considered as discrete agents within social networks. Galloway, 
by contrast, still considers representation according to an older model that maintains clear 
distinctions between subject and object, image and world, representation and reality. In 
these more traditional terms, a poetics or representational aesthetics still exists as a 
meaningful mediation between a complex, external reality and subjective experience and 
understanding. While Latour seeks only to descriptively trace out complex networks, 
Galloway is interested in the ways that they might be aesthetically represented in order to 
bring their functions and effects back into the realm of intuitive human understanding and 
meaning.  
My small contribution to these contemporary debates is simply to suggest the 
continuing importance of what I term “animistic fictions,” as a productive, aesthetic 
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strategy for making human sense out of complex things. While Galloway stresses the 
current difficulties of visually representing complex informational and military networks, 
there are in fact important forerunners for such aesthetic representations in the postwar 
literary arts. One thinks here, in particular, of the encyclopedic novels of Thomas 
Pynchon, whose Gravity’s Rainbow (1973), for example, presents a sophisticated 
narrative account of the “new living arrangements” of technological media and weapons, 
synthetic materials, molecules, codes, and information, emerging out of the technological 
struggles of World War II.436 Central to all of Pynchon’s major novels is the fictional 
representation of technological objects as if they were possessed of their own agency or 
autonomous life. Rather than being considered merely fanciful figments of a literary 
imagination, Pynchon’s animistic representations of technology have provided important 
insights into the human consequences of technological developments as well as in the 
development of postwar media theory––the work of Friedrich Kittler, most notably.437   
Beyond Pynchon, one might also point to examples of “animistic fictions” in the 
writings of Don DeLillo. The first-person narrator of his 1997 novel Underworld 
explicitly compares the animistic thinking of children to a positive ability of consciously 
connecting oneself, “to the things that slip through the world otherwise unperceived,” 
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437 For an early example of this influence, see Friedrich Kittler, “Medien und Drogen in Pynchons 
Zweitem Weltkrieg,” in Narrativität in den Medien, ed. Rolf Kloepfer and Karl-Dietmar Möller 
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humanist understanding of media and technology would be a productive strategy for challenging 
and revising the more questionable aspects of Kittler’s anti-humanist and deterministic media 
theory. 
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providing examples like the material flows of household garbage, the “linked grids” of 
electronic media, and the shifting structures of corporations and world markets. The lost 
omnipotence of thought of the narrator’s young son––his childhood belief “that he could 
look at a plane in flight and make it explode in midair by simply thinking it”––is rendered 
in DeLillo’s novel as, “the paradoxical gift for being separate and alone and yet 
intimately connected, mind-wired to distant things.”438 Presenting a striking, structural 
similarity with much of my analysis of “animistic fictions” in modernist German-
language literature, this highly ambivalent and open-ended account of simultaneous 
detachment and interconnection in relation to things is framed in DeLillo’s novel as a 
productive strategy for imaginatively situating oneself within a complex and threatening 
world, in which animated networks and systems seem to operate beyond the access of 
human understanding and control. 
Although there exist certain resemblances between these postwar literary 
examples and the function of animation and animism in German modernist fictions, it 
must also be said that such a reading of Pynchon or DeLillo would have to be situated in 
relation to a very different set of historical, economic, political, epistemic, and media-
technological conditions. As these brief examples suggest, however, the possible legacy 
of modernism’s “animistic fictions” lies less in current versions of post-humanist social 
theory like Latour’s, but rather in the complex, fictional representations of postwar 
literature. In the cases of both Pynchon and DeLillo, the anxiety or paranoia brought on 
by the thought of systems, networks, and technologies possessed of a “life” external and 
autonomous to human control coincides with a more productive dimension to such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Don DeLillo, Underworld (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), quoted above, pp. 88–89. 
	  
	   303	  
animistic thinking: the ability to develop a more intuitive, human understanding and 
awareness of the diffuse power and effects of one’s nonhuman environment. This is not 
to say that external objects are in themselves possessed of an animated “life” or 
“agency,” but rather that the fictional rendering of such a nonhuman life can bring the 
usually unnoticed workings of things back into human perspective and consideration. 
While, in the early twentieth century, this function of fictional animism developed at the 
intersections of urban experience, cinema, and the fragmentary texts of modernist poetry 
and prose, it would have to be substantially rethought in relation to the cybernetic 
paradigms and massive, encyclopedic novels of the postwar period.  
Aside from these more mental structures of animistic thinking, the dissertation’s 
focus on animation in film and literary aesthetics poses another possible horizon for 
exploring animistic fictions into the postwar period. The close interrelationship between 
poetry and avant-garde film, particularly in the postwar United States, presents many 
possibilities for analyzing the different functions of verbal and visual media in the 
artificial production of animistic experience. Here, I would cite as a prime example the 
productive exchange between the poet Charles Olson and filmmaker Stan Brakhage.    
Olson’s anthropologically informed poetics make animation a central feature in both the 
form and content of literary representation, focusing not only on the “kinetics of the 
thing” represented, but also on an aesthetic collapsing of distinctions between the human 
subject and material object through the physiological act of poetic breath (anima).439 In 
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Directions, 1967), pp. 15–26, quoted here, p. 16. See, in particular, pp. 20–21: “Because breath 
allows all the speech-force of language back in [...], because, now, a poem has, by speech, 
	  
	   304	  
his 1963 book Metaphors on Vision, Brakhage directly quotes Olson’s statements on 
poetics as a perfect description of the “working processes” involved in his filmmaking: 
“ONE PERCEPTION MUST IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY LEAD TO A 
FURTHER PERCEPTION.”440 This sense of an animated presence of perception in 
cinema would be explored both in Brakhage’s handmade abstract films as well as in the 
embodied movements represented through his dynamic use of hand-held cameras. 
Reflecting back on the broader developments of postwar avant-garde film in the mid 
1990s, Brakhage would privilege this “constant present-tense” of cinematic movement 
for its ability to externally reproduce the embodied movements or “dance” of the 
cameraperson in reaction to material objects, “which one would aesthetically separate 
oneself from and directly incorporate.”441 Beyond his own films, Brakhage cites the work 
of Marie Menken, in particular, as exemplifying this sense of cinematic aesthetics, and 
one might think here, as well, of other avant-garde filmmakers like Maya Deren, who 
made the interaction between embodied movement and material objects central to her 
cinematic representations. This, in Brakhage’s rendering, was the meaning of William 
Carlos Williams’s modernist poetic dictum, “No ideas but in things.”442             
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the absolute difference of the reality of verse from that other dispersed and distributed thing, yet 
each of these elements of a poem can be allowed to have the play of their separate energies.” 
   
440 See this quotation of Olson’s “Projective Verse,” in Stan Brakhage, “Margin Alien,” in 
Metaphors on Vision, ed. P. Adams Sitney (Film Culture, 1963), reprinted in Essential Brakhage: 
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441 See Stan Brakhage, “Inspirations” [1996], in Essential Brakhage, pp. 208–11, quoted here, pp. 
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While the cinematic and literary production of postwar Germany and Austria 
poses far less continuity with the complex, aesthetic animation of things found in the 
modernist decades of the early twentieth century, the work of Richter, Rilke, and Kafka 
analyzed in this dissertation have found considerable resonances in the broader, 
international culture of the postwar period. An enthusiastic reception and influence of 
1920s European avant-garde cinema in postwar London and the U.S. developed 
alongside Richter’s emigration and tenure as instructor and later director of the Institute 
of Film Techniques at the City College of New York during the 1940s and 50s. Rilke, 
beyond his ongoing popular reputation as a comforting “poet of things,” has found far 
more significant reverberations in postwar literary production. In Pynchon’s Gravity’s 
Rainbow, to stick to my previous example, Rilke’s privileging of the momentary 
experience and eternal preservation of things appears in caustic contrast to the cyclical, 
technological destruction and mass murder of WWII.443 For Kafka’s part, his animated 
Odradek continues to crop up in all manner of contexts––whether in visual or literary 
representations, popular culture or theoretical writings––and, in its uncanny afterlife, the 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
443 References to Rilke appear throughout Pynchon’s novel. See here, in particular, the 
comparison between the Teutonic romanticism of Rilke’s vision of a singular death (“Ein Mal / 
jedes, nur ein Mal”) found in the ninth of his Duineser Elegien and the looped molecular structure 
of the chemical compound benzene related to both capitalistic cycles of technological exploitation 
of nature as well as IG Farben’s chemical involvement in the repeated, systematic mass-murders 
of the Holocaust (Gravity’s Rainbow, p. 413). 
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